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Much has been written about representations of kingship and regnal au-
thority in the French vernacular chronicles popularly known as Les 
grandes chroniques de France, first composed at the Benedictine abbey 
of Saint-Denis in 1274 by the monk Primat. However, historians have 
ignored the fact that Primat intended his work to be a miroir for the 
princes—a didactic guidebook from which cadets of the Capetian royal 
family of France could learn good governance and morality. This study 
intends to correct this oversight by analysing the ways in which the 
chroniclers Guillaume de Nangis, Richard Lescot, Pierre d’Orgemont, 
Jean Juvénal des Ursins, and Jean Chartier constructed moral character 
arcs for many of the members of the Capetian family in their continua-
tions to Primat’s text. This thesis is organised into case studies that fol-
low the storylines of various cadets from their introduction in the 
narrative to their departure. Each cadet is analysed in isolation to deter-
mine how the continuators portrayed them and what moral themes their 
depictions supported, if any. Together, these cases prove that the chron-
iclers carefully crafted their narratives to serve as miroirs, but also that 
their overarching goals shifted in response to the growing political cri-
ses caused by the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) and the Armagnac-
Burgundian civil war (1405-1435). Where at first the chroniclers of the 
thirteenth century advocated many forms of Capetian dynasticism—the 
promotion of dynastic governance—by the fifteenth century, only 
forms of dynasticism that directly enhanced the authority of the kings 
of France were promoted by the continuators. The revelation that there 
is a conscious redirection of the narrative suggests a shifting awareness 
of the relationship between king and dynasty within late medieval 
French society. It also suggests that other contemporary chronicles 
likely functioned as miroirs and may require reassessment to verify 
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CHAPTER ONE  
Introduction: The Dionysian Vernacular Tradition 
 
Blanche was all alone. Her husband, Fernando de la Cerda, heir to the kingdom of Castile, 
died in 1275 and her father-in-law, Alfonso X of Castile, had withdrawn his support for her 
sons’ claims to the Castilian throne.1 Because of this, ‘Blanche, their mother, was not given 
her rent nor dower nor anything on which she could live. The good woman remained troubled 
and lost among the Spanish, who barely noticed her’.2 Had she been simply a Spanish noble-
woman, Blanche would have probably disappeared into obscurity, her story deemed unim-
portant to the history of thirteenth-century Europe. But Blanche was not just anybody: she 
was a lily of France, the daughter of King Louis IX, and her brother Philippe was not amused. 
Philippe III reigned during the most peaceful period of French history since Hugues 
Capet had seized the West Frankish throne in 987. Indeed, by the late-thirteenth century, de-
scendants of Hugues—the Capetians—sat on virtually every throne in western Europe, a 
product of the wide net the dynasty had cast as it solidified its position in France over the pre-
vious three centuries. The monks at the Benedictine abbey of Saint-Denis near Paris were well 
aware of the important position the Capetian dynasty held in Europe. Their French-language 
chronicles, begun in 1274, are littered with hundreds of passages about the activities of Cape-
tian kings, cadets, and their close relatives. Taken separately, most of these episodes appear as 
simple historical accounts or short biographical summaries. When considered together, how-
ever, they demonstrate far more than a passing knowledge by literate monks of important 
events and people—they constitute fully-realised stories and serve as examples from which 
readers could learn morality, good governance, and what it meant to be a Capetian prince. The 
first Dionysian vernacular chronicler, Primat, explains in his prologue that his text is com-
posed of ‘examples for leading a good life, both for kings and princes who have lands to gov-
ern…that this history is a mirror of life’.3 Thus, the vernacular chronicles produced at Saint-
                                               
1 See generally Charles-Victor Langlois, Histoire de France depuis les origins jusqu’à la revolution—
vol. 3, part 2: Saint Louis, Philippe le Bel, les derniers Capétiens directs (1226-1328) (Paris: Libraire Hachette, 
1901; reprint, Paris: Librairie Jules Tallandier, 1978), 114. 
2 ‘…Blanche leur mere il n’en donna rente ne douaire, ne autre chose dont elle peust vivre. La bonne 
dame demoura toute esbahie et toute esgarée entre les Espaignolz qui guéres ne l’avoient chiere’.  Les Grandes 
Chroniques de France, vol. 8, Société de l’histoire de France, ed. Jules Marie Édouard Viard (Paris: Librairie 
Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1934), 55. See Gesta Philippi Tertii Francorum Regis, in Receuil des historiens 
des Gaules et de la France, vol. 20, Pierre Daunou and Joseph Naudet, eds. (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1840), 
498. 
3 ‘…ce est examples de bonne vie mener, meismement aus rois et aus princes qui ont terres à governer; 
car I vaillans mestres dit que ceste estoire est miroers de vie’. Les Grandes Chroniques de France, Société de 
l’histoire de France, vol. 1, ed. Jules Marie Édouard Viard (Paris: Société de l’histoire de France, 1920), 3. 
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Denis were intended by their initiator to function as miroirs des princes, a medieval prose lit-
erary genre of instructive manuals given to members of royal families and the upper nobility 
to prepare them for a life of leadership.4 But stating this intention is not the same as following 
through. Traditionally, chronicles are not considered miroirs by most historians since they are 
not overt about their messages and do not appear, at least on the surface, to instruct ‘kings and 
lesser rulers about the virtues they should cultivate, their lifestyle, their duties, the philosophi-
cal and theological meaning of their office’.5 Although he hints that narrative sources were 
sometimes considered miroirs by their authors, Robert Lambertini does not name a single 
chronicle in his entry on the subject in the Encyclopedia of the Medieval Philosophy.6 Mean-
while, Einar Már Jónsson’s categorisation of the different types of miroirs overlooks chroni-
cles entirely.7 Even Jean-Philippe Genet’s study on the evolution of the genre only hints at the 
idea that chronicles could serve as miroirs, naming two early Dionysian texts before turning 
away from the concept.8 This study seeks to challenge this preconception and determine 
whether the continuations to Primat’s vernacular chronicle reflect an overt desire by the au-
thors to advance didactic messages to their readers. 
A moral undertone certainly emanates from the story of Blanche and her sons. The Di-
onysian chronicler shows that the mistreatment of Blanche and disinheritance of her children 
enraged Philippe, who ‘demanded that [Alfonso] ensure that the dower of his sister Blanche 
was not taken nor otherwise barred from her, and that the right that his nephews ought to have 
to the kingdom of Castile was protected’.9 Alfonso did not appreciate being told what to do by 
his neighbour in France, so Philippe’s agents covertly rescued Blanche instead.10 A chase en-
sued, during which other malcontents joined the fleeing French, but the chronicler reminds the 
reader that their defections were justified since Alfonso ‘had perjured himself and that he had 
made a false oath’.11 Moral lessons such as these are commonplace throughout the vernacular 
                                               
4 Roberto Lambertini, ‘Mirrors for Princes’, in Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy Be-
tween 500 and 1500, Springer Reference, ed. Henrik Lagerlund (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 792. 
5 Lambertini, 792. 
6 Lambertini, 791-797. 
7 Einar Már Jónsson, ‘Les “miroirs aux princes” sont-ils un genre littéraire?’, Médiévales: Langues, 
Textes, Histoire 51 (2007): 1-11. 
8 Jean-Philippe Genet, ‘L’évolution du genre des Miroirs des princes en Occident au Moyen Âge’, in 
Religion et mentalités au Moyen Âge: Mélanges en l’honneur d’Hervé Martin, Collection ‘Histoire’, eds. Sophie 
Cassagnes-Brouquet, Amaury Chauou, Daniel Pichot, and Lionel Rousselot (Rennes: Presses universitaires, 
2003), 531-541, esp. 536-537. 
9 ‘…li manda qu’il gardast bien que le douaire sa seur Blanche ne fust par li ne par autre empeeschié, et 
que le droit que ses neveus devoient avoir ou royaume de Castelle leur fust gardé’. GCF, VIII:56. See GPT, 498. 
10 Theresa M. Vann, ‘Alfonso de la Cerda’, in Medieval Iberia: An Encyclopedia, Routledge Revivals, 
ed. E. Michael Gerli (New York: Routledge, 2003), 50, clarifies that Blanche and her sons sought refuge in 
Aragón, but that Alfonso III of Aragón did not let them leave until 1284. 
11 ‘…comme cil qui estoit parjure et qu’il avoit faussé son convenant’. GCF, VIII:57. This sentiment 
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narratives and clearly show an intent to inform and educate the reader. Following Blanche’s 
rescue, Philippe again threatened the Castilian king, warning that ‘he would overrun his land 
and that he would take vengeance’ if the king did not restore the rights of his sister and neph-
ews.12 But Alfonso ‘responded by words of pride and vanity and he said that he would do 
nothing whatsoever that the king of France asked of him’.13 Thus, the chronicler attributes 
cardinal sins to the Castilian monarch, thereby justifying on moral grounds Philippe’s re-
peated incursions into Castile in 1276, 1280, and 1285.14 Alfonso acts the part of a villain and 
Philippe is framed as the hero who is forced to break the peace of the realm in order to uphold 
the birthright of his nephews. 
Crafting roles and archetypes for individuals found within the vernacular continua-
tions was a technique adopted frequently by the Dionysian authors, especially in relation to 
Capetian cadets. Doing so allowed for narrative continuity between disparate passages and 
mental comparisons between different but similar individuals. Indeed, Gabrielle Spiegel ar-
gues that ‘the chronicles of Saint-Denis stand as true documenta for a study of the “mental 
context” in which the French state existed, developed, and achieved legitimacy’.15 If this is 
true, then uncovering how these chronicles functioned and were understood by their audience 
is essential to decoding the mindset of the late medieval French aristocracy.16 Andrew Lewis 
suggests further that 
the image projected by [these chronicles] was not mere hagiography; it was 
drawn from the ideals of kingship and of Christian chivalry. Both ideals were 
shaped by the call to godly service, and they demanded blameless life of the 
individual. Both king and knight were to serve God in all that they did, to defend 
the church, promote justice, put down wrong-doing, protect the poor; piety, ob-
servance of good faith, avoidance of all sin were required of them…. The shared 
traits of the royal and chivalric ideals suggest a community of values giving sub-
stance and context to the royalist expressions.17 
                                               
originates in the vernacular. 
12 ‘…il li mandoit bien qu’il courroit sus sa terre et qu’il en prendroit vengance’. GCF, VIII:65. 
13 ‘…il respondi paroles d’orgueil et de boban, et dist qu’il n’en feroit riens de quanque le roy de France 
li mandoit’. GCF, VIII:65. 
14 GCF, VIII:66-67, 79-81, 103, 118. See generally Charles-Victor Langlois, Le règne de Philippe III le 
Hardi (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1887), 99-101, 115, 135, 352. 
15 Gabrielle M. Spiegel, The Chronicle Tradition of Saint-Denis: A Survey, Medieval Classics: Texts 
and Studies 10, Classical Folia Editions (Wetteren, Belgium: Brookline, Mass. and Leyden, 1978), 131. 
16 It remains unknown who specifically read or used the Dionysian vernacular chronicles. Discussing 
medieval literary audiences in general, Joachim Bumke, Courtly Culture: Literature and Society in the High 
Middle Ages, trans. Thomas Dunlap (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 508-509, notes that 
‘only a small number of people could have participated continuously in the literary life of the courts: the princely 
patron himself and his family, the court clergy, the holders of the chief court offices with their wives, the closest 
advisors to the prince from the local nobility—altogether surely not more than twenty to twenty-five people.... 
[O]ur understanding of literature in the Middle Ages involves categories different from the modern method of 
literary interpretation, which seeks to comprehend a work of art “in its entirety”’. 
17 Andrew W. Lewis, Royal Succession in Capetian France: Studies on Familial Order and the State, 
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If such a ‘community of values’ existed in late medieval France, it seems likely that chroni-
clers of royal history would have integrated expressions of it into their works.18 And there is 
no more fulfilling or flattering way to accomplish this task than to use members of the royal 
family itself as the primary examples for all that Lewis describes. Joachim Bumke explains 
that ‘consideration of the intended audience must have played an important role even during 
the composing of the work, so that the creative process could almost be seen as a continuing 
dialogue between the author and his audience. In this way, the listeners were drawn into the 
work itself—they became participants’.19 Therefore, it is likely that most of the moralising 
found in the vernacular continuations shows itself in the activities of the Capetian family 
since they are both the subjects and the audience of these texts, and it is through analysing 
their portrayals that the mentality of the Capetian royal family—or at least the Dionysian per-
ception of that mentality—may be revealed. 
Even when didactic messages are relatively clear in the narrative, they can shift or be-
come muddled under different authors or due to changing circumstances. A decade after 
Philippe III’s death, Blanche’s children—the de la Cerda princes—took charge of their war 
for Castile personally. The chronicler makes sure to remind the reader that they were ‘sons of 
Blanche, daughter of the holy king Louis of France’—in other words, they were still family.20 
The death of their uncle Sancho IV in 1295 gave the princes an excuse to assert their claim 
since the late king’s children were illegitimate.21 However, this moral cause did not lead to 
victory and early successes in 1296 could not be sustained once their uncle and strongest sup-
porter, Juan, señor de Valencia de Campos, abandoned their cause in 1298.22 The final straw 
came in 1302, when the pope legitimated the sons of Sancho, depriving the princes of their 
moral purpose.23 From this point forward, the story of the de la Cerda family becomes a tale 
of dynastic decay within the vernacular narrative. Alfonso, a grandson of Fernando, is only 
called a ‘cousin of the king’ by the chronicler, but his death from fever while fighting for the 
                                               
Harvard Historical Studies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 130-131. 
18 Bumke, Courtly Culture, 518, clarifies that ‘[m]ost men and women of the nobility were incapable of 
reading a book. But even those who could read seem to have used this skill only infrequently, for courtly litera-
ture was a social event, and its purpose lay in creating and confirming a sense of community’. 
19 Bumke, Courtly Culture, 510. 
20 ‘Aufour et Ferrant, filz Blanche, fille du saint roy Loys de France…’. GCF, VIII:165. See Chronicon, 
in Receuil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, vol. 20, eds. Pierre Daunou and Joseph Naudet (Paris: Im-
primerie Royale, 1840), 577. See also Figure 2.1. 
21 GCF, VIII:165-166, 199. See generally Theresa M. Vann, ‘Infantes de la Cerda’, in Medieval Iberia: 
An Encyclopedia, Routledge Revivals, ed. E. Michael Gerli. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 427. 
22 GCF, VIII:165-166, 170-172. 
23 GCF, VIII:199. See generally Joseph F. O’Callaghan, ‘Fernando IV, King of Castile’, in Medieval 
Iberia: An Encyclopedia, Routledge Revivals, ed. E. Michael Gerli (New York: Routledge, 2003), 331. 
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French king in Gascony is noted and his interment is described shortly afterwards.24 A decade 
later, France and Castile finally agreed to a permanent peace between the two realms, in effect 
ending any remaining support the de la Cerda princes could expect from their Capetian rela-
tives.25 Since the pretensions of the de la Cerdas threatened domestic security, their overall 
importance to the dynastic narrative disappeared. The last prince of the line, Charles de la 
Cerda, was a close friend and confidant of Jean II of France, eventually becoming constable 
of France and count of Angoulême, but his assassination by a rival in 1354 closes the book on 
the family within the Dionysian narrative.26 In their earlier passages, the de la Cerdas pre-
sented a moral struggle against a sinful antagonist who threatened the rights of relatives of the 
Capetian dynasty. This is something the Dionysian authors could rally behind. But once the 
princes’ cause lost its moral focus and, more importantly, directly threatened French diplo-
macy, the chroniclers turned away from it. 
The story of the de la Cerda family reflects a dualism found within the Dionysian ver-
nacular continuations between the promotion of Capetian dynasticism and the advocation of 
regnal authority. Dynasticism, as the term is used throughout this study, refers to the ways in 
which the chroniclers promoted dynastic governance and favoured narratives that highlighted 
specific Capetian cadets and cadet lines. The focus on dynasticism is strong throughout the 
Roman des rois and its first two continuations but then begins to fade beginning in the 1370s, 
when the life and activities of Charles V overshadow those of his relatives within the chroni-
cles. This emphasis on dynasticism in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries reflects contem-
porary perceptions of societal hierarchies and the relative autonomy of territorial units within 
France.27 Throughout this period, the king had titular authority over his nobility, but it was  
                                               
24 GCF, IX:61, 64. Henri-François Delaborde, ‘Un arrière petit-fils de Saint Louis: Alfonse d’Espagne’, 
in Mélanges Julien Havet: Recueil de travaux d’érudition dédiés a la mémoire de Julien Havet (1853-1893), ed. 
Ernest Leroux (Paris, 1895), 414-417. 
25 Les Grandes Chroniques de France, Société de l’histoire de France, vol. 9, ed. Jules Marie Édouard 
Viard (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1937), 158. Vann, ‘Alfonso’, 50, notes that Alfonso ‘re-
nounced his claims in 1331, when he took an oath of fealty to Alfonso XI of Castile and received several lord-
ships in return’. 
26 Les Grandes Chroniques de France: Chronique des règnes de Jean II et de Charles V, ed. Roland 
Delachenal (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1910-1920), I:30-31, 33, 37-38. See generally Jonathan Sumption, The 
Hundred Years War, vol. II: Trial by Fire (London: Faber and Faber, 1999), 70, 72, 124. 
27 Herbert H. Rowen, The King’s State: Proprietary Dynasticism in Early Modern France (New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980), 16, explains that ‘[f]eudal dispersal of power was in itself hardly 
good for the kingship; feudalism happened to kings, they did not deliberately create it. But they accepted it as 
part of the conditions of the time…. The kingdom became the highest feudal tenure, held of God himself but of 
no human being; it was a lordship (seigneurie) like that of vassals and rear-vassals down to the holders of man-
ors, and therefore held as property…. The same limitations were placed upon the royal domain; although the 
king held these lands (and other rights) not as supreme overlord but in the same capacity as any vassal (that is, 
his revenues were received and his rights exercised not as king of France but as, say, duke of Aquitaine or count 
of Soissons), he could not alienate them any more than the crown itself’. 
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often imprecise, based on traditions, and openly ignored.28 From the 1370s, however, the Dio-
nysian chroniclers came to view regnal authority as a much more important facet of the king’s 
identity. Although they were wont to define regnal authority any more precisely than had their 
predecessors, their focus shifted away from narratives that promoted general dynasticism and 
moved toward specific examples of members of the Capetian dynasty serving the king.29 This 
change in focus reflected new perspectives on royal governance that were being developed 
throughout this period.30 Together, these two themes—dynasticism and regnal authority—and 
how focus on the former shifts to the latter within the Dionysian tradition only become obvi-
ous when the various continuations are analysed together. 
The Dionysian vernacular continuations that were sponsored or otherwise patronised 
by the royal family form a surprisingly consistent and continuous narrative despite being writ-
ten by multiple unaffiliated authors. Pasquier Bonhomme, a commercial printer in Paris, cer-
tainly considered this series of texts a single work when he compiled the first printed 
Chroniques de France in 1476.31 But the chroniclers themselves must have felt there was 
some continuity between the texts since they repeatedly copied and adapted earlier continua-
tions into their own recensions. Nonetheless, no historian has examined the continuations to-
gether as a unit nor discussed the narrative transition that occurs within these chronicles in the 
mid-fourteenth century when the primary aim of the texts shifts from promoting general Ca-
petian dynasticism to advocating strict regnal supremacy. Evidence for this transition is found 
throughout the chronicles and will be discussed in numerous examples throughout this thesis, 
but elements of it are also found in the de la Cerda story above. When the story begins, 
Philippe supports the cause of his nephews both diplomatically and militarily. Yet as their 
claim becomes less powerful, their contribution to the Capetian dynasty declines and their 
story is simplified within the chronicles. By the time Charles de la Cerda appears, he is an 
agent of the French king, not a pretender to the Castilian throne, and his reason for being in 
                                               
28 For a comparison of theoretical powers of the French king versus his actual powers prior to 1328, see 
Charles T. Wood, The French Apanages and the Capetian Monarchy 1224-1328, Harvard Historical Mono-
graphs 59 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), 81-134. 
29 For a full discussion of this transition, see Chapter 5. 
30 David Potter, A History of France, 1460-1560: The Emergence of a Nation State (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1995), 30, argues that ‘[b]y the fifteenth century, the king was also a “seigneur souverain” and in 
this sense the notion of sovereignty had already been worked out by the glossators of the thirteenth century. An 
ordonnance of 1304 had referred to the “plenitude de la puissance royale”. It was during the fourteenth and fif-
teenth centuries that the concept of sovereignty was disseminated in the course of speculation about the king’s 
legislative powers and how far the power to initiate legislation extended beyond that of the purely positive law’. 
31 Elizabeth Morrison and Anne D. Hedeman, eds., Imagining the Past in France: History in Manu-
script Painting: 1250-1500 (Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2010), 276. See also Chroniques de Saint-
Denis depuis les Troyens jusques à la mort de Charles VII, 3 vols., ed. Pasquier Bonhomme. Paris: Bonhomme, 
1476. 
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the story is not because of his eighty-year-old claim, but because he embodies King Jean’s 
regnal authority and his assassination initiates a challenge to that authority. In other words, 
the narrative has seamlessly transitioned and the moral role Charles plays within this new 
framework is as an innocent victim whose murder necessitates royal justice. 
As the de la Cerda case demonstrates, the didactic nature of these tales is not always 
apparent when they are viewed as separate passages. Primat knew that some messages would 
be clear and others less so, but his purpose remained the same: to provide examples for his au-
dience. He explains in his prologue that ‘[h]ere each can find good and bad, beauty and ugli-
ness, sensibility and folly, and derive his profit above all by the examples of history; and for 
all these things that one reads in this book, even if they are not all profitable, the majority can 
provide guidance [aidier]’.32 Supporting this approach, Anne Hedeman explains that miroirs 
in general ‘shared a royal audience and a content designed to teach a prince to govern with 
sound moral principles’, to which Bernard Guenée adds that Primat’s text ‘was first of all an 
extended lesson in ethics’.33 The genre developed under the Carolingians as a means to pro-
mote ideals of kingship, with authors generally relying on Biblical and Augustinian ideals.34 It 
witnessed a resurgence in various forms under the reign of Louis IX, but the chronicles pro-
duced at Saint-Denis notably divert from the norm of abject moralising found in other miroirs 
by adopting an impersonal narrative style that forces the reader to identify and interpret the 
lessons found in the texts.35 Later continuations muddy the narratives further by interjecting 
long primary source documents such as letters, treaties, and witness accounts—items inher-
ently juristic in nature that do not always enhance the moral undercurrent in the texts.36 But 
Pierre Courroux reminds readers that, in the Middle Ages, ‘history for the sake of history did 
not exist: it is only because a chronicle had an intelligibility with respect to the present that it 
                                               
32 ‘Ci pourra chascuns trover bien et mal, bel et lait, sens et folie, et fere son preu de tout par les exam-
ples de l’estoire; et de toutes ces choses que on lira en cest livre, se eles ne profitent toutes, toutevoies la plus 
grant partie en puet aidier’. GCF, I:3. This and the earlier quote from Primat derive from the Historia Regum 
Francorum, written in 1214. GCF, I:1n1; Bernard Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques de France: Le Roman aux 
roys (1274-1518)’, in Les lieux de mémoire II: La nation, Bibliothèque illustrée des histoires, ed. Pierre Nora 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1986), 191-192; Guenée, ‘L’historien et la compilation au XIIIe siècle’, Journal des savants 
(1985): 132-133. 
33 ‘Le roman de Primat est d’abord une longue leçon de morale’. Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 
192; Anne D. Hedeman, The Royal Image: Illustrations of the Grandes Chroniques de France, 1274-1422, Cali-
fornia Studies in the History of Art (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 15. 
34 Daisy Delogu, Theorizing the Ideal Sovereign: The Rise of the French Vernacular Royal Biography 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 9. 
35 Delogu, Theorizing, 10; Gabrielle M. Spiegel, Romancing the Past: The Rise of Vernacular Prose 
Historiography in Thirteenth-Century France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 220. 
36 Henri-François Delaborde, ‘La vraie Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis’, Bibliothèque de l’école 
des chartes 51 (1890): 108. 
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was read. The present casts a shadow over the past to better understand the future’.37 Modern 
readers have their own biases and filters through which they interpret medieval texts such as 
those from Saint-Denis, and identifying medieval lessons in ethics is neither an easy task nor 
foolproof. Nonetheless, drawing out some of these codes and lessons within the vernacular 
continuations is a primary goal of this study. 
The vernacular chronicles produced at Saint-Denis may appear on the surface as medi-
eval prose histories, but they also functioned as instructional manuals on rulership—miroirs 
des princes—or at least such was Primat’s desire. The first such chronicle was likely intended 
as a gift to Philippe III from his father, Louis IX, while the prince was still heir to the throne. 
Other chronicles from the same tradition also served as gifts and all continued to be infused 
with didactic messages and moral examples. Yet modern historians have not widely embraced 
this view. This study intends to restart the debate by analysing the portrayals and characterisa-
tions of Capetian cadets within a single series of continuations to Primat’s chronicle to deter-
mine whether and what moral messages lie beneath the surface. 
 
1.1 Historiography 
The textual material produced at the abbey of Saint-Denis did not live in a vacuum. 
The items there were but a few of hundreds of Latin and vernacular chronicles, chronicle 
rolls, religious treatises, polemics, and other instructive texts that circulated throughout 
France in the later Middle Ages. All of these documents hold one thing in common, though: 
their authors had an entirely different idea of what constituted truth when compared to modern 
historical conceptions. Dionysian chroniclers followed the pattern of other medieval writers 
and believed that previously written and oral sources collected at the abbey proved, by their 
very existence, the authenticity and credibility of their works.38 Primat explains this in his 
prologue, stating that ‘this history will be described according to the letter and the order of the 
chronicles of the abbey of Saint-Denis in France, where the histories and the deeds of all the 
kings are written’.39 Thus, abbey records validated the truth found in his chronicle. Guenée 
suggests that ‘the dream of a [medieval] French historian was to write a trustworthy history, 
                                               
37 ‘L’histoire pour l’histoire n’existe pas: ce n’est que parce qu’une chronique a une intelligibilité par 
rapport au présent qu’elle est lue. Le présent couvre de son ombre les temps anciens pour mieux y comprendre 
son avenir’. Pierre Courroux, L’Écriture de l’histoire dans les chroniques françaises (XIIe-XVe siècle), Histoire 
Culturelle 1 (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2011), 586. 
38 Hans-Werner Goetz, ‘The “Methodology” of Medieval Chroniclers’, in Chronicon: Medieval Narra-
tive Sources: A Chronological Guide with Introductory Essays, eds. János M. Bak and Ivan Jurković (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2013), 29; Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 191. 
39 ‘Si sera ceste hystoire descrite selon la lettre et l’ordenance des croniques de l’abaïe de Saint Denis en 
France, où les hystoires et li fait de touz les rois sont escrit…’. GCF, I:2. 
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that is to say a history that, by royal approbation, would be authenticated’, adding that, ‘once 
he had completed it, he…humbly submitted his work to the very Christian king “so that it 
might become, by the king’s sole authority, a public monument”’.40 While this sentiment may 
not have been universally true, especially for material not intended for a royal audience, it 
certainly was true in respect to vernacular chronicles commissioned by and for the Capetian 
dynasty.41 Jean Chartier, the last vernacular chronicler in this study, wrote in his prologue that 
‘I…have the intention to record in writing that which [the king] did in his time and during his 
reign, as truthfully as I can, and without showing any favour or partiality’.42 Despite a two-
hundred-years gap between them, both Primat and Chartier strove to produce reliable, 
authoritative texts, proving that these qualities were a bedrock of Dionysian scholarship. 
The beliefs that most chroniclers held regarding the truthfulness and reliability of their 
texts did not make their works any more factual. It must be emphasised that conceptions of 
historical truth based in the Middle Ages are incompatible with modern historical standards. 
Hans-Werner Goetz explains that  
[h]istory was considered as (constant) change as far as the progress of time and 
the development of kingdoms was concerned, but it was perceived under the 
same structural conditions. That is why past events could easily be compared 
with features of the present and the present could be judged by their past prece-
dents. This includes a typological approach, by regarding a historical person or 
fact as a ‘type’, that is, a precursor of a present and future realization.43 
The implications of Goetz’s argument are troubling for modern historians. If most chroniclers 
could not differentiate between past and present institutions and mentalities or envision a dif-
ferent future, then they could only impose their present conceptions of reality upon the subject 
matter in their writings. This explains why archetypes and moral messages are so widespread 
within chronicles—they are a direct product of the moralistic mental context of their writers. 
This also means historical statements made in these texts may not necessarily be factually 
true. But this did not matter to the medieval reader nor should it trouble the modern historian. 
                                               
40 ‘Le rêve d’un historien français était d’écrire une histoire digne de foi, c’est-à-dire une histoire que 
l’approbation royale rendrait authentique…. Lorsqu’il l’eut achevée…soumettait humblement son œuvre au roi 
très chrétien “pour qu’elle devînt, alors seulement, par l’autorité du roi, un monument public”’. Guenée, ‘Les 
Grandes Chroniques’, 191. See also Spiegel, Romancing, 218-219. 
41 Recensions of Primat’s chronicle were only owned by a small fraction of the French nobility and saw 
virtually no dispersion out of northern France or into the clerical, merchant, and peasant classes. The diffusion of 
the text was largely isolated to courts closely related to the Capetian dynasty genealogically, such as those of 
England and Flanders. Guenée, Histoire et culture historique dans l’occident medieval, Collection historique 
(Paris: Aubier, 1980), 289, 312. 
42 ‘…je, cronicqueur dessus nommé, ay intencion de rédiger par escript ce qu’il se fera son temps et 
règne durant, le plus véritablement que je pourray, et sans porter faveur à aucun, ne parcialité’. Jean Chartier, 
Chronique de Charles VII, roi de France, new ed., ed. Auguste Vallet de Viriville (Paris: P. Jannet, 1858), I:27. 
43 Goetz, 30. 
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The struggle to reconcile this ‘belief that history should be true with the obvious fic-
tionality of so many’ texts has made the study of chronicles a contentious topic.44 In regard to 
French chronicles, historians of the 1830s were the first to begin seriously studying medieval 
texts, although their primary concern was centred on their usability and reliability as sources 
of historical fact. Because of this, vernacular chronicles, which are overwhelmingly derived 
from Latin sources, were discounted, if not wholly ignored. Exemplifying this attitude, Paulin 
Paris, an early editor of Dionysian vernacular chronicles, dismissively notes that ‘the true 
chronicles of Saint-Denis were without exception those compositions written in Latin’.45 In-
deed, his introductions to the first two volumes of his critical edition focus almost exclusively 
on the Latin origins of his vernacular subject matter. Similarly, Auguste Vallet de Viriville, 
who edited Chartier’s chronicle, includes an annotated bibliography of the various manu-
scripts and print editions of the chronicle and a detailed look at the sources Chartier likely em-
ployed in writing his work.46 In both instances, the editors failed to analyse the chronicles for 
differences between the Latin and French texts or address why such differences occur. 
This generally negative attitude toward especially vernacular chronicles became more 
pronounced at the turn of the nineteenth century as structural theorists such as Leopold von 
Ranke came to distrust chronicle sources since they felt the perspectives of the authors im-
peded the modern historian’s access to truth.47 Historians of this period felt a need to ‘strip 
away rhetorical amplifications and legendary accretions, and to try to control for obvious par-
tisanship and bias’.48 For example, Jules Viard, another editor of Dionysian vernacular texts, 
appends long introductions to almost every volume of his critical edition, outlining precisely 
which sources the chroniclers used when preparing their texts, which specific manuscripts 
were probably consulted, and the likely reasons why the author used those specific 
documents.49 Likewise, Roland Delachenal opens the third volume of his own edition by de-
scribing the manuscript history of his source, the process of writing, authorial intent, and even 
the writing quality of the chronicler.50 In addition, both editors include copious analytical 
                                               
44 Justin Lake, ‘Current Approaches to Medieval Historiography’, History Compass 13:3 (2015): 90. 
45 ‘Les véritables chroniques dites de Saint-Denis étoient toutes sans exception des compositions rédi-
gées en latin’. Paulin Paris, introduction to Les Grandes Chroniques de France, selon que elles sont conservées 
en l’église de Saint-Denis en France, ed. Paulin Paris (Paris: Techener, 1836-1838), I:xiii-xiv. 
46 See Auguste Vallet de Viriville, introduction to Chartier, I:v-xxviii. Cf. Charles Samaran, ‘La 
Chronique latine inédite de Jean Chartier (1422-1450) et les derniers livres du Religieux de Saint-Denis’, Biblio-
thèque de l’école des chartes, 87 (1926): 142-163. 
47 John Wyon Burrow, A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, Romances and Inquieries from Herod-
otus and Thucydides to the Twentieth Century (London, UK: Allen Lane, 2007), 463-464. 
48 Lake, 89. 
49 See Viard, introduction to GCF, I:vii-xxxii, VIII:i-xvi, IX:i-x. 
50 See Roland Delachenel, introduction to CRJC, III:i-xlvi. 
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footnotes and appendices from a plethora of critical editions and transcriptions produced over 
the previous century, much of which highlights alternative versions of passages found in simi-
lar texts. Despite these new developments, historical interest in medieval texts—especially 
vernacular chronicles—remained relatively static, although historians such as Henri-François 
Delaborde, Jean Lemoine, and Paul Viollet did begin examining the historiography of the var-
ious scriptoriums and identifying authors.51 Most historians remained focussed on Latin 
sources and their verifiability. With such limitations, it was impossible for researchers to rec-
oncile their desire to uncover truth with the excessive hyperbole and blatant fabrication found 
throughout chronicle sources. 
As historians began to turn away from structuralist approaches following World War 
II, they became intrigued with the process of myth-making and the construction of political 
ideologies.52 Guenée notes the growing post-structuralist trend in 1964, writing that ‘the in-
ventory and study of myths, which grounded French political life at the end of the Middle 
Ages, is far from over’, and suggests that much of this myth-building was intentional and pro-
moted by the Capetian monarchy.53 Nonetheless, he also defends the older school of thought, 
emphasising that ‘the nature and action of the State is not simply caused by a mental context. 
It depends also on the social and economic context’.54 Indeed, historians of the 1960s began to 
blend many different fields of social science together, including cultural anthropology, ar-
chaeology, sociology, economics, ideological studies, and the study of emotions, using the 
scientific method to revolutionise social and historical enquiry.55 Fundamentally, historians in 
this period ‘wanted answers, crystalline conclusions, whether they came as numbers or  
prosaic certainties’.56 It is in this environment that one finds Spiegel’s ground-breaking The 
Chronicle Tradition of Saint-Denis, an inherently structuralist work which, nonetheless, be-
came the springboard for all future Dionysian studies.57 The 1960s were a rupture point  
                                               
51 See Delaborde, ‘Le vraie chronique’: 93-110; Jean Lemoine, ‘Richard Lescot: Un nouveau chroni-
queur et une nouvelle chronique de Saint-Denis (1268-1364)’, Comptes rendus des séances de l’Académie des 
Inscriptions et belle-lettres 4:23 (1895): 141-151; Paul Viollet, ‘Une Grande Chronique Latine de Saint-Denis: 
Observations pour servir à l’histoire critique des œuvres de Suger’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 34 
(1873): 241-254. 
52 Guenée, ‘L’histoire’, 349-350. 
53 ‘Mais l’inventaire et l’étude des mythes, qui ont marqué la vie politique française à la fin du Moyen 
Age, sont loin d’être achevés’. Guenée, ‘L’histoire’, 350. 
54 ‘La nature et l’action de l’État ne sont pas simplement conditionnées par un contexte mental. Elles 
dépendent aussi d’un contexte social et économique’. Guenée, ‘L’histoire’, 352. See also Andre Burguiere, ‘The 
Fate of the History of Mentalites in the Annales’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 24:3 (1982): 426-
427. 
55 Michael Bentley, Modern Historiography: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 1999), 137. 
56 Bentley, 137. 
57 See Spiegel, Chronicle Tradition. 
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between the older, traditional, structural approaches of the modern period and the more mixed 
approaches of the post-structural era. Both schools survive today and often exchange and bor-
row ideas, but historians of each view and use chronicles differently within their research. 
The primary difference between structuralism and post-structuralism relates to the ‘lin-
guistic turn’, a concept adopted for use in history by Hayden White in 1978. White argues that 
historical narratives are, at their core, ‘verbal fictions, the contents of which are as much in-
vented as found and the forms of which have more in common with their counterparts in liter-
ature than they have with those in the sciences’.58 Robert Levine, the English translator of 
some of Primat’s chronicle, states this too, arguing that ‘history in the Middle Ages…was a 
branch of rhetoric—that is, it was literature’.59 Because of these tendencies, White argues, ‘a 
historical narrative is not only a reproduction of the events reported in it, but also a complex 
of symbols which gives us directions for finding an icon of the structure of those events in our 
literary tradition’.60 In other words, chronicles such as those produced at Saint-Denis were de-
signed to be relatable to their readers and it is through iconography and archetypes that one 
can most easily relate. White explains further that ‘history was not, and could not be, a trans-
parent medium for the recounting of facts, but was instead a literary construct that made use 
of the same types of narrative forms as fiction’.61 For the Dionysian vernacular writers, that 
meant that the chronicler created ‘a horizontal frame unified by a fluid narrative, whereas the 
Latin chronicles which inspired it came from sources of a type that were more or less hetero-
geneous’.62 Courroux adds that Primat ‘did not hesitate to invent to reduce the inconsisten-
cies’.63 But vernacular chroniclers did not simply reduce inconsistencies, they compressed the 
narrative and enhanced its moral themes. It must be emphasised that this process ‘cannot be 
explained through questions of propaganda and ideology. These anachronistic words badly 
explain the medieval reality that it was more a question of examples and didactic messages’.64 
Justin Lake clarifies that the ‘use of writing to ensure that important events would be  
                                               
58 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1978), 81. 
59 Robert Levine, introduction to A Thirteenth-Century Life of Charlemagne, Garland Library of Medie-
val Literature, series B, vol. 80, trans. Robert Levine (New York: Garland, 1991), xi. 
60 White, 88. 
61 White, 83. See also Lake, 91. 
62 ‘Primat…crée dans son Roman des rois une trame horizontale unifiée par une narration fluide, là où 
les chroniques latines dont il s’inspire cumulent des sources de manière plus ou moins hétéroclite’. Courroux, 
685. 
63 ‘Il n’hésite pas à inventer pour réduire les incohérences’. Courroux, 685. 
64 ‘Les manipulations de l’histoire ne peuvent être résumés à des questions de propagande ou d’idéolo-
gie. Ces mots anachroniques couvrent mal une réalité médiévale où il est plus question d’exemplarité et de di-
dactique’. Courroux, 586. 
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remembered in a certain way…should be distinguished from more traditional “synchronic” 
propaganda, which only really became possible with the advent of mass media’.65 Thus, while 
the Dionysian chronicles and other medieval texts may often appear propagandistic to a mod-
ern reader, the urge to analyse them as such must be suppressed. Within the post-structuralist 
school, medieval chronicles should be viewed primarily as pieces of historical fiction with all 
of the accompanying traits, including unreliable narrators, character arcs, and moral messages. 
Among post-structural historians analysing medieval texts, three distinct approaches 
have emerged that all respond in different ways to this linguistic turn. The least related to this 
study is the method adopted by art historians such as Anne Hedeman, who critically analyse 
the visual imagery found in chronicles in order to discover the ways in which medieval people 
viewed and interpreted their world.66 Meanwhile, Guenée’s L’opinion publique à la fin du 
Moyen Âge d’après la Chronique de Charles VI du Religieux de Saint-Denis (Public Opinion 
at the End of the Middle Ages According to the Chronique de Charles VI by the Religieux of 
Saint-Denis) has set the standard for how a single medieval text can prompt a wide variety of 
interpretations using both structural and post-structural techniques.67 In contrast, Spiegel has 
moved away from the structural undertones of her first book to focus specifically on the ways 
in which the linguistic turn impacts the modern study of medieval texts and why late medieval 
authors began adopting the vernacular in their writings, two topics that have proven contro-
versial among structuralists and post-structuralists alike.68 These latter two authors dominate 
the field of Dionysian studies today, producing between them scores of articles, chapters, and 
books on the subject and advancing the field in many new directions. However, other histori-
ans have also contributed to recent scholarship. Lindy Grant uses Dionysian texts to explore 
conceptions of church and state during the twelfth century.69 Meanwhile, Chris Jones anal-
yses, among other things, medieval perceptions of France’s relationship with the rest of Eu-
rope, especially the Empire, balancing the Dionysian position with those of other scriptoriums 
in western Europe.70 And more narrowly, Marie-Thérèse de Medeiros has aggregated data 
                                               
65 Lake, 95. 
66 See Hedeman, Royal Image; and Morrison and Hedeman. 
67 See Bernard Guenée, L’opinion publique à la fin du Moyen Age d’après la “Chronique de Charles 
VI” du Religieux de Saint-Denis, L’histoire (Paris: Perrin, 2002); and Guenée, Un roi et son historien: Vingt 
études sur le règne de Charles VI et la Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis, Mémoires de l’Académie des in-
scriptions et belles-lettres, nouvelle série, vol. 18 (Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1999). 
68 See Gabrielle M. Spiegel, The Past as Text: The Theory and Practice of Medieval Historiography 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); and Spiegel, Romancing. 
69 Lindy Grant, Abbot Suger of St-Denis: Church and State in Early Twelfth-Century France (London: 
Longman, 1998). 
70 Chris Jones, Eclipse of Empire? Perceptions of the Western Empire and its Rulers in Late-Medieval 
France, Cursor Mundi 1 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007). 
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from various French chronicles to explore how different authors perceived the Jacquerie re-
volt in 1358.71 There are dozens more authors who have contributed to recent Dionysian and 
French chronicle research, many of whom are published in Saint-Denis et la Royauté.72 Re-
lated fields have also seen a recent awakening, with Maree Shirota and Thandi Parker examin-
ing within chronicle rolls ideas such as prophecy-fulfilment as a political tool and the role of 
women in genealogical narratives.73 Ultimately, the post-structuralist position regarding medi-
eval texts is that they ‘reflect a plurality of “truths”, not a single Authorized Version’.74 They 
cannot be used as corroborators of facts, but they can serve as sources of public opinion, ide-
ology, mythology, and mental context. 
Within the field of Dionysian studies, post-structuralism holds sway, but it is not un-
contested and older structuralist approaches still command respect. Outlining a facet of the 
latter perspective, Keith Busby explains that it is ‘undeniable that each manuscript possesses 
its own autonomy and must have constituted “the text” for its own readers or listeners in the 
Middle Ages, [but] the true individuality of a textual witness only emerges after detailed (and, 
some would say, tedious) comparison with all the other surviving copies’.75 He adds that the 
‘exclusive use of a single-manuscript text-edition or unthinking use of the critical edition fails 
to do justice to practically every person involved in the process of transmitting the text: in-
cluding the authors, scribes, artists, and planners’.76 Busby’s perspective reflects the thoughts 
of American structuralist historians Charles Haskins and Joseph Strayer, who, Michael Bent-
ley explains, largely used ‘history as the early nineteenth century did, as a vehicle for locating 
groups and peoples and giving them a past that suits their present or encourages their sense of 
a future’.77 Their model is grounded on the idea that institutional history, including the study 
of bureaucracies, judiciaries, records, taxes, and the military, is fundamental to understanding 
how the Capetians consolidated their power.78 It looks from the present backwards to investi-
gate the structural processes that ultimately created modern France. Prominent historians such 
                                               
71 Marie-Thérèse de Medeiros, Jacques et Chroniqueurs: Une étude comparée de récits contemporaines 
relatant la Jacquerie de 1358, Nouvelle Bibliothèque du Moyen Age 7 (Paris: Éditions Honoré Champion, 
1979). 
72 See François Autrand, Claude Gauvard, and Jean-Marie Moeglin, eds., Saint-Denis et la royauté: 
études offertes à Bernard Guenée (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999). 
73 Maree Shirota, ‘Unrolling History: Fifteenth-Century Political Culture and Perceptions on the Canter-
bury Roll’, MA thesis (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 2015); Thandi Parker, ‘A Woman’s Role: How 
Scribes Depicted Women on the Fifteenth-Century Canterbury Roll’, Comitatus 48 (2017): 95-115. 
74 Bentley, 143. 
75 Keith Busby, Codex and Context: Reading Old French Verse Narrative in Manuscript, vol. I, Etudes 
de langue et littérature françaises 221 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), 61. 
76 Busby, Codex, I:61. 
77 Bentley, 148. 
78 Sean L. Field and M. Cecilia Gaposchkin, ‘Questioning the Capetians, 1180-1328’, History Compass 
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as Sean Field and M. Cecilia Gaposchkin strongly support the Haskins-Strayer model, assert-
ing that ‘the basic narrative and analytic scaffolding constructed by [them] was ultimately re-
inforced rather than destabilized [by post-structural historians], precisely because these 
cultural approaches to representations and disseminations of power remained directly relevant 
to the underlying question of how identity and political community coalesced’.79 Thus, they 
credit post-structuralism with opening new avenues of structuralist enquiry. As evidence, they 
note the massive œuvre of Elizabeth A. R. Brown and John W. Baldwin, two structuralists 
who have spent five decades producing hundreds of documents that collectively analyse 
nearly every aspect of medieval Capetian history.80 It is undeniable that all French historians 
rely heavily on secondary material produced by structuralists. Likewise, most structuralists 
accept that ‘“Political” issues [related to royal ideologies, religious legitimacy, and truth 
claims about the king and kingdom] shade over into the realm of cultural history and evidence 
of art, rhetoric, literature, sculpture, and architecture’.81 These are the areas in which post-
structuralists excel. Indeed, there is much crossover between the two schools, but a fundamen-
tal difference remains. Spiegel explains that, ‘in treating documents as texts rather than 
sources’—a key feature of post-structuralism—‘it suggests the instability and opacity of all 
and any knowledge of the past, while at the same time…attacking the very foundations on 
which [structural] medievalists had constructed their professional legitimacy’.82 This may 
have been true in previous decades, but today most historians accept some subjectivity in their 
sources and adopt elements of both approaches into their research, proving that structuralism 
remains viable and respected among medievalists.83  
 This present study walks a precarious line between the two schools of historical 
thought. Its premise is based on an overtly post-structuralist statement made by Spiegel in The 
Past as Text, in which she explains that the chronicles at Saint-Denis have 
never been systematically exploited. Concerned with the chronicles as source ma-
terial for other studies, both nineteenth- and twentieth-century discussion of them 
has focused on the problem of verifying their historical accuracy or exposing 
                                               
12:7 (2014): 568. 
79 Field and Gaposchkin, 569. 
80 Field and Gaposchkin, 569. 
81 Field and Gaposchkin, 568. 
82 Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ‘In the Mirror’s Eye: The Writing of Medieval History in America’, in Imag-
ined Histories: American Historians Interpret the Past, ed. Anthony Malho and Gordon S. Wood (Princeton: 
University Press, 1998), 249. 
83 For examples of this blended approach, see Deborah Mauskopf-Deliyannis, Liber pontificalis Eccle-
siae Ravennatis, Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 199, 3 vols. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006); and 
Chris Given-Wilson, Chronicles: The Writing of History in Medieval England (London: Hambledon, 2004). For 
counterexamples, see William Chester Jordan and John Roland Seymour Phillips eds., The Capetian Century, 
1214 to 1314 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017). 
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known instances of distortion or downright fabrication. Indeed, it is only recently 
that medieval historiography in general has begun to be investigated as an intel-
lectual tradition that demands the same sympathetic attention to its underlying be-
liefs and techniques of expression accorded other genres produced by medieval 
intellectual life. And that effort has not yet extended to the chronicle tradition of 
Saint-Denis.84 
Despite a gap of nineteen years since she first published these observations, Spiegel remains 
correct in her sentiments regarding Dionysian studies. With the exception of Guenée’s L’opin-
ion publique, the chronicles at Saint-Denis have only been used as contributing parts of long-
format studies, not the sole source for them.85 Therefore, there is great potential for explora-
tion within the texts of the Dionysian tradition. But Spiegel also makes an oversight in her as-
sessment. By discounting the critical editions produced over the past two centuries, she 
seemingly ignores their potential usefulness, implying that only medieval manuscripts are im-
portant historical sources. This criticism discounts all the contributions made to the historiog-
raphy of the Dionysian tradition by editors such as Paris, Viard, Delachenal, and Vallet de 
Viriville. Yet, through their critical commentaries, extensive footnotes, and frequent compari-
sons to other manuscripts, these historians have taken the first step toward unlocking the ‘un-
derlying beliefs and techniques of expression’ that Spiegel claims they unsympathetically 
overlooked. On a practical level, medieval manuscripts do not provide the same attention to 
detail found within these critical editions. By writing their editions, the editors worked toward 
completing the arduous task of transcribing and critically comparing their source documents. 
They simply left the task of analysing, interpreting, and explaining the reasons behind the 
myriad contradictions, omissions, corrections, and selections made within the vernacular 
chronicles to future historians. The end result is that critical editions of all the Dionysian ver-
nacular texts, from Primat’s 1274 chronicle to Chartier’s 1461 continuation, are currently 
available for use and historians do not need to balance both codicological interpretation and 
textual analysis. This study will use these critical editions and commentaries as a basis from 
which to answer a fundamentally post-structuralist question regarding the presence of didactic 
messages in Dionysian vernacular texts. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
This study will focus specifically on the portrayals and characterisations of various 
Capetian cadets found within specific Dionysian vernacular continuations, which is a novel 
                                               
84 Spiegel, Past as Text, 84. 
85 Although, as noted above, dozens of journal articles and chapters exist analysing specific aspects of 
the Dionysian chronicles. 
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means of uncovering overt and subtle didactic messages within medieval documents. The rea-
son for using Dionysian texts rather than material produced at other scriptoriums is straight-
forward: Saint-Denis was the home of the royal mausoleum and the crown jewels. Members 
of the Capetian dynasty frequently patronised the abbey throughout the later Middle Ages, 
making the chronicles produced at Saint-Denis the most likely to favour royal narratives and 
use cadets as supporting characters. Similarly, the focus on only a specific series of vernacular 
chronicles hinges on the fact that some texts had more direct connections to the royal family 
than others. Primat’s text was the first vernacular chronicle linked to a Capetian king, alt-
hough similar chronicles had circulated among the French aristocracy since the early thir-
teenth century.86 Almost as soon as it was presented to Philippe III, the text was copied by 
scriptoriums across northern France and fell outside Dionysian control.87 While based largely 
on Dionysian documents, these editions, many of which were continued by their owners, can-
not be said to be direct products of abbey scholarship and often include non-Dionysian mate-
rial.88 Therefore, this thesis will focus on a single set of Dionysian vernacular continuations, 
specifically a series of texts commissioned or otherwise promoted by the royal family that to-
gether span the history of France from the death of Philippe II Auguste in 1223 to the death of 
Charles VII in 1461. Together, these continuations constitute the Chroniques de France as 
printed by Bonhomme in 1476, although whether they truly should be considered one contin-
uous narrative will be discussed at the conclusion of this study.89 
One constant theme in all these continuations is that the activities of the Capetian ca-
dets and other close family members frequently motivated and dominated the narratives. 
Typically, however, the activities and portrayals of kings are the focus of historians, leaving 
cadets as a noticeable void in chronicle-centred scholarship.90 Cadets fulfilled many important 
                                               
86 Keith Busby, ‘Vernacular Literature and the Writing of History in Medieval Francophonia’, in Imag-
ining the Past in France: History in Manuscript Painting: 1250-1500, eds. Elizabeth Morrison and Anne D. 
Hedeman (Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2010), 28; Jacques Le Goff, Saint Louis, Bibliothèque des His-
toires (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 96-97, 135-136; Spiegel, Romancing, 13, 272, 312; Spiegel, ‘The Textualization 
of the Past in Thirteenth-Century French Historical Writing’, in Imagining the Past, 45. 
87 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 208; Jones, Eclipse, 64, 87. 
88 François Avril, ‘Jean Fouquet illustrateur des Grandes Chroniques de France’, in Les Grandes 
Chroniques de France: Reproduction intégrale en fac-similé des miniatures de Fouquet. Manuscrit français 
6465 de la Bibliothèque nationale de Paris, ed. Philippe Lebaud (Paris, 1987), 43-44; Jones, Eclipse, 67; Spie-
gel, Chronicle Tradition, 121-122, 128-129. 
89 Bonhomme supplemented his Chroniques for the years 1403 to 1422 with an extract from the 
Chronique du roi Charles VII by the herald of Berry, Gilles le Bouvier, whose writings have no Dionysian origin 
but were associated with the French court at Bourges. Maureen Boulton, ‘Gilles le Bouvier’, in Encyclopedia of 
the Medieval Chronicle, ed. Graeme Dunphy (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 708; Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 
207. 
90 See, for example, Colette Beaune, The Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-
Medieval France, trans. Susan Ross Huston (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Delogu, Theoriz-
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roles in medieval life as advisors and councillors, military commanders, peers and family, and 
trusted friends of the kings. Indeed, genealogy and family relationships are a key feature of 
the Dionysian continuations. Spiegel explains that, by ‘patterning his narrative along genea-
logical lines, the vernacular chronicler was able to create a seemingly coherent and realistic 
image of time and social affiliation that could give structure and meaning to an account of 
contemporary history’.91 Alain Demurger adds that the chronicles are ‘seeking the origins of a 
lineage or of a people’.92 The Dionysian chroniclers often highlight heritage, such as the ori-
gins of the Franks or the descent of Louis VIII from the Carolingians, and note genealogical 
relationships of individuals to parents, grandparents, siblings, and others.93 They are omni-
present reminders that the Capetian dynasty encompassed more than simply the ruler—it was 
a network of interconnected relationships and lineages that drives the narrative forward and 
provides it with necessary detail and structure. Therefore, this study will take the unusual ap-
proach of testing its hypotheses on those cadets of the Capetian dynasty mentioned within the 
continuations. The term ‘cadet’ will be used broadly to refer to both agnates, ‘persons related 
to each other through males only’, and cognates, ‘those relations who derive their common 
descent from the same pair of married persons, whether the descent be traced through males 
or females’.94 While such an all-encompassing definition is unusual, it better reflects how me-
dieval peoples likely perceived family and dynastic relationships. In contrast, the name ‘Cape-
tian’ will be used strictly to refer to agnates, including daughters but excluding their children, 
who descend in a male line from Hugues Capet.95 Because of their constant presence within 
the vernacular continuations, the Capetian cadets are ideal candidates for use as didactic mes-
sengers and it is through their portrayals and narrative arcs that this study will determine 
whether such messages were intentionally constructed. 
It is not possible nor necessary to recount the entire history of the Dionysian vernacu-
lar tradition for the purposes of this study—Spiegel, Guenée, and Hedeman have accom-
plished this task with appropriate thoroughness—but it is essential that the history of those  
                                               
ing; and M. Cecilia Gaposchkin, The Making of Saint Louis: Kingship, Sanctity, and Crusade in the Later Mid-
dle Ages (Cornell: University Press, 2008). 
91 Spiegel, Romancing, 224. 
92 Alain Demurger, Temps de crises, temps d’espoirs, XIVe-XVe siècle, Nouvelle histoire de la France 
médiévale 5 (Dijon: Seuil, 1990), 252. 
93 GCF, I:9-15; Les Grandes Chroniques de France, Société de l’histoire de France, vol. 7, ed. Jules 
Marie Édouard Viard (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1932), 2-8. 
94 Thomas Mackenzie, Studies in Roman Law with Comparative views of the Laws of France, England, 
and Scotland (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1876), 144. 
95 Elizabeth M. Hallam, Capetian France 987-1328 (London: Longman, 1988), 330-331; Elizabeth M. 
Hallam and Judith Everard, Capetian France 987-1328, 2nd ed. (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2001), 25. 
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continuations discussed in this study is outlined.96 The tradition itself began with Primat, a 
monk who was commissioned by the abbot of Saint-Denis, Mathieu de Vendôme—undoubt-
edly under orders from Louis IX—to write a vernacular history of the kings of France.97 Pri-
mat’s completed product, commonly called the Roman des rois (Sainte-Geneviève 782), is 
primarily a compilation of heavily-edited and translated material, largely derived from a Latin 
anthology (BNF lat. 5925) that had been compiled at the abbey in the 1250s from works by 
Aimoin de Fleury, Einhard, and Suger, among others.98 The chronicle is organised chronolog-
ically via books documenting the reigns of each French king, which are subdivided into chap-
ters that emphasise moments of significance.99 Thus, it differs in scope from the more 
common and popular universal chronicles of the period, which attempted to summarise the 
entirety of world history since Creation or the Deluge by drawing attention specifically to a 
sequence of historical figures.100 The continuators maintained this chronological framework 
and, with one exception, also retained the episodic chapter divisions. While Primat’s Roman 
is not included in this study, it is referenced on numerous occasions and Primat himself indi-
rectly acted as its first continuator. 
Continuations began almost immediately after Primat presented his Roman in 1274. 
Primat continued to write at the abbey until his death in 1277, although he appears to have 
never directly worked on continuations to his chronicle.101 Instead, he composed a Latin his-
tory of the reigns of Louis IX and Philippe to 1277. That text is now lost, but significant por-
tions of it were translated by the Hospitaller Jean de Vignay and used in the first continuation 
to the Roman.102 All of the continuations produced at Saint-Denis until 1300 derived the re-
mainder of their content from documents attributed to Guillaume de Nangis, another monk at 
                                               
96 For a graphical depiction of the chronicles used in this study, see Figure 1.1. 
97 François Bethune, ‘Les écoles historiques de Saint-Denis et Saint-Germain-Des-Près dans leurs rap-
ports avec la composition des Grandes Chroniques de France’, Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 4 (1903): 208-
210; Gaposchkin, 147; Bernard Guenée, ‘Histoire d’un succès’, in Les Grandes Chroniques de France: Repro-
duction intégrale en fac-similé des miniatures de Fouquet: Manuscrit français 6465 de la Bibliothèque nationale 
de Paris, ed. Philippe Lebaud (Paris, 1987), 90. 
98 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques, 191-192; Hedeman, Royal Image, 4; Spiegel, Chronicle Tradi-
tion, 78. See Paris, Sainte-Geneviève ms. 782; and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France ms. lat. 5925. 
99 Morrison and Hedeman, 108. 
100 Lisa Fagin Davis, La Chronique Anonyme Universelle: Reading and Writing History in Fifteenth-
Century France (London: Harvey Miller Publishers, 2014), 12; Patrick Geary, ‘Chronicles, Annals, and Other 
Forms of Memoria’, in Chronicon: Medieval Narrative Sources: A Chronological Guide with Introductory Es-
says, eds. János M. Bak and Ivan Jurković, 13-23 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 13-14. 
101 Spiegel, Chronicle Tradition, 91. 
102 Natalis de Wailly, Léopold Delisle, and Charles-Marie-Gabriele-Bréchillet Jourdain, introduction to 
Primat, Chronique de Primat, traduite par Jean du Vignay, in Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France, 
vol. 23, eds. Natalis de Wailly, Léopold Delisle, and Charles-Marie-Gabriel-Bréchillet Jourdain (Paris: H. Wel-
ter, 1894), 2. Jean de Vignay cites Primat as the source for the 1251 to 1277 continuation to his vernacular trans-
lation of Vincent de Beauvais’s Speculum historiale. This translation was written between 1335 and 1348. Jones, 
Eclipse, 77n102; Christine Knowles, ‘Jean de Vignay, un traducteur de XIVe siècle’, Romania 75 (1954): 371-
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the abbey. Traditionally, Guillaume is credited with writing the Latin life of Louis IX now at-
tributed to Primat, but Guillaume certainly edited and translated the life at least once.103 In-
deed, a later recension of this text was appended to Sainte-Geneviève 782 at some point in the 
early fourteenth century, and it is this version that Viard included in his critical edition and 
which is referenced in this study.104 Guillaume also concluded Primat’s Latin life of Philippe 
and wrote his own universal history, the Chronicon, which became the basis for numerous 
continuations and provided material for almost all continuations of Primat’s chronicle into the 
1340s.105 However, these continuations were not direct copies; rather, they mixed material 
from the Chronicon with, among other sources, continuations to Géraud de Frachet’s univer-
sal chronicle and Guillaume’s Chronique abrégée des rois de France, a truncated history of 
the Capetian kings that was continued long after Guillaume’s death.106 Nonetheless, the pieces 
that would contribute to the first attempt at a coherent continuation in the 1340s were moving 
into place. Around 1285, another piece was added: a short Latin life of Louis VIII, derived 
primarily from the Chronicon Turonense and Vincent de Beauvais’s Speculum Historiale, that 
filled the chronological gap between Primat’s Roman and his life of Louis IX.107 This haphaz-
ard process of continuing Primat’s work defines the Dionysian vernacular tradition for its first 
seventy years and it is unlikely that these early continuations derived from direct Capetian 
patronage. 
This situation changed once Richard Lescot took control of the scriptorium at Saint-
Denis in 1329.108 Like his predecessors, Lescot was a monk at the abbey, and it was he who 
began the difficult process of assembling the various Dionysian texts into one coherent docu-
ment. One of his first attempts was a royal commission to compose an updated version of Pri-
mat’s chronicle that brought the history to 1328 (BL Royal 16 G VI).109 This was completed 
in the 1340s and presented to the future Jean II, eldest son of Philippe VI, probably as a 
                                               
372. 
103 Jones, Eclipse, 62-63. 
104 Isabelle Guyot-Bachy and Jean-Marie Moeglin, ‘Comment ont été continuées les Grandes 
Chroniques de France dans la première moitié du XIVe siècle’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes, 163:2 
(2005): 393, suggest it was added after 1329, while Morrison and Hedeman, 109, state it was added between 
1310 and 1320. 
105 Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 394-395; Spiegel, Chronicle Tradition, 98-99. 
106 Isabelle Guyot-Bachy, ‘La chronique abrégée des rois de France et les Grandes chroniques de 
France: concurrence ou complémentarité dans la construction d’une culture historiographique en France à la fin 
du Moyen Âge?’ in The Medieval Chronicle VIII, eds. Erik Kooper and Sjoerd Levelt (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
2013), 209-210; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 398, 399. 
107 Bethune, 37; Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 195-196; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 387; Spiegel, 
Chronicle Tradition, 97. For a surviving fragment of this text, see Ex gestis Ludovici VIII regis, in MGH SS 26, 
ed. Georg Waitz (Hanover: Library of Hanover, 1882): 631-632. 
108 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 197. 
109 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 197. See London, British Library Royal 16 G VI. 
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miroir like Primat’s chronicle.110 After Philippe’s death in 1350, Lescot compiled an entirely 
new continuation to Primat’s vernacular chronicle that brought the narrative up to 1350.111 In 
compiling this new work, he used a translation of the life of Louis VIII, new translations of 
the lives of Louis IX and Philippe III, and the Chronicon and its continuations.112 Increas-
ingly, as the narrative advanced toward 1350, Lescot introduced translated portions of his own 
continuation to Géraud de Frachet’s chronicle, which he intermixed and ultimately replaced 
with selections from a continuation of the Chroniques abrégée des rois de France and the 
non-Dionysian Chronique de Flandres.113 The fact that this text was completed as early as 
1356 and no later than 1360 suggests that it was intended, as the two royal compositions be-
fore it, as a miroir for the royal heir, in this case the future Charles V.114 However, Lescot’s 
text was not widely disseminated, possibly because of the civil war that erupted in northern 
France following the capture of Jean II at the battle of Poitiers in 1356.115 The only reason it 
did not fall into obscurity was because it was soon included in the best-known product of the 
Dionysian vernacular school. 
As part of his campaign to glorify the French kingdom and definitively establish the 
legitimacy of the Valois line, Charles V usurped the traditional role of the Dionysian scripto-
rium and commissioned his chancellor, Pierre d’Orgemont, to compile a new vernacular his-
tory of the kings of France based on material produced at Saint-Denis (BNF fr. 2813).116 In 
this way, his chronicle remained a product of the Dionysian vernacular tradition although it 
was divorced from Dionysian oversight.117 A royal scribe, Henri de Trévou, completed the in-
itial writing of this new edition in 1375, adopting almost verbatim the text of Lescot.118 His 
                                               
110 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 197. 
111 Four versions of this ‘Richard Lescot edition’ still exist—Grenoble Bib. mun. 1004, Lyon Bib. mun. 
880, BNF fr. 17270, and BNF fr. 23140—but it is unclear which, if any, was the presentation version. Guenée, 
‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 201. 
112 Guenée, ‘Histoire’, 100-101; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 393. 
113 Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 398, 399; Lemoine, 147-148. Only the years 1347 to 1350 are com-
pletely original to Lescot, although his editorial hand is present throughout the entire continuation. Guyot-Bachy 
and Moeglin, 426. 
114 For a detailed history of this edition, see Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 201; and Guyot-Bachy 
and Moeglin, 415-424. 
115 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 201. 
116 Guenée, ‘Histoire’, 101; Douglas A. Kibbee, ‘Institutions and Multilingualism in the Middle Ages’, 
in Medieval Multilingualism: The Francophone World and its Neighbours, Medieval Texts and Cultures of 
Northern Europe 20, eds. Christopher Kleinhenz and Keith Busby (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 79; Lacabane, ‘Re-
cherches sur les auteurs des Grandes Chroniques de France, dites de Saint-Denys’, Bibliothèque de l’école des 
chartes 2:1 (1841): 66-74; Richard H. Rouse and Mary A. Rouse, Manuscripts and Their Makers: Commercial 
Book Producers in Medieval Paris 1200-1500, Illiterati et uxorati (Turnhout: Harvey Miller Publishers, 2000), 
I:272. See Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France ms. fr. 2813. 
117 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 203, goes so far to suggest that Saint-Denis may not have even 
possessed a copy of Orgemont’s chronicle. 
118 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 201; Rouse and Rouse, I:272. 
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recension was then updated and modified twice, once in 1377 and again in 1380, by another 
royal scribe, Raoulet d’Orléans.119 Raoulet added to Henri’s text an original history of the 
reign of Jean II as well as a partial history of Charles V’s reign that ended initially in 1375 
and, ultimately, in spring 1379, roughly a year before Charles’s death.120 The clear intended 
recipient for this chronicle was none other than the future Charles VI, who was born in 
1368.121 The 1377 continuation, in fact, ends with an admonition to the senior Capetian cadets 
to support and respect the regency agreement promulgated in 1375, suggesting that Charles V 
viewed this text as a miroir for his successor as well as an instruction manual for his succes-
sor’s guardians.122 In the 1380 edits, Raoulet modified a number of folios in the life of 
Philippe VI to better emphasise Valois legitimacy against English claims to the French 
throne.123 Hedeman notes that Raoulet’s edits ‘promote ideals of kingly behaviour in the con-
text of contemporary political rivalries, exaggerating English misconduct and minimizing 
French deficiencies’.124 The governmental instability that followed Charles V’s death in 1380, 
as well as the unorthodox teaching practices of Charles VI’s tutor, Philippe de Mézières, 
likely contributed to the chronicle never receiving further updates.125 Delachenal, in his criti-
cal edition of Orgemont’s continuation, appends as an ending a text that matches the style of 
Raoulet and ends in 1382 (BNF fr. 17267), coinciding with the date that Orgemont left the 
court to become chancellor of the Viennois.126 This marks the end of what can be described as 
Primat’s vernacular tradition, or what many modern historians consider to be the ‘canonical’, 
‘classical’, or ‘vulgate’ Dionysian vernacular chronicles.127 This reputation comes from the 
fact that dozens of manuscripts used Orgemont’s text as their basis over the subsequent cen-
tury and that no new vernacular continuation issued out of Saint-Denis again until the mid-
                                               
119 Morrison and Hedeman, 181. 
120 Hedeman, Royal Image, 95. 
121 Hedeman, Royal Image, 113. 
122 Hedeman, Royal Image, 113. By the late 1370s, Charles was aware of his impending death and 
sought to check the likely struggle over the regency of his son. Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War, vol. 
III: Divided Houses (London: Faber and Faber, 2009), 391. 
123 Hedeman, Royal Image, 106-107; Morrison and Hedeman, 181. 
124 Hedeman, Royal Image, 106. 
125 François Autrand, Charles VI: La folie du roi (Paris: Fayard, 1986), 22-23, 25-29, 75-104; Coleman, 
‘Reading the Evidence in Text and Image: How History Was Read in Late Medieval France’, in Imagining the 
Past in France: History in Manuscript Painting: 1250-1500, eds. Elizabeth Morrison and Anne D. Hedeman 
(Los Angeles: J. Paul Getty Museum, 2010), 54-55. Dozens of lined folios still follow the conclusion of BNF fr. 
2813, suggesting that Orgement intended to continue the chronicle. 
126 Delachenal, introduction to CRJC, III:xliv; CRJC, III:42n2. Delechenal extends his edition two years 
further, using material from the same manuscript, but these additions lack the fluid prose of the scribe or chan-
cellor. CRJC, III:43n2; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 385-386. 
127 Avril, 44; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 386; Peter S. Lewis, ‘Some Provisional Remarks Upon the 
Chronicles of Saint-Denis and Upon the [Grandes] Chroniques de France in the Fifteenth Century’, Nottingham 
Medieval Studies 39 (1995): 146.  
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fifteenth century.128 The critical edition of this text, edited by Viard and Delachenal in the 
early twentieth century, is referenced throughout this study for the years 1223 to 1226 and 
1270 to 1382. 
Lescot never returned to vernacular chronicle-writing, nor did anybody else at Saint-
Denis, and for a hundred years, only Latin histories were produced at the abbey.129 Lescot’s 
successor, Michel Pintoin, usually known as the religieux of Saint-Denis, wrote a detailed 
Latin history of the reign of Charles VI from 1380 until the author’s death in 1421, but it is 
unclear whether this text was produced under royal commission.130 This chronicle was later 
abridged and edited between 1430 and 1470 by an author connected to the French court, who 
tradition states was Jean Juvénal des Ursins, archbishop of Reims.131 Royal control over the 
abbey was temporarily lost between 1420 and 1435 when the Anglo-Burgundians occupied 
Saint-Denis, and work at the scriptorium appears to have mostly ceased during this time.132 
Reflecting this fact, Pintoin’s successor, Jean Chartier, did not complete Charles VI’s 
unfinished Latin life or begin his own history of the reign of Charles VII until he received a 
royal commission to do so in November 1437, a year after Saint-Denis had been recap-
tured.133 Chartier continued the Latin chronicle to 1450, at which point he abandoned the task 
and began a new French vernacular chronicle of the reign of Charles VII, using his own Latin 
                                               
128 Bernard Guenée, ‘Chancelleries et monastères: La mémoire de la France au Moyen Âge’, in Les 
lieux de mémoire II: La nation, ed. Pierre Nora (Évreux: Gallimard, 1986), 29; Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 385-
386. 
129 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 201; Guenée, Un roi, 38-39. 
130 Guenée, L’opinion publique, 163-164; Guenée, Un roi, 36. For the identification of Pintoin as the 
religieux, see Nicole Grévy-Pons and Ezio Ornato, ‘Qui est l’auteur de la Chronique Latin de Charles VI, dite du 
Religieux de Saint-Denis?’ Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 134:1 (1976): 85-102.  
131 Guenée, ‘Les Grandes Chroniques’, 207; Guenée, Un roi, 72. Guenée, Un roi, 427, notes that the 
Juvénal text ‘est partie un résumé français mais qui offer aussi pour partie un récit plus original’, thus it is not 
simply a translation of Pintoin’s work. Peter S. Lewis, Écrits politiques de Jean Juvénal des Ursins (Paris: 
Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1992), I:88, suggests that the portion through 1411 is derived from Pintoin, while René 
Planchenault, ‘La “Chronique de la Pucelle”, Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes 93 (1932): 95, disputes this, 
claiming everything until the Cabochien Revolt in 1413 is derived from Pintoin. Lewis, ‘L’histoire de Charles VI 
attribuée à Jean Juvénal des Ursins: Pour une édition nouvelle (information)’, Comptes rendus des séances de 
l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres 140:2 (1996): 565, 567-568, disputes the attribution to Juvénal en-
tirely and argues that the translation was either a manuscript commissioned by Juvénal, a lost product of Saint-
Denis itself, or a direct translation-compilation by Bonhomme’s printshop, although he does not entirely discount 
Juvénal’s influence over the chronicle’s creation. Claiming that a ‘Juvenel compiler’ borrowed an earlier 
abridged translation of Pintoin’s chronicle written as early as the late 1430s, Lewis laments that one ‘cannot tell 
if the translation used by the Jouvenel compiler was made at Saint-Denis, even part of the vernacular tradition of 
Saint-Denis, or not’. Lewis, ‘L’Histoire’, 567n10; Lewis ‘Some provisional remarks’, 161. Hedeman, Royal Im-
age, 180, and Spiegel, Chronicle Tradition, 125, speculate that Juvénal’s text was produced in the early 1430s, 
while Lewis, ‘L’histoire’, 567n10, argues that the chronicle could not have been written until 1455 and possibly 
as late as 1470. 
132 Guenée, ‘Chancelleries’, 28. 
133 Guenée, ‘Histoires, annales, chroniques: Essai sur les genres historiques au Moyen Age’, Annales, 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales 28:4 (1973): 1012; Lewis, ‘L’histoire’, 566-567; Samaran, 145, 152, 157; Spiegel, 
Chronicle Tradition, 124-125. 
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text as a source intermixed with primary documents and new information.134 Lewis speculates 
that ‘Chartier may have turned to French possibly simply because of the difficulty of writing 
up modern technical terms in Latin’.135 In any case, Chartier ended this French chronicle 
shortly after the death of Charles VII in 1461 and the chronicler died in 1464, at which point 
royal historiography formally passed out of Dionysian control.136 It is to the modern critical 
editions of these specific continuations, which were all sponsored or otherwise promoted by 
the Capetian family, that this study will turn to analyse whether chronicles functioned as 
miroirs within late medieval French royal circles. 
The key method of conducting this study is by analysing authorial intent. Goetz rea-
sons that  
by the choice and combination of facts, their respective themes and purposes and 
their manner of writing, judging and commenting on the facts…every chronicle 
actually was a new and independent work with its own aims and character, even 
if it was completely reliant on older traditions.137 
Taking this a step further, Spiegel suggests that 
even literal translations are the product of conscious intentions and that if the Old 
French texts replicate the substance of Latin texts, it is because the translators 
believed those Latin works to offer adequate expressions of their own historio-
graphical goals…. [T]o assume anything less would do an injustice to the intelli-
gence and purpose with which the creators of Old French prose historiography 
worked.138 
But definitively proving intentionality behind specific editorial decisions is impossible. Thus, 
this study will explore the idea of intentionality by analysing the portrayals of royal cadets to 
determine the ways in which Dionysian chroniclers actively constructed narratives that pro-
moted didactic messages. Because Capetian cadets and their close relatives are ubiquitous 
within the vernacular chronicles, their portrayals by the chroniclers will serve as the foci of 
the study. The specific method of analysis used in this study is literary in nature: episodes in-
volving cadets are isolated from the surrounding narrative and analysed to determine whether 
their portrayals constitute or contribute to a moral message. Detecting these messages is  
                                               
134 Estelle Doudet, ‘Chartier, Jean’, in Encyclopedia of the Medieval Chronicle, 267, dates the start of 
Chartier’s vernacular edition to 1445 and notes that the ‘French version is more detailed than the Latin and con-
siderably longer’, but adds that the ‘years 1445, 1446, 1459, and 1460 are missing in the manuscripts’. See gen-
erally Guenée, Le roi, 71-72; Samaran, 152. 
135 Lewis, ‘Some provisional remarks’, 154. 
136 Samaran, 149. After Chartier died, Louis XI gave the title of royal chronicler to Jean Castel, a monk 
at Saint-Martin-des-Champs, while in 1465, he named the Benedictine Guillaume Danicot historian of the king. 
Guenée, ‘Histoires’, 1013. The title of historiographer briefly returned to Saint-Denis from 1482 to 1483 when 
the monk Mathieu Levrien was given the position, but he died before making any meaningful contribution. 
Lewis, ‘Some provisional remarks’, 154. 
137 Goetz, 32. 
138 Spiegel, Romancing, 7. 
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conducted through a three-step process. First and primarily, episodes involving cadets in the 
vernacular narrative are reviewed on their own in order to reveal obvious didactic themes. 
Second, these episodes are compared to the Latin sources from which they derive, if such 
sources exist, to determine whether there are differences between the vernacular and source 
documents. And third, modern secondary sources are called upon to verify events and contrib-
ute scholarly opinions on the episodes. It must be emphasised, however, that these latter two 
steps are not intended to align events and characterisations with modern perceptions of truth. 
Rather, their purpose is to provide further evidence that narratives found within the chronicles 
have been intentionally altered in order to serve a specific purpose. Establishing empirical 
truth is not a goal of this study and, for the most part, the historical facts behind the events and 
people discussed by the chroniclers in this study do not matter. To better emphasise this point, 
Latin cross-references, archival documents, and secondary literature are primarily relegated to 
footnotes. Situating them thus allows the voices of the Dionysian vernacular continuators to 
remain at the forefront of this study. This process is repeated throughout this study to deter-
mine whether the Dionysian vernacular continuators intentionally crafted didactic narratives 
for their readers. 
 
1.3 Structure 
 In order to best emphasise the ways in which the Dionysian continuators embellished 
their chronicles to advance moral themes, this study is divided into two parts.139 The first fol-
lows the earlier vernacular continuations and analyses how Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot 
adopted a broad approach to Capetian dynasticism by using the independent activities of ca-
dets to serve as moral guides and didactic examples. The second part, in contrast, focusses on 
the ways in which attention within the chronicles shifts under Orgemont, Juvénal, and Chart-
ier away from general dynasticism and more toward a targeted form of dynasticism that cen-
tres around the supreme authority of the king. Chapter 5 serves as the pivot point in this 
argument, assessing how Orgemont intentionally downplayed the roles of cadets and, indeed, 
villainised one cadet in particular in order to make the transition between Capetian dynasti-
cism to regnal supremacy within his chronicle all the more obvious. However, many other 
case studies found throughout this study also span this transition period, such as the de la Cer-
das above. Although a crude overall chronology is retained, with Chapter 2 beginning with 
the reign of Louis IX and Chapter 8 ending with the reign of Charles VII, the individual case  
                                               
139 For a genealogically-based outline of this thesis, see Figure 1.2. 
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studies do not adhere to anything more than internal chronology. This allows for the individ-
ual stories of the various cadets to come to the forefront without being diluted by competing 
narratives. Cases of a similar nature are grouped within chapters so that they can be consid-
ered together and then compared to other cases within this study. While each chapter ap-
proaches the central issue differently, each contributes to the overall goal of determining 
whether there is an underlying moral purpose to the Dionysian vernacular continuations. 
 The three chapters that constitute Part I assess the approaches taken by the earlier ver-
nacular continuators regarding how they used Capetian cadets and close relatives of the royal 
family to tell an instructive tale. The clearest example of this in the entire study is found in the 
first case in Chapter 2, which focusses on the archetypes constructed by the chroniclers for the 
three brothers of Louis IX. With this serving as the exception rather than the rule, the remain-
ing eight case studies in Part I require deeper analysis to uncover didactic themes. In the rest 
of Chapter 2, attention is directed to the Capetian houses of Anjou and Artois and the drasti-
cally different ways the chroniclers portrayed the activities of the two families as they became 
more distantly connected to the ruling line. Chapter 3 explores how Dionysian chroniclers de-
picted the merger of the kingdoms of France and Navarre in 1314 and how they dealt with the 
division of those kingdoms in 1328. This chapter also surveys the vernacular portrayal of the 
succession crises of 1316-1328, focussing specifically on the moral merits of the Capetian 
house of Valois. Chapter 4 concludes Part I with three examples of less loyal relatives of the 
Capetian dynasty. The first case in this chapter is that of the rulers of Brittany to 1399, who, 
though legitimate Capetian agnates, the chroniclers never treat with the same degree of re-
spect given to other Capetian agnates. The counts of Flanders provide the second case and 
theirs proves to be a long narrative of dynastic merger, similar to that of the rulers of Navarre 
albeit with far more resistance. The final case is that of the Plantagenet rulers of England, 
who, although kings in their own right, were dukes of Guyenne in France and constantly de-
sired the return of ancestral lands lost to them under King John. Their narrative is one of con-
stant war, frequent treaties, and failed marriage alliances. The ways in which the vernacular 
chroniclers discuss them reveals much about the attitudes of the Capetian court towards their 
cross-Channel neighbours. Considered together, the nine case studies in Part I tell of a time 
when the French throne was not excessively under threat and the Dionysian scriptorium could 
focus on the activities of various Capetian relatives throughout western Europe. The messages 
in these case studies reflect common themes associated with Capetian dynasticism, incuding 
family loyalty, fraternal devotion, charity, and crusading zeal. 
 The cases found in the four chapters of Part II represent a direct reaction against some 
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of these earlier themes. Later chroniclers such as Orgemont, but especially Juvénal and Chart-
ier, promoted regnal authority, sacrificial devotion, and unquestioning loyalty. This reflects 
changing political conditions in France and evolving concepts of the role Capetian cadets 
played within French society. Chapter 5 primarily examines Orgemont’s changing attitude to-
ward cadets, comparing the portrayals of the future Charles V to Carlos II of Navarre during a 
period when Jean II was imprisoned in England. The chapter ends by analysing how Juvénal 
discusses the minority of Charles VI, a period that witnessed intense feuding between Cape-
tian agnates. These feuds erupted into open warfare between rival Capetian lines at the begin-
ning of the fifteenth century, and Chapter 6 compares how Juvénal depicted these cadets—
specifically those of the houses of Burgundy, Orléans, and Armagnac—and used them as ex-
amples for moral messages within his chronicle. Chapter 7 investigates the characterisations 
and didactic roles of more distant cadets through a number of non-traditional case studies. The 
first continues the story of the dukes of Brittany, examining how Juvénal and Chartier used 
members of the family for very specific moral purposes. Following this, the roles of bastards 
within the later continuations are assessed to determine why they suddenly appear in the ver-
nacular texts of the fifteenth century and what their presence meant for Capetian society. Five 
short case studies conclude this chapter and each analyses distant cognatic branches of the Ca-
petian dynasty that are not traditionally considered Capetian cadets yet nonetheless fulfil an 
important dynastic role within Chartier’s chronicle. The final case studies are found in Chap-
ter 8 and they seek to prove that Chartier intended regnal supremacy to be the primary mes-
sage of his chronicle. The first case, therefore, examines how the members of the house of 
Valois-Anjou were used as good representatives of Capetian loyalty and devotion. They are 
contrasted with three cadets who failed to live up to their obligations as Capetian cadets and, 
as a result, were vilified to varying degrees in the narrative. In the end, the primary message 
of Part II is that cadet ambitions should never overshadow the regnal authority of the French 
king and it is this idea that will be explored throughout these chapters. 
 Because the Capetians are an ever-present and essential part of Dionysian vernacular 
narratives, it seems certain that they also serve as the vessels of any moral messages placed 
within the chronicles. Indeed, simply through their actions, cadets provide examples of good 
and bad morality and act as archetypes, epitomes, stereotypes, and people whom readers could 
mimic or vilify.140 But the chroniclers also manipulated historical events, altered their sources, 
and fabricated moral themes to produce, via the cadets, a constant series of examples from 
                                               
140 Goetz, 30; Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ‘Political Utility in Medieval Historiography: A Sketch’, History 
and Theory 14:3 (1975): 319. 
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which readers could learn all that was required to become good Capetian rulers. If the purpose 
of a miroir is to provide a reflection, then it is undoubtedly the cadets of the Capetian dynasty 
who gaze back at readers. But not all the lessons are the same and some are better defined 
than others. Thus, it is only through detailed case studies such as those found within this study 
that the individual moral messages within the Dionysian vernacular continuations can be fully 
known. 
 
           
 
The world the Dionysian chroniclers inhabited was changing rapidly. Primat wrote during a 
long period of peace when France was safe and untroubled, and this sense of security flows as 
an undercurrent throughout his narrative. For his continuators, though, uncertainty and fear 
cloud their texts. Their attitudes and perspectives are more visible and their motives more ob-
vious because they held a personal stake in the matter. The events they record are not just mo-
ments in an obscure past, but something they lived through and may have still been 
experiencing. Guillaume wrote during the Anglo-Flemish wars that saw numerous French de-
feats. The Black Death, the battle of Crécy, and the loss of Calais darken Lescot’s writings. 
Orgemont, Juvénal, and Chartier all wrote after hard-fought victories, where ultimate triumph 
over the English was still uncertain. Because of this, the continuators lacked adequate hind-
sight to truly understand the implications of their messages and were forced to rely on fore-
sight to interpret events, predict their outcomes, and derive moral meaning from them.141 
Therefore, the task of identifying didactic messages within their texts is all the more difficult, 
but also more important. As continuations of Primat’s Roman des rois, these texts are also 
stewards of the moral lessons found within that chronicle. And since these texts were copied 
and continued repeatedly for over two centuries by monks, royal bureaucrats, and commercial 
printers, these didactic messages must have remained relevant and the examples set by previ-
ous generations of princes must have continued to provide guidance to future generations. It 
means individuals such as the de la Cerda princes were not simply historical oddities haphaz-
ardly thrown into a highly-derivative, crudely-constructed, French-language compilation; ra-
ther, they contributed something important to an intentionally-crafted narrative that was 
meticulously tailored to a specific audience for a specific purpose. This study will analyse 
such individuals and narratives to discover precisely what those purposes were.
                                               









CHAPTER TWO  
In the Shadow of the Lion 
 
Any study on didactic messages within the Dionysian vernacular continuations must begin 
with the four sons of Louis VIII le Lion. Louis was the son of Philippe II Auguste, the king 
whose reign concludes Primat’s chronicle, and he was the father of Saint Louis IX, the king 
who commissioned the chronicle. The activities and lives of Louis IX and his brothers moti-
vated chroniclers to continue the story that terminated in 1223, thereby converting a singular 
example of vernacular literature into a living history of the Capetian dynasty. Primat himself 
was responsible for the Latin text that first continued the story to 1277, and Guillaume de 
Nangis completed that text and may have provided the first French translation as well. Rich-
ard Lescot, writing in the 1330s, compiled a new translation that he appended to the end of 
Primat’s original manuscript, which, in turn, served as the basis for Pierre d’Orgemont’s edi-
tion.1 Throughout these early recensions, one theme persisted: the affection and devotion 
shared among the sons of Louis VIII. The relationship between Louis IX, Robert I d’Artois, 
Alphonse de Poitiers, and Charles I d’Anjou represented Capetian dynastic solidarity as it had 
never been experienced before, and the chroniclers emphasised this by fitting each brother 
into archetypal moulds that could serve as examples to readers. The king supplies the most 
obvious—a pious defender of the faith who would be remembered by and inspire all his de-
scendants, be they Valois, Angevin, Artesian, Bourbon, or even English—but his oft-over-
looked brothers also support archetypes of their own.2 However, as later generations of cadets 
drifted further from their archetypal ancestors, continuators began to use them as examples of 
dynastic devotion that transcended the traditional limits of French influence. It is only under 
Lescot that this emphasis on fraternal unity within the vernacular tradition begins to wane. 
Nonetheless, the dynastic models established by the sons of Louis VIII and perpetuated by 
their descendants continued to bring the senior Capetians, the Angevins, and the Artesians to-
gether repeatedly over the ensuing centuries. This chapter will analyse the archetypal repre-
sentations of these brothers and their descendants within the Dionysian vernacular tradition 
and discuss the ways in which their portrayals by the chroniclers acted as a didactic tool to ad-
vance a message of Capetian dynastic unity and strength. 
                                               
1 Guyot-Bachy and Moeglin, 393. 
2 However, Beaune, Birth, 124, argues that ‘pervasive Mendicant imagery soon after his death had made 
him into a model Christian rather than a model king [while] movements of protest among the nobility joined his 
name to fiscal freedoms and later to special privileges. This had made it difficult for a centralizing monarchy 
without financial resources to profit fully from his legend’. For a thorough discussion of the archetypal qualities 
of Louis IX, see Gaposchkin, Making. 
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2.1 Model Brethren 
 Such an intimate relationship had not always existed among cadets—the vernacular 
life of Louis VIII mentions no Capetian by name except previous kings.3 Primat and Guil-
laume (who will be treated together for 1226-1250 since Primat’s text is missing for this pe-
riod and the originator of the information is unclear) do mention agnates at the beginning of 
their life of Louis IX—primarily Pierre I, count of Brittany, and Latin Emperor Baudouin II—
but all are portrayed as unrelated lords, their Capetian credentials never emphasised.4 In con-
trast, Lescot introduces the royal family in the first sentence of his recension of the life of 
Louis IX, inserting before his translation of Primat-Guillaume’s narrative a reference to all 
Louis VIII’s children together rather than giving each their name.5 This makes the brothers’ 
individual introductions appear more impactful, with Alphonse and Robert first introduced in 
1236 as royal counsellors, and Charles named in 1241 revering the Crown of Thorns.6 It is in 
this order that they are best understood within the vernacular tradition. The chroniclers portray 
Alphonse as the very model of domestic steadfastness, the literal and figurative solution to the 
ongoing problems in Languedoc and Guyenne. Robert, meanwhile, represents the valiant 
chivalric crusader, a selfless warrior who sacrifices all for the righteous cause of the king. 
Conversely, Charles demonstrates the potential for the Capetian dynasty to expand outside the 
traditional boundaries of the kingdom. This section will explore how the chroniclers used the 
lives of these brothers as positive examples of Capetian dynasticism, thereby instilling in 
readers the idea that royal princes have important roles to play in the Capetian dynasty and 
that it is the duty of all Capetian cadets to participate. 
 Among the three brothers of Louis IX, Alphonse is presented by Lescot first, although 
he is only introduced by his title, count of Poitiers, rather than by his name.7 This treatment is 
important because the role of this prince in the Dionysian tradition is intimately linked to his  
                                               
3 GCF, VII:6. Ex gestis Ludovici VIII regis, 631-632, also does not mention any Capetians. 
4 GCF, VII:35ff, 72-74. See Gesta Sancti Ludovici regis Francæ, in Receuil des historiens des Gaules et 
de la France, vol. 20, eds. Pierre Daunou and Joseph Naudet (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1840), 312; Vie de Saint 
Louis par Guillaume de Nangis, in Receuil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, vol. 20, eds. Pierre Daunou 
and Joseph Naudet (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1840), 327. The exception to this is Louis VIII’s brother, Philippe, 
count of Boulogne, who is mentioned once, in 1226, as an uncle of Louis IX. GCF, VII:37. 
5 GCF, VII:32. Jean Richard, Saint Louis: roi d’une France féodale, soutien de la Terre sainte (Paris: 
Fayard, 1983), 437, notes that the descendants of Louis VIII were ‘[u]ne famille qu’il s’individualise au sein du 
lignage capétien: les liens de parenté se sont distendus tant avec les Courtenay et les Dreux, qui sont issus de 
Louis VI, qu’avec les ducs de Bourgogne, détachés du tronc capétien au temps de Robert le Pieux. De ces trois 
familles, les armes ne retiennent pas les fleurs de lys, qui figurant sur l’écu de toutes les branches issues de Louis 
VIII: ceux-là seuls sont des “princes des fleurs de lys”’. See Figure 2.1. 
6 GCF, VII:66, 74. Cf. GSL, 322, 324. See generally M. Cecilia Gaposchkin and Sean L. Field, intro-
duction to The Sanctity of Louis IX: Early Lives of Saint Louis by Geoffrey of Beaulieu and William of Chartres, 
eds. M. Cecilia Gaboschkin and Sean L. Field (London: Cornell University Press, 2014), 4. 
7 GCF, VII:66. 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IN THE SHADOW OF THE LION Whaley 38 
territorial possessions. The apanage is only granted to Alphonse in the narrative in 1241, when 
the king ‘made messire Alphonse, his brother, a knight, and then gave to him as wife the 
daughter of the count of Toulouse, and the country of Poitiers and the land of Auvergne and 
that of Albigeois’.8 The count’s grants said much about his intended role in Capetian politics. 
Through Albigeois and Joana, the only daughter of Raimon VII of Toulouse, Alphonse was 
intended to resolve the recurrent revolts in Languedoc. Through Poitou and Auvergne, he be-
came lord of many vassals long beholden to the kings of England on the Aquitainian march.9 
Indeed, by joining Toulouse, Auvergne, and Poitou into a contiguous bloc, Louis IX effec-
tively surrounded the Plantagenet holdings in Aquitaine, creating a buffer between their iso-
lated duchy and the rest of France.10 But Primat-Guillaume demonstrate that this encirclement 
prompted an immediate response from Henry III of England and his step-father, Hugues X de 
Lusignan, who intermittently assaulted Alphonse’s lands for nearly two decades afterwards.11 
In both this situation and in the later treaty of Paris in 1259, Primat-Guillaume and Lescot turn 
the prince into a passive victim of royal authority, who allowed large portions of his territory 
to be signed away to the English upon his childless death.12 Nonetheless, Alphonse’s strategic 
position in France made him the best candidate to act as regent alongside his mother, Blanca 
of Castile, when the rest of the family departed for the Seventh Crusade in 1248.13 Not want-
ing to undermine the chivalric valour of this woebegone prince, Lescot, translating Primat-
Guillaume, clarifies that Alphonse ‘took the cross, but it was agreed by the king and the bar-
ons that he would remain this year in France’.14 Alphonse travelled to Egypt the next year but 
came too late to help capture Damietta, although he did participate in the ensuing attack on 
                                               
8 ‘…et fist messire Alphons, son frere, chevalier, et si li donna à fame la fille au conte de Thoulouse, et 
la contrée de Poitiers et la terre d’Auvergne et celle d’Aubigois’. GCF, VII:85. See GSL, 334. ‘Le mariage de 
Jeanne of Toulouse avec Alphonse de Poitiers avait été célébre entre 1238 et 1241’. Richard, 106, 136-138. The 
apanage grants were arranged by Louis VIII in 1225, but were not confirmed until his sons reached a suitable age 
or status. Thus, although the chroniclers are technically incorrect in attributing the apanage grants as coming 
from Louis IX, Louis was responsible for conferring these grants upon his brothers. Lewis, Royal Succession, 
162-165. 
9 Richard, 135, emphasises that ‘la reine mère envisageait avec faveur l’installation de ses puînés dans 
des territoires formant en quelque sorte frontière, et qu’elle pensait que cette installation, complétée par un ma-
riage avec la fille d’un puissant voisin, serait un facteur de sécurité pour le royaume’. 
10 See generally Robert Ducluzeau, Alphonse de Poitiers: Frère préféré de Saint Louis, La Crèche 
(France: Geste éditions, 2006), 56-59. 
11 GCF, VII:86-101. See GSL, 334-340 (evens). See generally Ducluzeau, 37ff; Richard, 115-117. 
12 GCF, VII:211. Primat-Guillaume did not mention Alphonse in the discussion of the treaty of Paris. 
Cf. GSL, 410, 412. See generally Richard, 352-353. 
13 Ducluzeau, 68. 
14 ‘…estoit-il croisié, mais il fu acordé du roy et des barons qu’il demourast celle année en France’. 
GCF, VII:118. See GSL, 356. See generally Simon Lloyd, ‘King Henry III, the Crusade and the Mediterranean’, 
in England and Her Neighbours 1066-1453: Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais, eds. Michael Jones and Mal-
colm Vale (London: Hambledon Press, 1989), 108. 
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Mansoura.15 After a brief captivity, Alphonse returned ‘to guard the realm of France with 
queen Blanche his mother who guarded it very wisely’.16 In effect, Primat-Guillaume deprive 
the prince of any feats of valour while abroad and then write him out of the narrative entirely 
until 1270, when the family departed on the Eighth Crusade.17 Even on this campaign, Al-
phonse is only mentioned by the chroniclers after the crusade fails, when both he and his wife 
died in short succession due to a camp illness.18 Lescot ends their story by stating that the 
‘county of Toulouse and the county of Poitiers descended and came to the king of France be-
cause they had no heirs of their bodies’, underlining the true role Alphonse plays in the Dio-
nysian vernacular narrative: he was not a unique individual, but rather the manifestation of the 
stalwart, absolute duty French territorial magnates owed to their king and dynasty.19 In the 
end, the chroniclers deprived Alphonse of all personal glory and agency in order to better es-
tablish him as an example of Capetian devotion and faithfulness. 
 There are numerous narrative parallels between the lives of Alphonse and his elder 
brother Robert despite a different underlying agenda by the chroniclers in their presentations. 
Lescot first mentions Robert in 1236 at the same time as Alphonse, where he is named ‘Rob-
ert d’Artois’, thereby binding his name with his territory in a union that continued through his 
descendants into the fifteenth century.20 The following year, the king ‘desired to give land to 
Robert, his brother, and make him a knight. And he requested [of] the duke of Brabant that he 
would give Mahaut, his daughter, to him as wife…. And he gave to his brother the county of 
                                               
15 GCF, VII:145. See GSL, 372. See generally The Seventh Crusade, 1244-1254: Sources and Docu-
ments, Crusade Texts in Translation 16, ed. and trans. Peter Jackson (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 73. 
16 ‘…et manda son frere le conte de Poitiers, et li commanda qu’il alast garder le reamme de France 
avoec la royne Blanche sa mere qui mout le gardoit sagement’. GCF, VII:159. See GSL, 382. William Chester 
Jordan, Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in Rulership (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1979), 
113, states that Alphonse ‘fell under Blanche’s accusing eye for leaving the war in the East, an act which had left 
a bad impression on many. It had saddened the king’, suggesting that Guillaume altered the facts of this episode. 
Alphonse took control of the royal council after Blanca died in late 1252, breaking a precedent that disallowed 
agnates from serving as regent. Lewis, Royal Succession, 179; Richard, 241, 259. 
17 GCF, VII:261. See Primat, 39; GSL, 440. See generally Ducluzeau, 199. 
18 GCF, VIII:37-38. See Primat, 88; GPT, 488. See generally Lewis, Royal Succession, 174-175; Jona-
than Sumption, The Albigensian Crusade (London: Faber and Faber, 1978), 251. 
19 ‘La contée de Thoulouse et la contée de Poitiers descendi et vint au roy de France pour ce qu’il 
n’avoient nul hoir de leurs corps’. GCF, VIII:38. Richard, 138, emphasises that ‘il serait faux de croire que la 
constitution de l’apanage et l’incorporation à celui-ci du comté de Toulouse aient été conçus dans la perspective 
de cette réunion. La stérilité du couple toulousain est un accident historique…. Et l’adaptation des territoires ap-
partenant à Alphonse aux méthodes d’administration en usage dans le domaine royal n’avait pas pour but de fa-
ciliter leur annexion’. Richard, 442, adds that Alphonse ‘faisant exécuter dans ses terres les ordonnances de saint 
Louis, même lorsqu’elles portaient préjudice à ses propres droits… En un mot, il se comportait en vassal modèle, 
et saint Louis lui faisait entière confiance’. See generally Robert Fawtier, The Capetian Kings of France: Monar-
chy and Nation (987-1328), trans. Lionel Butler and R. J. Adam (London: MacMillan, 1962), 124-125. 
20 GCF, VII:66. Primat-Guillaume do not mention him. 
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Artois and the city of Arras’.21 Thus, Lescot links Robert’s land to marriage, just as with Al-
phonse, but Robert’s territory was small and the marriage did not bring additional territory 
into the kingdom. Robert first made his presence in the continuation felt in the 1242 Saintonge 
War, where he is portrayed by Primat-Guillaume as a steadfast defender and loyal servant to 
Louis when he negotiates a truce with the English.22 The chroniclers name him first among 
the laity to take the cross for the Seventh Crusade in 1245, and he departed for the Levant 
alongside the king and Charles d’Anjou in 1248.23 Primat-Guillaume also include Mahaut in 
these passages, uncharacteristically introducing her by name in 1236 and stating that a preg-
nancy prevented her from accompanying her husband to the Holy Land, although she later 
joined him in 1249.24 The significance of her inclusion in the continuation is not her devotion 
to Robert, but rather the offspring that resulted from both episodes. Soon after her first men-
tion in 1248, she gave birth to Blanche, mother of Jeanne I of Navarre, the future wife of 
Philippe IV.25 Her reunion with Robert in Egypt produced his posthumous heir, Robert II, 
who quickly outshone his father in the vernacular tradition.26 As if to emphasise his lack of 
importance after this point, Robert I’s defeat and death at Mansoura in 1250 is barely re-
counted by Primat-Guillaume, despite him being the closest relative of the king to die while 
on crusade.27 Robert’s seeming unimportance to the narrative demonstrates an evolving atti-
tude toward the Artesian patriarch that emerged during the recension process at Saint-Denis. 
Whereas Primat-Guillaume viewed Robert as a favourable representation of Capetian chival-
ric virtue and considered his sacking of Mansoura to be a short-lived victory against the Sara-
cens, Lescot realised that Robert’s son served this purpose far better and downplayed the 
count’s importance in his own recension.28 None of the continuators criticised Robert to the 
                                               
21 ‘…si li prist talent de donner terre à Robert son frere et faire chevalier. Et requist le duc de Brebant 
qu’il li donnast Mahaut sa fille à fame…. Et donna à son frere la conté d’Artois et la cité d’Arras’. GCF, VII:70-
71. See GSL, 324, 326. See generally Richard, 135. 
22 GCF, VII:96; GSL, 336, 338. See generally Charles Bémont, ‘La campagne de Poitou 1242-1243: 
Taillebourg et Saintes’, Annales du Midi 5:19 (1893): 303; Le Goff, 153. 
23 GCF, VII:111-112, 118; GSL, 352, 356. See generally Jordan, Louis IX, 66. 
24 GCF, VII:71, 119, 145; GSL, 324, 326, 356; Vie de Saint Louis, 373. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, 
Nouvelle histoire généalogique de l’auguste maison de France (Villeneuve d’Ascq, 1987-2000), II:226. 
25 GCF, VIII:46-47. See GPT, 492. See also Chapter 3.1. 
26 Robert II is first mentioned by Primat-Guillaume in 1267, when he is knighted alongside the future 
Philippe III. GCF, VII:246; GSL, 428; Van Kerrebrouck, II:227. 
27 GCF, VII:149; GSL, 374. Jackson, Seventh Crusade, 72-73, contextualises this incident by adding 
that Robert was victorious on the battlefield but lacked sufficient troops to counter the disadvantages of street 
fighting. He redeems Robert somewhat, saying that ‘Joinville has been accused of turning Robert d’Artois into 
the scapegoat for the failure of the crusade, which was a foregone conclusion in any case’. Louis IX himself 
blamed the arrival of the sultan, while the Patriarch of Jerusalem blamed the dysentery overrunning the camp. 
Regardless, ‘Louis was deeply grieved by the death of his younger brother’. Gaposchkin and Field, introduction, 
7. 
28 Although his Latin life does not emphasise Robert’s bravery in 1250, Guillaume’s French life glam-
ourises the count’s chivalric boldness: ‘Iluec avint une aventure trop layde; car li cuens dArtoys freres le roys 
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same degree as many non-Dionysian chroniclers.29 Therefore, the version of Robert’s story 
that survived in most recensions emphasises Robert’s virtues while setting up the narrative for 
the generation to come. In both Primat-Guillaume’s and Lescot’s versions, Robert’s chivalric 
sacrifices, much like Alphonse’s political sacrifices, demonstrate a selfless advancement of 
Capetian dynastic authority at great personal cost. 
 The chroniclers portrayed Charles d’Anjou as a blending of the attributes of his broth-
ers, but there was something that made him unique as well: in Charles rested the potential of 
the dynasty to expand beyond the traditional boundaries of France.30 This archetypal model is 
constructed by the chroniclers in two phases, first when Charles became count of Provence 
and then when he became king of Sicily, the former of which will be examined here. Before 
he is introduced in the narrative, Charles is conspicuously preceded by his future wife, Beat-
ritz, who was sovereign countess of Provence, an Imperial territory that served as the bound-
ary between French Languedoc and Imperial Lombardy.31 Primat-Guillaume recount how, in 
1246, Chaime I of Aragón attempted to forcibly marry the girl to his son, for which Lescot 
notes ‘the damsel went into France to the queen, her sister, and she put her body and lands un-
der the protection and guardianship of the king’.32 By possessing the countess, Louis was able 
to direct the future of Provence by controlling the marriage of Beatritz. And, indeed, he ‘gave 
her…to Charles, his brother…and then he gave him the country of Anjou and all the land of 
Maine’.33 Absent from this transaction was Provence, a tacit acknowledgment by Primat-Guil-
laume that was retained by Lescot that the king had no legal authority over the Imperial 
county.34 Instead, Louis gave Charles wealthy lands on the Breton march that held symbolic 
                                               
Loys, qui chevaliers preus et hardis estoit, si fui après les Sarrazins qui fuioient en la ville de la Massourre, parmi 
la porte que il vit ouverte, et iluec fu pris ou occis, si que puis nouvelle nen fu oye; dont ce fu moult grans do-
mages; car il estoit bons chevaliers et hardis’. Vie de Saint Louis, 375. Primat’s original thoughts on the matter 
are unknown, but may be reflected in Guillaume’s Latin text, which says little about Robert. GSL, 374. Jean 
Dunbabin, The French in the Kingdom of Sicily, 1266-1305 (Cambridge: University Press, 2011), 157, opines 
that ‘Robert II d’Artois probably thought of his father’s death at Mansoura as martyrdom’. 
29 See, for example, Matthæi Parisiensis, Monachi Sancti Albani, Chronica Majora, vol. 5, ed. Henry 
Richards Luard (London: Longman, 1880), 154, 158, 160. For a counter-example, see Guillaume de Lorris and 
Jean de Meung, Le roman de la rose, vol. 4, ed. Pierre Marteau (Paris: Paul Daffis, 1879), 176. 
30 Only three Capetian agnatic lines operated outside of France at this time: those descended from Hen-
rique, count of Portugal, since 1096; the family of Latin Emperor Pierre II, since 1216; and Guigues VI, dauphin 
of Viennois, since 1228. Van Kerrebrouck, II:456-457, 559, 624-625. 
31 See generally Stephen Weinburger, ‘Provence’, in Medieval France: An Encyclopedia, eds. William 
W. Kibler and Grover A. Zinn, 765 (New York: Garland, 1995), 765. 
32 ‘Et la damoiselle s’en vint en France à la roine sa suer, et mist son cors et sa terre en la deffensse et en 
la garde du roy’. GCF, VII:114. See GSL, 354. See generally Jean Dunbabin, Charles I of Anjou: Power, King-
ship and State-Making in Thirteenth-Century Europe, The Medieval World (London: Longman, 1998), 41. 
33 ‘…la donna…à Karle son frere…et si li donna la contrée d’Angou et toute la terre du Meine’. GCF, 
VII:115. See GSL, 354. See generally Jordan, Louis IX, 18; Lewis, Royal Succession, 165. 
34 Richard, 139, explains the initial transfer of power, by writing that after ‘s’être entendu avec la 
comtesse mère, et laissant le gouvernement du comté à Romée de Villeneuve et Albeta de Tarascon, qui avaient 
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and strategic value as former Plantagenet possessions. This clarifies to the reader that Charles 
remained a French vassal, despite his extraterritorial domains.35 The chroniclers show that 
Charles later joined Louis and Robert on the Seventh Crusade, fighting and being captured at 
Mansoura before returning to France with Alphonse.36 Thus, Charles shared certain key traits 
with his brothers—he was a French territorial magnate and a crusader—but he served a differ-
ent role in the overall narrative. Primat notes how in 1254, Marguerite II of Flanders at-
tempted to install Charles as ruler over the Imperial county of Hainaut in opposition to her 
quarrelsome sons, an action that was rejected by the French king.37 This incident provided a 
counterpoint to Charles’s legitimate status in Provence, where in 1257 he suppressed a revolt 
as if it was any other provincial uprising.38 His right to the county suo uxoris is never ques-
tioned and the continuator streamlines the narrative in such a way that it appears to be primar-
ily an isolated burgher revolt in Marseilles followed by the rebellion of a single baron; there is 
no sense of widespread opposition to Angevin rule, nor is there a hint that this conflict lasted 
eighteen years.39 To the chronicler, Provence is the legitimate possession of Charles and the 
count was justified in prosecuting those who questioned his rule.40 This was in stark contrast 
to his claims to Hainaut, which were portrayed by the continuator as unjustified, and ruled as 
such by the king. Within the context of the vernacular narrative, Charles remained a loyal 
French vassal throughout his early life despite reigning over territories outside of France, sug-
gesting to the reader that Capetian dynasticism and loyalty transcend the boundaries of the 
kingdom and are essential components to being a Capetian prince. 
 Together, the portrayals of these three royal brothers reflect different traits of Capetian 
dynasticism that the chroniclers highlighted throughout their lives of Louis IX. Alphonse 
serves as the quintessential territorial magnate and the solution to forty years of heresy, 
                                               
été les auxiliaires du comte Raymond Béranger…’. 
35 In contrast, Richard, 140, argues that the ‘mariage qu’il avait contracté avec l’héritière de la Provence 
avait été, pour cette ambition princière, un élément décisif. Par là, d’ailleurs, il était en mesure d’échapper à l’au-
torité du roi de France’. 
36 GCF, VII:120, 156. See GSL, 356, 380. See generally Jackson, Seventh Crusade, 64-65, 73. 
37 In 1257, ‘le conte Karle d’Anjou quita toute le droit qu’il avoit en Henaut par une somme d’argent 
qui li fu livrée’. GCF, VII:179-180, 182. See Primat, 10-11; GSL, 390, 392. See generally Dunbabin, French, 51, 
120-121.  
38 GCF, VII:205-206. See Primat, 13-14; GSL, 410. 
39 Jean-Paul Boyer, ‘De force ou de gré. La Provence et ses rois de Sicile (milieu XIIIe siècle-milieu 
XIVe siècle)’, in Les princes angevins du XIIIe au XVe siècle: Un destin européen, eds. Noël-Yves Tonnerre and 
Élisabeth Verry (Rennes: Presses universitaires, 2003), para. 12, emphasises that after 1251, when Arles and 
Avignon capitulated, the centralisation of the county under Charles was assured. See generally Dunbabin, 
Charles I, 47, 78; Émile G. Léonard, Les Angevins de Naples (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 49-
51. 
40 GCF, VII:206. Dante Alighieri felt that the inheritance and conquest of Provence was so important to 
contemporary history that he mentioned it in Purgatorio, canto XX, verses 61-63. See Primat, 22-23. 
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crusades, and noble revolts in Languedoc. Robert, meanwhile, is the stalwart companion of 
the king, the stereotypical chivalric knight whose crusading adventure was unsuccessful, but 
whose memory was embraced and reinvigorated by his more important progeny. And Charles 
establishes the dynastic expectations and obligations for those cadets living in the French pe-
riphery. The Dionysian vernacular continuators encourage other agnates to look to these men 
for inspiration as they set off to advance Capetian dynasticism, both domestically and abroad. 
 
2.2 Charles d’Anjou and the War for Sicily 
 Charles d’Anjou, unlike all three of his brothers, survived both of Louis IX’s crusades 
and lived through most of the reign of Philippe III before dying in 1285, having lost most of 
his erstwhile empire to the Aragonese. Indeed, the magnitude of Charles’s Italian adventures 
on European politics caused Primat to virtually abandon his life of Louis IX to focus specifi-
cally on Charles. But the chroniclers used the prince’s adventures in Sicily to highlight more 
profoundly the ways in which Capetian influence expanded beyond the traditional boundaries 
of France, building off the precedents discussed above.41 Snippets of information permeate the 
narrative between the excommunication of Emperor Friedrich II in 1245 and the crowning of 
Charles as king of Sicily in 1266, the latter of which led to a two-year campaign to suppress 
those who challenged the Angevin claim to the kingdom. But while Primat used Charles’s ad-
ventures as further proof of Capetian dynastic might abroad, the resulting Sicilian response in 
1282 undeniably undermined the impact of this message in Guillaume’s continuation. Facing 
the loss of the island of Sicily, Charles and his son fought a twenty-year war that led to the un-
precedented partition of the kingdom between the island and the mainland, an event that Guil-
laume and Lescot struggled to recount in any coherent detail.42 This division became the 
burden of the later Angevins and a constant reminder of their inglorious defeat. To Pierre 
d’Orgemont and Jean Juvénal des Ursins, the matter of Sicily was only a sideshow, rarely de-
serving attention, while Jean Chartier ignored it entirely. Thus, to view the Angevins in the 
Dionysian vernacular tradition is to read a story of two families—intimately entwined—drift-
ing apart over generations as their interests and attentions shift. Constructed as a core example 
of Capetian dynastic solidarity under Primat, the Angevins in later continuations become rep-
resentative of how reckless ambition and a lack of foresight can undermine the sustainability 
of that same solidarity. 
                                               
41 Provence gave Charles a solid base from which to begin his later invasions of Italy. Boyer, para. 11; 
Léonard, 77-80. 
42 See Figure 2.2. 
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 Beginning with the excommunication of Friedrich II by Pope Innocent IV in April 
1245, Primat-Guillaume interject short bits of information regarding affairs on the Italian pen-
insula that provide context for the later Angevin conquest.43 They briefly outline the case 
against Friedrich, citing specifically the emperor’s lack of respect for the feudal dues he owed 
the Papacy for Sicily and the Empire.44 Lescot resumes this tale during his narrative of the 
Seventh Crusade, recounting how, after the death of the emperor’s son Heinrich, Friedrich 
went into Apulia to Manfredi, his bastard son, and began to draw the barons to 
him; then…he asked them that they make Manfredi their lord, and he showed 
them many things which were to the confusion of the church of Rome. Since 
[Friedrich] machinated against Pope Innocent, a throat tumour developed which 
blocked his windpipe so that he could not breathe, so he died.45  
The chronicler accomplishes much with this passage, primarily by showing how the Frie-
drich-Manfredi relationship led directly to the death of the emperor, which, in turn, caused a 
succession war in Sicily. Lescot states further that the pope challenged ‘Manfredi, who in all 
his power was against the Church, and he made alliances jointly with the Saracens so that they 
would help him, alongside all the powerful men of the land’.46 The author builds a convincing 
case against Manfredi in these passages and later ones, labelling him a bastard, a usurper, the 
son of an excommunicant and himself excommunicated in 1258, an ally to Saracens and Jews, 
a friend of heretics, a harbourer of evil men, an oath breaker, and a recalcitrant vassal.47 It was 
for these reasons that ‘Pope Urban [IV], who was desiring to put an end to the evilness of 
Manfredi, sent his messengers to the king of France, and requested that he would rescue and 
help the Church of Rome against the king Manfredi of Sicily, who had installed and imposed 
                                               
43 Léonard, 35. 
44 GCF, VII:110; GSL, 346, 348, 350. See generally Henri Bresc, ‘La chute des Hohenstaufen et l’in-
stallation de Charles Ier d’Anjou’, in Les princes angevins du XIIIe au XVe siècle: Un destin européen, eds. Noël-
Yves Tonnerre and Élisabeth Verry (Rennes: Presses universitaires, 2003), para. 1; Thomas Curtis Van Cleve, 
The Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen: Immutator Mundi (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 485, 486. 
45 ‘…si s’en ala en Puille à Mainfroi son fiuz de bast et commença à atraire les barons à soi; si…leur 
requist qu’il feissent de Mainfroi leur sire, et leur monstra mout d’essemples qui estoient à la confusion de 
l’eglise de Romme. Si comme il machinoit contre le pape Innocent, une rieume li descendi en la gorge qui li es-
toupa les conduiz, si qui’il ne pot avoir s’alaine, si en morut’. GCF, VII:160. Neither Guillaume’s Latin text nor 
the first French translation discusses Friedrich’s death in any detail. However, it is possible that this passage de-
rives from Primat. Cf. GSL, 382; Vie de Saint Louis, 383. See generally Léonard, 36; Van Cleve, 529-530. 
46 ‘…Mainfroi qui de tout son pooir estoit contraires à l’Eglise, et fist aliances conjointement aus Sar-
razins qui li furent en aide avoec touz les puissanz homes du païs’. GCF, VII:161-162. 
47 Indeed, each chronicler appears to expand upon the list of Manfredi’s crimes. Primat, 23-24; GSL, 
412; Vie de Saint Louis, 413; GCF, VII:162, 217, 223-224, 236. For discussions regarding how Guillaume con-
structed specifically anti-Hohenstaufen narratives, see Mireille Chazan, ‘Guillaume de Nangis et la translation de 
l’Empire aux rois de France’, in Saint-Denis et royauté: Études offertes à Bernard Guenée, ed. Françoise 
Autrand, Claude Gauvard, and Jean-Marie Moeglin, 463-480 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999); Chris 
Jones, ‘The Role of Frederick II in the Works of Guillaume de Nangis’, in Representations of Power in Medieval 
Germany, 800-1500, International Medieval Research 16, eds. Björn Weiller and Simon MacLean, 273-294 
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2006). See generally Bresc, paras. 10-11, 17; Dunbabin, French, 20. 
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himself upon the land and the kingdom wrongly and without reason’.48 Primat understood the 
importance of context in justifying the events that follow. He wanted to make clear to his 
readers that Capetians were not usurpers—an accusation that had haunted them since Hugues 
Capet took the West Frankish throne in 987—and he more specifically clarified that Charles 
was not some papal puppet unjustly installed on the Sicilian throne as a rival to Hohenstaufen 
authority, but rather he was a righteous saviour who had ventured into Italy to rescue the 
Church from the threat posed by a dangerous enemy. This nuance underlines the overarching 
message of dynastic legitimacy that Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot wished to instil in their 
readers, and it is only through this background that Charles’s actions could be glorified as a 
rightful expression of Capetian dynasticism. 
 Lescot, heavily modifying Primat, used similar means to justify how Charles took the 
Sicilian crown and conquered the kingdom. The continuator begins this process with Louis IX 
himself: when Urban’s messengers entered France in 1263, they met with the French king ra-
ther than Charles, and it was Louis who expressed concerns regarding the conditions of the 
papal grant and his approval which ultimately allowed the project to move forward.49 At this 
time, Lescot also presents the justice of the cause, emphasising that the Papacy had controlled 
the Sicilian crown since the time of Constantine and that Manfredi did not respect this ar-
rangement.50 Borrowing directly from Primat, Lescot adds that Charles enthusiastically sup-
ported the plan on religious grounds, since ‘his will was to help the holy Church and to aid it 
in all of his power’.51 Thus, the chroniclers establish four prerequisites that lend legitimacy to 
the cause: papal support, royal approval, comital righteousness, and a just cause. Charles left 
France in 1266 and, upon his arrival in Rome, a fifth element was bestowed upon him: popu-
lar approval. Copying Guillaume, Lescot recounts that when the people greeted Charles, they 
                                               
48 ‘Pape Urbain qui fu desirrant de metre à fin la mauvaistié de Mainfroi, envoia ses messages au roy de 
France, et li requist qu’il vousist secorre et aidier l’eglise de Romme contre le roy Mainfroi de Sezile, qui s’estoit 
mis et bouté en la terre et el reamme à tort et sanz reison…’. GCF, VII:233. See Primat, 23; GSL, 418. No Dio-
nysian vernacular chronicler mentions Pope Innocent IV’s attempt to install Edmund, earl of Leicester, on the 
Sicilian throne in 1254. Noman J. Housley, The Italian Crusades: The Papal-Angevin Alliance and the Crusades 
against Christian Lay Powers, 1254-1343 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 16; Jones, Eclipse, 195-196. 
49 Both Primat and Guillaume have the papal embassy approach Charles directly. Primat, 23-24; GSL, 
418. The pope only promises the Sicilian crown to the Angevins for four generations, but this issue does not im-
pact Charles’s decision nor is it mentioned again in the vernacular chronicles. GCF, VII:233-234; Housley, Ital-
ian Crusades, 18. Galasso, ‘Charles Ier and Charles II of Naples, Italian princes’, in Les princes angevins du XIIIe 
au XVe siècle: Un destin européen, eds. Noël-Yves Tonnerre and Élisabeth Verry (Rennes: Presses universi-
taires, 2003), para. 2, adds that it ‘est du reste significatif qu’en premier lieu le pape ait pensé au fils cadet de 
Louis IX et que par suite des difficultés à persuader le souverain français, son choix se tourna vers le dernier 
frère du roi’. See generally Léonard, 51. 
50 GCF, VII:233. Neither Primat nor Guillaume mention Constantine. Primat, 23-24; GSL, 418, 420. See 
generally Housley, Italian Crusades, 47. 
51 ‘…sa volenté estoit de secorre sainte Eglise et de li aidier a tout son pooir’. GCF, VII:234. See Pri-
mat, 23; GSL, 420. 
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said ‘truly the virtue of Our Lord is with him’ and made him their senator.52 Shortly after-
wards, the ‘noblemen of Rome and of the country assembled on the day that the king was 
crowned, and they held a great festival in Rome; and the people began to cry “Vive le roy 
Karle”’.53 Although this sequence of events emphasises Charles’s popularity to the Roman 
people, the chroniclers still place a heavy emphasis on religious motivations. This is particu-
larly evident in the speech Charles gave to his troops at Benevento, explaining to them that 
‘you do not fight for me, but for the Holy Church, by whose authority you are absolved for all 
your sins. Look at your enemies who despise God and the holy Church, and who are excom-
municated, which is the beginning of their death and of their damnation’.54 By including this 
speech, Primat confirms the crusading nature of Charles’s cause and converts a succession 
dispute into a war against apostates.55 The ensuing battle at Benevento further confirmed for 
the chroniclers the righteousness of the war against Manfredi since the Hohenstaufen usurper 
was killed in the engagement, a clear sign of divine judgment.56 However, with his death, the 
religious pretence was removed and Charles was forced to resort to more judicial means to so-
lidify his legitimacy as king. When depicting the uprising led by Friedrich II’s grandson, Kon-
radin, in 1268, Primat focuses primarily on the aftermath, emphasising how the rebels were 
executed and the young claimant was delivered to the courts and beheaded for his attempted 
usurpation.57 The chronicler implies that Charles’s actions were respected by the Neapolitan 
people and that this trial confirmed his juridical authority over them. Through these different 
aspects of legitimacy, the chroniclers build a strong case for Charles against the Hohenstaufen 
heirs, proving that Capetians are uniquely suited with the appropriate regnal qualities to sit 
                                               
52 ‘…veraiement la vertu Nostre Seigneur est avoec lui’. GCF, VII:237. See GSL, 420. Charles served 
as senator from 1263 until 1278, although the curia ruled it a breach of contract since the Papacy had no control 
over the election. He concurrently held the post of imperial vicar in Tuscany until 1279. Galasso, paras. 7-8, 11-
12. 
53 ‘Les nobles hommes de Romme et de la contrée s’assamblerent au jour que le roy fu couronné, et 
firent grant feste parmi Romme; et commença le pueple à crier “Vive le roy Karle…”’. GCF, VII:237-238. See 
Primat, 24. See generally Léonard, 54. 
54 ‘…ne vous conbatez pas pour moi, mès pour sainte Eglise, de laquelle auctorité vous estes absols de 
touz voz pechiez. Regardez voz anemis qui despisent Dieu et sainte Eglise, et qui sont esconmenié, qui est com-
mencement de leur mort et de leur dampnacion…’. GCF, VII:242. See Primat, 27. See generally Léonard, 58. 
55 ‘The project was from the start designated a crusade…’. Housley, Italian Crusades, 18. 
56 GCF, VII:242-245. See generally Housley, Italian Crusades, 19. 
57 GCF, VII:258-259. See Primat, 37-39. Primat and Lescot clarify that some protested the boy’s sen-
tence, but that the Neapolitans demanded his death, with the latter adding, ‘pour ce que Corrat [Konrad IV of 
Germany] son pere avoit abatu les murs de la cité de Naples et toutes les fortereces, et le pueple domagié for-
ment’. Jean-Christophe Cassard, L’âge d’or capétien 1180-1328, Histoire de France (Paris: Belin, 2012), 125, in 
contrast, says that Konradin’s execution was ‘sur l’ordre du nouveau roi, contrairement aux usages’, suggesting 
the chronicler is stretching the truth in this retelling. See generally Jones, ‘Perspectives from the Periphery: 
French Kings and their Chroniclers’, in The Medieval Chronicle X, eds. Ilya Afanasyev, Juliana Dresvina, and 
Erik Kooper (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2015), 77-78; Léonard, 71-72. 
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upon any throne.58 
 Lescot, translating Primat, optimistically ends his recounting of the Sicilian affair by 
noting that ‘when all the realm of Sicily was conquered…the men of the land obeyed the king 
and were in peace’, but Lescot ominously appends ‘until Constanza, the queen of Aragón, re-
started the quarrel’.59 This addendum foreshadows how Guillaume approaches the ensuing 
War of the Sicilian Vespers, which began in 1282 when the Sicilians, inspired by promises of 
Aragonese support, massacred all the French settlers on the island in one night.60 Lescot al-
most verbatim copies Guillaume’s depiction of this war. Guillaume establishes Constanza, the 
daughter of Manfredi, whom Lescot calls ‘the damned and excommunicated’, as the villain of 
this piece, supported by her husband, Pero III of Aragón, who ‘was very much in the mali-
cious mind-set of his wife and believed whatever she said’.61 This Aragonese-Sicilian malevo-
lence remains the underlying theme of Guillaume’s entire retelling. The chronicler begins by 
explaining how Pero deceived the pope into supporting a crusade against the Saracens, by 
which means he was able to legitimately bring his fleet to Tunis, just across the strait from 
Sicily.62 Once in Sicily, Guillaume continues, Pero crowned himself king, betraying promises 
to the Sicilians that he would only claim overlordship of the island.63 In response, Charles was 
forced to scrap a crusader fleet, fearing that it may come into enemy hands.64 Guillaume, 
therefore, links the failure of Charles’s proposed crusade to the Levant and the rejection of pa-
pal and Angevin authority in Sicily with the atrocities committed by the Sicilians in the name 
of Constanza and Pero. The chronicler also notes that Pope Martin IV excommunicated Pero 
                                               
58 According to the contemporary French poet Rutebeuf, ‘Charles could be seen to imitate [Charle-
magne] both as a crusader and as a defender of the Church…’. Jones, Eclipse, 179-180. Similarly, Jean de Meun 
‘saw in Charles the king with the power to checkmate, the model of effective kingship, demonstrated in his 
slaughter of Manfred, his execution of Corradin, and his long imprisonment…of Henry of Castile. These men’s 
terrible fates were entirely the results of their own misdeeds…. Writing at some time in the reign of Philippe III, 
Jean’s glowing words probably reflected the predominant French opinion of the matter’. Dunbabin, French, 272. 
Dunbabin, Charles I, 7, adds that ‘[f]or contemporaries, [Charles] was the archetype of the Machiavellian new 
prince’. 
59 ‘Quant tout le reamme de Sezile fu conquis…les genz du païs obeirent au roy et furent en pais 
jusques atant que Coustance la royne d’Arragon recommença l’estrif’. GCF, VII:260. See Primat, 39. See gener-
ally Léonard, 140-141. 
60 GCF, VIII:83-84; GPT, 516, 518. The actual uprising was prompted by the murder in the streets of an 
Angevin official who had taken advantage of a man’s wife, but Aragonese agents had been inciting violence for 
some time prior to this. Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in the 
Later Thirteenth Century, Canto edition (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 213, 215. 
61 ‘…Pierre d’Arragon roy fu moult en volenté des malices sa femme et la crut de quanque elle disoit’. 
GCF, VIII:80, 82. Cf. GPT, 514, 516. See generally Runciman, 202. 
62 GCF, VIII:84-85. Cf. GPT, 518. See generally Runciman, 210, 213, 222. 
63 GCF, VIII:89. Cf. GPT, 520. See generally Runciman, 226, 228. 
64 GCF, VIII:89. 
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and wholesale condemned the kingdom of Aragón in retaliation.65 Lescot offhandedly com-
ments here that Pero ‘planned how, by treachery, he could trick or deceive [Charles], because 
he did not have the talent to go against him in battle’.66 The Aragonese king’s solution, ac-
cording to Lescot, was to challenge Charles to a duel, one hundred men on either side.67 But 
when the day of the combat arrived, the king ‘did not come, nor countermand, nor excuse 
himself of anything’.68 Through their careful retelling, Guillaume and Lescot reaffirm to read-
ers that Pero lacked chivalric virtue and was an oath breaker, therefore justifying any action 
used against him in pursuit of his defeat. 
 The dichotomy between Constanza and the Angevins as developed by Guillaume and 
Lescot becomes more pronounced after Pero disappears from the Sicilian narrative in 1284. 
Lescot informs the reader that dispatches sent by Charles to his son, the future Charles II, 
were intercepted by Sicilian agents, which led to a naval battle at Naples during which the 
prince was captured.69 He also reveals Constanza’s ruthlessness by explaining how she held 
the captured prince by an axe blade, threatening to behead him if the Neapolitans did not give 
up her sister.70 They submitted to her, but widespread riots broke out in Naples during which 
many French residents were killed. Lescot then explains how Charles I ‘chastised [the Nea-
politans] horribly [for submitting to Constanza], then he took and dragged and killed them by 
diverse torments’.71 Charles died soon afterwards and Lescot shows that, by possessing the 
heir to the throne, Constanza became increasingly paranoid ‘that those of Sicily would will-
ingly reconcile themselves to their lord [Charles II]’.72 Lescot uses this fear to highlight Con-
stanza’s tactical ineptitude: she sent the prince to her husband in Aragón at the same time that 
the king of France was invading ‘with so many men that none could count or estimate 
                                               
65 GCF, VIII:89. See generally Strayer, ‘The Crusade Against Aragon’, in The Crusades: Critical Con-
cepts in Historical Studies, vol. 3: Crusading and the Crusader States 1198-1336, ed. Andrew Jotischky (Abing-
don, UK: Routledge, 2008), 444-445. 
66 ‘…se pourpensa comment, ne par quel barat, il pourroit celi conchier ou decevoir, car il n’avoit talent 
d’aler contre li à bataille…’. GCF, VIII:92. Cf. GPT, 522. See generally Léonard, 151. 
67 GCF, VIII:92. Cf. GPT, 522. Runciman, 236, argues that Charles suggested this solution. 
68 ‘Mais le roy d’Arragon ne vint ne ne contremanda ne ne s’escusa de riens…’. GCF, VIII:94. Cf. 
GPT, 524. Dunbabin, French, 39, states that ‘Pope Martin IV was appalled and ordered Edward I of England, in 
his capacity as duke of Gascony, to prevent the battle, because such a form of ordeal was against canon law. 
Charles and Peter each explained the failure of the battle to take place by the failure of the other to turn up at the 
appointed time’. See generally Runciman, 240-241. 
69 GCF, VIII:99. Cf. GPT, 526. See generally Dunbabin, French, 103; Housley, Italian Crusades, 21. 
70 GCF, VIII:99. See generally Runciman, 248. 
71 ‘…si les chastia moult horriblement, car il les fist pendre et trainer et mourir de diverse tormens…’. 
GCF, VIII:100. Charles only executed the ringleaders and pardoned the rest, but Guillaume does not make this 
clear in his narrative. Runciman, 248. 
72 ‘Si s’apperçut bien que ceulz de Cecille se reconciliassent volentiers à leur seigneur…’. GCF, 
VIII:100, 104. Cf. GPT, 528. See generally Runciman, 254-255. 
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them’.73 The death of Pero in late 1285 prompted the chronicler to criticise Constanza one last 
time, noting that she ‘occupied the land of Sicily, against the inhibition and the commandment 
of the Church of Rome’, and he adds that the new pope upheld the excommunication imposed 
on her by his predecessor.74 Lescot narrates this war as one between a rightful king and those 
whose credentials made them unworthy of even their own kingdom, much less one directly 
under papal suzerainty. In so doing, he continues the model of legitimacy Primat and Guil-
laume constructed in the life of Louis IX and maintains their assertion that the Angevins rep-
resented the best features of the Capetian dynasty. 
 After 1285, Guillaume, via Lescot, turns his attention to family matters, demonstrating 
how under Charles II, the Capetian dynasty still retained a vested interest in the Angevin ca-
dets. He notes how Philippe III’s brother Pierre d’Alençon and his cousin Robert II d’Artois 
came to Naples in 1282 and were installed as the prince’s guardians, with the former dying in 
that capacity and the latter becoming regent during Charles’s four-year captivity.75 Later, Ed-
ward I of England—a maternal first cousin of Charles—organised a meeting with the Arago-
nese at Oloron in Gascony in 1287 in order to negotiate the prince’s release, although papal 
opposition killed the treaty.76 Ultimately, it was Philippe IV who secured that release through 
a treaty in 1289, by which his brother, Charles de Valois, gained an Angevin bride and both 
Anjou and Maine as his dowry.77 Thus, the Angevin and Valois dynasties became intimately 
entwined, a fact that encouraged later chroniclers to continue the Sicilian narrative. However, 
with their major French territorial possessions gone, the Angevins no longer held a landed 
stake in French politics and, therefore, their overall importance to the dynastic narrative de-
clined. 
The Dionysian narrative turns toward Angevin-Valois relations after 1300. Evidence 
for this new focus presents itself soon after Guillaume died and his direct influence over the 
scriptorium at Saint-Denis ended. Lescot writes that, in 1302, Charles de Valois, who was 
fighting for Charles II in Naples, unilaterally made peace with Aragón, ending the War of the 
                                               
73 ‘…le roy de France venoit en son royaume d’Arragon a si grant gent que nulz ne les pooit nombrer ne 
esmer…’. GCF, VIII:104. See generally Runciman, 260. 
74 ‘Constance, occupa la terre de Cecille, contre l’inibicion et le commandement de l’église de Rome’. 
GCF, VIII:128. See Chronicon, 571. See generally Runciman, 263. 
75 GCF, VIII:91, 97, 100-101. Cf. GPT, 522-526 (evens). See generally Galasso, para. 16; Housley, Ital-
ian Crusades, 149. 
76 GCF, VIII:129. See Chronicon, 571. See generally Marc Morris, A Great and Terrible King: Edward 
I and the Forging of Britain (London: Hutchinson, 2008), 209-211. 
77 GCF, VIII:136, 139, 144. Cf. Chronicon, 572-573, 574. This dowry was intended to satisfy Charles 
de Valois’s claims to Aragón and move the French towards peace. Galasso, para. 19. See also Chapter 3.2. 
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Sicilian Vespers and confirming the separation of Sicily from Naples in the process.78 He did 
this not to aid the Angevins, but rather so he could leave in good conscience to help his 
brother, Philippe IV, who was fighting a losing war in Flanders. The chronicler notes another 
Valois connection that is forged in 1313, when Catherine de Valois, the titular Latin Empress, 
married Philippe of Taranto, a son of Charles II.79 From this point forward, Lescot increas-
ingly sensationalises the history of Naples. Charles II’s death in 1309 goes unremarked and 
the chronicler primarily discusses the new king, Roberto, through the lens of the Guelph-
Ghibelline feud in Lombardy, in which the future Philippe VI de Valois was a notable partici-
pant.80 Decades pass within the narrative before the Angevins enter the story again. Lescot 
notes after the brutal murder in 1345 of András of Hungary, the husband of Queen Giovanna I 
of Naples, that he was ‘buried without great solemnity and without any of the royals of his lin-
eage being present there’.81 He does not explain where they were, nor what circumstances 
brought Naples to this low point, and when Giovanna was ejected by the Angevin king Lajos 
of Hungary in 1348 for her possible complicity in her husband’s murder, Lescot merely writes 
for 1349 that ‘the kingdom of Sicily was once again acquired’.82 Thus, by the mid-fourteenth 
                                               
78 GCF, VIII:213-215. Cf. Continuatio Chronici Guillelmi de Nangiaco, a monarcho Benedictino ab-
batiæ S. Dionysii in Francia, ab anno MCCCI ad MCCCXLVIII, in Receuil des historiens des Gaules et de la 
France, vol. 20, eds. Pierre Daunou and Joseph Naudet (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1840), 587. See generally 
Housley, Italian Crusades, 23. Dunbabin, French, 136, explains that the treaty of Caltabellotta ‘strongly dis-
pleased Boniface VIII, [but] came as a welcome relief to Charles II (who had ceased to believe that a victory in 
Sicily was possible)’. 
79 GCF, IX:290. Cf. Continuatio, 607. See generally Dunbabin, French, 136. Lescot overlooks the mar-
riage of Marie, daughter of Charles de Valois, to Charles, duke of Calabria, heir to Roberto of Naples, in 1316. 
80 GCF, VIII:347, 356-357, IX:27-28, 92. Cf. Continuatio, 624, 626-627, 635. Roberto had been formal 
head of the Guelph (Papal and pro-Angevin) faction in Lombardy since 1305. Although Lescot suggests Roberto 
requested help from his French cousins, Contamine claims the pope made the request, which explains why, when 
Philippe de Valois was in Lombardy, he negotiated with the Ghibelline (Imperial and pro-Aragonese) party 
against the wishes of the Neapolitan king. Philippe Contamine, ‘À l’ombre des fleurs de lis. Les rapports entre 
les rois de France Valois et les Angevins de Naples et de Provence (1320-1382)’, in Les princes angevins du 
XIIIe au XVe siècle: Un destin européen, eds. Noël-Yves Tonnerre and Élisabeth Verry (Rennes: Presses univer-
sitaires, 2003), para. 9, http://books.openedition.org/pur/18335. See generally GCF, VIII:357; Galasso, para. 24; 
Norman J. Housley, ‘Politics and Heresy in Italy’, in The Crusades: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies—
Vol. 3: Crusading and the Crusader States 1198-1336, ed. Andrew Jotischky (London: Routledge, 2008), 362-
363, 371. For Roberto’s interactions with Emperor Heinrich VII, see Jones, Eclipse, 139-140, 220, 360-362. 
81 GCF, IX:256. Cf. Richard Lescot, Chronique de Richard Lescot, religieux de Saint-Denis (1328-
1344) suivie de la continuation de cette chronique (1344-1364), ed. Jean Lemoine (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 
1896), 69. The Giovanna-András marriage was part of a dynastic union to join the Neapolitan branch of the An-
gevins to the senior Hungarian line, but it was against the wishes of the queen and ‘la reine fut accusée de com-
plicité dans ce meurtre’. Pope Clement VI ‘cleared her of any part in the murder of her husband’. Contamine, ‘À 
l’ombre’, para. 17. See generally Elizabeth Casteen, From She-Wolf to Martyr: The Reign and Disputed Reputa-
tion of Johanna I of Naples (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015), 58-59; Benedetto Croce, History of the 
Kingdom of Naples, Classic European Historians, trans. Frances Frenaye, ed. H. Stuart Hughes (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1970), 47; Diana Wood, Clement VI: The Pontificate and Ideas of an Avignon Pope, 
Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought (Cambridge: University Press, 1989), 97.  
82 ‘Item, en celi temps, le royaume de Sezille fu derechief acquis’. GCF, IX:319. See generally Casteen, 
48-50; Kenneth M. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), vol. 1: The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Cen-
turies (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976), 199n33; Wood, Clement VI, 48. 
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century, the priorities of the Angevins were so different from those of their Valois kin in 
France as to render their inclusion in the chronicles nonessential to the overarching dynastic 
narrative.83 Simply stated, the cadets no longer provided the type of didactic examples their 
forebears had once produced. 
 The Western Schism drew the Angevins back into the Dionysian vernacular tradition, 
but in a manner that did not end well for the cadet house. When Juvénal first introduces Gio-
vanna I to his chronicle, he calls her ‘Queen Jeanne of Sicily and of Jerusalem, countess of 
Provence, daughter of Charles, duke of Calabria, son of Roberto, king of Sicily and Naples, 
and of Marie, sister of the king of France, Philippe [VI]’.84 By giving the monarch her full ti-
tle and linking her directly to her Angevin and Capetian-Valois heritage, Juvénal reintegrates 
the Angevins into the narrative after an absence of over thirty years. However, it was Orge-
mont who first saw the need to reintroduce the neglected kin because they were the first to ac-
cept the election of the Avignon pope in 1378.85 The chronicler contrasts them with Lajos of 
Hungary, who initially pledged support for Clement VI before siding with the Roman claim-
ant.86 The repercussions of this schism were immediate for Naples. Giovanna’s nephew-in-
law, Carlo of Durazzo, adopted the Roman position and invaded Naples in 1381 to bring it 
into obedience, proclaiming himself Carlo III.87 In response, the queen—heirless, her husband 
captured, and surrounded by enemies—adopted Louis I, duke d’Anjou and uncle of Charles 
VI of France, as her successor in the last act of Angevin-Valois dynastic loyalty depicted in 
                                               
83 Dunbabin, French, 46, notes this change occurred after 1305 because the ‘links of friendship were 
becoming strained; opportunities for reinforcing them becoming rare…. As Philippe [IV]’s concerns became in-
creasingly northern, so Charles II was drawn to Piedmont and to Hungary. The bonds created by a common en-
terprise had notably loosened’. Galasso, para. 30, adds that it ‘n’est qu’avec Jeanne Ire que les Anjou deviendront 
vraiment et uniquement des princes napolitains et italiens et verront pratiquement se dissoudre leur physionomie 
de princes de la maison de France’.  
84 ‘La reyne Jeanne de Sicile et de Jerusalem, comtesse de Provence, fille de Charles duc de Calabre, 
fils de Robert roy de Sicile et de Naples, et de Marie sœur du roy de France Philippe…’. Histoire de Charles VI, 
Roy de France, in Nouvelle collection des mémoires pour servir a l’histoire de France, depuis le XIIIe siècle 
jusqu’a la fin du XVIIIe, eds. Joseph-François Michaud and Jean-Joseph-François Poujoulat (Paris: Chez 
l’éditeur du commentaire analytique du code civil, 1836), 347. Cf. Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, Col-
lection de documents inédits sur l’histoire de France. Première série: Histoire politique, ed. and trans. Louis-
François Bellaguet (Paris: Imprimerie de Crapelet, 1839-1852), I:118, 120. 
85 CRJC, II:343. Indeed, she was largely responsible for his election. Contamine, ‘À l’ombre’, para. 28; 
Léonard, 454. See generally Casteen, 196ff; Christof Ohnesorge, ‘Les ambitions et l’échec de la seconde maison 
d’Anjou (vers 1380-vers 1480)’, in Les princes angevins du XIIIe au XVe siècle: Un destin européen, eds. Noël-
Yves Tonnerre and Élisabeth Verry (Rennes: Presses universitaires, 2003), para. 5; Sumption, III:344. 
86 CRJC, II:345. Lajos was one of Urban VI’s earliest and strongest supporters. Contamine, ‘À l’om-
bre’, para. 28. Juvénal later explains that it ‘sembla aux Seigneurs et conseil du Roy, que lesdites manieres es-
toient bien estranges au regard des Hongres, de eux departir de l’alliance du roy de France, sans ce que oncques 
leur eust esté fait chose, parquoy ils le deussent estre’. HCRF, 344. Cf. CKS, I:72-80 (evens). See generally 
Casteen, 211. 
87 CRJC, III:8-10; HCRF, 347. Cf. CKS, I:120, 122. See generally Casteen, 204; Croce, 88; Sumption, 
III:438-439. 
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the vernacular tradition.88 Juvénal villainises the Durazzo Angevins in much the same way 
that Guillaume villainises Manfredi: Carlo is characterised as a usurper, a poisoner, a schis-
matic, an oath breaker, uncharitable, deceptive, and unchivalrous.89 He was guilty of many of 
the sins of his predecessor, but, unlike in 1266, Carlo was the victor in this war and his family 
remained interruptedly on the Neapolitan throne until 1435.90 His son, Ladislao, recaptured 
Naples from a briefly triumphant Louis II in 1399, but Juvénal’s narrative is so broken and 
Valois-centric that none of the facts are clear.91 The chronicler includes two battles that Ladis-
lao lost, but never shows any of the king’s earlier victories nor Louis’s abandonment of the 
campaign in 1411.92 The last Angevin ruler of Naples, Giovanna II, is never mentioned by Ju-
vénal or Chartier in any context, although her usurping husband, Jacques II de la Marche, a 
Bourbon cadet, is ambiguously called ‘king’ by Juvénal in 1412.93 In the end, not enough in-
formation is given surrounding the circumstances of this conflict for the reader to ever under-
stand what is happening in Italy in the early fifteenth century, but it is clear that the Durazzo 
Angevins are not considered by the chroniclers to be the true successors of Charles I or, for 
that matter, legitimate Capetian agnates. As such, Naples becomes little more than a sideshow 
for the chroniclers, barely worthy of mention and certainly a poor representative of Capetian 
dynasticism abroad. 
 This depiction of the Angevin-Valois succession dispute contrasts greatly with Guil-
laume and Lescot’s portrayal of the War of the Sicilian Vespers and highlights the fact that 
Neapolitan politics, even those of the Valois-Angevins, were of far less importance to Juvénal 
and Chartier than they had been to the earlier continuators, signalling a change in interest 
within the vernacular tradition that pivots with Orgemont. When Charles I claimed the Sicil-
                                               
88 The final Angevin monarch of Naples, Giovanna II, adopted as her heir the Valois prince, Louis III 
d’Anjou, in 1423 and then his brother René in 1434, but Chartier does not comment upon this, presumably be-
cause Giovanna I had already granted the succession to the Valois-Anjou dukes earlier. Chartier, I:233; 
Ohnesorge, para. 4, 7, 9; Zita Eva Rohr, Yolande of Aragon (1381-1442) Family and Power: The Reverse of the 
Tapestry, Queenship and Power (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 116. For more on the house of 
Valois-Anjou in Naples, see Chapter 5.3. 
89 HCRF, 350-351, 362-363. Cf. CKS, I:166-168, 330-338 (evens). See generally Ohnesorge, para. 5. 
90 Louis died on campaign in 1384 leaving the Neapolitan claims to his descendants. HCRF, 363, 381; 
Sumption, III:779. See also Noël Valois, ‘L’expédition et la mort de Louis Ier d’Anjou en Italie (1382-1384)’, 
Revue des questions historiques, nouvelle série 9 (1894): 84-153. 
91 HCRF, 381, 418. See CKS, I:622-624, II:748 See generally Ohnesorge, para. 5. 
92 HCRF, 452, 455. Cf. CKS, IV:310, 390, 392. See generally Croce, 53; Rohr, 71-72. 
93 HCRF, 479. Pintoin does mention Ladislao’s death in 1414 and Giovanna’s succession. CKS, V:382. 
Jacques II de la Marche had remained in Italy to represent Louis II of Anjou but married Giovanna II in 1415, 
betraying his Angevin benefactors. He attempted to seize power but was imprisoned and later ejected from the 
kingdom. Rohr, Yolande, 107-108, 225n56. Juvénal is prematurely named Jacques king in this passage. Chartier 
implies that René gained his title to Naples from his brother, Louis III, rather than from Giovanna, although nei-
ther ruler is mentioned by name. 
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ian throne, he was elevated by Primat and Guillaume above all the other Capetian agnates in-
cluding the French king himself. Charles’s struggles against Manfredi, Konradin, Constanza, 
and Pero become a trademark focus of their writing, one that their successors could not en-
tirely abandon. Under Lescot and the Latin chroniclers he borrows from, Neapolitan politics 
retain a presence in the vernacular tradition, albeit one based primarily on the continued rela-
tionship between the Angevins and the Valois. Orgemont, breaking this pattern, avoids dis-
cussing the Angevins almost entirely, focussing instead on the life of Charles V. When he 
does finally return to the Angevins, it is in the context of the Western Schism and Giovanna 
I’s adoption of Louis d’Anjou—the focus is never on Naples-Sicily itself. For both Orgemont 
and Juvénal, Giovanna’s death in 1382 is but a footnote in a larger struggle in which the An-
gevins play a decreasingly significant part. The last Angevins, seven generations removed 
from Louis VIII, are no longer considered by the chroniclers to be agnates, but rather usurpers 
and rivals for the throne of Sicily against the legitimate claims of the house of Valois-Anjou. 
Although Charles I himself sets a noteworthy example of Capetian dynasticism in the Diony-
sian chronicles, the Angevins ultimately represent how genealogical, geographical, and politi-
cal distance can weaken a cadet line, rendering it incapable of supporting the French king or 
Capetian dynasticism. 
 
2.3 The Question of Artois 
 Dynasticism manifests itself in many ways throughout the Dionysian vernacular tradi-
tion and the chroniclers represent a very different aspect of it through the agnates who de-
scended from Robert I d’Artois. The primary purpose of Robert’s story in the vernacular 
chronicles, as assessed above, is to establish the Artesians as valiant knights and crusaders, 
while also setting up the next generation for further greatness. It was with the second genera-
tion, embodied by Robert II, that the family reached its chivalric peak. Robert II was every bit 
his father’s successor, but because he was longer-lived, he provides a better example in the 
chronicles of the duty an agnate owed to the Capetian kings, be they French or Sicilian. Mean-
while, Lescot uses the rivalry of Robert’s heirs, Mahaut and Robert III, as a lesson in dynastic 
loyalty, contrasting the faithfulness of Mahaut with the treason of Robert. This serves the 
overarching narrative well since it villainises Robert, but not at the expense of his descend-
ants. Orgemont rehabilitates the Artesians quickly and Juvénal returns them to the same prom-
inence as their forbears, portraying them as loyal vessels of regnal authority, both at home and 
abroad. The story of the Artesians in the vernacular tradition, so unlike that of the Angevins,  
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is one of brave agnates who passed through a crucible and resisted the urge to abandon dynas-
tic responsibilities for personal glory, thereby reclaiming their status as praiseworthy exem-
plars of Capetian dynasticism.94 
 Robert II, rather than his father, was the true standard for a Capetian crusader and 
knight in the Dionysian vernacular tradition. First introduced by Primat in 1267 when he was 
dubbed a knight alongside the future Philippe III, Robert joined the Eighth Crusade, for which 
he took the cross in 1270 beside his uncles Louis IX and Alphonse, the king’s sons Jean and 
Pierre, and numerous Capetian cognates.95 Robert is, thus, closely associated with prominent 
members of the dynasty from the very beginning. Primat notes that, during the crusade, Rob-
ert saved his men from being flanked by the enemy, suggesting he possessed an inherent tacti-
cal skill that his father had lacked at Mansoura.96 Furthermore, Guillaume implies a close 
friendship between Philippe and Robert, which the chronicler develops from the former’s cor-
onation ceremony in 1271, in which Robert participates, and emphasises when the new king 
visits the count in Artois later that year.97 This implied closeness, however, makes Robert ap-
pear unusually critical of the king in the continuations. Guillaume, via Lescot, reports that, af-
ter Philippe gave the count’s sister away to Edmund, earl of Lancaster, in 1276, Robert ‘was 
very displeased and became enraged, because he thought well that the king of England did not 
have a love for the king of France’.98 Robert was then sent into Navarre to relieve a siege and, 
after his victory, ‘he was infuriated, because he had thought to present [the traitors] to the king 
of France’.99 Guillaume portrays these outbursts as righteous anger, using them to show the 
count’s protective sense of duty to his king and dynasty.100 Philippe held Robert ‘as good and 
                                               
94 See Figure 2.3. 
95 GCF, VII:246, 261. See Primat, 39; GSL, 428, 440. See generally Dunbabin, French, 101. 
96 GCF, VII:276. See Primat, 50; GSL, 456. See generally Kinoshita, ‘Worlding Medieval French’, in 
French Global: A New Approach, eds. Christie McDonald and Susan Rubin Suleiman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2010), 11. 
97 GCF, VIII:39-40. See GPT, 488. See generally Langlois, Philippe III, 55; Gérard Sivéry, Philippe III 
le Hardi (Paris: Fayard, 2003), 85, 86. 
98 ‘…si li desplut moult et en fu forment corroucié, car il pensoit bien que le roy d’Angleterre n’avoit 
nul amour au roy de France’. GCF, VIII:59. See GPT, 500. See generally Sivéry, Philipppe III, 150. 
99 ‘…si en fu corroucié, car il avoit epensé qu’il les presenteroit au roy de France’. GCF, VIII:71. See 
GPT, 506. See generally Langlois, Philippe III, 102-104; Sivéry, Philippe III, 163-165. 
100 Richard E. Barton, ‘“Zealous Anger” and the Renegotiation of Aristocratic Relationships in Elev-
enth- and Twelfth-Century France’, in Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages, ed. Bar-
bara H. Rosenwein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 157, 159, explains that ‘[a]nger through zeal 
occurred when one grew angry against vices and those who committed vices, and thus this type of anger was vir-
tuous.... Like Gods and kings, lords too might grow righteously angry when evil threatened their position or the 
areas under their protection.... For if God, the ultimate source of authority in the universe, was known to have 
become righteously angry when his will was flouted, then kings and lords, also representing legitimate authority 
in the world, should have been able to grow righteously angry with those who flouted their will. Moreover, if 
theology and social reality tended to equate possession of authority with the legitimate expression of anger, it 
would not be long before the persons who resisted such authority would come to be seen as sinful, as deserving 
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loyal’, and this is the very image Guillaume wishes to impress upon his readers: Artesians do 
as they are told, even if they disagree.101 Such is the duty of all Capetians. 
 For the Artesians, dynastic loyalty extended beyond the borders of France. Guillaume 
recounts how Robert II joined his uncle Charles I in Italy in 1275, which served as a prelude 
to Robert’s return in 1282 to defend Naples against the Aragonese.102 Charles entrusted Rob-
ert with the guardianship of the future Charles II at this time, and Robert remained in Naples 
for nearly a decade, about which Guillaume, via Lescot, notes ‘the enemies never dared un-
dertaking on foot nor dared come to battle against him, and it was commonly said that if he 
had remained in the lands, all Apulia and Calabria would have turned in this same year’.103 
Guillaume implies here that Robert’s reputation and skill were such that his very presence in 
Italy could turn the tide of the Angevin-Aragón war.104 These same qualities are showcased in 
1294, when Robert resolved a dispute between the counts of Armagnac and Foix while he was 
campaigning in Guyenne.105 However, it was only in their description of the Anglo-Flemish 
conflict that Guillaume and his continuator exhibit Robert’s true martial abilities. Guillaume 
shows him first in Guyenne in 1297, capturing English castles, before the count relocated to 
Flanders where he fought valiantly at Furnes, although his son, Philippe, was mortally 
wounded in the engagement.106 At Courtrai in 1302, Robert led the French army against the 
Flemish, but victory escaped him and he fell, prompting a poetic lament by Guillaume’s 
nameless continuator.107 Robert’s death rounds out this archetypal Capetian prince. The 
count’s bravery and chivalric qualities merge seamlessly with his dynastic devotion and his 
ultimate sacrifice, providing material upon which the chroniclers can build a standard of dy-
nastic integrity that Capetians can follow in future generations.108 
                                               
recipients of zealous rage’. 
101 ‘[Il] tenoit pour bon et pour loyal…’. GCF, VIII:72. See GPT, 508. 
102 GCF, VIII:57-58. See GPT, 500. See generally Xavier Hélary, L’armée du roi de France: La guerre 
de Saint Louis à Philippe le Bel (Paris: Perrin, 2012), 65, 70; Housley, Italian Crusades, 156. 
103 ‘Tant comme il fu ou pays, les anemis ne furent onques si osés qu’il y meissent le pié ne n’oserent 
onques venir à bataille contre li, et dist l’en communement que se il ne fust ou pays demouré, que toute Puille et 
toute Calabre fust tournée en celle année meismes’. GCF, VIII:101. See GPT, 526. See generally Dunbabin, 
French, 104; Housley, Italian Crusades, 49. 
104 Dunbabin, French, 106, supports this assertion, claiming that ‘Robert’s aim was to contain Arago-
nese intervention, which he came close to achieving, though with great difficulty’. Housley, Italian Crusades, 
21, counters that Robert ‘continued to suffer defeats in Sicily and southern Italy’. 
105 GCF, VIII:151. See Chronicon, 575. See generally Hélary, 148-152. 
106 GCF, VIII:168-169, 175-177. See Chronicon, 578, 579. See generally Cassard, 538; Dunbabin, 
French, 119. 
107 GCF, VIII:207. See Continuatio, 585. See generally Cassard, 539, 541. 
108 Dunbabin, French, 119, disagrees, arguing that when ‘Philippe d’Artois, who had been trained to 
take over from him, died, [he left] a baby son who knew nothing of his grandfather’s hopes for the future. And 
with the death of Robert himself…, the hero of the story lost his great reputation as the most skilled French gen-
eral of his age’. 
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 The durability of this newly-erected archetype was tested almost immediately by Rob-
ert II’s quarrelsome successors: his only living child, Mahaut, and his grandson Robert III, 
seigneur de Conches-en-Ouche. None of the Dionysian vernacular writers dispute the for-
mer’s right to Artois. They demonstrate that, when Robert II was killed in 1302, the title 
passed without contention to Mahaut and her husband, Othon V of Burgundy; then it passed 
seamlessly to their eldest daughter, Jeanne, in 1329.109 Lescot specifically streamlines these 
successions to bring focus to Robert III, who enters the narrative as an aggressor because of 
his invasion of Artois in 1315.110 He was defeated not by his aunt, but by Philippe V, who 
‘put him in prison for a long time until an agreement was made and he abandoned his case 
against the countess of Artois’, in return for which Robert was granted the county of Beau-
mont-le-Rogier.111 Lescot demonstrates that, after this seeming resolution, Robert began to 
express a key Artesian trait by performing meritorious acts of martial prowess alongside his 
Valois in-laws in both 1324 and 1328 against the English and the Flemish respectively.112 But 
these brief expressions of dynasticism merely serve to make the count’s later actions more 
damning. 
 Soon after the battle of Cassel in 1328, Robert appealed his case to Philippe VI, claim-
ing that he had proof that his grandfather intended the county to pass to him.113 Lescot notes 
that several Capetian lords supported his pretensions, including the king’s brother, Charles II 
d’Alençon, and Jean III of Brittany.114 However, when the supporting documents were found 
to be forgeries, Robert denied the charges and fled the French court, never to return again.115 
                                               
109 GCF, VIII:58, 212, IX:108-109; Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 a 1300 avec les 
continuations de cette chronique de 1300 a 1368, ed. Hercule Géraud (Paris: Jules Renouard, 1843), I:322, 334, 
II:111; Continuatio, 588. See generally Jean Favier, Philippe le Bel (Paris: Fayard, 1978), 302; Jonathan Sump-
tion, The Hundred Years War, vol. I: Trial by Battle (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 170. 
110 GCF, VIII:331. Cf. Chronique latine, I:429; Continuatio, 616. See generally Wood, French Apa-
nages, 124-131. 
111 ‘[Il] li fist tenir prison longuement tant que accort fu fait et qu’il quita la contesse d’Artois, et l’en li 
donna la contée de Biaumont en Normendie’. GCF, VIII:335. This county had already been granted to Robert by 
Philippe IV in 1309 as compensation for being bypassed in the Artois succession. Wood, French Apanages, 61. 
Guillaume’s continuators do not mention the county by name here nor when the county was granted in 1309. 
Chronique latine, I:433; Continuatio, 617. See generally Joseph Kervyn de Lettenhove, ‘Le procès de Robert 
d’Artois’, Bulletins de l’académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique, 2nd series, 10-
11 (1860): 652. 
112 GCF, IX:33, 85. See generally Roselyne Callaux, Robert III d’Artois (Paris: Le Manuscrit, 2002), 
34; Dana L. Sample, ‘Philip VI’s Mortal Enemy: Robert of Artois and the Beginning of the Hundred Years 
War’, in The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas, History of Warfare 51, eds. L. J. Andrew Villalon 
and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 265. 
113 GCF, IX:108. See Chronique latine, II:111. See generally Dana L. Sample, ‘The Deceived as De-
ceiver: False Testimony in the Case of Robert of Artois’, in Shell Games: Studies in Scams, Frauds, and Deceits 
(1300-1650), eds. Mark Crane, Richard Raiswell, and Margaret Reeves (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and 
Renaissance Studies, 2004), 288. 
114 GCF, IX:110. 
115 GCF, IX:123-124, 126, 128-132, 142. See Chronique latine, II:124, 126-127, 129-130, 132-133. See 
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His trial was conducted entirely in absentia and the king’s final decision of banishment served 
as more of a confirmation of the status quo than an enforceable judgment.116 In the years that 
follow, Lescot blames Robert for the increased tensions between England and France, noting 
that ‘no truce could be made because Robert d’Artois inhibited many things’ and that every-
thing Edward III did was ‘decided and ordered by the advice of messire Robert d’Artois’.117 
Thus, Lescot blames Robert as much as Edward for the ensuing Anglo-French war.118 Never-
theless, the author understands that Robert sought above all else the restoration of his titles, 
and this explains why the exiled count joined the English in Flanders in 1340.119 Lescot dedi-
cates significant space to the battle at Saint-Omer between Robert and his rival, Eudes IV, 
duke of Burgundy and husband of Mahaut’s granddaughter, Jeanne II d’Artois.120 Besides be-
ing a rare engagement between Capetian agnates, this battle was the culmination of the Arte-
sian dispute, one that confirmed Mahaut’s line of succession and relegated Robert to little 
more than an English sycophant.121 Robert died ingloriously in Brittany in 1342, doing ‘many 
bad things’.122 By depicting his demise in this way, Lescot forewarns all who would turn 
against the dynasty of the potential fate that awaits them. Whereas Mahaut’s heirs remained 
loyal Capetians and only increased in stature and prestige, Robert lost his family, his property 
and titles, and his wealth, and then died in a foreign land, fighting for a cause that was not his 
own.123 Lescot emphasises that this is the penalty for abandoning Capetian dynastic solidarity, 
and it was a lesson that Robert’s children learned well after nearly two decades in French cap-
tivity. 
 Robert III left his Valois wife and their children behind, who were imprisoned and 
equally condemned by Lescot. Indeed, the chronicler reports that ‘the wife of messire Robert 
                                               
generally Simon Hirsch Cuttler, The Law of Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France, Cambridge 
Studies in Medieval Life and Thought, 3rd series, vol. 16 (Cambridge: University Press, 2003), 104; Jonathan 
Sumption, The Hundred Years War, vol. I: Trial by Battle (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 170-171. For more 
on his trial, see Sample, ‘Deceived’.  
116 GCF, IX:131. See Chronique latine, II:132-133. See generally Elizabeth A. R. Brown and Richard 
C. Famiglietti, The Lit de Justice: Semantics, Ceremonial, and the Parlement of Paris 1300-1600, Beihefte der 
Francia: Herausgegeben vom Deutchen Historischen Institut Paris 31 (Sigmaringen, Germany: Jan Thorbecke 
Verlag, 1994), 108. 
117 ‘…nul acort n’i pot estre mis, car messire Robert d’Artois empeeschoit moult la chose…’. GCF, 
IX:157; ‘Toutes lesquelles choses estoient conseilliées et ordenées par le conseil de messire Robert d’Artois…’. 
GCF, IX:160. See Continuatio, 154; Lescot, 42. 
118 Even after Robert’s death, he remained one of the ‘très grans anemis du roy de France’ according to 
Lescot. GCF, IX:246. 
119 GCF, IX:181-184. See Chronique latine, II:168-180. 
120 GCF, IX:187-198. Cf. Lescot, 52; Chronique latine, II:170. 
121 See generally Sumption, I:339-343. 
122 ‘…[il] fist moult de maulz en la duchié de Bretaigne’. GCF, IX:226 228. See Lescot, 59. See gener-
ally John A. Wagner, Encyclopedia of the Hundred Years War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2006), 
271. 
123 For more on Mahaut’s successors, see Chapter 4.2. 
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d’Artois…was more culpable than her husband’.124 Yet the family’s rehabilitation begins al-
most immediately in Orgemont’s continuation. He implies their release when Jean II knighted 
Robert’s eldest son, Jean, alongside other prominent Capetian agnates during the coronation 
celebration in 1350.125 By April 1356, Jean was already count of Eu, and both he and his 
brother, Charles, assisted the king when he arrested Carlos II of Navarre in Rouen that year.126 
In this episode, Orgemont lists Jean and Charles directly after the king’s brother, Philippe 
d’Orléans, suggesting that the chronicler considered their place in the Capetian dynasty re-
stored. At Poitiers, the brothers served in the French army and were captured by the victorious 
English.127 After peace was restored and Jean II died, Jean d’Eu took his place beside the new 
king, Charles V, during whose coronation procession he led the horse of the prestigious Cape-
tian duchess Blanche, daughter of Charles IV and wife of the duke d’Orléans.128 Orgemont 
also names Jean one of the fleurs de lis—the first instance in the vernacular tradition in which 
this term is used—when describing the parlement that condemned Edward, prince of Wales, 
in 1369.129 Lastly, Jean, accompanying the king and other prominent Capetians, greeted Em-
peror Karl IV when he visited France in 1378.130 By the conclusion of his continuation, Orge-
mont has entirely reversed the perception of the Artesian agnates. Abandoned narratively by 
Lescot, the cadets are redeemed and emerge as good and loyal representations of regnal au-
thority within Orgemont’s continuation. 
 Juvénal—abridging material from Michel Pintoin—advances the archetypal qualities 
of the Artesians further by restoring their status as paragons of chivalric virtue. Early in his 
chronicle, Juvénal recounts how Louis d’Anjou asked Philippe d’Artois, Jean’s son and ‘a 
valiant knight’, to ‘take the lead in going to fight’ Carlo [III] of Durazzo in Naples.131 
Philippe’s role in Louis’s Neapolitan campaign is reminiscent of Robert II’s participation in 
                                               
124 ‘…la famme messire Robert d’Artois…estoit plus coupable que son mari’. GCF, IX:130. See 
Chronique latine, II:130. Even his sister, the wife of the count of Foix, was imprisoned because ‘elle trop jolive-
ment de son corps sa grant confusion et vilanie de son linage’. GCF, IX:125, 142. See Chronique latine, II:125-
126. See generally Frank Ledwidge, ‘Le procès de Robert d’Artois: coupable—mais de quoi?’, in Proceedings of 
the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History, 14-16 October 1982, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 
Canada, ed. John F. Sweets (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 1984), 34. 
125 CRJC, I:25-26. See generally Françoise Autrand, Charles V: Le Sage (Paris: Fayard, 1994), 85, 156. 
126 CRJC, I:62-63. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 176. 
127 CRJC, I:73. See generally Sumption, II:247, 462. 
128 CRJC, II:4. 
129 CRJC, II:74. See generally Lewis, Royal Succession, 181. 
130 CRJC, II:201. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 788. 
131 ‘[Il] escrivit à messire Philippe d’Artois, qui estoit vaillant chevalier, qu’il voulust prendre la charge 
d’aller combatre ledit Charles’. HCRF, 347. See CKS, I:120, 122. Juvénal and Pintoin may be confusing Philippe 
with his brother Robert, who married Giovanna, duchess of Durazzo, and was murdered in 1387 by order of 
Carlo III of Naples, her brother. Van Kerrebrouck, II:234. 
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Charles I’s Sicilian adventure a century earlier. But the comparison ends there. Unlike Rob-
ert’s, Philippe’s skill was not enough and he, as well as Giovanna I and her husband, Otto von 
Braunschweig, were captured by Carlo. This failure did not seem to mar his reputation, how-
ever, since in 1383 he served as standard-bearer for Charles VI against Despenser’s crusade, 
during which he ‘carried himself valiantly’.132 Juvénal portrays Philippe as both valiant in 
arms and a willing vessel for both the Valois-Angevin and French kings, eventually serving as 
constable of France for the latter, a position rarely granted to agnates.133 He also proved him-
self a crusader when he travelled to Hungary in 1393 and then, ‘displeased that he had made 
no exploits of war against the Saracens, learned…that the king of Bohemia was suspicious of 
several articles of faith, and was valued little better than a Saracen, and for this…he put the 
King and all the land into his subjection, and returned to great honour and praise’.134 Philippe 
joined the Hungarian king again in 1396 in the ill-fated siege of Nicopolis against the Otto-
man Turks, although the count’s capture and eventual death in captivity are recorded neither 
by Juvénal nor Pintoin.135 Philippe’s son and the last Artesian agnate, Charles, was captured at 
Agincourt as a young soldier and does not return to the narrative until the Praguerie revolt in 
1440, at which time he is portrayed by Chartier as a mediator between the rebels and Charles 
VII.136 His loyalty to the Capetian cause and his martial abilities are confirmed by the chroni-
cler in his account of the 1449-50 invasion of Normandy, where Charles was one of the lead-
ing generals responsible for defeating the English, although his individual acts were merged 
with those of the other commanders.137 Ultimately, though, it was his role as one of the four 
                                               
132 ‘…se porta vaillamment messire Philippes d’Artois comte d’Eu…’. HCRF, 360. See CKS, I:280. See 
generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:234. Philippe did not in fact become count d’Eu until 1387, following the death in 
rapid succession of his father and his brother, Robert IV. 
133 HCRF, 390. See CKS, II:30. See generally Setton, 344. The only known earlier Capetian constable 
was Jacques I, count de la Marche, who served from 1354 to 1356. Anselme de Sainte-Marie, Histoire des 
grands officiers de la couronne de France avec l’origine et le progrez de leurs Familles (Paris: Estienne Loyson, 
1674), 32, 38. 
134 ‘Le comte d’Eu desplaisant qu’il n’avoit fait quelque exploict de guerre sur les Sarrasins, sceut…que 
le roy de Boheme sentoit mal en plusieurs araticles de la foy, et ne valoit gueres mieux que Sarrasin, et 
pource…mit le Roy et tout le pays en sa subjection, et s’en retourna à grand honneur et loüange’. HCRF, 396. 
See CKS, II:122, 124. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:234. 
135 HCRF, 408. See CKS, II:428. See generally Setton, 345, 355, 360. 
136 HCRF, 497, 521; Chartier, I:258. See CKS, V:303. Pintoin does not mention Charles among the cap-
tured at Agincourt in 1415. Cf. CKS, V:574. See generally Gaston du Fresne, marquis de Beaucourt, Histoire de 
Charles VII (Paris: Librairie de la société bibliographique, 1881-1891), III:20, 131. The count was not released 
until 1438, which explains his narrative absence. Chris Given-Wilson and Françoise Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Pris-
oners of War: The Battle of Poitiers and its Context’, English Historical Review 116:468 (2001): 825. From the 
time of his release, he was a regular councillor of Charles VII. Pierre-Roger Gaussin, ‘Les conseillers de Charles 
VII (1418-1461): Essai de politologie historique’, in Francia: Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte, 
vol. 10 (Munich: Artemis, 1983), 106. See also Chapter 8.2 
137 Chartier, II:84-87, 94-97, 101, 104ff. See generally Beaucourt, V:8; Edouard Perroy, The Hundred 
Years War, trans. W. B. Wells (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1951), 318. 
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pallbearers of Charles VI in 1461 that confirms his status as a great Capetian lord.138 Despite 
initial hardships and the legacy of Robert III, the final Artesian agnates proved themselves to 
be just as valiant, chivalrous, loyal, and devoted to the Capetian dynasty as their house’s pro-
genitors. This is precisely the message that the Dionysian vernacular continuators wished to 
impress upon their readers: that the Artesians express as well as any Capetian—and better 
than many—key qualities that all agnates should replicate in order to secure and advance Ca-
petian dynasticism. 
 Such is the legacy of Artesian cadets within the Dionysian tradition. Their ancestor 
Robert I established the groundwork for a house built on chivalric virtue, crusading spirit, and 
dynastic loyalty, but it was only under Robert II that such an edifice was properly constructed. 
His role in French, Angevin, and crusading politics set a standard for the greater Capetian 
dynasty to follow. The vernacular chroniclers demonstrate how this legacy was embraced by 
all his agnates, who together retained the surname d’Artois despite having lost their titular 
lands in 1329. Indeed, no other Capetian cadet branch is so consistently identified with its an-
cestral roots. Robert III is always named Robert d’Artois by Lescot, while Orgemont intro-
duces Robert’s son as Jean d’Artois in 1350 and Juvénal names Jean’s son Philippe d’Artois 
in 1381.139 Although Robert III ultimately failed in his dynastic duties, he nonetheless exhib-
ited much of the martial spirit of his predecessors, a fact that Lescot cannot entirely overlook. 
His failings provided the Capetians in general and Robert’s descendants in particular with a 
counterexample to the valour exhibited by earlier Artesians, and these also gave his children a 
basis from which to recover their reputation. These final agnates were able to embrace their 
martial heritage and combine it perfectly with their newfound respect for regnal authority, res-
urrecting the role that Robert II had established for the house at the beginning of the century. 
The Artesians in the Dionysian tradition are a unique family, but their emergence from the 
bleak depths of Robert III’s betrayal not only proves the durability of their specific didactic 
role within the Capetian dynastic narrative, but establishes the merits of pursuing a selfless 
approach towards advancing dynasticism. 
 
           
 
                                               
138 Chartier, III:115. See generally Beaucourt, VI:443; Malcolm Graham Allan Vale, Charles VII (Lon-
don: Eyre Methuen, 1974), 212. 
139 CRJC, I:26, 63; HCRF, 347. Chartier is the only chronicler not to link the cadets to their Artesian 
origins. 
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Devotion within a family is never a given, especially in one so powerful and influential as the 
Capetians of France. Indeed, before the time of Louis IX, the relationship between Capetian 
agnates was that of lords-to-lords or kings-to-vassals. What occurred between the children of 
Louis VIII, therefore, was unprecedented in French history. The Dionysian continuators real-
ised this and used the potential of such a positive relationship to their benefit, creating for 
each prince an archetype to which other agnates could aspire to emulate.140 Within this narra-
tive framework, Alphonse serves as the territorial magnate, the loyal vassal who protects the 
realm from outside threats at the cost of his own glory. Robert is the valiant knight, a crusader 
willing to sacrifice all for God and dynasty. And Charles is the great expansionist, a man ca-
pable of advancing dynastic authority out of the Capetian heartland and into the periphery. 
The descendants of the latter two agnates continued to test and refine the models set by their 
ancestors to varying degrees. For the Angevins, this produced diminishing returns as later Ne-
apolitan monarchs lost progressively more land and status to rivals until all record of their 
deeds disappeared from the vernacular texts. The Artesians, meanwhile, reached new heights 
under Robert II only to pass through the fire of treason before their reputation was recovered 
and their legacy restored. The moral examples provided by these agnates informed the chroni-
clers and helped direct them as they wrote. Primat understood the inherent archetypal qualities 
of the king and his brothers when he presented his chronicle to Philippe III in 1274—the proof 
is in his later writings and in how Guillaume worked so diligently to continue what his prede-
cessor began. But neither could predict how difficult it would be for subsequent generations 
of Capetian cadets to follow these archetypes. Nonetheless, the examples set by the sons of 
Louis VIII establish within the Dionysian vernacular continuations important didactic models 
upon which future Capetian kings and princes could reflect.
                                               
140 Chazan, 469, notes more generally of thirteenth century French chronicles that ‘[l]a pieuse unanimité 
de la famille capétienne fait contraste avec l’indignité qui marque les descendants de Frédéric II…’. Thus, Pri-
mat, Guillaume, and Lescot’s writings fit within this larger literary framework of the period while also accom-
plishing their own independent goals. 

 
CHAPTER THREE  
Cursed and Fortunate Kings 
 
The Capetian kings of the early fourteenth century did not measure well against their glorified 
forbearers. Endless warfare, brutal rebellions, public scandals, dynastic disunity, and a series 
of succession crises punctuated the period, leaving its kings as poor representatives of Cape-
tian dynasticism and regnal authority. Reflecting on the death of Charles IV without a son in 
1328, the Dionysian vernacular chronicler Richard Lescot laments that ‘all the lineage of King 
Philippe [IV] le Bel failed and disappeared in less than thirteen years, which caused very great 
damage’.1 This final assessment is embraced by many later writers, and French historical fic-
tion author Maurice Druon labels these monarchs the rois maudits—the accursed kings.2 Alt-
hough Lescot may not entirely agree with Druon’s characterisation of the rulers of this period, 
there is a truth to this sentiment that underlies the Dionysian narrative. To the continuators, 
the moral lessons that derive from the rois maudits begin with the intermarriages between the 
Capetian dynasty and the Champenois monarchs of the tiny Pyrenean kingdom of Navarre in 
the thirteenth century, and conclude in the early fifteenth century after the rulers of Navarre 
permanently abandoned French politics.  
Rising above the ignominy of multiple rebellions against the regency government of 
Louis IX, the last Navarrese rulers of the house of Champagne married heavily into the Cape-
tian dynasty until their family and titles were literally absorbed by their French royal kin. 
When Louis I of Navarre—Louis X of France—died young in 1316, his brother Philippe de 
                                               
1 ‘Et ainsi toute la ligniée du roy Phelippe le Bel, en moins de XIII ans, fu deffaillie et amortie, dont ce 
fu très grant domage’. GCF, IX:65. See Chronique latine, II:82. See generally Jules Viard, ‘Philippe VI de Va-
lois. La succession au trône’, in Le moyen age revue d’histoire et de philologie, 2nd series, vol. 23, ed. Albert 
Marignan, et al. (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1921), 259-260. 
2 Popular history writer Alison Weir, Isabella: She-Wolf of France, Queen of England (London: Vin-
tage Books, 2012), 103, argues that ‘given the dynastic scandal [the Tour de Nesle affair] that had overtaken 
Philip’s sons, it is hardly surprising that he and they quickly became known as “les Rois Mauduits”’. Meanwhile, 
paranormal researcher Bob Curran, Frankenstein and Other Man-Made Monsters, Haunted: Ghosts and the Para-
normal (New York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2014), 106, blames the epitaph on Jacques de Molay, the last grand 
master of the Knights Templar, who, as he was burning at the stake, ‘showed no fear and called on God to 
avenge him on his enemies: the king, the pope, and the Capetian line. Within a year, both Clement and Philip 
were dead…. The decline in the fortunes of the monarchy continued from 1314 to 1328…. This gave the com-
mon nickname to the rule of the later Capetian monarchs, Les Rois Maudits… and their fortunes were linked di-
rectly to de Molay’s supposed curse’. Famed fantasy author George R. R. Martin, ‘My hero: Maurice Druon by 
George RR Martin’, The Guardian, 5 April 2013, notes of Druon’s series—ergo, this period as a whole—that ‘it 
is the original game of thrones’. See also Maurice Druon, Le Roi de Fer (1955), La Reine étranglée (1955), Les 
Poisons de la couronne (1956), La Loi des mâles (1957), La Louve de France (1959), Le Lys et le lion (1960), 
and Quand un Roi perd la France (1977). The series was turned into a French television series twice. See Les 
Rois maudits, directed by Claude Barma, written by Marcel Jullian (ORTF, 21 December 1972-24 January 
1973); and Les Rois maudits, directed by Josée Dayan, written by Anne-Marie Catois (France 2, 7 November-28 
November 2005). For art of the period, see Danielle Gaborit-Chopin and François Avril, eds., L’art au temps des 
rois maudits: Philippe le Bel et ses fils, 1285-1328 (Paris: Reunion des musées nationaux, 1998). 
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Poitiers seized both thrones against the rights of his niece, prompting a period of twelve years 
in which Navarre ceased to be an entity within the context of the Dionysian continuations. 
When the two realms were finally ripped apart in 1328, they fell into the hands of two Cape-
tian cadets, agnatic grandsons of Philippe III. Philippe VI, son of the famed count and right-
eous warrior, Charles de Valois, succeeded to France, and the chroniclers dedicate 
considerable space thereafter to examining the political and religious reasons why Philippe is 
worthy of such an unlikely inheritance. Meanwhile, a similar approach is taken in describing 
Filipe III, son of Louis d’Evreux and suo uxoris king of Navarre, who proved himself a faith-
ful Capetian prince and soldier of God throughout his fifteen-year reign. His descendants, 
however, were weaker champions of dynastic solidarity, and Pierre d’Orgemont and Jean Ju-
vénal des Ursins often depict them groping desperately via murder, intrigue, and civil war for 
lands and titles which they had lost. This chapter will examine the ways in which the vernacu-
lar chroniclers portrayed these French and Navarrese rulers in order to determine whether 
their representations reflect a desire on the part of the continuators to create and advance a 
specific dynastic message about Capetian dynasticism and French regnal authority. 
 
3.1 The Navarrese Double Monarchy 
 The merger of the French and Navarrese thrones in 1285 was an unprecedented event 
in Capetian history. The last union of crowns had occurred under the Carolingians four centu-
ries earlier and the next would not happen until Charles VIII briefly seized the Neapolitan 
throne in 1495. To the chroniclers at Saint-Denis, this was a watershed moment. Primat, una-
ware of the future union, nevertheless sets the groundwork for it by emphasising the loyalty 
shown by the rulers of Navarre to Louis IX during the Eighth Crusade and afterwards. Within 
the context of the chronicles, this demonstrates a much more dramatic shift in opinion since 
the first Navarrese king of the house of Champagne, Thibaut I, was a frequent opponent of 
Louis’s regency government. Guillaume de Nangis and his anonymous continuators ulti-
mately merged the Navarre and Capetian narratives together after 1285, with the later writers 
portraying Louis I of Navarre as a valiant, but loyal, Capetian warrior prior to his coronation 
as king of France. Louis’s death and the accession of his brother, Philippe de Poitiers, in 1316 
ends any discussion of dual monarchy, leaving readers with the impression that Navarre be-
came simply another part of the French kingdom. This section will explore how the continua-
tors discuss the merger of the Navarrese and French royal lines at the end of the thirteenth 
century to determine the ways in which the event provided lessons in dynasticism. 
 Who precisely at Saint-Denis wrote the information covering the period 1226 to 1250 
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is unclear—it was either Primat, Guillaume de Nangis, or Lescot—but what is certain is that 
Thibaut is reviled by the chroniclers as a recalcitrant vassal of Louis IX in 1226 when he joins 
a rebellion against the young king.3 But Thibaut proved to be a poor rebel on multiple occa-
sions and returned to Louis each time.4 His narrative arc in the continuation changes after Thi-
baut became king of Navarre in 1234 to one that advances a message of Capetian 
dynasticism.5 Thibaut’s leadership in the Barons’ Crusade of 1239 is emblematic of this 
change—the king proved himself a true soldier for Christ, much like earlier Capetian kings 
had done and Louis would shortly do, and this is the impression of the Navarrese king that the 
chroniclers leave with readers.6 Thibaut I’s successor, Thibaut II, is introduced in 1270 by Pri-
mat in precisely this same role.7 Indeed, the king is shown fighting alongside Louis at Tunis 
on the Eighth Crusade and, in response to Thibaut dying on the return journey, Primat, via 
Lescot, laments that ‘he was the greatest member of the host after the king of France and the 
most powerful, and he was a wise man and gave good counsel, and he was so large and wont 
to give to those who worked for him, and he especially never forgot the poor’.8 Thibaut’s 
wife, Isabelle, daughter of Louis, died soon afterwards because, as Lescot reports, ‘she had no 
more joy in her heart’.9 The chroniclers feel the loss of Thibaut is significant to the overarch-
ing narrative—his martial abilities, status, and his wife’s devotion are all evidence of his Ca-
petian qualities. Furthermore, Thibaut and Isabelle embodied the first iteration of the Franco-
Navarrese dynastic relationship that would be repeated and enhanced under subsequent rulers. 
 That dynastic unity would develop further under Thibaut’s successor and brother, 
Henri I, whose primary importance to the vernacular narrative is that he was the father of 
Jeanne I.10 This point is made manifest when Henri died in 1274, after which his widow  
  
                                               
3 GCF, VII:35-37. See GSL, 312. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 7; Le Goff, 101-102. 
4 GCF, VII:37, 40-41, 65-66. See GSL, 312-316, 322-324 (evens). See generally Richard, 92-95. 
5 See GSL, 328, 330; GCF, VII:77. 
6 Le Goff, 183, suggests that ‘Saint Louis a peut-être vu dans la réussite de cette expédition un motif 
d’émulation personnelle’. Jordan, Louis XI, 42, holds a more critical view, arguing that Thibaut was forced to 
take a crusader vow after having been banished from Champagne in 1236, and notes of the crusade that it ‘was a 
disastrous failure’. Indeed, he adds that ‘memory of it had something to do with the opposition to Louis’s vow a 
few years later’. See also Le Goff, 111; Michael Lower, The Barons’ Crusade: A Call to Arms and Its Conse-
quences (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). 
7 GCF, VII:261. See Primat, 39; GSL, 440. See generally Richard, 533. 
8 ‘…c’estoit le greigneur membre de l’ost après le roy de France et le plus puissant; et estoit sages hons 
et donnoit bon conseil, et si estoit large et abandonné de donner à ceulz qui en avoient mestier, et especiaument il 
n’oblioit point les povres’. GCF, VIII:28; Primat, 84. See GPT, 482, 484. See generally Le Goff, 738; Richard, 
571, 573. 
9 ‘…ne n’ot onques puis joie à son cuer’. GCF, VIII:29. Primat notes more specifically that she died 
from falling off a horse, although adds that ‘la mort d’icelle troubla moult très forment meesmement le roy et 
puis tout l’ost’. Primat, 85. See generally Le Goff, 738. 
10 GCF, VIII:46-47. See GPT, 492. See generally Sivéry, Philippe III, 150. See Figure 3.1. 
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‘hastened quickly to take her child into France’, where ‘Philippe [III] dutifully and willingly 
received the child and nourished her at his court at Paris with his children so that when she 
was of age, he could give her to some high lord in marriage’.11 Thus, Jeanne’s entry in the 
story parallels that of Beatritz of Provence forty years earlier.12 Lescot adds that ‘the king sent 
Eustache de Beaumarchais into Navarre and ordered that he receive in [Philippe’s] name as 
tutor and guardian of the child the homages of the barons of Navarre’.13 Within this single ep-
isode, the continuator demonstrates how decisively Navarre fell under French control, justify-
ing the legitimacy of its de facto annexation via the voluntary flight of the dowager queen and 
the threat posed by a noble revolt. When the Navarrese did rise up against French overlord-
ship in 1276, Philippe quickly suppressed the revolt and converted Navarre into what was es-
sentially a client kingdom.14 This situation became permanent in 1284 when the king’s heir, 
the future Philippe IV, wed Jeanne and legally bound Navarre to the Capetian line.15 Upon her 
death in 1305, the title passed to her eldest son, Louis I, who continued to rule Navarre 
throughout his reign, even after becoming king of France as Louis X in 1314.16 Within the 
vernacular continuations, the story of the last Champenois rulers of Navarre is one of a promi-
nent noble house merging seamlessly into the Capetian dynasty through marriage until it loses 
what makes it unique and becomes simply another aspect of Capetian identity. 
 The subsuming of Navarre into the kingdom of France was not without contest. Lescot 
explains that Louis was forced to subdue Navarre and claim the kingship personally in 1307, 
further bringing the kingdom into the French orbit.17 In this way, the chronicler demonstrates 
how noble revolts in Navarre against French authority actually cemented Capetian dynastic 
authority over the Pyrenean kingdom. From 1307, and especially after Louis became king of 
                                               
11 ‘…si se hasta moult de porter son enfant en France… Le roy Phelippe, l’enfant doucement et volen-
tiers reçut et le fist nourrir à sa court à Paris avec ses enfanz tant que elle fust en aage qu’il la peust donner à 
aucun haut homme à mariage’. GCF, VIII:50-51. See Primat, 93; GPT, 494, 496. See generally Elizabeth A.R. 
Brown, ‘The Prince is Father of the King: The Character and Childhood of Philip the Fair of France’, Mediaeval 
Studies 49 (1987): 322. From the time of her arrival in France, Jeanne was betrothed to Philippe III’s second son, 
Philippe. Langlois, Philippe III, 98-99. 
12 See Chapter 2.1. 
13 ‘…le roy envoia maistre Huistace de Biau Marchais en Navarre et li commanda qu’il receust en son 
nom et comme tuteur et garde de l’enfant les hommages des barons de Navarre’. GCF, VIII:51-52. See generally 
Langlois, Histoire, 114. 
14 GCF, VIII:67-71. See Primat, 94-96; GPT, 504-508 (evens). Langlois, Histoire, 114, says that, after 
this revolt, it ‘fut gouvernée à la façon d’une sénéchaussée française’. See generally Sivéry, Philippe III, 151. 
15 GCF, VIII:101. See GPT, 526, 528. Originally, Philippe was to inherit Navarre while his elder 
brother, Louis, succeeded in France, but Louis died in 1276 leaving Philippe heir to both kingdoms. Brown, 
‘Prince’, 316, 317-318. See generally Brown, ‘Prince’, 330. 
16 GCF, VIII:243-244, 255. See Chronique latine, I:347; Continuatio, 595. See generally Brown, 
‘Prince’, 304. 
17 GCF, VIII:258. Cf. Continuatio, 595. See generally Elena Woodacre, The Queens Regnant of Na-
varre: Succession, Politics, and Partnership, 1274-1512, Queenship and Power (New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2013), 48, 65. 
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France in 1314, Navarre was little more than a status symbol for the king in the eyes of the 
chronicler. Lescot continues to associate Louis with both kingdoms throughout his short reign, 
but the Navarrese title declines in importance afterwards.18 When Louis died in 1316, his 
brother Philippe de Poitiers was called by Lescot ‘governor of the kingdoms of France and of 
Navarre, for all justice, etc.’19 Lescot intentionally does not name Philippe regent of the king-
doms, as his sources do, and he also leaves out all discussion of the rights of Joana, Louis X’s 
daughter and presumed heiress, discussed below.20 His text is streamlined to avoid any hint of 
usurpation. When Philippe ascended the thrones later that year, Lescot never explicitly says 
that Philippe also succeeded to Navarre—only Orgemont’s rubric, added in 1377, draws atten-
tion to this fact.21 The most that is said by Lescot is that, after the death of Louis’s posthu-
mous son, Jean I, in 1316, Philippe ‘put himself in possession of the kingdoms’, although, 
notably, he was not specifically named king of either realm in this passage.22 Lescot does not 
mention Navarre at all during the formal reigns of Philippe V and his brother, Charles IV.23 In 
fact, Juvénal, writing a century later, does not seem to consider these two men rulers of the 
small kingdom when he calls a later king ‘Charles I’, a rejection of Charles IV’s claim to that 
name.24 Regardless, what is clear from the vernacular narrative is that, rather than treating 
France-Navarre as the dual monarchy that it legally was, Lescot overlooks Navarre as a politi-
cal entity once its personal union with France was secured.25 This means either that Navarre 
ceased to be important to the vernacular continuators or that its erasure produced a more pow-
erful statement about dynasticism and regnal authority within the chronicles. 
 The story of Navarre from 1250 to 1328 within the Dionysian chronicles is a narrative 
                                               
18 GCF, VIII:305-307, 314, 319-332. See Chronique latine, I:415, 426; Continuatio, 612, 615. 
19 ‘…Phelippe filz du roy de France, gouvernant les royaumes de France et de Navarre, à touz justiciers, 
etc’. GCF, VIII:328, 332. Lewis, Royal Succession, 105, 178, 188. 
20 Guillaume’s continuators name Philippe ‘Franciæ et Navarræ regens regna’, which was a stronger 
title than the mere ‘gouvernant’ title noted by Lescot, since, according to Lewis, Royal Succession, 187-188, it 
implied a right to the throne. Chronique latine, I:427; Continuatio, 615. 
21 GCF, VIII: 333; Hedeman, Royal Image, 106. In contrast, Guillaume’s continuators note controversy 
surrounding Philippe’s succession and name both kingdoms. Chronique latine, I:617; Continuatio, 431-432. 
22 ‘…Phelippe conte de Poitiers se mist en possessions des royaumes’. GCF, VIII:334. See generally 
Lewis, Royal Succession, 149-150; Woodacre, 48. 
23 Lescot writes that when Philippe V died in 1322, ‘vint en succession le royaume…à Charles conte de 
la Marche’. He neglects to reference Navarre in this succession. GCF, VIII:366. 
24 HCRF, 371. Charon, Princes et principautés au Moyen Âge: L’example de la principauté d’Évreux, 
1298-1412, Mémoires et documents de l’École des chartes (Paris: École des chartes, 2014), 122, explains that the 
‘Navarrais n’avaient jamais considéré Philippe V et Charles IV comme rois légitimes: ils n’étaient pas venus se 
faire couronner à Pampelune’. See Chronique latine, II:38-39. 
25 Jones, Eclipse, 300, argues that this may have reflected the belief that ‘such unions were considered 
to be essentially matters of personal inheritance’, and that the acquisition of a throne ‘would not, in itself, alter 
the relationship between’ the two realms. 
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of dynastic cohesion, loyalty, and unity. Although long at odds with one another, the Na-
varrese and Capetians emerge as key allies due to the crusades of the thirteenth century. The 
unprecedented union of the crowns under Louis I/X in 1314 is the culmination of this dynastic 
cooperation. In a way, Lescot acknowledges this successful strategy by completely writing out 
Navarre after Philippe de Poitiers’s succession in 1316, a clear sign that France had consumed 
its neighbour wholesale and expanded its reach into the French periphery. More generally, the 
Navarrese rulers in this period—from Thibaut I to Louis I—represent the potential of Cape-
tian dynastic outreach as demonstrated through successful marriage alliances, fraternal cru-
sading zeal, and increased involvement in affairs along the French frontier. The story of 
Navarre prior to 1316 highlights for readers key methods through which Capetian dynasticism 
and regnal authority can expand and how interdynastic relationships can benefit both the Ca-
petian dynasty and the kingdom of France. 
 
3.2 The Valois Ascendancy 
 The Capetian monarchy as a whole experienced an identity crisis between 1316 and 
1328 when the established framework for royal succession faltered and then failed entirely 
following the rapid deaths of Philippe IV’s three sons: Louis X, Philippe V, and Charles IV.26 
Alone among his vernacular peers, Lescot must explain to his readers these successions in 
such a way that both emphasises the advancement of dynastic authority and justifies the sud-
den elevation of a cadet, Philippe de Valois, to the kingship, itself an unprecedented event in 
Capetian history. Philippe’s father, Charles de Valois, was for many years the most prominent 
royal in France after the king, a man whose activities attracted the interest of Lescot and 
prompted a eulogy by Orgemont. Indeed, the reasons for Philippe’s elevation to the throne are 
as much the legacy of his father as they are his own. Lescot—and Orgemont through later re-
visions—dedicates considerable space to explaining precisely why Philippe was the best-
suited candidate in 1328, justifying his election in the face of opposition from others who 
could claim a share of the succession. Although the Valois were not guaranteed to inherit the 
French throne, their status within the kingdom and their personal merits ensured the viability 
of the cadet kings. This section will examine Lescot and Orgemont’s depictions of the succes-
sions of 1316-1328 and analyse the ways in which the chroniclers portray Philippe de Valois 
as both a Capetian cadet and an ideal candidate for the French throne. 
 The crises that overwhelmed France in the early fourteenth century began with three  
                                               
26 See Figure 3.2. 
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marriages between Capetian cadets. Lescot, generally borrowing directly from his sources, de-
scribes how between 1305 and 1307, all three sons of Philippe IV wed: Louis I of Navarre to  
Marguerite of ducal Burgundy, Philippe de Poitiers to Jeanne of comital Burgundy, and 
Charles de La Marche to Blanche, Jeanne’s sister.27 These linkages became important in 1314 
when the three wives were implicated in the Tour de Nesle affair, a scandal that Lescot re-
counts in a single paragraph and never directly relates to the later succession crises.28 Copying 
Guillaume’s continuators, Lescot summarises the court proceedings that proved Marguerite 
and Blanche to be adulteresses and writes that the women were imprisoned for their crimes.29 
He adds that Jeanne was briefly imprisoned for knowledge of their affair, but was subse-
quently released and redeemed by her husband.30 Lescot underemphasises the ramifications of 
this scandal with skill. Marguerite’s death in April 1315 is noted simply in passing, with no 
suggestion that Louis may have had a role in it to allow for his marriage to Klemencia of Hun-
gary.31 Similarly, when Charles IV became king, he petitioned the pope for a dispensation to 
divorce Blanche, yet Lescot intentionally emphasises that the king did not claim adultery as 
the reason for divorce; rather, the king claimed that he was too closely related to Blanche 
since her mother, Mahaut d’Artois, was the king’s godmother.32 By reframing the details of 
this affair in such a way, Lescot removes any hint that the children of Louis and Charles could 
have been illegitimate and masks anything that could have potentially undermined the regnal 
qualities of the last three Capetian kings. 
From 1316, the personality and abilities of Philippe de Poitiers direct the course of the 
vernacular narrative. Of the three brothers, Philippe was the only one to reconcile with his 
wife and she was the only spouse to be exonerated of any wrongdoing, thereby confirming for 
Lescot the virtuosity of their marriage and the legitimacy of their offspring.33 In addition, 
Philippe was Louis’s nearest brother and the chronicler often associates the three siblings, 
                                               
27 GCF, VIII:245-246, 249-250, 256-257. See Continuatio, 592, 594, 597. See generally Elizabeth A.R. 
Brown, ‘Louis X’, in Medieval France: An Encyclopedia, eds. William W. Kibler and Grover A. Zinn (New 
York: Garland, 1995), 567; John Bell Henneman, Jr., ‘Jeanne of Burgundy’, in Medieval France, 492; Joseph R. 
Strayer, The Reign of Philip the Fair (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1980), 18. 
28 GCF, VIII:297-298. See Continuatio, 609-610. For a full discussion of the affair, see Tracy Adams, 
‘Between History and Fiction: Revising the Affaire de la Tour de Nesle’, Viator 43:2 (2012): 165-192. 
29 See generally Woodacre, 52. 
30 See generally Favier, La guerre de cent ans (Paris: Fayard, 1980), 29. 
31 GCF, VIII:316, 320. Cf. Continuatio, 613. Favier, La guerre, 29, asserts that her death was ‘dé-
libérément provoquée’. 
32 GCF, IX:3-4. In contrast, Guillaume’s continuator includes her adultery. Cf. Continuatio, 630; 
Chronique latine, II:39. See generally Hallam and Everard, 366. 
33 GCF, VIII:297-298. See generally Elizabeth A.R. Brown, ‘The Ceremonial of Royal Succession in 
Capetian France: The Double Funeral of Louis X’, Traditio 34 (1978): 236; Brown, ‘Prince’, 308. 
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implying a close personal connection between them.34 Thus, it makes sense within the context 
of the narrative that when Louis died, Philippe became regent while awaiting the birth of 
Louis’s posthumous child, the short-lived Jean I.35 The chronicler explains that Philippe was 
‘received peacefully by the barons of France [and] at the same time took by their assent and 
agreement the guardianship and government of the kingdoms of France and Navarre’.36 Les-
cot frames Philippe’s elevation to governance as elective, and this pattern continues in subse-
quent passages.37 Shortly after recounting Jean’s death, the chronicler summarises that 
‘several barons, nobles, prelates, bourgeois, who all assembled approved the coronation of 
Philippe le Long and promised him obedience as their lord…and also there were those of the 
University, and they approved the things abovesaid’.38 Again, the elective nature is empha-
sised, but the chronicler adds a key proviso that ‘it was declared that women did not succeed 
to the kingdom of France’, thus setting the precedent that strict agnatic primogeniture was the 
royal succession law of France.39 The impact of this ruling is immediate in the text. When 
Lescot references a brief debate between Philippe and Eudes IV of Burgundy over the rights 
of Louis’s daughter, Joana, to the throne, he explains that Philippe dismissed her claim out-
right because ‘others say that women cannot inherit the kingdom of France’.40 Through this 
simple scribal comment, Lescot reinforces the recent precedent in the course of a single suc-
cession. Furthermore, he emphasises that it was not Philippe but the French aristocracy who 
insisted upon this ruling, and its placement in the narrative suggests it may have been derived 
from the university’s academics. Orgemont later includes a legal justification for this 
                                               
34 GCF, VIII:305, 322-323, 327. Guillaume’s continuators do not make these comparisons. Cf. Continu-
atio, 612-615. 
35 GCF, VIII:328. See generally Woodacre, 53. 
36 ‘…des barons de France receu paisiblement, prist tantost par l’assentement et l’acort de eulz la garde 
et le gouvernement des royaumes de France et de Navarre…’. GCF, VIII:328. Brown, ‘Ceremonial’, 242-246, 
explains that Philippe collected oaths of homage as he moved between Lyon and Paris in June 1316 before he 
became regent. See generally Brown, ‘Ceremonial’, 257. 
37 Guillaume’s continuators do not mention the elective nature of Philippe’s accession. Cf. Chronique 
latine, I:427; Continuatio, 615. 
38 ‘…pluseurs barons, nobles, prelaz, bourgois en la cité de Paris; lesquiex tous ensamble aprouverent la 
coronacion de Phelippe le Lonc et li promistrent obedience tant comme à leur seigneur…et aussi firent ceulz de 
l’Université, [et] aprouverent les choses dessus dittes…’. GCF, VIII:332. See Chronique latine, I:434. 
39 ‘Et adonc fu il desclairié que femme ne succède pas ou royaume de France’. GCF, VIII:332. Wooda-
cre, 53-54, argues that this proviso was not actually declared at this time, but rather after Philippe’s coronation in 
January 1317, and that Philippe intentionally delayed negotiations over Louis’s daughter’s status to secure his 
hold on the throne. For more on the history of royal succession in France, see Derek R. Whaley, ‘From a Salic 
Law to the Salic Law: The Creation and Re-Creation of the Royal Succession System of Medieval France’, 
Routledge’s History of Monarchy (New York: Routledge, forthcoming). 
40 ‘Mais les autres disoient que femme ne peut heritier ou royaume de France’. GCF, VIII:334-335. 
Guillaume’s continuators, rather, explain in further detail how many lords, including Charles de la Marche and 
Charles de Valois, disputed Philippe’s claim. Cf. Continuatio, 617. Brown, ‘Ceremonial’, 126, 235, 258-259, 
elaborates that the nobility rose up against Philippe to defend the rights of Joana. She also suggests that Louis 
recognised his daughter as heir presumptive, although he left no written record of this decision. 
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succession in his rubric, noting that ‘Philippe, count of Poitiers, was crowned as king of 
France after the death of the said son [Jean I], who was his nephew, as if he were the son of 
his brother, Louis’.41 Therefore, to Orgemont, this succession was justified because Philippe 
took the place of his deceased nephew via an abstract transference of royal authority.42 The 
precedent of agnatic succession was reinforced in 1322 when Charles de La Marche suc-
ceeded his brother, which Lescot notes he did ‘without any contradiction’, a tacit acceptance 
of agnatic succession.43 Lescot and his sources recount these two successions in such a way as 
to leave no doubt regarding their legitimacy, justifying them via aristocratic election, juristic 
and academic approval, and precedent. 
Those precedents would be recalled again in 1328 when Charles died prematurely 
leaving behind a pregnant wife.44 Because of this, Lescot writes, the ‘barons and the nobles 
assembled to discuss the government of the kingdom’ and ‘it was only a question of to whom, 
as closest, the government of the kingdom ought to be committed’.45 Thus, just as with 
Philippe V, the election was decided by the lords of France rather than through any estab-
lished principle, although there was here an added stipulation that the candidate must be near-
est in blood, although to whom is not explicitly stated.46 At this point, the narrative is heavily 
abridged from the sources by Orgemont in order to remove any question of legitimacy sur-
rounding the Valois kings.47 Orgemont concludes, paraphrasing Guillaume’s continuator, that 
‘the said government belonged to the said Philippe, who was first cousin of King Charles and 
son of monseigneur Charles de France, late count of Valois, and full brother of the father and 
mother of King Philippe le Bel’.48 In other words, Philippe’s election as regent was supported 
                                               
41 ‘Phelippe conte de Poitiers fu coronné en roy du royaume de France après la mort dudit roy Jehan, 
lequel estoit son neveu, so comme celui qui estoit filz de son frere Loys’. GCF, VIII:333. 
42 The sixteenth-century French jurist Charles Loyseau defines this principle in detail in his Traité des 
Ordres and simples Dignitez. His ideas result from the evolution of juristic concepts that predate the 1316 suc-
cession, although his specific arguments relate to the French succession of 1589, and he argues that any Capetian 
prince can substitute as the son of a previous king in order of agnatic seniority if the king dies without leaving an 
heir. Ralph E. Giesey, Le rôle méconnu de la loi salique: La succession royale XIVe-XVIe siècles, Histoire, trans. 
Franz Regnot (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2007), 261. 
43 ‘…vint en succession le royaume, sanz nul contredit, à Charles…’. GCF, VIII:366. See Continuatio, 
630. See generally Woodacre, 57. 
44 GCF, IX:62. See generally Jules Viard, ‘Philippe VI de Valois. Début du règne (février-juillet 1328)’, 
Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 95 (1934): 259. 
45 ‘…furent assemblez les barons et les nobles à traictier du gouvernement du royaume…; mais 
seulement estoit question auquel, tant comme plus prochain, devroit estre commis le gouvernement du royaume’. 
GCF, IX:71-72. See Continuatio, 645. See generally Woodacre, 57. 
46 Beaune, Birth, 156, and Woodacre, 56, argue that this proximity of blood refers to nearness to Louis 
IX.  
47 GCF, IX:71-73. Cf. GCF, IX:72n2; Chronique latine, II: 82-86; Continuatio, 645-646. For an exam-
ple of what was redacted in 1377, see GCF, IX:330-341. See generally Hedeman, Royal Image, 122. 
48 ‘Si fu deliberé que audit Phelippe appartenoit ledit gouvernement, lequel estoit cousin germain du roy 
Karle et filz de monseigneur Charle de France, jadis conte de Valois, secont frere germain de pere et de mere du 
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because of his close genealogical relationship to the previous king and that king’s father, who 
was his uncle. This, in effect, placed him on equal footing with Edward III, who was put for-
ward by some as a better candidate because he was Charles IV’s nephew.49 To further support 
the Valois claim, the continuator adds that ‘Philippe had the government of the kingdom since 
the death of the said King Charles’, thereby establishing him as the status quo candidate.50 
Lastly, the chronicler returns to the precedents of 1316 and 1322, explaining that, after the 
dowager queen gave birth to a daughter, the succession passed to Philippe ‘because a girl does 
not inherit the kingdom’.51 Therefore, Orgemont, summarising Guillaume’s continuator, ar-
gues for the Valois regency and succession on the grounds that Philippe was the closest-re-
lated male to Philippe IV, that he already controlled the government, and that precedent 
excluded females, such as Charles’s posthumous daughter, from inheriting the throne. Orge-
mont concludes that ‘it appeared clearly that the right line of the kings of France was trans-
ferred [translatée] to a transverse line—that is from a cousin to a cousin’.52 To Lescot and 
Orgemont, justifying the Valois succession is of paramount importance. By drawing unignor-
able comparisons between the 1316 and 1328 successions and establishing firmly in the minds 
of their readers the precedents of quasi-elective kingship and agnatic succession, the two con-
tinuators present to their readers the incontestable legitimacy of the Valois succession—a tri-
umphal moment for Capetian dynasticism. 
 Lescot, by including important biographical information provided by Guillaume and 
his continuators, establishes Charles de Valois, the second son of Philippe III, as a key com-
ponent in Philippe VI’s claim to the French throne. Guillaume first introduces Charles in 1282 
at the time of his election as king of Aragón, the benefactor of the pope’s excommunication 
and condemnation of Pero III of Aragón during the War of the Sicilian Vespers.53 The chroni-
cler relates how Philippe led a crusade against Aragon in 1284 to seize the crown for Charles, 
an unsuccessful endeavour that resulted in the king’s death in 1285.54 Throughout this narra-
tive, Charles is little more than a background character, the adolescent son of an overly- 
                                               
roy Phelippe le Bel’. GCF, IX:72-73. See Continuatio, 645. See generally Viard, ‘Début’, 263. 
49 GCF, IX:73. See generally Viard, ‘La succession’, 220. For more on the Plantagenet claim to France, 
see Chapter 4.3. 
50 ‘Lequel Phelippe ot le gouvernement du royaume depuis la mort dudit roy Karle…’. GCF, IX:73. See 
generally Viard, ‘Début’, 262-263; Viard, ‘Philippe de Valois avant son avènement au trône’, Bibliothèque de 
l’école des chartes 91 (1930): 324. 
51 ‘Et pour ce que fille ne herite pas au royaume…’. GCF, IX:73. 
52 ‘…il appert clerement que la droite ligne des roys de France fu translatée en ligne transversale; c’est à 
savoir de germain en germain’. GCF, IX:75. See Continuatio, 646. 
53 GCF, VIII:87-89; GPT, 520. See generally Strayer, ‘Crusade’, 444-445. See also Chapter 2.2. 
54 GCF, VIII:97, 102-104, 119-120. See GPT, 524, 528, 530, 536, 538. See generally Strayer, ‘Cru-
sade’, 442, 446. 
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ambitious king. He becomes more prominent in the Dionysian vernacular narrative beginning 
in 1290, when Charles, according to Guillaume, renounced his claim to Aragón in exchange 
for the counties of Anjou and Maine, which he received as a dowry for his marriage to Mar-
guerite of Naples.55 The chronicler later recounts that Charles led an army against Hainaut in 
1292, where he accepted the count’s submission on behalf of the king.56 Indeed, Charles fre-
quently appears in the narrative leading armies for his brother and nephews: in Gascony in 
1295, in Flanders in 1297, 1304, and 1315, and in Gascony again in 1324.57 But Guillaume’s 
continuators demonstrate that Charles was more than simply a devout servant of his brother 
and nephews. In addition to his pretension to Aragón, the Latin Empire was also claimed by 
Charles following his marriage to Catherine I, successor to Emperor Philippe de Courtenay, in 
1301.58 Although Constantinople itself was recaptured by the Byzantines in 1264, remnant 
territories of the former empire still remained, a fact that led Charles on a far-flung campaign 
in 1301 to quell the Italian Peninsula in order to conquer his particulate empire.59 Charles’s 
Italian adventures were cut short, however, in 1308 when his wife died unexpectedly.60 The 
continuators and Lescot demonstrate that Charles was a successful diplomat who achieved a 
long-sought peace treaty that ended the War of the Sicilian Vespers in 1302 and aided in the 
peace accords with the rebellious French barons in 1315.61 Most importantly, he was a faithful 
Christian, visiting the pope in 1301 and 1302, and attending the papal coronation at Lyon in 
1305 alongside his brothers.62 The chroniclers never leave any doubt regarding the meritori-
ous qualities that define Charles de Valois throughout his life. He is portrayed unceasingly as 
a loyal Capetian prince, a defender of the faith, and a reliable counsellor and advisor. 
The only deviation from this depiction is an incident in 1315, which Lescot converts 
into one of his most overtly didactic lessons within his continuation. The chronicler records 
that, only days after the death of Philippe IV, Charles and his nephews accused the royal 
chamberlain, Enguerrand de Marigny, of stealing from the royal treasury, for which he was 
                                               
55 GCF, VIII:144. See Chronicon, 574. See generally Strayer, ‘Crusade’, 450. The renunciation was fi-
nalised in May 1293. Joseph Petit, Charles de Valois (1270-1325) (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1900), 21. 
56 GCF, VIII:149-150. See Chronicon, 574, 576. See generally Petit, 25. 
57 GCF, VIII:155, 161-162, 177, 215, 240-241, 302, 322-323, IX:33-37. See generally Petit, 28ff, 34ff, 
91ff, 140, 163, 210ff. 
58 GCF, VIII:190-191. See Chronicon, 582. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 301. 
59 GCF, VIII:193, 201. See Continuatio, 584-585. See generally Housley, Italian Crusades, 95, 99; Nor-
man J. Housley, The Later Crusades, 1274-1580: From Lyons to Alcazar (Oxford: University Press, 1992), 53. 
60 GCF, VIII:258-259, 262. See Continuatio, 595. See generally Petit, 110-111. 
61 GCF, VIII:213-215, 330. See Chronique latine, I:323-324. Guillaume’s continuators do not mention 
the 1315 meeting. See generally Elizabeth A.R. Brown, ‘Reform and Resistance to Royal Authority in Four-
teenth-Century France: The Leagues of 1314-1315’, Parliaments, Estates and Representation 1 (1981): 125. 
62 GCF, VIII:193, 215, 245. See Chronique latine, 350. See generally Favier, Philippe le Bel, 310, 314; 
Petit, 104. 
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imprisoned, tried by a court of his peers, and hanged.63 Louis X had originally sought  
clemency and advocated for Enguerrand to go into exile to Cyprus, but Charles maliciously 
countered by accusing Enguerrand’s wife and his sister-in-law of additional crimes against the 
kingdom, which further condemned the chamberlain and led to the imprisonment of the sisters 
as well.64 Had the story ended here, the message in the continuation would be one of Capetian 
justice against those who wronged the kingdom and dynasty. But Lescot returns to the matter 
again in his account of the events of 1325, when Charles was on the brink of death, and the 
entire episode is transformed as a result. As Charles lay dying, 
several thought that in this illness he was conscious of the death of Enguerrand de 
Marigny, who was hanged, as several men said, to his regret, which he realised 
afterwards. When his illness grew worse, he arranged to give alms throughout the 
city of Paris; and those who gave the alms to the poor said, “take it for messire 
Enguerrand de Marigny and for messire Charles de Valois”. And because they 
named Enguerrand before that of messire Charles, several judged that he was con-
scious of the death of messire Enguerrand.65 
Lescot translated this passage almost directly from his sources, but the details of the incident 
in 1315 were expanded from the original material provided by Guillaume’s continuators. By 
elaborating on the earlier passages, Lescot more clearly illustrates the sins committed by 
Charles earlier in life and compares those to his penitent attitude upon death. Furthermore, 
Lescot not only redeems the man for his one episode of malice, but demonstrates how even an 
errant agnate can save himself by seeking forgiveness for his sins. 
 Ultimately, though, it is because of his children and descendants that Charles is im-
portant to the Dionysian vernacular tradition. Within the span of three decades and with three 
wives, Charles sired no fewer than nine children of note, whose descendants and their spouses 
would become prominent figures themselves within the continuations.66 The first of these 
marriages mentioned in the vernacular chronicles came in 1308, when Guy I, count of Blois,  
  
                                               
63 GCF, VIII:304-316. Viard, GCF, VIII:304n2, notes that ‘[l]es Grandes Chroniques donnent un récit 
plus détaillé de l’arrestation d’Enguerrand de Marigny que’ both the Chronique latine and the Continuatio. See 
generally Elizabeth A.R. Brown, ‘Philip the Fair and his Ministers: Guillaume de Nogaret and Enguerran de 
Marigny’, in The Capetian Century, 1214-1314, ed. William Chester Jordan and Jenna Rebecca Phillips (Turn-
hout: Brepols, 2017), 206; Claude Gauvard, Le Temps des Capétiens (Xe-XIVe siècle), Une histoire personnelle 
de la France (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2013), 144; Petit, 149ff. 
64 GCF, VIII:314, 316. See generally Petit, 152-153. 
65 ‘…cuidierent pluseurs que en celle maladie il feist conscience de la mort Engorran de Marigni, lequel 
fu pendu, so comme aucunes gens dient, à son pourchaz par ce que on apperceust après. Quant sa maladie l’en-
grega, il fist donner une aumosne parmi la ville de Paris; et disoient ceulz qui donnoient l’aumosne aus pouvres: 
“Priez pour messire Engerran de Marigni et pour messire Charles de Valoys.” Et pour ce qu’il nommoient avant 
le nom de messire Engerran que de messire Charles, plusseurs jugerent que de la mort messire Engerran il faisoit 
conscience’. GCF, IX:49. See Chronique latine, 64-65; Continuatio, 639. See generally Brown, ‘Philip the Fair’, 
207-208; Petit, 219. 
66 See Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3 The Children of Charles de Valois
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married Marguerite de Valois.67 One of their children was Charles de Blois, the future duke of 
Brittany during the War of the Breton Succession.68 Another marriage, that of Guillaume I, 
count of Hainaut, to Jeanne, produced, among other children, Philippa, wife of Edward III of 
England.69 And Charles’s former imperial title passed through his daughter, Catherine II, to 
Philippe I, the Angevin prince of Taranto, whose descendants vied for the Byzantine throne 
for the following seventy years.70 Other daughters would marry the notorious Robert III d’Ar-
tois, count of Beaumont-le-Rogier; Duke Carlo of Calabria, heir of Robert of Naples; Pierre I, 
duke of Bourbon; and the future Emperor Karl IV.71 More vital to dynastic survival, though, 
were Charles de Valois’s two surviving sons, Philippe and Charles, who resumed his pro-An-
gevin campaigns in Italy in 1319-20 and fought alongside their father in Gascony in 1324.72 
The legacy of the elder son quickly merged into the dynastic history of France itself once he 
was elected king in 1328.73 In the end, the chroniclers promote the Valois family as an exam-
ple of Capetian cadets who actively supported one another and constantly upheld regnal au-
thority throughout their actions and marriages, thereby lending credibility to their right to the 
French throne. 
 When Philippe de Valois is first introduced in the continuation, he is a failed adven-
turer in a foreign land, which immediately informs readers that he is a cadet, not the heir to 
the French throne.74 Nonetheless, Lescot quickly emphasises Philippe’s merits once the man 
becomes king in the narrative. He records in detail how the first Valois king led a massive 
army into Flanders, proving his martial prowess by defeating the frequently recalcitrant Flem-
ish at the battle of Cassel in 1328.75 He then borrows from Guillaume’s continuation to re-
count how the king flexed his juridical muscles in forcing Edward III to recognise him as 
suzerain over Guyenne and Ponthieu.76 Similarly, he demonstrates in numerous vignettes how 
the king used his judicial authority to settle the matter of the Artesian succession.77 But 
                                               
67 GCF, VIII:262. See Continuatio, 598. See generally Petit, 241, 243. 
68 See Chapter 4.1. 
69 GCF, VIII:267. See generally Petit, 240-241. 
70 GCF, VIII:290. See Continuatio, 607. See generally Housley, Later Crusades, 54; Petit, 244. 
71 See generally Petit, 244, 247-248. 
72 GCF, VIII:347, IX:33. See Chronique latine, II:57; Continatio Chronici, 625. See generally Housley, 
Italian Crusades, 74; Langlois, Histoire, 302; Viard, ‘Philippe de Valois’, 321. 
73 For more on the younger son, Charles II, count d’Alençon, and his descendants, see Chapter 8.3. 
74 Viard, ‘Philippe de Valois’, 324, notes that ‘pendant les deux années qui précédèrent son avènement 
au trône, le nom de Philippe de Valois ne paraît pas souvent dans les documents ou les chroniques…’. 
75 GCF, IX:84-85. See generally George Minois, La guerre de cent ans: Naissance de deux nations 
(Paris: Perrin, 2008), 35. For more on the Flemish wars, see Chapter 4.2. 
76 GCF, IX:96-104. See Chronique latine, 105, 106-108. See generally Minois, 41. See also Chapter 
4.3. 
77 See Chapters 2.3 and 8.3. 
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perhaps the most important action taken by Philippe according to the chroniclers was the 
king’s advocacy for a new crusade in 1333, at which time he and other prominent French 
nobles took the cross and pledged upon holy relics to venture to the Levant.78 This not only 
gives Philippe similar saintly qualities to Louis IX and Philippe III, but implies an inherent 
religiosity surrounding the Valois king.79 It also became a point of contention when Edward 
III proclaimed himself king of France in 1340, since Philippe complained that ‘your enter-
prise, which shows your unreasonable will, has prevented the holy voyage to Outremer and 
resulted in a great quantity of Christians being put to death, and service to God being dimin-
ished, and the holy Church being less revered’.80 By including this statement, Lescot denies 
any legitimacy to the English claim to France by demonstrating how such a pretension di-
rectly interfered with God’s divine mission. By examining these various aspects of his charac-
ter, Lescot builds the case that Philippe represented an ideal French king and a righteous 
counterpoint to England’s wanton aggression. 
The concluding portion of Philippe de Valois’s narrative is due to Orgemont, not Les-
cot, and was added in 1377 to further emphasise the king’s moral traits. The chronicler ex-
plains to the reader the surnames that Philippe accumulated throughout his life and what each 
says about his character.81 Philippe was ‘the Fortunate’ because he was fortunate to have ob-
tained the throne considering the circumstances, and he was ‘the Lucky’, for he won a great 
victory against the Flemish at Cassel.82 But more important are his other two surnames, ‘the 
Very Good Christian’ and ‘the Very Catholic’, the former ‘because he loved and feared God, 
and he honoured the power of the Holy Church’, and the latter ‘because…he showed this by 
faith and words in his life’.83 Orgemont then gives examples of the king’s righteousness, 
showing how Philippe demonstrated selfless piety in 1335 when he travelled barefoot 
throughout the Île-de-France to find a cure for his son’s illness and how he publicly criticised 
Pope John XXII for preaching a false message.84 By doing this, Orgemont converts Philippe 
                                               
78 GCF, IX:133. See Chronique latine, II:134-135. See generally Christopher J. Tyerman, ‘Philip VI 
and the Recovery of the Holy Land’, in The Crusades: Critical Concepts in Historical Studies, vol. 3: Crusading 
and the Crusader States 1198-1336, ed. Andrew Jotischky (London: Routledge, 2008)’, 456-459. 
79 Tyerman, 474, writes that ‘[n]o French monarch of the fourteenth century could ignore the legacy of 
Louis VII, Philip II and Louis IX. Crusading had become part of the essence of French kingship. The crusade 
was to confirm Philip VI’s position in France, in Europe and, even, in Paradise’. 
80 ‘…vostre emprise qui est de volenté non raysonnable, a esté empeeschié le saint voiage d’outre mer, 
et grant quantité de crestiens mis à mort, et le service de Dieu apeticié, et sainte Eglise aornée de moins de rever-
ence’. GCF, IX:201. 
81 See generally Hedeman, Royal Image, 106-107. 
82 GCF, IX:327. 
83 ‘…car il amoit et doubtoit Dieu, et si honnoroit à son povoir sainte Eglise’, and ‘car…il le monstra 
par fait et par dit en son vivant’. GCF, IX:327. 
84 GCF, IX:148-149, 327-329. See generally Lucien M. Martin, La Rédemption, qu’est-ce donc? (Paris: 
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into the embodiment of a good man ruling in terrible times, a layman favoured by fortune and 
luck for his devout piety but who suffered greatly nonetheless because of the greed and ambi-
tions of others. Within the Dionysian tradition, Philippe VI represents a cadet turned king and 
what is expected of a French monarch. 
By using his sources in the way he does, Lescot never foreshadows that the Valois line 
would succeed the senior Capetians in 1328. Indeed, most of his sources were written before 
that date so could not have predicted it. Lescot abridges very little of what is said by Guil-
laume and his continuators and enhances a few key portions of text to further highlight the ul-
timate importance of the Valois to the narrative. It is ultimately Orgemont who is responsible 
for removing doubt regarding the legitimacy of the Valois succession. He removes Lescot’s 
discussion of the 1328 succession and replaces it with a simple summary that decisively un-
dermines the arguments of rival candidates, making their claims appear fundamentally counter 
to French interests. Later in the text, the chronicler examines the reasons why Philippe VI was 
so deserving of the royal title, summarising his points as a way of reassuring readers of the ca-
det’s suitability. Through this process, he makes it abundantly clear that the Valois are worthy 
successors to the Capetians. Collectively, the chroniclers convey a message that kings, regard-
less of their origins, are expected to be valorous and devout, and that only those who express 
all these traits concurrently can successfully represent and promote Capetian dynasticism in 
the manner of the great kings who ruled before them. 
 
3.3 The Perseverance of the House of Évreux 
 The triumph of the Valois came at the expense of Joana, the only surviving child of 
Louis I/X, who failed to secure the French throne for her family and was given as a consola-
tion prize Navarre, since the kingdom permitted female succession and there was recent prec-
edent for it.85 Lescot never grants the Pyrenean kingdom the same level of attention he and 
earlier chroniclers gave it prior to 1316, but its rulers maintain a constant presence in his text 
since they were actively involved in representing Capetian dynasticism.86 Within Orgemont’s 
continuation, Joana’s successors from the Capetian house of Évreux return to prominence due 
to the frequent intrigues and intra-dynastic conflicts encouraged by Carlos II, whose aware-
ness of dispossessed ancestral territories motivated him to act against the Valois kings. A true 
                                               
Éditions Publibook, 2012), 141; Sumption, I:145. 
85 Thibaut I inherited Navarre through his mother, sister of the last native king, Antso VII. Meanwhile, 
Jeanne I inherited Navarre from her father and passed the title to each of her surviving sons in turn. Woodacre, 
60. 
86 See Figure 3.4. 
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reconciliation between the Valois and Évreux came only with Carlos III, who is portrayed by 
Juvénal in a more neutral light. Considered together, the Évreux monarchs represent continu-
ity of Capetian dynastic authority in Navarre, but also exemplify the conflict that can arise be-
tween agnates who feel themselves equal to their French royal peers. This section will explore 
the ways in which the Évreux family is represented within the Dionysian vernacular tradition 
to explore how their story enhanced the dynastic narrative. 
 When considering the Évreux agnates in any capacity, one must remember that they 
remained minor French territorial lords throughout their entire existence. Guillaume and Les-
cot emphasise repeatedly that the family’s patriarch, Louis, only son of Philippe III and his 
second wife, Marie de Brabant, was count of the small city of Évreux in Normandy.87 In 1300, 
he married the Capetian princess Marguerite, daughter of Philippe d’Artois and sister of Rob-
ert III, placing Louis firmly in the Capetian dynastic matrix.88 However, despite being a con-
stant presence in Lescot’s text as a French commander in the Flemish wars of 1314-16, Louis 
is never described in any detail and his very existence seems inconsequential for a prince of 
such high lineage.89 His death in 1319 passes without note in the narrative and the marriage of 
his son, Philippe, to Joana in 1318 is equally unremarkable to Lescot, making their sudden 
joint inheritance of Navarre in 1328 an unexpected development.90 Rather than describing 
Louis in ways similar to his elder brothers, Philippe IV and Charles de Valois, Lescot chooses 
to largely ignore him, suggesting that he considers the count of little didactic benefit to his 
narrative of Capetian dynasticism. 
 Concerning the Navarrese succession itself, Lescot frames it as a royal grant, an action 
within the prerogative of the French king, stating that Philippe VI, ‘accepting the good coun-
sel of the barons and the elders regarding the laws of the kingdom of Navarre and county of 
Champagne, restored the said kingdom of Navarre to [Philippe], count d’Évreux, because of 
his wife, the daughter of King Louis [X]. And regarding the matter of the county of Cham-
pagne, he assigned other rents in the county of La Marche, near Angoulême’.91 Lescot implies 
                                               
87 GCF, VIII:122, 193. See Continuatio, 584. Louis was confirmed in his titles and income in 1308. 
Charon, 109-110. Brown, ‘Prince’, 302, notes, however, that the actual lands and revenue were withheld until 
1317. See generally Langlois, Philippe III, 186. 
88 GCF, VIII:193. See Continuatio, 584. See generally Charon, 116; Marie-Laure Lemonnier-Surget, 
Les ‘ennemis du roi’: parenté et politique chez les Evreux-Navarre (1298-1425) (Paris: Atelier national de repro-
duction des thèses, 2006), 36. 
89 GCF, VIII:301-303, 323, 330. See Continuatio, 611, 616. For Louis’s role in the Flemish wars, see 
Favier, Philippe le Bel, 510. 
90 GCF, IX:77-78. See Lescot, 3. See generally Charon, Princes, 132; Viard, ‘Début’, 269. 
91 ‘…Phelippe, en aprouvant le bon conseil des barons et des anciens sur l’ordenance du roiaume de Na-
varre et de la conté de Champaigne, il restitua ledit royaume de Navarre à Loys [sic] conte d’Evreux pour la 
cause de sa femme fille du roy Loys Hutin. Et pour la cause de la conté de Champaigne, il li assigna autres rentes 
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that Philippe VI held suzerainty over both Navarre and Champagne and that neither belonged 
to Joana by right, but only by his royal will.92 Thus, Philippe legally denied Joana her heredi-
tary claims to Champagne because it never was hers in the first place.93 The issuing of Na-
varre to Philippe d’Évreux—hereafter Filipe III—rather than to Joana underlines this point. 
Filipe was a Capetian agnate, a man who, both by himself and via his wife, had a claim to the 
French throne nearly equal to the king himself. Thus, by emphasising Filipe as the Navarrese 
heir, Lescot is able to focus on dynastic unity rather than lingering on problematic claims.94 
The chronicler notes that, immediately after his succession, Filipe fought beside Philippe in 
the same battalion at the battle of Cassel in 1328.95 He attended the wedding of Philippe’s son 
Jean to Bonne de Luxembourg in 1332.96 He later led the royalist forces in Flanders in 1334 
and in the war against comital Burgundy in 1336.97 And he was foremost among the ranks of 
French generals in the earliest years of the Anglo-French war.98 His ultimate sacrifice while 
on crusade against the Saracens on the Iberian Peninsula in 1343 is the grandest display of his 
Capetian heritage.99 Lescot demonstrates that, by the time of his death, Filipe was a worthy 
example of Capetian dynasticism. 
 The vernacular portrayal of Joana, Filipe’s wife, is equally positive. In the narrative, 
                                               
en la conté de la Marche, emprès Engolesme’. GCF, IX:77-78. See Lescot, 3. See generally Gaposchkin, Mak-
ing, 231; Viard, ‘Début’, 271. 
92 Viard, ‘Début’, 270, argues, in contrast, that the Navarrese ‘[é]taient, en effet, toujours restés attachés 
à Jeanne. Déjà, en 1316 et en 1318…la succession de Louis X fut réglée en faveur de Philippe le Long, ils ré-
servèrent ses droits; et après Charles le Bel…ils jurèrent de défendre leurs coutumes et leurs privilèges’. Wooda-
cre, 55-56, adds that ‘Juana was required to renounce her rights to the thrones of France and Navarre, although 
crucially this had to be ratified once she reached her majority at twelve years of age, and it appears that this rati-
fication never occurred’. 
93 Following Lescot’s logic, Champagne was presumably merged into the royal domain upon the acces-
sion of Louis to the French throne in 1314, which was a common practice by earlier Capetian kings, who could 
not logically be their own vassals. Wood, French Apanages, 47. The final treaty wherein Joana and Filipe re-
nounced Champagne was sealed in July 1336. Charon, 123. 
94 ‘Aux côtés de Philippe VI, le jeune comte d’Évreux [Philippe] fit figure, non de souverain indé-
pendant, ni même de prince territorial émancipé, mais de jeune cousin sur le dévouement et l’affection de qui le 
roi de France put légitimement compter. Il était en effet…un satellite obligé de la couronne de France’. Charon, 
230. 
95 GCF, IX:84-85. See Lescot, 3. See generally Jules Viard, ‘La guerre de Flandre (1328)’, Bibliothèque 
de l’École des chartes 83 (1922): 368. 
96 GCF, IX:132. See Chronique latine, II:133-134. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 13. 
97 GCF, IX:140, 154. See Chronique latine, 141, 152. See generally Sergio Boffa, ‘The Duchy of Bra-
bant Caught Between France and England: Geopolitics and Diplomacy during the First Half of the Hundred 
Years War’, in The Hundred Years War: A Wider Focus, Part I, History of Warfare 25, eds. L. J. Andrew Vil-
lalon and Donald J. Kagay (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 217-218. No modern source corroborates Filipe’s participation 
in the war against comital Burgundy. 
98 GCF, IX:161, 204. See Chronique latine, 159. See generally Sumption, I:215, 255, 284, 414.  
99 GCF, IX:237, 240. See Lescot, 61, 62. See generally Housey, Later Crusades, 280-281. Filipe had 
also proposed a crusade against Grenada in 1329 but it never came to fruition. ‘Memorandum to Philip of 
Evreux, king of Navarre, by his governor, Henry of Sully, on Philip’s project for a crusade against Granada, 
summer 1329’, in Documents on the Later Crusades, 1274-1580, ed. Norman Housley (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1996), 59. 
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she emerges from her husband’s shadow only after his death, at which point she acted ‘by the 
council of the king of France’, suggesting that she remained under the influence of her Valois 
cousins.100 However, this aspect of the Évreux-Valois relationship is never further developed 
in the chronicles. Lescot takes a different approach when recording that Joana died of plague 
in 1349, placing a strong emphasis on her Capetian ancestry and ignoring entirely her life af-
ter 1328.101 He records that ‘Jeanne, queen of Navarre, daughter of Louis Hutin, king of 
France, died and was interred at Saint-Denis in France at the foot of her father and beside 
messire Jean, her brother, who was called king although he was never crowned’.102 Thus, she 
is buried in the crypt of the French kings, at the foot of a French king, and beside a child con-
sidered a French king, implying strongly to the reader that she is worthy of equal respect, alt-
hough Lescot stops short of acknowledging her right to the throne. This lends further evidence 
to the argument that Lescot views the entire Évreux matter as part of the greater Capetian dy-
nastic narrative. According to the chronicler, Filipe was a steadfast vessel of dynastic author-
ity, and his wife, although sidelined narratively, was nonetheless a clear continuity marker, 
one whose genealogical positioning made her vital to understanding the approach to dynasti-
cism found in the chronicles. 
 Under their son, Carlos II, this dynastic relationship utterly collapsed due to lingering 
animosities from the 1328 settlement and a perceived sense of deprivation maintained by the 
new Navarrese king. Orgemont remarks that in 1351, Jean II granted the county of An-
goulême to his friend Charles de la Cerda, a distant Capetian cognate and the constable of 
France.103 Earlier, Lescot mentions this county as land ceded to Filipe and Joana to settle out-
standing claims to Champagne, but clearly it had reverted to the French crown, although nei-
ther chronicler notes this.104 In what appears to be an unrelated event within Orgemont’s 
                                               
100 GCF, IX:241. Woodacre, 74, suggests that Joana had more autonomy than Lescot implies, emphasis-
ing that she ‘became more demanding about her rights, pursuing negotiations with the French king over disputed 
territories and dues. She complained in 1345 that the revenues of the county of Angoulême did not match what 
she had originally been promised and eventually negotiated an exchange for more strategic castles closer to 
Paris’. She adds further that the ‘French king and the Duke of Normandy were forced to obtain Juana’s consent 
and negotiate accords with her in 1343 and 1348 regarding the crucial levy of troops in Normandy as the Evreux 
holdings there were considerable’. 
101 GCF, IX:320. See generally Woodacre, 59. 
102 ‘…trespasssa madame Jehanne royne de Navarre, fille de Loys Hutin roy de France, et fu enterrée à 
Saint Denys en France as piez de son pere, et de costé messire Jehan son frere, lequel estoit appellé roy jasoit ce 
qu’il ne fust onques couronné…’. GCF, IX:320. 
103 CRJC, I:33. See generally Bruno Ramirez de Palacios, Charles dit le Mauvais: Roi de Navarre, 
comte d’Evreux, pretendant au trone de France (Le Chesnay, France: La Hallebarde, 2015), 66. See also Chap-
ter 1. 
104 GCF, IX:78. Viard, ‘La succession’, 221, states that, when Joana and Filipe received the counties of 
Angoulême and Mortain in 1328, it was a ‘rente annuelle et perpétuelle’, but there were no provisions in place 
for children. 
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chronicle, Carlos shortly afterwards condoned the murder of Charles, an event that initiated an 
intense hatred between the Navarrese and French kings.105 The first of many reconciliations 
came a few months later, about which Orgemont reports that Jean agreed to ‘grant to [Carlos] 
38,000 livres tournais of land…for other land that the said king of France ought to hold due to 
certain treaties made a long time ago by the predecessors of the two abovesaid kings, because 
of the county of Champagne’.106 In exchange, Carlos pledged fealty to Jean and the French 
king’s heir, the Dauphin Charles of Normandy, for all his territories in France and Nor-
mandy.107 Orgemont shows that Jean broke this treaty almost immediately when he invaded 
Normandy and recaptured most of it from Carlos, prompting a second reconciliation in 
1355.108 But the chronicler demonstrates Jean’s hatred for Carlos again in 1356, when the 
king covertly captured Carlos in Rouen while he was feasting with the dauphin.109 Orgemont 
justifies this act by clarifying that ‘since his reconciliation made to the king of France for the 
death of the abovesaid constable, the king of Navarre had machinated and arranged several 
things, to the damage, dishonour, and ill-will of the King and monseigneur, his eldest son, and 
to all the kingdom of France’.110 Unusually, Orgemont does not outline any of these misdeeds 
and, contextually, Jean appears to be the aggressor, ruthlessly executing Carlos’s compatriots 
without a trial.111 The chronicler implies that Jean’s heavy-handed actions against the Na-
varrese king made Carlos popular with the Parisian populace, and this expedited the process 
of turning the Évreux-Valois feud into a permanent fixture in French politics.112 Therefore, 
although he does not paint Jean in a good light, Orgemont views Carlos as an 
                                               
105 CRJC, I:37-38. This murder took place in January 1354. Sumption, II:124.  
106 ‘…le dit roy de France bailleroit au dit roy de Navarre XXXVIII mil livres à tournois de terre…pour 
autre terre que le dit roy de France li devoit asseoir par certains traictiez fais lonc temps avoit entre les predeces-
seurs des deux roys dessus diz pour cause de la conté de Champaigne’. CRJC, I:41. The lands in question are 
Beaumont-le-Rogier and numerous territories in Normandy. Ramirez de Palacios, 87. 
107 CRJC, I:42. He also married Jean II’s daughter, Jeanne, at this time, although Orgemont does not 
mention this fact. Charon, 134. See generally Ramirez de Palacios, 89. 
108 CRJC, I:47, 51-52. Jean invaded Normandy in 1354 after convincing himself that the treaty with 
Carlos and a truce with Edward III were the products of pro-Navarre members of his royal council. Sumption, 
II:137, 139, 164, 166, 167. 
109 CRJC, I:63. See generally Charon, 201-202; Ramirez de Palacios, 110-114; Sumption, II:205-206. 
110 ‘La cause fu que, depuis leur reconsiliacion faite par le roy de France de la mort du devant dit con-
nestable, le dit roy de Navarre avoit machiné et traictié pluseurs choses, au domage, deshonneur et mal du Roy et 
de monseigneur son ainsné filz et de tout le royaume de France’. CRJC, I:63-64. 
111 Sumption, II:206, 207, explains that ‘John II was said to have received a cache of documents whose 
authenticity was hotly disputed but which appeared to disclose a scheme for murdering him and his son and de-
livering up Normandy to Edward III…. [T]his latest incident festered in John’s mind, and coalesced with the ac-
cumulated grievances of the past three years’. He adds that ‘[t]o the many in Normandy and elsewhere…it 
confirmed the widespread impression that [John] was irrational, unstable and impulsive, and that his government 
lived every day from one expedient to the next’. 
112 CRJC, I:80, 90. For a detailed discussion of the political situation in France from 1356 to 1360 and 
how Carlos’s actions triggered a change in direction within the Dionysian vernacular tradition, see Chapter 5.2. 
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aberration in Capetian dynastic history, an agnate who not only undermined dynasticism but 
fought actively against regnal authority. 
 The inherent selfishness of Carlos and the repercussions of such greed are the reasons 
why Orgemont devotes so much space to the Navarrese king. Throughout the numerous con-
flicts and scandals that Carlos engaged in between 1351 and his death in 1387, his primary 
motivator within the chronicles remains the reassertion of Évreux authority over lands and ti-
tles seized by the Valois. When Carlos escaped from prison in November 1357, one of his 
first public acts was to demand either land or money derived from Normandy or Champagne, 
the latter of which reflected his outstanding claim on the county left unsettled in 1328.113 The 
matter of his inheritance is again an issue in 1358, when the future Charles V convinced 
Champagne to remain loyal to the Valois despite Carlos attempting to sway their allegiance, 
an acknowledgement by Orgemont that at least some in the county considered Carlos to be 
their rightful lord.114 More drastically, when Carlos took control of Paris, the chronicler indi-
cates that he ‘said that he loved very much the kingdom of France and he was held in good re-
gard there, as it is said, because he was of the fleurs de lis on all sides, and his mother would 
have been king of France if she had been a man, because she had been the only daughter of 
the king of France’.115 Orgemont strategically makes Carlos the architect of this pretension, 
allowing the chronicler to recount the claim, but not support it. However, he does 
acknowledge that the claim had enough merit to win over some citizens of Paris. When 
Charles retook Paris in August 1358, Orgemont justifies his execution of several traitors by 
explaining that many Parisians sought ‘to make the said king of Navarre king of France and 
put the English and Navarrese into Paris’.116 In other words, Orgemont considers Carlos a le-
gitimate threat to the sustainability of the Valois kingship and he justifies Carlos’s defeat by 
targeting his unjust claim to the French throne. When a truce was finally agreed between 
Charles and Carlos in late 1359, Champagne and the matter of the 1328 succession were not 
broached. Instead, Charles re-granted Carlos his hereditary lands and gave him a substantial 
monetary payment for everything else.117 The treaty of Brétigny in 1360 confirmed this peace 
and marks for Orgemont the end of any legitimate complaints the Navarrese king may have 
                                               
113 CRJC, I:125. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 279, 283; Ramirez de Palacios, 138. 
114 CRJC, I:164-168, 172-173. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 309. 
115 ‘Et entre autres choses dist que il amoit moult le royaume de France et il yestoit bien tenuz, si 
comme il disoit; car il estoit des fleurs de lis de tous costez, et eust esté sa mere roy de France se elle eust esté 
homme, car elle avoit esté fille seule du roy de France’. CRJC, I:185. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 331. 
116 ‘…c’est asavoir de faire le dit roy de Navarre roy de France, et de mettre les Anglois et Navarrois en 
Paris…’. CRJC, I:212. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 349. 
117 CRJC, I:238-239. See generally Charon, 214-217; Ramirez de Palacios, 175-176. 
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had regarding Champagne and the French crown.118 Although Carlos schemed and intrigued 
against the Valois long after 1360, Orgemont suggests that his primary motivation was to re-
gain his land in Normandy.119 In the end, Orgemont accepts the peace at Brétigny as the con-
clusion of the Évreux dispute over the 1328 settlement, and his treatment of Carlos throughout 
this narrative and afterwards suggests that he primarily considers the Navarrese king to be a 
schemer and manipulator of minds and, therefore, a very poor representative of Capetian dy-
nasticism. 
 Very little is said of the Navarrese kings under Juvénal, and Carlos III, the eldest son 
of Carlos II, first appears in the narrative as king only in 1396 at the proxy wedding of Isa-
belle of France to Richard II of England.120 However, the matter of the 1328 settlement re-
turns in 1397, when Carlos expressed his desire to permanently end the Évreux-Valois 
feud.121 Juvénal notes that there was a general fear ‘that it would be bad to deliver anything to 
[Carlos III], due to the horrible and detestable evil that his father had done in the kingdom’.122 
Others feared that, ‘if he had the places in Normandy that he requested and he wanted to make 
war, that great inconveniences could come from it’.123 Juvénal conflates this first treaty, men-
tioned by Pintoin, with a later treaty in 1404, where Carlos was given a newly-created duchy 
centred at Nemours.124 In addition, Juvénal emphasises that Carlos was also granted a sub-
stantial income from Gastinois and Champagne, once again confirming the link between the 
lost Champenois inheritance and the rulers of Navarre.125 Because he conflates the two epi-
sodes, Juvénal repeats much of this story in 1404, focussing again on Nemours and the 
                                               
118 CRJC, I:322, 329-330. Carlos refused to pledge homage a second time, arguing that ‘ce n’était pas 
lui qui avait forfait son engagement d’honneur et de fidélité’. Autrand, Charles V, 403. See generally Sumption, 
II:453.  
119 CRJC, I:342, II:140-142, 153-155. Indeed, Orgemont transcribes two confessions into his chronicle, 
the longer of which by Jacques de Rue highlights that in 1370, Carlos intended to divide France between himself 
and Edward III, with the latter receiving the French crown, suggesting the Navarrese king had abandoned his 
claim to France. CRJC, II:289-291. In 1364, Carlos attempted to claim the duchy of Burgundy since he was the 
heir by primogeniture, although Orgemont does not discuss the matter in these terms. CRJC, I:342, 345-346, 
II:9-10. See generally Charon, 217-219, 693-700; Favier, La guerre, 294ff, 308ff, 361; Sumption, III:317-318, 
320, 340; Woodacre, 78. 
120 HCRF, 402. See generally Favier, La guerre, 408. 
121 HCRF, 411. Pintoin includes a much longer discussion here, linking the Évreux-Valois agreement 
directly to the Navarre-Champagne inheritance and the crimes of Carlos II. Cf. CKS, II:536-540 (evens). No 
modern historian mentions this treaty, focussing instead on the 1404 final treaty between Navarre and France. 
122 ‘Et disoient aucuns, que ce seroit mal fait de luy rien bailler, veu les horribles et detestables maux 
que son pere avoit fait en ce royaume’. HCRF, 411. Pintoin does not mention any such fears and attributes dis-
cussion of Carlos’s ancestors to the Navarrese negotiator rather than anonymous French commentators. 
123 ‘…que s’il avoit en Normandie les places qu’il demandoit, et il vouloit faire guerre, que grands in-
convéniens en pourroient advenir’. HCRF, 411. 
124 HCRF, 411. See CKS, III:154. See generally Boris Bove, Le temps de la guerre de cent ans, 1328-
1453, Histoire de France (Paris: Éditions Belin, 2009), 184; Michael Jones, ‘The Crown and the Provinces in the 
Fourteenth Century’, in France in the Later Middle Ages, ed. David Potter (Oxford: University Press, 2002), 83. 
125 HCRF, 411. The income was in fact the purchase price for the port of Cherbourg, although Juvénal 
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deprived Champagne and Norman estates. In this second instance, though, there is no sugges-
tion that Carlos’s position was compromised by the activities of Carlos II. Indeed, Juvénal 
notes that ‘his son had none of the imagination of his father’.126 In the agreement, Carlos 
‘ceded and conveyed all the rights that he could have, and had to the counties of Champagne 
and Évreux, and all that he had in Normandy. And in compensation, the King erected 
Nemours in Gastinois into a duchy, and assigned him 12,000 livres in rent from Gastinois and 
Champagne’.127 This was the definitive resolution to ninety years of debate over the 
Champenois succession. Carlos is last mentioned by Juvénal departing Paris in 1409, at which 
point the Évreux cadets disappear from the vernacular tradition entirely.128 Thus, the Na-
varrese king’s role in Juvénal’s chronicle is straightforward: he put an end to the matter of the 
1328 succession and reconciled the Évreux cadets to the greater Capetian family. Further-
more, by restoring his place within the dynasty, Carlos represented the Christian idea that one 
should not pay for the crimes of their ancestor—a concept Juvénal undoubtedly wished to pro-
mote among Capetians in the years after the Armagnac-Burgundian war.129 
 Ultimately, the story of the Évreux kings of Navarre in the Dionysian vernacular con-
tinuations is one of a cadet line quickly falling out of favour with their senior kin due to terri-
torial disputes and failed pretensions. Lescot begins to develop this theme by exemplifying the 
first agnates’ loyalty to the senior Capetians and Valois, focusing specifically on the positive 
attributes of Filipe III of Navarre as both a Capetian prince and crusader. Orgemont, however, 
is faced with a very different sort of Navarrese monarch in the person of Carlos II and is 
forced to confront the fact that the succession of 1328 remained unresolved and acted as a jus-
tification for Carlos to openly rebel against the future Charles V in pursuit of his lost heritage. 
Under Juvénal, the matter of outstanding claims to Champagne returned twice and its 
                                               
does not mention the transfer of this vital location in the chronicle. Pintoin adds that Carlos’s brother, Pitri, re-
ceived Mortain. Cf. CKS, II:540, III:154. See generally Charon, 748-755; Peter Linehan, ‘Castile, Navarre and 
Portugal’, in The New Cambridge Medieval History VI c.1300–c.1415, ed. Michael Jones (Cambridge: Univer-
sity Press, 2000), 648. 
126 ‘…son fils n’eut pas l’imagination comme son pere’. HCRF, 429. See Charon, 746-748; CKS, 
III:150. 
127 ‘Et finalement iceluy roy de Navarre ceda et transporta tout le droict qu’il pouvoit avoir, et avoit és 
comtez de Champagne et Évreux, et tout ce qu’il avoit en Normandie. Et en recompense, le Roy erigea Nemours 
en Gastinois en duché, et luy assigna en Gastinois et Champagne douze mille livres de revenu’. HCRF, 429. See 
CKS, III:154, 156. 
128 HCRF, 451. Pintoin clarifies in the account that Carlos left to resolve the papal schism with other 
Capetian lords. Carlos last appears in Pintoin’s chronicle the next year when he was trying to negotiate an agree-
ment between the Parisians and rural farmers. Cf. CKS, IV:270, 374, 376. Chartier never discusses Navarre or 
the Évreux to any degree and, after 1425, the cadet house passed to a cognatic line that quickly disengaged from 
French affairs. Woodacre, 103. See generally Jonathan Sumption, The Hundred Years War, vol. IV: Cursed 
Kings (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 250, 261.  
129 For more on the Armagnac-Burgundian war, see Chapter 6. 
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resolution by an agreement between Carlos III and Charles VI permanently ended the Évreux 
presence in the vernacular tradition. For all these chroniclers, it is clear that Navarre remained 
an important aspect of French dynastic history throughout the fourteenth century, but it is how 
that narrative undeniably shifted from one of dynastic unity to one of dynastic distancing that 
reveals the true role the Évreux served in the vernacular tradition. When cadets prove them-
selves loyal and influential to the dynasty as a whole, their role is emphasised and their contri-
butions praised by the chroniclers. When they prove themselves disloyal or simply 
unimportant, they are ostracized, either through narrative shaming or outright abandonment. It 
is for this reason that the Évreux rulers of Navarre disappear from the vernacular narrative: 
they serve as poor representatives of Capetian dynasticism and were, therefore, removed to 
make room for better examples. 
 
           
 
Overall, the rulers of Navarre represent the benefits of good Capetian dynasticism within the 
Dionysian vernacular continuations. The earlier Champenois monarchs accepted their place 
within the Capetian dynasty and allowed their kingdom to fall under the umbrella of French 
regnal authority. As a result, France and Navarre merge together within the chronicles and are 
treated as one unit, the latter entirely subject to the will of the Capetian king. Once the two 
kingdoms are separated, though, the later Évreux rulers of Navarre progressively become less 
affiliated with the Capetian dynasty and cease to support French regnal authority. While Filipe 
III and Joana II continued to act as positive representations of Capetian dynasticism, Carlos II 
directly challenged regnal authority repeatedly, prompting Orgemont to portray him as a vil-
lain. His son, Carlos III, was never quite able to restore his family’s reputation within the Ca-
petian dynasty and, as a result, he eventually disappears from the Dionysian narrative. If the 
Dionysian continuations are intended to act as miroirs des princes, the later rulers of Navarre 
were poor reflections of dynasticism. Better candidates could be found in the brave and peni-
tent Charles de Valois or his son, Philippe VI, who was continually blessed by fortune and di-
vine favour. It is these individuals who most closely resemble the archetypal brothers of Louis 
IX. Individuals such as Thibaut II, Jeanne I, and Filipe III possess some of these traits, such as 
crusading zeal, martial valour, and dynastic devotion, but none are developed with the same 
detail as their Valois cousins. In the end, it was Philippe VI who represented a second birth 
for the Capetian dynasty, an ideal monarch ruling in uncertain times, and it was his succession 
that broke the curse of the kings who preceded him. 

 
CHAPTER FOUR  
All Roads Lead to War 
  
The relationship between the royal families of France and Navarre was one of many forged 
between the Capetian dynasty and its vassals and neighbours in the later Middle Ages. Indeed, 
the kings of France often sought to reinforce their suzerainty through strategic marriage alli-
ances, as was the case with the rulers of Brittany, Flanders, and Guyenne. But the results of 
this strategy varied wildly and Dionysian vernacular chroniclers often struggled to derive di-
dactic meaning from them. For example, Brittany, which was granted to a Capetian cadet in 
1213, remained constantly disloyal to the French kings and war eventually broke out in 1341 
between two rival ducal claimants, one who accepted French suzerainty and another who de-
sired independence. Flanders similarly fought for its autonomy against French aggrandise-
ment, although it was ultimately inherited by a cadet branch of the Valois. Guyenne, the 
largest Plantagenet possession in France after 1259, was a unique case. Despite five inter-
dynastic marriages with the Capetian dynasty over a 145-year period, the Plantagenets of Eng-
land maintained a state of near-constant war with France, especially after Edward III claimed 
the French throne in 1340. In each case, French suzerainty over autonomous territories was 
the primary point of conflict and the kings attempted to use dynasticism in unique ways to re-
solve them. This chapter will explore the ways in which the Dionysian vernacular continua-
tors documented these disputes and how they used the families to serve as didactic examples 
of the potential pitfalls of poorly-implemented dynastic policy. 
 
4.1 Suspicious Agnates 
The thirteenth-century rulers of Brittany were a unique breed of Capetian cadets. 
Springing from the union of Pierre de Dreux and Alix de Thouars, the family drifted in their 
orientation between dynastic loyalists and troublesome neighbours.1 Pierre was given his posi-
tion in order to bring Brittany into the Capetian fold, but under Louis IX, he established a pat-
tern of Franco-Breton animosities that lingered until the end of the fourteenth century. His 
successors slowly regained their status within the vernacular continuations, if not within the 
Capetian dynasty, but their loyalties continued to drift, sometimes towards England, other 
times towards autonomy. The Franco-Breton relationship reached a high point during the 
reign of Jean III of Brittany, but his death in 1341 resulted in a violent feud between rival 
  
                                               
1 See Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1 The Capetian House of Dreux-Brittany, 1213 – 1399
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claimants that inadvertently restarted the Anglo-French war. Even after the War of the Breton 
Succession formally ended in 1364, animosities between the feuding factions as well as be-
tween Brittany and France continued until Jean IV died at the end of the century. This section 
will analyse the Dionysian vernacular depictions of the rulers of Brittany in this period to de-
termine how their portrayals reflected a desire on the part of the continuators to use them as 
didactic examples of the challenges of promoting Capetian dynasticism.  
 There was nothing unusual about the fact that Philippe II Auguste arranged for his 
cousin Pierre, younger son of Robert II of Dreux, to marry the countess of Brittany, Alix, in 
1213.2 Indeed, it was common practice to wed younger agnates of the dynasty to powerful 
families, partially because this expanded Capetian influence and partially because it satisfied 
any lingering claims these agnates could assert on the French throne.3 Primat clearly recog-
nises the status of the Dreux family as Capetian agnates since he, borrowing from the chroni-
cler Guillaume le Breton, names the count’s father ‘the cousin of king Philippe’.4 However, 
Primat also includes Guillaume’s entire genealogical discussion of Pierre’s new relationship 
to the previously-recognised count of Brittany, explaining how ‘Pierre…married the daughter 
of Guy…of Thouars, whose brother had been Arthur, count of Brittany, by the countess, his 
mother’, and that ‘in this manner, he had the lady and all the county by the gift and grace of 
the king’.5 Thus, the chroniclers reframe Pierre as a continuation of the Breton comital line 
and show how his marriage was permitted by the will of the king, who was suzerain over Brit-
tany. By doing this, Primat, via his source, implies the de jure subjugation of Brittany under 
French suzerainty and removes any semblance of Breton independence from the arrangement. 
Primat then demonstrates what can result from such a relationship by showing Pierre leading a 
Breton army to support the future Louis VIII in his wars with John of England, implying that 
Philippe’s trust in Pierre was justified.6 The chronicler also shows Pierre mediating a dispute 
between the king and the viscount of Thouars, his uncle by marriage, in 1214. In this instance, 
                                               
2 Patrick Galliou and Michael Jones, The Bretons, The Peoples of Europe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 
198. Although all Breton rulers styled themselves dukes, the title was only recognised in France in 1297. Galliou 
and Jones, 204. 
3 Pierre’s great-uncle married a wealthy heiress; their children, the Courtenays, inherited her title. 
Meanwhile, an earlier Capetian agnate, Hugues, wed the countess of Vermandois under similar circumstances. 
Lewis, Royal Succession, 46, 54, 60. 
4 Les Grandes Chroniques de France, Société de l’histoire de France, ed. Jules Marie Édouard Viard 
(Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1930):314. See Guillaume le Breton, Gesta Philippi Augusti. In 
Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, historiens de Philippe-Auguste, vol. I, ed. Henri François 
Delaborde (Paris: Librairie Renouard, 1882), 255. 
5 ‘En ce tens espousa Pierres Mauclers…la fille Guy, le vieuconte de Thouart, qui seror ot esté Artur le 
conte de Bretaigne, de par la contesse sa mere. En tel maniere, ot la dame et tote la contée par le don et par la 
gràce le roi’. GCF, VI:314-315. See Guillaume le Breton, 255. 
6 GCF, VI:315. See generally Hallam and Everard, 177. 
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Pierre leveraged his heritage as ‘cousin of the king’ to seek mercy for his uncle.7 By borrow-
ing from Guillaume le Breton, Primat defines Pierre by his Capetian status and exemplifies 
how a properly-placed cadet can increase Capetian dynastic authority in the French periph-
ery.8 
 The later continuations by Primat and Guillaume de Nangis demonstrates how such 
faith in an agnate can be undermined by princely ambition. The chroniclers report that, not 
long after Pierre was entrusted with two royal castles in 1224, Louis VIII died leaving the 
throne to his young son Louis IX.9 This transfer of power prompted Pierre to seize the castles, 
forcing the regency government to retake them.10 Robert III of Dreux, Pierre’s brother, inter-
vened and facilitated a reconciliation between the king and the count.11 Nonetheless, Primat-
Guillaume caution the reader not to trust Pierre, noting that the king ‘was young and meek’ 
and that ‘[his councillors] cautioned him from making a mistake’.12 As if to prove his point, 
the chroniclers demonstrate how Pierre attempted to depose the regent, Blanca of Castile, and 
kidnap the king.13 Primat-Guillaume then explain that the count ventured to England, where 
he encouraged Henry III to invade France.14 By these examples, the chroniclers firmly estab-
lish in the minds of their readers that Pierre was an untrustworthy, dangerous man. Still, Rich-
ard Lescot, adding to Primat-Guillaume, notes that the count was forgiven by the king again 
in 1231 when his brother, ‘who was in good with the king’, arranged for a second reconcilia-
tion.15 This was Pierre’s last recorded rebellion against Louis and the chronicler emphasises 
that, afterwards, the barons of France ‘did not dare bring war against the king from that day 
forward’.16 Yet Primat-Guillaume continue to criticise Pierre: as a leader of the Barons’ Cru-
sade in 1239, the count ignored the orders of Thibaut I of Navarre and led a skirmish against 
the Saracens, which resulted in the death and capture of many crusaders.17 Rather than 
                                               
7 GCF, VI:363. See Guillaume le Breton, 298. See generally Gérard Sivéry, Louis VIII: Le lion (Paris: 
Fayard, 1995), 246-247. 
8 See generally Galliou and Jones, 198-199; Michael Jones, The Creation of Brittany: A Late Medieval 
State (London: Hambledon Press, 1988), 32. 
9 GCF, VII:35-36. See GSL, 312, 314. See generally Pierre-Antoine-Noël-Bruno Daru, Histoire de Bre-
tagne, vol. 2 (Paris: Firmin Didot, 1826), 13, 15-16. 
10 GCF, VII:36. See generally GSL, 316. 
11 GCF, VII:35-36. Guillaume de Nangis does not mention Robert as an intermediary. See generally 
Hallam and Everard, 269. 
12 ‘Le roy qui fu jeunes et debonnaires…mais qu’il se gardassent de mesprendre’. GCF, VII:38. See 
GSL, 514. 
13 GCF, VII:38-40. See GSL, 514, 516. See generally Hallam and Everard, 269.  
14 GCF, VII:42. See generally GSL, 316; Hallam and Everard, 269, 270. 
15 ‘…le conte de Dreues, qui mout estoit bien du roy’. GCF, VII:47. See generally Galliou and Jones, 
200. 
16 ‘…les autres barons en furent plus humbles n’oserent mouvoir guerre contre le roy puis ce jour en 
avant…’. GCF, VII:47-48. See GSL, 318. See generally Hallam and Everard, 271. 
17 GCF, VII:78-79. See GSL, 328. See generally Lower, 167-169. 
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focusing on heroic feats against the Saracens, the continuators dwell on Pierre’s crimes and 
neglect to mention his death while returning from the Seventh Crusade in 1250.18 Ultimately, 
Pierre’s story is one of contrasts. Primat, writing in the 1270s and aware of Pierre’s later ex-
ploits, nonetheless depicts the count as a faithful Capetian prince, a willing vassal to the 
French king in an historically hostile region. In the first continuation, though, Pierre becomes 
a recalcitrant lord who leverages his dynastic position to achieve undeserved forgiveness. Pri-
mat-Guillaume’s characterisation of the Breton lord deprives the house of Dreux of its Cape-
tian heritage and establishes a negative image of the family as a whole within the 
continuations. 
 A total of four Breton rulers succeeded Pierre without contest, but Primat, Guillaume, 
and Lescot neglect to discuss any of them in detail. Pierre’s heir, Jean I, enters the Dionysian 
vernacular tradition in 1245 at the First Council of Lyon, where he took the cross in prepara-
tion for the Seventh Crusade.19 Primat-Guillaume place Jean in the middle of the list of at-
tendees and never states whether he actually ventured to the Levant to fulfil his vow.20 
Similarly, Primat leaves the count out of the narrative of the Eighth Crusade in 1270, although 
Jean’s son is included at the end of a list of Capetian relatives.21 In this way, Primat-Guil-
laume almost entirely remove Jean from the history of France, retaining only enough infor-
mation to demonstrate his crusading zeal. Jean II is erased even more decisively by the 
chroniclers and the elevation of Brittany into a French peer-duchy in 1297 goes unmen-
tioned.22 His singular claim to fame is the fact that he died when an overladen wall crushed 
him at the papal coronation at Lyon in 1305.23 Although Lescot laments that his death ‘was a 
pity, sad and damaging’, these platitudes are standard eulogic rhetoric.24 The next duke, Ar-
thur II, is entirely absent from Lescot’s chronicle, suggesting to readers that Jean III directly 
succeeded his grandfather. The chronicler does mention Arthur’s brother, John, the English 
earl of Richmond, who fled from the French in battle in 1297 and was captured by the Scots 
                                               
18 Galliou and Jones, 199. Primat-Guillaume note, however, that Pierre took the cross at the Council of 
Lyon in 1245. GSL, 352. 
19 GCF, VII:112. See GSL, 352. No modern source confirms Jean took the cross in 1245. 
20 GCF, VII:112. Jean did not ultimately participate in the crusade.  
21 GCF, VII:261. See Primat, 39; GSL, 440. See also Arthur le Moyen de la Borderie, ‘Derniers jours et 
obsèques de Jean II duc de Bretagne (1305)’, Bulletin et mémoires de la Société Archéologique du Département 
d’Île-et-Vilaine 14 (1880):1-27. 
22 Primat does mention Jean by name. Primat, 39. See generally Paul D. Abbott, Provinces, Pays and 
Seigneuries of France (Mrytleford, Australia, 1981), 249; Jones, ‘The Crown’, 62-63. 
23 GCF, VIII:245. See Continuatio, 592-593. See generally Galliou and Jones, 204.  
24 ‘…don’t ce fu pitié, doleur et dommage’. GCF, VIII:245. These emotions seem to be Lescot’s, alt-
hough Guillaume’s continuator notes that ‘mœris confusionem superinduxit et lamentum’. Continuatio, 593. 
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in 1322, but he allows these episodes to speak for themselves.25 The relative neglect the 
Dreux family receives in the Dionysian continuations implies that they were too autonomous 
and too cosy with the English, thereby rendering them poor examples of Capetian dynasti-
cism. 
 The only exception to this pattern was the last senior Dreux duke, Jean III. Lescot 
mentions Jean on three separate occasions and in each the duke is supporting the Capetian 
dynasty. In 1328, he appeared as a French commander at the battle of Cassel, where he was 
subsequently wounded.26 He served Philippe VI again in 1340, and this is the only instance 
where Lescot or his predecessors lists a Breton ruler among other Capetian lords.27 But the 
surest sign of a Franco-Breton detente occurred in 1334, when Jean attempted to name 
Philippe heir to Brittany in order to avoid a succession war. Jean, Lescot writes, ‘was consid-
ering the good of the kingdom and the peril which would come to this kingdom if the duchy 
of Brittany escheated into the hand of a woman, so the said Jean wished to leave the said 
duchy to the king of France after his death’.28 Approval for this plan pivoted on the acquies-
cence of the Breton barons, who resoundingly vetoed the anticipated loss of autonomy.29 
Within the context of the Dionysian chronicles, Jean’s prophetic fears came true in 1341 when 
the duke’s death led to a succession war in Brittany. But Lescot’s decision to include this pas-
sage was a product of hindsight since he assembled his continuation a decade later.30 The 
chronicler clearly considered Jean to have been unique among the rulers of Brittany. Although 
no new marriage bonds were formed between the senior Capetians and their Breton cousins 
between 1213 and 1341, Lescot implies that the relationship between Jean III and Philippe VI 
was so strong that complete French suzerainty over Brittany was nearly achieved. Therefore, 
within the narrative, the Breton family came full circle. Jean’s willingness to sacrifice Brit-
tany’s independence for a stronger, safer France made him the opposite of his ancestor, Pierre, 
who sought independence at the expense of France. But Jean’s failure to provide an uncon-
tested heir shattered any hope for a definitive Franco-Breton reconciliation and rendered him 
an unfit example of Capetian dynasticism within the chronicles. 
                                               
25 GCF, VIII:168-169, IX:11-13. See Chronicon, 578; Chronique latine, II:43-45. See generally Mal-
colm Graham Allan Vale, The Origins of the Hundred Years War: The Angevin Legacy 1250-1340 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), 26-27. 
26 GCF, IX:85, 89-90. See generally Galliou and Jones, 205. 
27 GCF, IX:204. See generally Jones, Creation, 211. 
28 ‘Jehan le duc de Bretaigne, considerans le bien du royaume et le peril qui à celui pourroit venir se la 
duchié de Bretaigne escheoit en main de femme, si voult ledit Jehan laissier ledit duchié au roy de France après 
son decès…’. GCF, IX:147. See generally Jones, Creation, 211. 
29 GCF, IX:147. See Lescot, 36-37. See generally Galliou and Jones, 221. 
30 GCF, IX:217-218. 
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 To Lescot and Pierre d’Orgemont, the War of the Breton Succession was fundamen-
tally a struggle concerning French suzerainty over Brittany, fought between the Montforts—
who sought autonomy—and the Blois-Penthièvres—who accepted French overlordship. 
Therefore, it was a fight between Capetian dynasticism and regnal authority. Lescot indisputa-
bly supports the latter’s pretensions, explaining that Charles de Blois’s claim derived from his 
wife, Jeanne de Penthièvre, daughter of the ‘second brother born of the abovesaid duke Jean 
[III]’, whose claim he compares to Jean, count of Montfort-l’Amaury, who was merely 
‘thirdly born’.31 More important to Lescot is that Charles’s case was reviewed ‘by several 
wise men and experts and similarly by several bishops of the land…and it was said by decree 
that the king ought to receive and invest the abovesaid Charles for the homage of the duchy of 
Brittany’.32 In this way, Lescot portrays Brittany as a French fief, which means the king is 
vested with full power to confirm its duke. The chronicler also informs his readers that 
Charles was ‘the nephew of the king of France’, thus implying a dynastic motive for Charles’s 
nomination.33 But Jean de Montfort forged a dynastic alliance of his own when he married his 
son to the daughter of Edward III in 1342, thereby elevating the conflict into a war between 
France and England.34 The end result of these complex relationships was that neither Jean’s 
capture by the French in 1341 nor his death in 1345 nor Charles’s capture by the English in 
1347 brought an end to the war.35 Indeed, Orgemont, writing after the first phase of the con-
flict ended, shows that it was only when Charles de Blois died in 1364 that Charles V recog-
nised the legitimacy of Montfort claims to Brittany.36 Indeed, Orgemont appears to have had 
no choice but to acknowledge Jean IV, son of Jean de Montfort, as duke, since the former ‘did 
not find in all the said lands of Brittany anyone who would resist him or make any war’.37 
Orgemont knew that the war for Breton autonomy had already ended: both claimants had 
agreed to accept French overlordship before their swords ever clashed. Regnal supremacy had 
won, albeit by those who championed dynasticism. 
 Orgemont and Jean Juvénal des Ursins demonstrate this rise of French suzerainty over 
Brittany in a series of interconnected episodes that span forty years. In the treaty of Brétigny 
                                               
31 ‘…la fille Guy de Bretaigne, visconte de Lymoges, frere secondement né du devant dit duc Jehan, et 
entre le conte de Monfort…tiercement né’. GCF, IX:217, 218-219. See Lescot, 54-56. 
32 ‘Et quant la cause fu menée en parlement à la parfin, par plusseurs sages et expers, et meismement 
par aucuns evesques dudit pays…et fu dit par arrest que le roy devoit recevoir et envestir le devant dit Charles à 
l’omage du duchié de Bretaigne’. GCF, IX:219. See Lescot, 55. See generally Galliou and Jones, 220. 
33 GCF, IX:217. See generally Galliou and Jones, 217. 
34 GCF, IX:228. See generally Jones, Creation, 267. 
35 GCF, IX:220-221, 304-305. See generally Galliou and Jones, 223-225. 
36 CRJC, II:6. See generally Galliou and Jones, 227. 
37 ‘…le dit monseigneur Jehan de Montfort ne trouva, ou dit pays de Bretaigne, qui luy resistast ou feist 
aucune guerre’. CRJC, II:6. 
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in 1360, French suzerainty was agreed by both England and France.38 Later that year, Jean IV 
pledged homage to the French king for his county of Montfort-l’Amaury.39 Then, in 1365, 
Jeanne and her children renounced their claims to Brittany in the treaty of Guérande and Jean 
swore oaths to the king for the duchy the next year.40 Orgemont uses these moments to high-
light how decisively and completely French suzerainty was extended over Montfort lands. 
Thus, when Jean betrayed this suzerainty and began cavorting with the English in 1373, Orge-
mont felt justified in branding him ‘he who had been duke of Brittany’.41 He also uses this as 
a segue to explain why Charles V conquered Brittany, adding as further justification that the 
duke had been deprived of all his titles, lands, and possessions.42 When the Bretons recalled 
Jean in 1379, Orgemont is critical of their decision, arguing that they were ‘acting against 
their oaths, loyalties, and promises’.43 The chronicler also reminds readers in 1381, when Brit-
tany was returned to Jean, that the duchy had been ‘confiscated and forfeited to the King’ and 
that Jean ‘ought to make homage to the King, both for the duchy of Brittany and the county of 
Montfort’.44 To Orgemont, recognising French suzerainty remained key to the Breton narra-
tive and he condemned any violation of Jean’s oaths. Michel Pintoin and Juvénal, meanwhile, 
emphasise that, even after this reconciliation, the Franco-Breton relationship sat at a precipice 
between war and peace.45 Jean IV secured his dynasty’s future by marrying his heir to Charles 
VI’s daughter—a political manoeuvre that brought the two dynasties closer together.46 This 
action emphasises the important role marriage could serve in reaffirming dynastic loyalty 
among cadets and shows how even long-maligned agnates can return to the Capetian fold with 
the correct incentives. The marriage became an important compromise within the narrative 
between the themes of regnal authority and Capetian dynasticism. While the Montforts agreed 
to acknowledge French suzerainty, thereby submitting to regnal authority, the French king 
agreed to remain aloof of Breton affairs, conceding an element of Capetian dynasticism. 
                                               
38 CRJC, I:286-287. See generally Daru, II:120; Jones, Creation, 266. 
39 CRJC, I:326-327. 
40 CRJC, II:24-25. See generally Galliou and Jones, 227, 234. 
41 CRJC, II:168-169, 171, 173, 183. See generally Galliou and Jones, 235; Sumption, III:104. Sumption, 
III:352, notes that the ‘French royal chancery had referred to John as the “former” duke ever since he had re-
nounced his homage in 1373’. 
42 CRJC, II:183, 192, 353, 355-359. See generally Sumption, III:351-352. 
43 ‘…en venant contre leurs foiz, loiautez et seremens…’. CRJC, II:363. See generally Galliou and 
Jones, 235. 
44 ‘…le dit duc de Bretaigne devoit faire hommage au Roy, tant de la duchié de Bretaigne comme de la 
conté de Montfort…’. CRJC, III:7. See generally Galliou and Jones, 236. 
45 HCRF, 372-375, 386-387, 388-389, 391, 395. See CKS, I:480-490, 720-730, II:8-12, 16-22, 28-32, 
100-104, 114-116 (evens). 
46 HCRF, 410, 412. See CKS, II:443. The ceremony was conducted in 1402. Autrand, Charles VI, 393. 
See also Chapter 7.1. 
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 The Dreux-Montfort family saga ended in 1397 much as it began in 1213. In the latter 
year, Pierre became count of Brittany because of his position in the Capetian dynasty, his 
marriageability, and his suitability for the role. In the former, Jean IV was reconciled to his 
ancestral dynasty because of his willingness to submit to Capetian authority, the marriageabil-
ity of his heir, and his uncontested status within Brittany. Juvénal seems to recognise this, too, 
since the final two entries in which Jean IV appears display him in a positive light, much like 
Primat’s first two entries about Pierre. But Pierre’s actions afterwards and Jean’s actions be-
fore, as well as the various activities of the five rulers that ruled between, leave the Breton rul-
ers wanting. The history of Brittany in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was one of 
balancing two conflicting problems: its autonomy and its fealty to the French king. Each ruler 
dealt with this issue in his own way and the chroniclers praised those who placed their fealty 
first and criticised those who emphasised independence. Notably, very little actually changed 
over the two centuries, but by 1399 the Dreux rulers of Brittany were undeniably closer to the 
French royal family than ever before and French suzerainty was openly acknowledged, if not 
fully embraced. As with the rulers of Naples and Navarre, the rulers of Brittany serve within 
the Dionysian vernacular continuations as didactic examples of how Capetian cadets can ad-
vance dynasticism into the French periphery while simultaneously demonstrating why recalci-
trance and independence undermine regnal authority and dynastic integrity. 
 
4.2 The Flemish Problem 
 Within the Dionysian continuations, the Dampierre family of Flanders was a key ex-
ample of how Capetians could overcome feudal recalcitrance during the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries.47 Throughout their continuations, the Dionysian authors dedicate scores of 
pages to the Dampierres’ struggle against French suzerainty. Guy de Dampierre, the first 
count mentioned in the vernacular continuations, frequently set himself against the Capetian 
kings, challenging their overlordship of Flanders and their influence in the Low Countries. 
His successors continued these rebellious tendencies, often allying with the English to keep 
Capetian expansion at bay. But the Capetians fought back, first militarily and then through 
targeted dynastic strategies, ultimately integrating their families together so tightly that the 
Dampierre family ceased its separate existence and merged into a Capetian cadet branch, 
much like the rulers of Navarre a century earlier. The chroniclers—some writing near-con-
temporaneous to these events, others many decades afterwards—viewed the history of this 
                                               
47 See Figure 4.2. 
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interdynastic strategy with uncertainty, with only Juvénal knowing how it would conclude. 
This section will explore the ways the chroniclers depicted the Capetian-Dampierre relation-
ship from 1251 until 1405 and analyse how the Dampierres became positive representations 
of Capetian dynastic authority, first indirectly and ultimately as cadets of the dynasty itself. 
 Within the Dionysian tradition, Guy de Dampierre did not begin as a recalcitrant vas-
sal of the French king; rather, he became one after his great hereditary rival, Jean II d’Hai-
naut, submitted to Philippe IV and requested French help in defeating the Flemish in 1293.48 
According to Lescot, translating Guillaume’s Chronicon, Philippe’s first action against the 
Dampierres came in 1294. In that year, Philippe captured Guy and his daughter, Philippa, who 
were attempting to arrange a dynastic alliance with the Plantagenets.49 Philippe decided that 
Philippa would remain ‘with the children of the king in order to be taught and nurtured with 
them’.50 Although the text never calls her a hostage, her inevitable indoctrination is implied 
by the context. Her captivity did little to distract Guy from his rebellion. In 1297, the count 
sent a letter to the king declaring ‘that he held nothing of him in fiefdom nor in any other 
manner to be his subject’.51 Philippe used this pretence to invade Flanders, with the chronicler 
justifying this action by stating that Guy had ‘departed from his fealty’.52 French suzerainty 
over Flanders, therefore, remained the primary issue and even the capture of Guy in 1300 did 
not stop the war.53 Indeed, Lescot even records that Guy and his sons ‘requested pardon for 
their misdeeds and discord, and they received it from [Philippe] very piteously. But until such 
a time that they had his mercy and pardon, they were put in various places in prison under 
guard’.54 The early thirteenth-century vernacular continuators prove that this lack of trust in 
the Dampierres was justified: another of Guy’s sons destroyed the French army in 1302 at the 
battle of Courtrai.55 Philippe, desperate for a resolution to this conflict, even briefly released 
Guy from prison ‘in order to appease the people—but it could not be done. And since every 
                                               
48 GCF, VIII:150. See Chronicon, 574-575. See generally Strayer, Reign, 320-321. 
49 GCF, VIII:154. See Chronicon, 576. See generally Paul Arblaster, A History of the Low Countries 
(Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 83; David Nicholas, Medieval Flanders (London: Longman, 
1992), 187-188. 
50 ‘Mais ycelle fille après ce demoura avec les enfans le roy pour estre enseigniée et nourrie avec 
eulz…’. GCF, VIII:154-155. See Chronicon, 576. See generally Nicholas, 288. 
51 ‘…nulle chose il ne tenoit de lui en fié, ne en autre quelconque maniere…estre à lui sougiet’. GCF, 
VIII:169. See Chronicon, 578. See generally Arblaster, 85. 
52 ‘Gui le conte de Flandres qui de sa feauté estoit departi…’. GCF, VIII:173. See Chronicon, 579. See 
generally Nicholas, 189. 
53 GCF, VIII:187, 188-189. See Chronicon, 581, 582. See generally Nicholas, 191. 
54 ‘Lesquiex amenez à Paris, qu roy de France requistrent pardon de leurs meffaiz et misericorde, et il la 
reçurent très piteusement. Mais jusques au temps d’avoir miseracion et pardon, furent mis par divers lieux en 
prison souz garde’. GCF, VIII:189. See Chronicon, 582. 
55 GCF, VIII:203, 208, 210. See generally Nicholas, 192-194. 
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day, the problematic pride of the Flemish showed their hatred of the French, the abovesaid 
Guy and his son returned to the places under their guard without doing anything’.56 The Dio-
nysian texts demonstrate that anti-French sentiment was so strong during this period that the 
Flemish refused to listen to their own count—a recurring problem in Flanders. Ultimately, 
Philippe took to the field himself in 1304, risking his life to subdue the Flemish.57 Perhaps be-
cause Guy had relented before the end, the chronicler allowed the count’s story to conclude. 
He notes that ‘the count Guy of Flanders, detained in prison by the king of France, died at 
Compiègne and, by leave of the king, his body was taken into Flanders and he was interred 
with his ancestors at Marquette’.58 Nonetheless, death in prison certainly represents a failed 
policy from both the French and Flemish perspectives, and Guy’s fate showcases what hap-
pens to those who do not cooperate with the Capetian dynasty. 
The next two generations of Dampierres provided further fodder upon which Lescot 
built his case against the family. Reflecting the beliefs of Philippe IV, Lescot blames a new 
rebellion in 1311 on Louis de Nevers, Robert’s heir. The king quickly confiscated Nevers and 
imprisoned Louis, temporarily resolving the crisis.59 Tensions between Philippe and Robert 
reached a breaking point in 1314, leading Lescot to begin counting the rebellions in his recen-
sion, noting ‘once more, after rebelling four times, the count of Flanders, Robert de Bethune, 
and the Flemish, who agreed to the peace with the king of France…in no manner would hold 
[to it]’.60 Because of this, Philippe led another army into Flanders and Lescot explains that ‘all 
Flanders could have been conquered and killed, so it would be rightly governed’, but the army 
was subsequently dismissed ‘without glory or honour’.61 Clearly, Lescot felt that Flanders 
warranted harsh penalties for its continued recalcitrance, but Philippe’s death later that year 
allowed the Dampierres to seek forgiveness instead from the new king. Louis X pardoned the 
Dampierres, but Robert himself remained condemned, prompting a fifth uprising in 
                                               
56 ‘…pour le peuple apaisier; mais il ne pot estre fait. Et pour ce que touz jours en la haine des François 
montoit le fol orgueil des Flamens, s’en revin drent arriere aux lieux de leur garde le devant dit Gui et son filz 
sans riens faire’. GCF, VIII:234. See Continuatio, 589. See generally Favier, Philippe le Bel, 243. 
57 GCF, VIII:240-241. See generally Favier, Philippe le Bel, 243-244. 
58 ‘…le conte Gui de Flandres, en la prison le roy de France detenu, mourut à Compiegne, et par le con-
gié du roy fu son corps portez en Flandres, et en Marquete, avec ses ancesseurs u enterré’. GCF, VIII:243. Viard 
notes that he was actually interred at the monastery at Flines near Douai. See Continuatio, 591. See generally 
Arblaster, 86. 
59 GCF, VIII:283-284. See Continuatio, 604. See generally Favier, Philippe le Bel, 490-196. 
60 ‘…derechief, après le rebellement IIII foiz du conte de Flandres Robert de Bethune, et les Flamens 
qui les convenances de pais avec le roy de France…en nulle maniere ne vouloient tenir…’. GCF, VIII:301. See 
generally Favier, Philippe le Bel, 507-508. 
61 ‘…toute Flandres peust avoir conquis et occis s’il fussent à droit gouverné…[mais] sanz rien faire 
furent deboutez à eulz en revenir non glorieux et sanz honneur en France’. GCF, VIII:302. See generally Favier, 
Philippe le Bel, 508-511; Strayer, Reign, 344-346. 
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September 1315.62 The king responded by bringing into Flanders an army so large that ‘never 
had a king of France assembled so noble a host of Frenchmen’.63 Nevertheless, the Flemish 
won by flooding the countryside.64 It was only during the regency of the future Philippe V in 
1316 that peace negotiations resumed.65 But Louis de Nevers remained dissatisfied and seized 
his French lands in Nevers and Rethel in 1318.66 When Robert attempted to broker a new set-
tlement in 1320, ‘one malicious lawyer’ in his party effectively blocked him.67 However, Les-
cot gives Robert due credit, describing how the count went into Flanders and told the town 
leaders ‘that he would not leave Paris until he had made a firm peace with the king…and that 
if he returned without achieving anything, they would not have heads upon which they could 
put their hats’.68 Peace was secured shortly afterwards via a dynastic marriage between 
Philippe’s daughter and Robert’s grandson.69 Shortly afterwards, Louis and Robert died in 
quick succession, leaving the stability of Flanders in doubt.70 Lescot, therefore, demonstrates 
that the ultimate result of thirty years of Flemish resistance to French rule was a potential suc-
cession crisis and a strengthened Capetian-Dampierre relationship. These are hardly the hall-
marks of a successful Flemish strategy of autonomy, and Lescot uses this situation to 
showcase a technique for his Capetian readers to use against recalcitrant vassals. 
This Capetian-Flemish dynastic relationship did not simply arise at the beginning of 
the fourteenth century—it began much earlier with the marriage of Philippe II Auguste and 
Isabelle of Hainaut-Flanders in 1180.71 Decades later, monks at Saint-Denis convinced them-
selves—and the royal court—that Philippe and Isabelle’s son, Louis VIII, represented a return 
to the line of Charlemagne via his maternal descent from Charles of Lorraine, the last legiti-
mate Carolingian agnate.72 The unknown author of Louis VIII’s vernacular life thoroughly 
                                               
62 GCF, VIII:317-318, 322. See Continuatio, 615. See generally Hallam and Everard, 364. 
63 ‘…ne fu d’aucun roy de France tel noble ost de François assamblé’. GCF, VIII:323. See generally 
Langlois, Histoire, 317. 
64 GCF, VIII:324. See generally Nicholas, 197. 
65 GCF, VIII:330. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 317. 
66 GCF, VIII:340-342, 345-346. See generally Nicholas, 209. 
67 GCF, VIII:350-352. 
68 ‘…leur fu dit que il ne se partiroient de Paris tant qu’il eussent fait ferme pais au roy…et que s’il re-
tornoient sanz riens faire, il n’avoient teste où il peussent mettre leurs chaperons’. GCF, VIII:351-352. See Con-
tinuatio, 625. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 318. 
69 GCF, VIII:351-352. The betrothal was arranged in 1317 but the subsequent rebellions delayed the 
marriage until 1320. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 318; Nicholas, 197.  
70 GCF, IX:4-6. See Continuatio, 651. See generally Nicholas, 210. 
71 GCF, VI:103, VII:2. See generally Jim Bradbury, Philip Augustus, King of France 1180-1223, The 
Medieval World (Harlow, UK: Longman, 1998), 41-43. 
72 Vincent de Beauvais was the first to articulate this doctrine in the form found in the Dionysian tradi-
tion, but he drew his inspiration from a speculative history by Andreas de Marchiennes in 1196. The Valerian 
prophecy, which underpins much of the doctrine, dates to 1040. Gabrielle M. Spiegel, ‘The Reditus Regni ad 
Stirpem Karoli Magni: A New Look’, French Historical Studies 7:2 (1971): 149. Philippe IV actively worked to 
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explains this theory, placing a strong emphasis on the Hainaut-Flanders family.73 But this dy-
nastic connection is never recalled elsewhere in the Dionysian continuations and contributes 
nothing to depictions of the Capetian-Flemish relationship. Indeed, the only hint given by Pri-
mat or Guillaume of a Capetian-Flemish dynastic relationship occurs in their account of 1258, 
when Marguerite II of Hainaut-Flanders attempted to cede Hainaut to Charles d’Anjou, whose 
claim to the county originated from Isabelle.74 More frequently, Flemish dynastic crosscur-
rents appear in the context of the multi-generational Avesnes-Dampierre feud, which Primat 
and Guillaume only tangentially reference in their continuations. Although Guy de Dampierre 
joined Louis IX on the Eighth Crusade in 1270 and his son Philippe supported Charles II in 
Sicily until 1303—both clear reflections of Capetian influence—no new marriage ties were 
forged during this time.75 It was only in 1307, with the marriage of Jean I de Namur, Robert 
III’s brother, to Marguerite, daughter of Robert de Clermont, that new dynastic connections 
were formed.76 But the marriage of the future Louis I of Flanders and Marguerite, daughter of 
Philippe V, in 1320 was entirely different.77 It was a solid dynastic link between the royal and 
the comital families. Although earlier dynastic connections proved important to the Dionysian 
narrative, none adequately emphasised the success of Capetian dynastic policy in Flanders. 
 Lescot implies that Louis I’s succession in 1322 was a dynastic coup for the Capetians 
since the Flemish ‘communes had promised that they would have no other [count]’.78 Thus, 
with Flemish approval, a cognatic Capetian cadet ruled over the oft-rebellious county. Charles 
IV supported Louis when the latter’s uncles, Robert de Cassel and Mathieu of Lorraine, at-
tempted to depose him in favour of their own claims in 1323 and 1325.79 However, it was pre-
cisely this increased Capetian involvement in Flemish affairs that prompted the Flemish to 
revolt in 1328 and 1338.80 Essentially, Louis’s intimate relationship with the Capetian family 
                                               
erase this idea since it undermined dynastic authority and implied that the earlier Capetian kings ruled illegiti-
mately. See Elizabeth A. R. Brown, ‘La généalogie capétienne dans l’historiographie du Moyen Age: Philippe le 
Bel, le reniement du reditus et la création d’une ascendance carolingienne pour Hugues Capet’, in Religion et 
culture autour de l’an mil: Royaume capétien et Lotharingie, eds. Dominique Iogna-Prat and Jean-Charles Pi-
card, 199-214 (Paris: Picard, 1990). 
73 GCF, VII:3-7. The chronicler was likely directly translating the Latin chronicle Ex Gestis Ludovici 
VIII. Regis, but only fragments survive, none of which include this doctrine. See generally Lewis, Royal Succes-
sion, 113-114. 
74 GCF, VII:180-181. See Primat, 10-11; GSL, 391. See Chapter 2.2. 
75 GCF, VII:260-261, VIII:138, 221-222. See GSL, 440; Continuatio, 572, 589. See generally René 
Grousset, Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem. La monarchie musulmane et l’anarchie 
franque (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1936), 651; Van Kerrebrouck, II:472. 
76 GCF, VIII:260, 265. See Continuatio, 597. 
77 GCF, VIII:336, 351-352. See Chronique latine, II:1. See generally Nicholas, 197. 
78 ‘…lesquelles communes avoient juré que il n’auroient autre…’. GCF, IX:6. See Continuatio, 651. 
79 GCF, IX:6-8, 44-48. See Continuatio, 638. See generally Langlois, Histoire, 318; Nicholas, 210, 214-
215. 
80 GCF, IX:78, 94, 162-164. See Lescot, 4, 9-10. See generally Nicholas, 215; Sumption, I:186, 231-
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eroded Flemish goodwill felt at the time of his succession. In 1338, Louis beheaded a Flemish 
knight ‘by the command of the king of France’ because the man ‘had received the coins of the 
king of England against the king of France’.81 This execution prompted months of revolt and 
Louis was eventually forced into exile in France, for which Philippe obtained an excommuni-
cation for everyone in Flanders.82 Lescot hints that Louis was to blame for this, noting that 
‘the Flemish…suffered great injuries and griefs from the count of Flanders’, but he adds ‘so it 
is said’ afterwards to suggest that the statement was only a rumour.83 It is also clear from this 
text that Philippe considered Louis a cousin and viewed the entire Flemish rebellion an affront 
both to his suzerainty over Flanders and to Capetian dynastic authority.84 Louis’s death at the 
battle of Crécy fighting the English in 1346 supported his lifelong political orientation.85 Les-
cot demonstrates throughout this narrative that Louis lived his life as a loyal Capetian prince 
and died among like-minded individuals. His succession brought an end to a century of anti-
French sentiment held by the Dampierre family and it decisively confirmed French suzerainty 
over the county, even if the Flemish people disagreed with such status. 
The inevitable merger of the Capetian and Dampierre dynasties began under Louis I, 
but it was with his son, Louis II, and his granddaughter, Marguerite III, that the two families 
became intractably entangled. The younger Louis first appears in the continuations in 1346 
when he entered Flanders following the death of his father.86 But when the bourgeois tried to 
force him to marry a daughter of Edward III against his will, Louis fled back to France, ‘for 
which the king of France and the mother of the said count expressed great joy and he was re-
ceived very honourably’.87 Throughout this episode, Louis, Lescot demonstrates, acted like a 
proper Capetian cadet and rejected policies that went against the royal will. Louis’s later mar-
riage to Marguerite of Brabant in 1347 is barely a footnote in the chronicles, a sign that it re-
flected Philippe VI’s intentions.88 Meanwhile, the chronicler frames the count’s final 
subjugation of Flanders in 1348 as a completed task and, indeed, Lescot does not mention 
                                               
233. 
81 ‘…par le commandement du roy de France li fist coper la teste, pour ce que l’en li metoit sus qu’il 
avoit receu les deniers du roy d’Angleterre contre le roy de France’. GCF, IX:162. See generally Sumption, 
I:231. 
82 GCF, IX:166. See Lescot, 46. Only those in Ghent were actually excommunicated. See generally 
Sumption, I:231, 301. 
83 ‘…les Flamens…souffrissent moult de injures et de griefs du conte de Flandres, si comme il 
disoient…’. GCF, IX:169. 
84 GCF, IX:201. 
85 GCF, IX:283. See generally Nicholas, 224. 
86 GCF, IX:286. See generally Nicholas, 224. 
87 ‘Dont le roy de France et la mere dudit conte orent très grant joie, et fu receu très honnorablement’. 
GCF, IX:292. See generally Sumption, I:564. 
88 GCF, IX:309. See generally Nicholas, 224. 
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Flanders again within his chronicle.89 To Lescot, Flanders being under firm comital control 
meant that the long Capetian-Dampierre struggle was at an end with a decisive French victory 
and a positive didactic example to convey to his readers. 
It was left to Orgemont to conclude the story of independent Flanders. He recounts 
how, in 1368, plans were initiated to have Philippe II of Burgundy, the youngest son of Jean II 
of France, marry Louis II’s daughter and heir, Marguerite.90 Due to her ancestry, she was not 
only heiress to Flanders, but also Artois, comital Burgundy, Nevers, and Rethel—essentially a 
small kingdom’s worth of territories along France’s eastern frontier.91 Thus, it made dynastic 
sense to marry her to a cadet who already controlled territory adjacent to hers. Presumably, 
such consolidation would expand Capetian dynastic authority into the western Empire. Orge-
mont gives meticulous details regarding the marriage treaty, explaining how the towns of Lille 
and Douai were to return to Flemish control after sixty years of French occupation.92 But this 
was only another step towards finalising the Capetian-Dampierre union and reversing a cen-
tury of Franco-Flemish animosity. It was the birth of their son and heir, Jean, in 1371 that 
marked the beginning of the end for the Dampierres.93 The chroniclers rarely note the birth of 
children to cadets, so this event’s inclusion by Orgemont marks it as especially important. The 
transition from Dampierre to Capetian control accelerated from 1382, when Louis’s mother, 
Marguerite de France, died leaving all her titles to him.94 Two years later, Louis himself ex-
pired and everything passed to his daughter, Marguerite III—Philippe of Burgundy’s wife.95 
Although it can be argued that the dynastic merger was only finalised when Jean inherited his 
parents’ titles in 1404 and 1405, the succession of Marguerite in 1384 was the functional cul-
mination of the multi-generational dynastic plan of the Capetian kings.96 By the end of the 
fourteenth century, Flanders was completely under the control of the Capetian dynasty, its era 
of rebellion over and its suzerainty under the French king confirmed. The dynastic policy set 
in place by Philippe V reached its desired climax, giving readers of the chronicles a successful 
example of the possibilities inherent in supporting Capetian dynasticism. 
                                               
89 GCF, IX:318. See generally Sumption, II:13-15. 
90 CRJC, II:58-59. See generally Richard Vaughan, Valois Burgundy (Hamden, CT: Archon Book, 
1975), 15. 
91 Autrand, Charles V, 521. 
92 CRJC, II:116-131. Lille and Douai had been ceded to France in lieu of payment in 1314. Strayer, 
Reign, 342, 345. See generally Vaughan, Valois, 15. 
93 CRJC, II:157. 
94 CRJC, III:17; HCRF, 350. See CKS, I:156, 158. See generally Vaughan, Valois, 16. 
95 CRJC, III:62; HCRF, 361. See CKS, I:298, 300. See generally Arblaster, 95. 
96 HCRF, 427, 431. See CKS, III:144, 234. The existence of two other sons of Philippe and Marguerite 
protected the dynasty from issues that could result from premature deaths. Indeed, Nevers and Rethel did not 
pass to Jean but rather to his youngest brother, Philippe. Vaughan, Valois, 18. See generally Nicholas, 322-323. 
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When they set out to write their continuations, the Dionysian chroniclers recognised 
the important didactic examples that the Dampierre rulers of Flanders could contribute to the 
overarching narrative, even if they could not see the conclusion to their story. Primat and the 
anonymous author of Louis VIII’s life first hinted at this connection, but it was left to later 
continuators to develop it further. Guillaume and Lescot record the fall of the Dampierres, 
their rebellions and depravity, with neither entirely able to foresee the reconciliation to come. 
Orgemont, in contrast, always viewed the Dampierres as faithful cadets, so he focussed in-
stead on the details of the merger of the two dynasties in the person of Marguerite III, with the 
result being the end of any separation between the families. Thus, his message is more direct: 
the Dampierres began as half-Capetians, but end as full cadets. When viewed as a whole, the 
Dampierres exemplify how far astray a family may drift before returning to their French roots 
and becoming faithful adherents of Capetian dynasticism. The narrative is a powerful message 
of dynastic cohesion, loyalty, and co-dependence. At the same time, the story sends a firm 
message that it was the duty of every French lord to represent the Capetian dynasty in their 
lands, even at the expense of regional autonomy and personal identity. 
 
4.3 The War of the French Succession 
The Dionysian vernacular continuators adopted a much more fluid approach toward 
the kings of England that responded to the changing relationship between the Plantagenet and 
Capetian dynasties. Following the treaty of Paris in 1259, the Plantagenets ruled the duchy of 
Guyenne in southern France as French vassals and peers, but the English chafed under French 
suzerainty and fought the advancement of French regnal authority at every opportunity. In re-
sponse, the Capetians weaponised dynasticism, using intermarriage in an attempt to keep the 
Plantagenets faithful to their oaths of fealty and treaty obligations. From 1299 until 1444, no 
fewer than five marriages between Capetian princesses and reigning English kings intimately 
bound the dynasties together.97 But this strategy had unexpected consequences. When all of 
Philippe IV’s sons died without male progeny in 1328, the French succession was left open. 
Philippe de Valois’s accession did not erase Edward III’s hereditary claim to the French 
throne, and he and his descendants asserted this claim repeatedly over subsequent centuries 
until the matter of French suzerainty over Guyenne became little more than a sideshow to a 
much larger conflict over the rulership of France itself. To the vernacular chroniclers, there  
                                               
97 See Figure 4.3. 
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was never a question of the legality of Capetian kingship or their status as suzerains over Guy-
enne, but the writers could not overlook the bellicose actions taken by the Plantagenet kings 
against their Capetian overlords. Indeed, the ongoing Anglo-French conflict runs as an under-
current throughout the continuations and helps glue its sometimes-divergent narratives to-
gether. This section will examine the dynastic relationship between the Capetians and 
Plantagenets within the context of the Dionysian vernacular chronicles to analyse how the 
English are portrayed in the texts and what didactic messages the chroniclers provide regard-
ing the limits of Capetian dynasticism. 
The Capetian-Plantagenet relationship was extremely complex and the conquests of 
Normandy, Anjou, and Aquitaine—the ancestral lands of the Plantagenets—by the French 
kings at the beginning of the thirteenth century only complicated it further. Guillaume and 
Lescot set the treaty of Paris, agreed between Henry III of England and Louis IX in 1259, as 
the baseline for Anglo-French relations.98 The treaty confirmed Plantagenet control over Guy-
enne, the remnant coastal portion of Aquitaine, but as a formal French fief. Thus, when Ed-
ward I declared war on France in 1294, Philippe confiscated Guyenne since, as Lescot argues, 
‘it belonged as a fief to his kingdom, and he summoned Edward, king of England, to come to 
his parlement’.99 Although Guillaume notes events in the war on two occasions, Lescot only 
mentions that the status quo ante bellum was formally restored in 1303.100 The indecisive na-
ture of this war made it irrelevant to Lescot’s overarching narrative. The shorter, albeit more 
decisive, War of Saint-Sardos in 1324 followed much the same pattern. Lescot states that 
Charles IV ‘reputed Gascony to be forfeited to him by right and that justice must be applied, 
because he had written to the king of England and summoned him to a certain place and time 
where he ought to be, and the king of England had accepted this, but did not come nor send 
somebody’.101 Again, the Plantagenet king abrogated the terms of the treaty of Paris and had 
                                               
98 GCF, VII:209-216, 222. Lescot includes a full transcription of the treaty in his chronicle. See gener-
ally Gauvard, 119-120; Vale, Origins, 49-63. For more on the treaty of Paris, see Chris Jones, ‘Paris (Paris, 
France), treaty (1259)’, in International Encyclopaedia for the Middle Ages–Online: A Supplement to LexMA-
Online (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008). 
99 ‘…ainsi comme appartenant au fié de son royaume, et fist semondre Edouart le roy d’Angleterre à 
venir en son parlement’. GCF, VIII:148-149, 151. See Chronicon, 575. Philippe summoned Edward in October 
1293, prior to Edward’s declaration of war, although isolated Anglo-French fighting began in 1292. See gener-
ally Margaret Wade Labarge, Gascony, England’s First Colony: 1204-1453 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1980), 
64; Michael Prestwich, Edward I, 2nd ed., Yale English Monarchs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1997), 376-381; Vale, Origins, 190. 
100 GCF, VIII:219. Cf. Chronicon, 578; Continuatio, 588. See generally Labarge, 74; Prestwich, 397; 
Vale, Origins, 215, 219-220, 224. 
101 ‘…il reputa Gascoigne estre forfaite à lui par droit, et justice devoir estre apliquièe, tant comme pour 
ce qu’il avoit cité le roy d’Angleterre et semons à certain lieu et jour où il devoient touz II estre, et le roy d’An-
gleterre accepté, mais il ne vint ne envoia…’. GCF, IX:33. See generally Labarge, 114. 
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to pay the penalty. Shortly afterwards, the chronicler reports that ‘all Gascony was in the lord-
ship of the king without much effort, except Bordeaux, Bayonne, and Saint-Sever, which held 
themselves and remained under the lordship of the king of England’.102 Although peace was 
restored when Edward II’s wife, Isabella, sister of Charles, intervened and their son, the future 
Edward III, pledged homage for Guyenne, Charles refused to return the seized lands, further 
aggravating Anglo-French tensions.103 In this way, Lescot establishes that those opposed to 
regnal authority within France must suffer the consequences of their recalcitrance. 
Events began to snowball after Charles died in 1328. Soon after his accession, 
Philippe VI demanded an oath of homage from Edward III, but the English king demurred, so 
Philippe seized Guyenne, ‘but only during the time that the homage has not been made’.104 
Lescot includes this unusual courtesy to showcase Philippe’s juristic integrity and desire to 
deescalate recent Anglo-French animosity. Before Edward relented, the English king de-
manded the return of lands seized in 1325, something that Philippe refused to do. Lescot—or 
more likely Orgemont in 1380—explains that ‘Edward [II] had forfeited this part and more, 
and that the said messire Charles [de Valois] well and justly had annexed it to the kingdom of 
France by right of battle and that no restitution was owed to him’.105 But the chronicler adds 
that Philippe was willing to compromise and promised that the matter would be decided ‘by 
the judgment of the peers of France, [and] he would do everything to the fulfilment of jus-
tice’.106 Thus, Lescot and Orgemont establish three key truths: that Philippe held Guyenne by 
feudal oaths, by right-of-conquest, and by the approval of the courts. To close his case, Lescot 
transcribes the entire oath of liege homage sealed by Edward two years later, which confirmed 
Philippe’s suzerainty over Guyenne.107 The chronicler masterfully manipulates these events in 
his retelling to prove the legality of Philippe’s position in relation to Edward and the subjuga-
tion of Guyenne under Capetian authority. 
The precedents above are recalled by Lescot in 1337 when tensions in Guyenne 
reached a breaking point and open war erupted between the English and the French. 
                                               
102 ‘…ainsi fu ramenée toute Gascoigne en la seignourie du roy sanz moien, excepté Bordiaux, Baionne 
et Saint Sever qui se tindrent et demourerent souz la seignourie du roy d’Angleterre’. GCF, IX:37. See generally 
Labarge, 115. 
103 GCF, IX:40-43. See generally Labarge, 114-115; Sumption, I:97-99; Vale, Origins, 241-242. 
104 ‘…mais seulement durant le temps que l’omage n’a pas esté fait…’. GCF, IX:97, 98. See Lescot, 10-
11. See generally Labarge, 118; Vale, Origins, 251-252. 
105 ‘…Edouart roy d’Angleterre, pere dudit roy avoit forfaite celle partie et plus, et que ledit messire 
Charles bien et justement l’avoit acquise au royaume de France par droit de bataille, et que en aucune restitu-
cionil n’estoit tenu’. GCF, IX:100. See Chronique latine, II:107-108. See generally Labarge, 119. 
106 ‘…et sur ce, par le jugement des pers de France, tout acomplissement de justice li seroit fait’. GCF, 
IX:101. See generally Labarge, 119. 
107 GCF, IX:101-104. 
ALL ROADS LEAD TO WAR Whaley 113 
Confiscation of the duchy was assumed under the circumstances.108 As before, Lescot focuses 
little on the war in the south and only returns to it in 1340, when Edward agreed to a Cape-
tian-Plantagenet union on the condition that Guyenne was returned to him ‘as king Edward, 
his grandfather, had held it before, so that no sergeant of the king could oversee the lands’.109 
This was not, in fact, how Guyenne operated under the terms of the treaty of Paris, although it 
was often the reality.110 Nevertheless, both parties agreed to the truce, but no marriage agree-
ment was made to seal the pact. When the truce broke down in 1345, Guyenne became a bat-
tleground between rival forces again.111 However, the issue of suzerainty did not arise again 
until after Jean II was captured by the English at the battle of Poitiers in 1356.112 In 1359, 
Orgemont reports, Edward demanded the restoration of everything lost to the French since 
1205 and he required full suzerainty over them.113 The prospect of ceding half of France to the 
English was unpopular with the French baronage and they declared war.114 A compromise 
was finally agreed at Brétigny in 1360.115 Orgemont shows that, within this treaty, Jean ceded 
to Edward most of historic Aquitaine in full suzerainty and, in exchange, Edward renounced 
his claim to the French throne.116 Thus, a century of Anglo-French conflicts had done nothing 
to advance regnal authority into Plantagenet lands and the new status quo significantly set that 
progress back. 
The war that erupted in 1369 was a reaction against this new status quo.117 Orgemont 
outlines in juristic detail the ways in which the English failed to uphold the treaty of Brétigny 
and why they forfeited their right to suzerainty over Aquitaine.118 However, the durability of 
this agreement was evident five decades later, when Juvénal reports incredulously that Henry 
V ‘demanded Guyenne and Ponthieu and, in effect, that the treaty of Brétigny be held’.119 The 
English expanded upon their demands, though, once they invaded in 1414, and ‘maintained 
that they had rights to the duchies of Normandy and Guyenne and the counties of Anjou, 
                                               
108 GCF, IX:157. See Lescot, 42. The other reason for the war was Edward’s unwillingness to surrender 
Robert d’Artois to Philippe. See generally Vale, Origins, 244, 260. 
109 ‘…comme le roy Edouart son tayon la tint, par ainsi que nul serjant du roy ne peust sergenter au 
pays’. GCF, IX:208. No modern source confirms this marriage negotiation. 
110 See generally Vale, Origins, 53-57, 68-71. 
111 GCF, IX:253, 258-259, 316, 325. See generally Sumption, I:454. 
112 CRJC, I:72-75. See generally Sumption, II:244-245. See also Chapter 5.1. 
113 CRJC, I:234-235. See generally Hallam and Everard, 170; W. Mark Ormrod, Edward III, Yale Eng-
lish Monarchs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011), 396. 
114 CRJC, I:236. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 368. 
115 CRJC, I:259ff. 
116 CRJC, I:268, 286. See generally Ormrod, 405. 
117 CRJC, II:45-47, 67-68, 72-118. See generally Labarge, 162. 
118 CRJC, II:76-116. See generally Labarge, 162-3. 
119 ‘[Ils] demandoient Guyenne, et Ponthieu, et en effet que le traitté de Bretigny se tint’. HCRF, 503. 
Pintoin does not mention Brétigny. Cf. CKS, V:51. See generally Sumption, IV:371. 
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Poitou, Maine, Touraine, and Ponthieu’.120 Finally in 1419, Henry insisted on ‘that which was 
agreed by the treaty of Brétigny…and with this, all the duchy of Normandy, both that which 
he had conquered and that which remained of the said duchy, and that in effect without hom-
age, resort, and sovereignty’.121 Thus, the treaty of Brétigny became a touchstone for the Eng-
lish, the foundation for a peace that was never realised and the solution to a problem that was 
beyond resolution. The frequency with which the chroniclers recall the treaty by name sug-
gests its power in the Anglo-French narrative, but also its wistfulness. Even as the Plantage-
nets attempted to advance their own form of dynasticism within France, the vernacular 
continuators actively worked against that goal, categorically undermining all aspects of the 
English claims to better assert the idea of Capetian suzerainty over Guyenne within their 
chronicles. 
The task of downplaying English claims in France was made more difficult for the Di-
onysian chroniclers due to the close familial bond between the Capetian and Plantagenet dyn-
asties. Guillaume first documents this growing kinship in 1299, when he reports the marriage 
of Edward I and Philippe IV’s sister, Marguerite.122 He also emphasises the birth of their first 
child, Thomas, noting he was ‘handsome’, a characteristic common to Philippe’s family.123 
Edward II’s marriage to Isabelle, Philippe’s only daughter, occurred in 1308, but Guillaume’s 
continuator leaves out the political reasons behind this union—it appears as simply a family 
affair.124 Lescot emphasises this Capetian connection repeatedly through his narrative of the 
following two decades: he mentions it when recounting Edward III’s birth in 1312; it is a 
                                               
120 ‘[Ils] disient et maintenoient “qu’ils avoient droict és duchez de Normandie, et de Guyenne, et és 
comtez d’Anjou, de Poitou, du Maine, de Touraine, et de Ponthieu…”’. HCRF, 505. Cf. CKS, V:498-504 
(evens). See generally Sumption, IV:395. 
121 ‘…qui fut accordé par le traitté de Bretigny…et avec ce toute la duché de Normandie, tant ce qu’il 
avoit conquesté, que tout le demeurant de ladite duché, et ce en effet sans hommage, ressort et souvereineté…’. 
HCRF, 550-551. See generally Juliet Barker, Conquest: The English Kingdom of France 1417-1450 (London: 
Little, Brown, 2009), 25-26; Sumption, IV:635-642. 
122 GCF, VIII:184, 255. See Chronicon, 581. Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot all overlook the kinship 
between Louis IX of France, Charles I of Sicily, Henry III of England, and Richard of Germany, who all married 
daughters of Ramon Berenguier V of Provence between 1234 and 1245. Le Goff, 130. See generally Labarge, 
74.  
123 GCF, VIII:184. Philippe IV and Charles IV both were known as ‘the Fair’. See Chronicon, 581. See 
generally Seymour Phillips, Edward II, Yale English Monarchs (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 
81.  
124 GCF, VIII:244, 259. See Continuatio, 597. The marriage was arranged at the treaty of Montreuil in 
1299 (at which time Edward I and Marguerite wed). They were betrothed in 1303 and again in 1305, but the 
wedding did not occur until 1308. Lescot mistakenly places Edward’s marriage in 1305, but then duplicates this 
entry in 1308. He is the originator of this mistake as it does not appear in Guillaume’s continuation. See also 
Elizabeth A. R. Brown, ‘The Political Repercussions of Family Ties in the Early Fourteenth Century: The Mar-
riage of Edward II of England and Isabelle of France’, Speculum 63:3 (1988): 578-595; and Brown, ‘The Mar-
riage of Edward II of England and Isabelle of France: A Postscript’, Speculum 64:2 (1989): 373-379. See 
generally Labarge, 74; Phillips, 125. 
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major component in his depiction of the Anglo-French peace accords of 1325; and Lescot 
concedes that it made Edward a potential claimant to the French throne in 1328.125 Lescot, 
copying Guillaume’s continuator, adds another dimension to this relationship when he notes 
that Edward’s wife was the ‘niece of the king of France’, a fact not mentioned elsewhere.126 
Indeed, this treatment even extends to other Plantagenet cadets like Edmund, earl of Lancas-
ter, who is described as the ‘uncle of the king of France’.127 The Capetian-Plantagenet rela-
tionship is a recurring theme in the pre-1375 continuations, suggesting that the Plantagenets 
should be considered Capetian cognates within its context. To the early vernacular writers, the 
reality of Capetian-Plantagenet kinship cannot be ignored. 
Orgemont never implies a familial connection between the rival dynasties, likely due 
to the fact that he wrote during a period of renewed Anglo-French tensions. But Pintoin, Juvé-
nal, and Chartier include three occasions where attempts were made by the Plantagenets to re-
establish their former dynastic bonds. In 1396, Richard II married Isabelle, eldest daughter of 
Charles VI, in exchange for a twenty-eight-year truce.128 The following year, Richard visited 
Charles personally to finalise the marriage, and Juvénal notes that, ‘from then on, the King 
called the king of England his son, and the other called him his father’.129 Because of this fa-
ther-son relationship, Juvénal considers it an affront to Charles when Henry, duke of Lancas-
ter, deposed Richard in 1399, stating that ‘when the King learned what had happened in 
England against his relative, he was very displeased and knew well that all the alliances and 
truces were void and that we were returning to war’.130 The family relationship, therefore, is 
directly linked to the likelihood of war. Henry V attempted to repair this familial damage and 
solve the ongoing crisis. Juvénal reports that, prior to the battle of Agincourt in 1415, Henry 
requested the hand of Catherine, Charles VI’s youngest daughter, as part of a comprehensive 
                                               
125 GCF, VIII:287; IX:43, 73. Guillaume’s continuator does not mention Isabelle’s relationship to the 
French king in 1312 and it is not emphasised in 1325. Cf. Chronique latine, II:60-61; Continuatio, 607. See gen-
erally Langlois, Histoire, 310. See also Chapter 3.2. 
126 GCF, IX:166-167. See Chronique latine, II:160. Ormrod, 38-39, 69-70, states that the ‘court of 
Philip VI had interpreted [the marriage proposals between Edward and a Capetian princess] as a unilateral at-
tempt by the Plantagenets to insinuate themselves further in the extended royal family of France, and had vigor-
ously resisted the proposal’. 
127 GCF, IX:8-9, 114. Edmund of Lancaster was actually Philippe IV’s step-father-in-law since the for-
mer’s wife was Blanche, mother of Jeanne I of Navarre, Philippe’s wife. See generally Labarge, 64.  
128 HCRF, 402. Juvénal mistakenly claims that a thirty-eight-year-truce was arranged, but Pintoin notes 
the number correctly. Cf. CKS, II:366. See generally Nigel Saul, Richard II, Yale English Monarchs (New Ha-
ven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 227, 230. 
129 ‘Car dés lors le Roy appelloit le roy d’Angleterre son fils, et l’autre l’appelloit son pere’. HCRF, 
406. Cf. CKS, II:458. 
130 ‘Quand le Roy sceut ce qui avoit esté fait en Angleterre contre son gendre, il en fut bien desplaisant, 
et cognut-on bien que toutes alliances et trefves estoient rompuës, et qu’on estoit revenu à la guerre’. HCRF, 
418. Cf. CKS, II:730, 732. See generally Saul, 416-424; Sumption, III:864. 
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peace treaty between England and France.131 Charles’s government eventually acquiesced to 
this demand in 1420 in the treaty of Troyes, but most Capetian agnates, including Charles’s 
eldest son and hereditary heir, ignored the treaty, making the marriage compact ineffectual.132 
The last interdynastic marriage, between Henry VI and Marguerite d’Anjou in 1445, was part 
of a two-year truce agreement, but Chartier gives the union little context and does not suggest 
any ongoing peace project.133 Indeed, he neglects to reference Marguerite’s relationship to 
Charles VII (she was the king’s niece) and never hints at any previous kinship between the 
Plantagenets and the Capetians. Thus, while the chroniclers prior to Orgemont believed that 
familial bonds were essential to understanding the Capetian-Plantagenet relationship—indeed, 
they found it difficult to perceive the Plantagenets as anything other than Capetian cadets—
the writers of the fifteenth century wrote with the retrospective knowledge that all such agree-
ments failed to secure a lasting peace and none contributed to improving Anglo-French rela-
tions or ending the war. In other words, the later authors understood that earlier examples of 
interdynastic cooperation had failed and they made clear to their readers that attempting dy-
nastic marriages with the Plantagenets was a hopeless endeavour. 
The primary reason the chroniclers ultimately discount the Anglo-French dynastic re-
lationship was due to the prevalence of the Plantagenet claim to the French throne in contem-
porary political discourse. The marriage of Edward II to Isabelle in 1308 created the 
possibility that a Plantagenet would one day assert a right to the French throne, as indeed hap-
pened after Charles IV died in 1328 without male issue. To place a stronger emphasis on the 
legitimacy of the Valois succession, Orgemont replaced Lescot’s original statements regard-
ing the succession with a much more straight-forward depiction of the event.134 Because of 
this, he does not use legal arguments to nullify Edward III’s candidacy; rather, he simply 
states that ‘the king of England and other enemies of the kingdom held against reasonable 
opinion that the kingdom belonged more to the said Englishman’.135 Orgemont still outlines 
the source of Edward’s claim, but undermines it by including both of Edward’s oaths of hom-
age to Philippe made in 1329 and 1331, thereby proving to the reader that the Plantagenet 
                                               
131 HCRF, 506. See CKS, V:502. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 525-526. 
132 HCRF, 557. Pintoin includes the entirety of the treaty in his chronicle, although he agrees that it is 
unjust and illegal. CKS, VI:410-430, 436-440 (evens). See generally Barker, 29. 
133 Chartier, II:43, 45-46. See generally Barker, 324-328. 
134 Hedeman, Royal Image, 116-117. 
135 ‘…le roy d’Angleterre, et autres ennemis du royaume, tenissent contre raisonnable oppinion, que le 
royaume appartenist miex audit Anglois…’. GCF, IX:73.  
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claimant accepted the Valois succession.136 Lescot similarly manipulates the events surround-
ing Edward’s proclamation as king of France in 1340 to redirect responsibility from Edward 
to the Flemish, writing that, ‘they made homage to the king of England as king of France, and 
they left their rightful lord, false and traitorous that they were to him’.137 In this new frame-
work, Edward’s claim disrupted Capetian dynastic authority in the Low Countries. Lescot also 
includes two letters that the kings exchanged that year, wherein Edward petitioned Philippe to 
renounce the crown ‘to avoid the death of the people’.138 In response, Philippe emphasised 
that Edward ‘entered into our homage, in recognising us, as, is right, king of France, and 
promising obedience such as one ought to promise to his sovereign liege’.139 In summary, Ed-
ward broke his oaths in claiming the French crown and his actions imperilled the domestic 
stability that he, as a French peer and Capetian cognate, should have championed. 
 Lescot’s vernacular successors downplay the Plantagenet claim to the throne and 
never afford it significant space. Orgemont primarily focusses on debunking the English claim 
via official documentation that he transcribes into his narrative. For example, the claim is 
prominent in the English-authored treaty of Brétigny in 1360, but in that agreement, Edward 
promised to renounce ‘especially the name and the right to the crown and the kingdom of 
France’.140 But this became a problem since, after it was agreed, Edward ‘still did not re-
nounce the said kingdom of France, and also the king of France did not renounce his resort 
and sovereignty nor the homage over the lands that he gave to the king of England, but [Ed-
ward] abstained from the name king of France and must renounce it, once certain lands would 
be delivered to him’.141 Orgemont later explains that, by 1369, ‘the king of England had been 
                                               
136 GCF, IX:73, 100-104. Hedeman, Royal Image, 117, notes that combining the events of 1329 and 
1331 ‘blur[s] distinctions between the homage that took place in 1329 and that which was described in 1331, dis-
torting the actual ceremony of homage to bolster the French position and promote the legitimacy of the Valois 
line. Textual changes in the manuscript manipulate the description of the events of 1329 to imply that the Eng-
lish king unequivocally accepted the Valois succession immediately after Philip of Valois’s accession in 1328, 
rather than three years later’. Cf. GCF, IX:72n2, 330-331; Continuatio, 645. See generally Giesey, 51-53, 61.  
137 ‘…il firent hommage au roy d’Angleterre comme roy de France, et laissierent leur droit seigneur, 
comme faux et traistres qu’il estoient’. GCF, IX:173. See Chronique latine, II:165. Ormrod, 212-214, clarifies by 
stating that ‘Edward agreed to announce himself king of France, and thus feudal suzerain of Flanders, in order 
that the men of Ghent, Bruges and Ypres might argue the justice of their cause against the Valois regime and es-
cape the penalties that might otherwise befall them for making an act of rebellion against their superior lord’. See 
generally Sumption, I:348-349.  
138 ‘…et pour eschever mortalité de peuple…’. GCF, IX:198-200. 
139 ‘…car vous estes entrés en nostre hommage, en nous recognoissant, si comme raison est, roy de 
France, et promis obeissance telle comme on la doit promettre à son seigneur lige…’. GCF, IX:201. 
140 ‘…et par especial au nom et au droit de la coronne et du royaume de France…’. CRJC, I:267-300, 
especially 279-280. 
141 ‘…mais il ne renonça pas encore au dit royaume de France, et aussi ne renonça pas le roy de France 
aus ressors et souverainetez des terres que il bailloit au dit roy d’Angleterre ne à l’omaige, mais il seurseoit du 
nom de roy de France et y devoit renoncier, quant certaines terres li seroient delivrées…’. CRJC, I:324. See gen-
erally Ormrod, 409-410. 
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refusing and delaying to make any renunciations, as he ought to make [and] until the said 
renunciations are made, the said resort and sovereignty would remain to the king of 
France’.142 To support this argument, the chronicler appends a long transcription of the terms 
of the renunciation from 1360 as evidence that Charles V retained suzerainty over Guy-
enne.143 Through these documents, Orgemont argues that, since Edward did not renounce his 
titles, Charles could legitimately hear appeals from Gascon lords in the French parlement. 
Charles later recounted these facts to his cousin Emperor Karl IV when the latter visited the 
French court in 1378, thus giving Orgemont an opportunity to elaborate to the reader the justi-
fications for the war.144 By using documentation to make his points, Orgemont makes a strong 
case against the English without ever explicitly taking a side in the conflict. 
 Juvénal and Chartier, meanwhile, largely ignore the French succession issue except 
when they cannot. For example, Juvénal, abridging Pintoin, writes that, when Henry V in-
vaded France in 1414, he said that ‘he was the true king of France and that he would conquer 
the kingdom’.145 Juvénal, therefore, allows Henry to speak for himself. He also shows that the 
French replied by stating that ‘the king of France, our sovereign lord, is the true king of 
France, unlike the things in which you say to have right or have any lordship, not even to the 
kingdom of England; for it belongs to the true heirs of the late king Richard, not with you’.146 
Thus, Juvénal uses a combination of documentation and juristic reasoning to undermine Plan-
tagenet claims. Within this framework, Henry essentially had no valid claim to France (or 
even England), so he had to marry Catherine to support his pretensions. After Henry and 
Catherine’s marriage and the signing of the treaty of Troyes in 1420, Juvénal dispassionately 
concludes that ‘there were, in effect, three kings in France, those being [of] France, England, 
and monseigneur the Dauphin’.147 This perception of the repercussions of the treaty is a 
                                               
142 ‘Car le roy d’Angleterre avoit estee refussans et delayans de faire aucunes renonciacions, que il de-
voit faire…. Et toutevoies, jusques ad ce que les dictes renonciacions feussent faites, les diz ressors et souverain-
netez demourroient au roy de France…’. CRJC, II:47. See generally Labarge, 162-163; Ormrod, 500-501. 
143 CRJC, II:47-58. This addendum was issued separately from the treaty of Brétigny and Orgemont 
does not include it with the rest of the agreement. 
144 CRJC, II:252. 
145 ‘…il estoit vray roy de France, et qu’il conquesteroit le royaume’. HCRF, 505. Cf. CKS, V:530, 532. 
See generally Autrand, Charles V, 545-567. 
146 ‘Sire, le roy de France nostre souverain seigneur est vray roy de France, ny és choses esquelles dites 
avoir droict, n’avez aucune seigneurie, non mie encore au royaume d’Angleterre: mais compete aux vrais heri-
tiers du feu roy Richard, ny avec vous…’. HCRF, 505. This sentiment reflects Juvénal’s 1446 treatise Tres 
crestien, tres hault, tres puissant roy, in which he denounces Henry VI’s right to either throne due to the stronger 
Yorkist claim to both. Craig Taylor, introduction to Debating the Hundred Years War: Pour ce que plusieurs (La 
loy Salicque) and A Declaracion of the Trew and Dewe Title of Henry VIII, Camden Fifth Series 29, ed. Craig 
Taylor (Cambridge: University Press, 2006), 3.  
147 ‘…car en effect il y eut trois rois en France, c’est à sçavoir France, Angleterre, et monseigneur le 
Dauphin…’. HCRF, 557. Henry V, as regent, ruled northern France and Guyenne alongside Jean of Burgundy. 
The Dauphin Charles ruled central France and Languedoc. Barker, 50. See also Chapter 6. 
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damning indictment of Plantagenet politics and its impact on French territorial integrity. For 
his part, Juvénal never ceases to recognise the claims of the dauphin, whom he considers 
Charles VII after Charles VI died in 1422.148 Chartier only mentions the matter of the English 
claim twice, once at the beginning of his text and once when relating the coronation of Henry 
VI at Paris in 1431.149 The chronicler largely confirms Juvénal’s opinion, recounting that in 
1422 ‘the more sane party wept and groaned…, considering the enormous evil which could 
come to them by the transference of their natural lord, and that the said lordship governed it-
self by strange manners and customs [nacions], which were and are against reason and right-
ful order, to the total destruction of the people of the kingdom of France’.150 Thus, both 
chroniclers consider the realities of the Plantagenet kingdom of France to be a direct threat to 
regnal authority and something that must be actively destroyed in order to restore Charles VII 
to full power. 
 The vernacular chroniclers had a difficult task when it came to discussing the con-
stantly-evolving Plantagenet-Capetian relationship. Guillaume’s continuators and Lescot had 
the greatest ability to demonstrate how a simple squabble over suzerainty in Guyenne became 
complicated by the intermarriages between the two dynasties, resulting in an unforeseen Plan-
tagenet claim to the French throne. But the repercussions of this claim were emphasised most 
strongly by Orgemont and Juvénal, who documented and summarised the diplomatic corre-
spondence sent between the two courts as they haggled over lands, rights, titles, and marriage. 
By the time of Chartier, France was divided into three spheres of influence, an aberration of 
law and custom. While the Plantagenet princes may have briefly been a manifestation of Ca-
petian dynasticism and been recognised by the chroniclers as cognatic cadets, the matter of 
the French succession became a solid barrier to future reconciliation. The later chroniclers re-
alised this and concluded that the Plantagenets were anathema to Capetian dynasticism and 
that their ejection from the European continent not only was needed to stabilise the kingdom, 
but was essential if the dynasty wished to securely expand their influence into the French pe-
riphery. Collectively, the final message of the chroniclers is clear: nothing good ever comes 
from negotiating with or tolerating the existence in France of the Plantagenets. 
 
                                               
148 HCRF, 562, 569. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 591. 
149 Chartier, I:27-30, 130-131. See generally Barker, 175-177; Bertram Wolffe, Henry VI, English Mon-
archs (London: Eyre Methuen, 1981), 60-61. 
150 ‘Maiz la plus saine partie plouroit et gémissoit…considérans les énormes maulx qui leur povoient 
venir par la mutacion de leur seigneur naturel, et que ladite seigneurie se gouverneroit par estranges manières et 
nacions, qui estoit et est contre raison et ordre de droit, à la totalle destruction du peuple et du royaulme de 
France’. Chartier, I:27-28. 
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Within the Dionysian vernacular chronicles, images of Capetian dynasticism projected by dis-
tant agnates such as the Dreux rulers of Brittany or cognates like the Dampierre counts of 
Flanders and Plantagenet kings of England differ significantly from each other, but they all 
provide didactic examples that could help instruct future Capetian rulers. The Breton rulers 
showcase the dangers in assuming that a family relationship can sustain French suzerainty 
over lands that are traditionally autonomous. Only increased involvement by the French kings 
and intra-dynastic marriage brought the Breton dukes back into the Capetian fold. Similarly, 
the perennial rebellions of the Dampierres forced the French kings to progressively integrate 
the Dampierre dynasty into their own, proving that aggressive dynasticism could sometimes 
resolve crises related to regnal authority. However, this strategy could have unforeseen conse-
quences, as exemplified by the Plantagenets. In an attempt to end wars of a similar nature to 
those of the Dampierres, the Capetian kings forged closer marriage bonds with the Plantage-
nets, which unintentionally gave Edward III a claim to the French throne and provided the 
family with yet another reason to fight their French kin. Thus, improved dynastic relationships 
were a double-edged sword. As lessons within a miroir, these examples illustrate how Cape-
tian princes must be cautious when using dynasticism as a method of empowering regnal au-









CHAPTER FIVE  
The Times of Troubles 
 
Capetian dynasticism certainly was a central theme under Primat, Guillaume de Nangis, Rich-
ard Lescot, and the other anonymous continuators who wrote prior to the reign of Charles V. 
But their broad approach toward dynasticism narrowed sharply when Pierre d’Orgemont as-
serted himself as a continuator of the Dionysian vernacular chronicles in 1375. Later chroni-
clers never again adopted such an all-embracing approach to portraying members of the 
Capetian dynasty. The narrative turn that began under Orgemont was the result of a number of 
pivotal events that occurred in the latter half of the fourteenth century that fundamentally al-
tered the direction of Capetian history. Jean II’s capture by the English in 1356 on the fields 
outside Poitiers halted much of the progress the Valois had made since 1328 to assert and se-
cure their lordship over France. Jean’s young heir, Charles, duke of Normandy and dauphin 
de Viennois (later Charles V), struggled throughout the period of his father’s captivity to sta-
bilise and unify the kingdom against the overwhelming threats aligned against him. Yet Orge-
mont, benefiting from twenty years of hindsight, glorified the deeds and actions of Charles, 
converting the entire situation between 1356 and 1360 into a tale of Valois and regnal tri-
umph. Upon Charles’s death in 1380, a new crisis erupted resulting in more domestic instabil-
ity and the threat of civil war between the late king’s brothers over the regency of the young 
Charles VI. Jean Juvénal des Ursins, abridging Michel Pintoin and writing decades after the 
events he recounts, strategically downplayed these instances of dynastic conflict, focussing 
instead on the inherent regnal authority of the king and ignoring the actual power wielded by 
his uncles. This chapter will examine the creative ways in which Orgemont and Juvénal redi-
rected the Dionysian vernacular tradition away from a broad approach toward dynasticism, as 
their predecessors had done, and toward a narrower view that emphasises the promotion of 
regnal authority over cadet ambitions. 
 
5.1 A Kingdom Without a King 
 The capture of Jean II reintroduced a recurring problem in late medieval French history: 
the kingdom had no obvious leader. Similar situations had occurred in 1226, 1316, and 1328, 
and in each instance, domestic revolt ensued. Unlike those crises, though, in 1356 there was 
still an adult king—he was just a hostage in England. Thus, Jean continued to assert his posi-
tion over the French people, an activity against which the Dauphin Charles had to constantly 
struggle and that Orgemont generally condemned in his continuation. Charles, for his part, 
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was not simply the French heir but also a great lord, suffering constant attacks in his duchy of 
Normandy throughout the period of his father’s captivity, which forced him to divide his at-
tention between Paris and Rouen. To make matters worse for the king’s lieutenant and, later, 
regent in France, most of the dauphin’s immediate family were held in captivity in England or 
actively fought against him, and none of the remaining cadets could give Charles more than 
token assistance. This section will explore how Orgemont balances his portrayal of the Dau-
phin Charles by showing him both as the embodiment of regnal authority and as a Capetian 
cadet, thereby making him an important transitional figure within the vernacular narrative. 
Paradoxically for a narrative tradition ostensibly organised by the reigns of kings, 
Orgemont’s chronicle is not really interested in Jean II but rather focusses primarily on the 
young dauphin. But this makes sense—Orgemont wrote his continuation under commission 
from Charles V during his reign, probably as a miroir for the future Charles VI, who was born 
in late 1368. Nevertheless, Jean is initially depicted favourably. When the king declared war 
on the English in early 1355, the Estates approved the necessary subsidies and declared that 
‘they would all live and die with the King, and put [their] body and possessions in his ser-
vice’.1 In other words, to Orgemont, Jean was worthy of public trust and devotion. The king 
soon proved his judicial qualities, as well, when he imprisoned Carlos II of Navarre in April 
1356, because, the chronicler explains, the Navarrese king ‘had schemed and plotted several 
things, to the damage, dishonour, and ill-will’ of Jean, the dauphin, and France.2 But this is 
virtually all the information about Jean that Orgemont gives his readers before noting that the 
king was captured by the English at the battle of Poitiers on 19 September 1356.3 The chroni-
cler never directly blames the king for the subsequent chaos in France nor the governmental 
crisis that ensued—such issues are the faults of others. In this way, Jean remains in the Diony-
sian tradition a faultless monarch, firmly in control of his government and popular even after 
his capture, a depiction with which most modern historians would strongly disagree.4 
                                               
1 ‘…ilz estoient tous près de vivre et mourir avecques le Roy, et de mettre corps et avoir en son 
servise…’. CRJC, I:56. See generally Bove, 102. 
2 ‘…le dit roy de Navarre avoit machiné et traictié pluseurs choses, au domage, deshonneur et mal…’. 
CRJC, I:64. See Chapter 3.3. See generally Charon, 201-203. 
3 CRJC, I:67-75. For more information on the battle, see Alfred H. Burne, The Crécy War: A Military 
History of the Hundred Years War from 1337 to the Peace of Bretigny, 1360 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 
1956; reprint, Ware, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1999), 275-321. 
4 Sumption, II:262, notes that, after being captured, around Jean ‘arose a shadow court, injecting fresh 
uncertainties into an already difficult political situation…. [I]t cannot have taken these men long to perceive the 
growing chasm which was opening up between the King and his subjects’. Autrand, Charles V, 218, explains, 
though, that ‘L’image du roi Jean et du courage malheureux a traversé les siècles, image du roi-chevalier qui, sur 
le champ de bataille, bassinet en tête et épée au point, n’abandonne pas son peuple. Si certains ont pensé qu’il 
aurait mieux fait de ne pas se trouver là, d’éviter à son royaume un traité si désastreux et à ses sujets le poids 
écrasant de la rançon, ils ne l’ont pas écrit. Ou du moins pas avant longtemps. À vrai dire, le blâme se lit entre 
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 The capture of Jean meant that, for the third time in a century, France found itself with-
out a functional monarch, paralysing the government of the kingdom.5 Rather than moving on 
with the narrative as if nothing significant had occurred, as his predecessors had done after the 
deaths of Louis X and Charles IV, Orgemont redirects the entire story, transferring nearly all 
of the king’s regnal qualities to the eighteen-year-old dauphin, Charles, who becomes the pri-
mary protagonist of the chronicle. As the story unfolds, it is clear to the reader that Charles is 
an underdog, a man who must struggle against the government itself to assert his dynastic 
identity and claim the regnal authority left vacant by his father. Orgemont reports that, soon 
after Jean’s capture, Charles called together the Estates of Languedoïl in order to arrange a tax 
that could pay for the king’s ransom and fund the ongoing war.6 However, the contemporane-
ous divisions in Paris are immediately apparent within the narrative when the Estates rose up 
against the dauphin, declaring that ‘the King had been badly advised (gouvernez) in times 
passed…for which the kingdom was lain waste and [was] in peril of being entirely destroyed 
and lost’.7 Orgemont lists three demands that the people made to the dauphin: the imprison-
ment of numerous royal officers and the confiscation of their lands and goods; the establish-
ment of a governing commission controlled by the Estates and presided over not by the 
dauphin, but by twenty-eight knights, prelates, and bourgeois; and the release of Carlos of Na-
varre.8 After this, Orgemont categorically counters each demand. First, he contrasts the Es-
tates of Languedoïl with those of Languedoc, showing how the latter voted to raise taxes to 
continue the war without appending any demands.9 Next, he shows how the dauphin unilater-
ally dismissed the Estates of Languedoïl and then left the kingdom in the care of his brother 
Louis d’Anjou in order to confer with his uncle, Emperor Karl IV, thereby emphasising his 
confidence in his government.10 And finally, he remarks that Filipe of Navarre, Carlos’s 
                                               
les lignes de toute une série d’écrivains, tous du même bord, qui, depuis le temps de Charles V jusqu’à celui de 
Louis XI, seront les théoriciens du parti royal, ceux qu’au temps de Jeanne d’Arc on appellera “les vrais Fran-
çais”’. For a thorough discussion on the historiographic portrayals of Jean II, see Raymond Cazelles, ‘Jean II le 
Bon: Quel homme? Quel roi?’, Revue Historique 251:1 (1974): 5-26. 
5 See generally Bove, 102. For earlier periods without a monarch, see Chapter 3.2. 
6 CRJC, I:76. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 248-251. 
7 ‘…le Roy avoit esté mal gouvernez ou temps passé…dont le royaume estoit gastez et en peril de estre 
tout destruit et perduz’. CRJC, I:78. Sumption, II:254, adds that ‘the government’s proposals were coldly re-
ceived. The kingdom was exhausted and much of it was being overrun by bands of English, Gascon and Na-
varrese adventurers. John’s courage on the battlefield was genuinely admired, but few men regarded the payment 
of his ransom the first call on their resources’. 
8 ‘…bien n’estoit venu au Roy ne au royaume, par le pechié de la prise du dit roy de Navarre’. CRJC, 
I:78-80. This popular sentiment reflected the view that Carlos was a champion of ‘root-and-branch reform of the 
administration’. Jones, ‘The Crown’, 86. See generally Sumption, II:256. 
9 CRJC, I:86-87. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 257; Bove, 106. 
10 CRJC, I:91. Sumption, II:264-265, clarifies that the dauphin went to the emperor on Jean’s orders and 
adds that ‘there could hardly have been a worse time for the Dauphin to leave France’, suggesting Orgemont is 
intentionally altering the narrative here to emphasise Charles’s independence of action. 
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brother, continued to pillage Normandy, highlighting the faithlessness of the Navarrese and 
undermining the case for Carlos’s release.11 Thus, in Orgemont’s text, the dauphin almost im-
mediately becomes a capable and reliable leader who justly desired above all else the return of 
the king and the defeat of the English, two objectives that were essential to reinstating Valois 
regnal authority over France. 
 The prominence of Charles in the narrative is at odds with the fact that Jean remains the 
titular focus of the continuation. Indeed, the relative power, influence, and authority of the 
dauphin and the king are so muddled within Orgemont’s narrative that identifying the origina-
tor of many governmental decisions is almost impossible. The literal absence of Jean from 
France is emphasised by the fact that the chronicler does not mention him again in the narra-
tive until March 1357, when a two-year truce was agreed between the king and Edward III of 
England.12 This moment standardises Jean’s usual portrayal in Orgemont’s continuation: 
throughout his captivity, the king undermined the dauphin’s attempts to govern by negotiating 
peace settlements from England without first discussing his plans with the dauphin and the 
French government.13 When news of a proposed peace treaty reached Paris in December 
1357, Orgemont frames it as an aside from the main text; when the negotiators arrived in Paris 
the next month, the ‘treaty was very pleasing to the said [dauphin] and councillors’, but noth-
ing more is said of it in this passage.14 In March 1358, the king asked for notaries to be sent to 
him ‘in order to ordain the letters of the treaty of peace between him and the king of Eng-
land’.15 But by this time, opinions of the treaty had turned icy, with Orgemont noting that 
‘several no longer believed it, some because they did not want it, others because it had been 
ordered several times and still the English placed obstacles before it, and others who were 
very happy to believe it’.16 Orgemont depicts Jean’s demands regarding the treaty as the cata-
lyst that compelled the dauphin to declare himself regent, thereby eliminating the captive 
king’s de jure authority within the kingdom.17 Jean’s attempt to promulgate another treaty in 
                                               
11 CRJC, I:90-91. See generally Charon, 203-206. 
12 CRJC, I:107. See generally Burne, Crécy War, 322. 
13 Bove, 102, notes that ‘Jean II persistait à prendre des décisions politiques depuis sa prison dorée lon-
donienne…. Mais il n’était plus obéi, car ses sujets le soupçonnaient, non sans raison, d’agir dans son intérêt per-
sonnel plus que dans celui du royaume: ni les états, ni le Dauphin ne donnèrent suite à ses injonctions’. 
14 ‘Le quel traictié plot moult aux diz duc et conseilliers…’. CRJC, I:127, 144. See generally Sumption, 
II:298-299. 
15 ‘Et aussi manda que le dit duc li envoiast deux bons notaires, pour ordener les lettres du traictié 
d’acort entre li et le roy d’Angleterre’. CRJC, I:156-157. See generally Sumption, II:309-311. 
16 ‘La quelle chose pluseurs ne creoient point, les uns pour ce que ilz ne le vousissent pas, les autres 
pour ce que par pluseurs foiz avoit ainsi esté mandé et tousjours les Anglois y avoient mis ampeschement, et les 
autres qui en estoient forment joieux le creoient’. CRJC, I:177. See generally Bove, 102. 
17 CRJC, I:161-162. See generally Sumption, II:311. 
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May 1359, therefore, was ill-received by Charles, who led the Estates of Languedoïl in de-
nouncing it outright as ‘not fair, nor feasible’.18 By usurping his father’s authority, Charles set 
himself upon an independent path, one that would later see him negotiate the treaty of Bré-
tigny in 1360 without interference from his father.19 The chronicler resolves the issue of con-
flicting authority between the dauphin and Jean by downplaying the king’s influence in 
absentia, implying that Charles possessed all regnal power in the kingdom throughout the late 
1350s. Uniquely within the Dionysian vernacular continuations, this results in the only posi-
tive portrayal of a Capetian cadet triumphing over the otherwise incontestable authority of the 
king, although the fact that Orgemont is aware that Charles will later become king undermines 
the gravity of this event considerably. 
 This line of argument prompts a question, though: did the chroniclers consider the heir 
to the French throne a Capetian cadet? It has been argued previously in this study that the 
chroniclers treated Louis X as a cadet for his kingdom of Navarre prior to 1314.20 A similar 
argument, indeed, could be forwarded for the future Charles V from 1349, since he was the 
independent dauphin de Viennois within the Empire.21 However, Orgemont never makes that 
specific case, possibly because Charles only visited the county once, and the chronicler rarely 
uses the title ‘dauphin’ to refer to the prince.22 Within France, however, both Jean and Charles 
held a lay peerage title prior to their elevations to the kingship. In 1331, Jean was granted the 
duchy of Normandy, the first Capetian to hold that title and one that Charles would later be 
granted.23 Both Lescot and Orgemont almost exclusively use this title to refer to the future 
kings in all their activities, including in matters of precedence, in effect treating them like ge-
neric Capetian agnates.24 While Lescot never directly links Jean’s actions to his territory at 
any point in the narrative, Orgemont suggests that Charles’s bonds to Normandy were im-
portant through several examples. He explains how Jean sent Charles into Normandy in 1355 
to act as his lieutenant there, and then, shortly afterwards, the dauphin was appointed duke, 
                                               
18 ‘…le dit traictié n’estoit passable, ne faisable’. CRJC, I:236. See generally Christopher T. Allmand, 
The Hundred Years War: England and France at War c. 1300-c. 1450 (Cambridge: University Press, 1988), 18. 
19 CRJC, I:260-261. Indeed, the entire transcription of the treaty of Paris included in Orgemont’s chron-
icle, as well as the public letters and declarations made surrounding it, is attributed to Charles. CRJC, I:260-309. 
See generally Bove, 110. 
20 See Chapter 3.1. 
21 GCF, IX:319. Charles was the first dauphin of the Valois line and the first to use the title in associa-
tion with his status as French heir, having succeeded to the count of Viennois in 1349 after the abdication of 
Humbert II, who had sold the title to Philippe VI in 1342. Autrand, Charles V, 52-53, 66; Jones, ‘The Crown’, 
65. 
22 CRJC, I:26, 50, 57. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 74-76. 
23 GCF, IX:128, 132; CRJC, I:56-57. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:93. 
24 See, for example, GCF, IX:154, 180, 204, 220; CRJC, I:57, 72, 76, 101. 
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for which he gave homage to his father.25 By linking Normandy to Charles, Orgemont makes 
Carlos of Navarre’s autonomy in the duchy and Edward III of England’s pretensions to the 
ducal title more personal: they were literally attempting to take Charles’s title.26 Furthermore, 
the chronicler proves that the duke had a vested interest in his duchy. He was found at Rouen, 
the duchy’s capital, in 1356 with Carlos when Jean arrested the Navarrese king.27 Orgemont 
notes numerous other conflicts between the duke and his Navarrese and English rivals over 
the subsequent eight years.28 The only explanation for the duchy’s importance to the overarch-
ing narrative is its connection to the prince. Indeed, Orgemont demonstrates that Charles’s 
declaration of war on England in 1359 was due to the terms of the second treaty of London, 
which would have stripped the duke of everything he held in Normandy.29 Charles was only 
willing to compromise if those terms were removed, as happened in the later treaty of Bré-
tigny.30 In the end, Charles was certainly not a typical Capetian cadet, but Orgemont likely 
characterises him in such a way to make his struggles appear more relatable to his princely au-
dience. 31 
 When one reads Orgemont’s chronicle, it seems certain that he considered Charles to be 
the only relatable Capetian cadet operating in France during this time. Between 1356 and 
1360, most representatives of the dynasty were either in captivity in England with the king, 
too young to actively assist the dauphin, or outspoken enemies of the Valois.32 There were ex-
ceptions, however. Jean’s younger brother, Philippe, duke d’Orléans, appears periodically in 
Orgemont’s narrative as a companion of his nephew, protecting Charles against the abuses of 
                                               
25 CRJC, I:50, 56-57. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 168, 170; Sumption, II:161, 200; Van Kerre-
brouck, III:104-105. 
26 CRJC, I:234.  
27 CRJC, I:63. Sumption, II:205, explains that the ‘Dauphin was presiding over a council of the leading 
men of Normandy in Rouen Castle…. Charles of Navarre and…most of the more prominent noblemen of the 
province and the mayor and leading citizens of Rouen [were there]’. 
28 See, for example, CRJC, I:67-70, 89-91, 125-134, 248, 322, 342. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 
221-400; Sumption, II:250-404. 
29 CRJC, I:234-236. See generally Perroy, 137-138. 
30 CRJC, I:280. See generally Perroy, 138-140. 
31 This line of argument conflicts with political thought that developed in the early fifteenth century, 
when French jurists, citing Roman law and Greek theories, argued that the king and his heir were considered one 
entity for legal purposes, a justification that was used to delegitimise the claims of Henry VI to the French throne 
when Charles VI died in 1422. Even if he were aware of these arguments, though, Orgemont had no need to call 
upon them since he wrote from hindsight, long after Charles V had succeeded to the throne without controversy. 
For more on this theory, see Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theol-
ogy (Princeton: University Press, 1957), 391-395. 
32 CRJC, I:43, 47, 63, 72-74. Pierre I of Bourbon died at Poitiers, while his brother, Jacques I de la 
Marche, was captured alongside the king’s youngest son, Philippe (the future duke of Burgundy), and the Arte-
sian counts Jean d’Eu and Charles de Longueville. Autrand, Charles V, 206-207; Given-Wilson and Bériac, 831-
832. 
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the Estates in 1356 and later standing beside him in 1358 when Paris broke out in rebellion.33 
In the latter instance, Philippe was accompanied by Louis, count d’Étampes, a paternal cousin 
of Carlos of Navarre who nonetheless supported Charles and peace.34 The dauphin’s brothers 
Louis d’Anjou and Jean de Berry also appear in the chronicle in isolated incidents as support-
ers of Charles, although their capabilities were restricted due to their young age. Louis, for ex-
ample, acted as Charles’s lieutenant when the duke visited the emperor in late 1356, but the 
inexperienced count was incapable of controlling the rabble, forcing Charles to return to 
Paris.35 Later in March 1357, both brothers are shown attending an Estates meeting with 
Charles, but neither appear to have participated in the proceedings.36 Notably, all four of these 
cadets are listed as hostages in 1360 to ensure that Jean II complied with the terms of the 
treaty of Brétigny, thereby stripping the dauphin of the few supporters he had gained during 
his brief time ruling France.37 By devoting so little space to other Capetian princes during the 
period 1356 to 1360, Orgemont isolates Charles and highlights the relatively weak position of 
the Valois family at this time. But this framing simultaneously demonstrates how a single Ca-
petian agnate was able to assert dynastic and regnal authority despite impossible odds, thereby 
producing a strong didactic message that a prince can overcome any adversity. 
 The Dauphin Charles is a pivotal figure in the entire Dionysian vernacular tradition, and 
the importance of his portrayal as both a Capetian cadet and the functional embodiment of 
regnal authority during his father’s captivity in England cannot be overemphasised. As a ca-
det, Charles was the duke of Normandy and dauphin of Viennois, a vassal of his father and his 
uncle, Emperor Karl IV. When he was operating in the role of royal lieutenant, he could never 
fully embrace the regnal authority of his father since Jean was still alive and occasionally is-
sued decrees and memoranda. Even after becoming regent, his key aim remained the release 
of his father and a sustained peace with England, two goals that he accomplished. But, in so 
doing, he deprived himself of his regnal authority and became once again a simple Capetian 
cadet. Thus, it is only after reporting Jean’s death in 1364 that Orgemont fully merges 
Charles’s parallel identities. By representing both dynasticism and regnal authority, Charles 
highlights the merits of both. Dynastically, Charles demonstrates the paternal attitude that all 
Capetian cadets should show toward their subjects, even in uncertain times. Regarding regnal 
                                               
33 CRJC, I:76, 85, 157-158, 166, 199. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 309, 324, 335; Sumption, 
II:251. 
34 CRJC, I:157-158, 166, 199. See generally Sumption, II:316-317. 
35 CRJC, I:91, 93-95. See generally Sumption, II:266. 
36 CRJC, I:101. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 248. 
37 CRJC, I:282, 323, 325-326. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 409. 
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authority, Charles shows how a prince should handle moments of regnal crisis and what role 
the French heir needs to take in such situations. With this example, Orgemont’s chronicle be-
comes not simply a miroir for all princes, but an exemplar specifically for the future Charles 
VI and other potential French kings. 
 
5.2 The War of the Two Charles 
Through his characterisation of the Dauphin Charles from 1356 to 1360, Orgemont 
changed the thematic direction of the Dionysian vernacular continuations away from promot-
ing Capetian dynasticism and toward promoting a policy of regnal supremacy. The situation 
in France in the 1350s likely motivated this redirection. With the Plantagenets triumphant, the 
king and most of the loyal Capetian princes held captive in England, and the career of Carlos 
II of Navarre ascendant in Paris, promoting Capetian dynasticism distracted from the more 
important and immediate need to show a unified Valois. To accomplish this task, Orgemont 
contrasts a particularly bad example of Capetian dynasticism with a remarkably good exam-
ple, with both individuals belonging to the same cadet branch: the Évreux. Following repeated 
petitions by the Estates of Languedoïl for his release, Carlos II of Navarre escaped prison in 
1357 and led a popular civil war both in Normandy and on the streets of Paris, undermining 
all of the Dauphin Charles’s attempts to restore regnal authority to the kingdom.38 Throughout 
his narrative, Orgemont builds a strong case against rampant Capetian dynasticism and Carlos 
constitutes his most important case study. Yet Orgemont does not completely undermine the 
concept of Capetian dynasticism, he simply restructures its nature and purpose. He does this 
by exemplifying the deeds of Jeanne d’Évreux, Carlos’s aunt and widow of Charles IV, who 
strove throughout the civil war to advance the regnal authority of the dauphin, repair family 
connections, and strengthen dynastic solidarity. This section will examine how Orgemont 
used the feud between Carlos of Navarre and the Dauphin Charles to transition the scope of 
the Dionysian vernacular continuations away from a tale of dynasticism and toward one of 
regnal supremacy. 
 At the first Estates meeting in October 1356, the tide had turned against the Valois. 
Orgemont, probably in attendance at this meeting, records that the council unanimously de-
manded the release of Carlos, claiming that ‘since this king of Navarre had been imprisoned, 
good things had not come to the King or to the kingdom due to the sin of seizing the king of 
                                               
38 For more on Carlos II’s other activities before and after this period, see Chapter 3.3. 
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Navarre’.39 In February 1357, the Estates met again and the topic of Carlos was not broached, 
but Orgemont notes how ‘the iniquitous power of the three estates declined and came to noth-
ing’ in the chapter’s rubric.40 In the streets of Paris, the public demanded the release of the im-
prisoned Navarrese monarch and Orgemont accelerates the narrative until November, when 
Carlos was released ‘without the consent, permission, or will of the said king of France, his 
lord’.41 Carlos immediately marched on Paris, armed with weapons and the self-assurance that 
the dauphin would respect his position as a senior Capetian prince and major territorial mag-
nate, whether the young French heir liked it or not.42 It is here where Orgemont shows the 
dauphin at his weakest: politically outmatched, lacking an army, and trapped in Paris—a vic-
tim of his father’s hubris and his own naïveté. His lack of regnal authority is complete. 
 Concurrently, Orgemont describes how a populist triumvirate was established between 
Étienne Marcel, provost of the merchants of Paris; Robert Le Coq, bishop of Laon; and the 
liberated Carlos.43 The chronicler shows that Marcel gained his power by rallying the people 
against unpopular monetary policies recommended by the dauphin after the battle of Poi-
tiers.44 Le Coq is first introduced at the February Estates meeting where he, echoing state-
ments made anonymously in October, ‘said that the King and the kingdom had been, in times 
past, badly governed’, and then outlined a number of recent problems, placing the blame 
squarely on King Jean.45 Carlos, meanwhile, even before his escape, encouraged revolts in 
Normandy via his brother Filipe, who led a five-year guerrilla war against anyone who would 
oppose Évreux power in northern France.46 Orgemont condemns these malcontents in a rubric 
by stating that they ‘usurped the power of the governance of the kingdom’, thereby proclaim-
ing his support for regnal supremacy at the expense of popular rule in France.47 Although the 
triumvirs maintained a public attitude of reconciliation and compromise, Orgemont implies 
that they undermined the inherent regnal authority of the dauphin. But the chronicler is not 
                                               
39 ‘…depuis que ycellui roy de Navarre avoit esté emprisonné, bien n’estoit venu au Roy ne au roy-
aume, par le pechié de la prise du dit roy de Navarre’. CRJC, I:80. Orgemont is mentioned by name at the second 
meeting in March 1357. CRJC, I:102. See generally Sumption, II:255, 259. 
40 ‘Comment la puissance inique des III estaz declinea et vint à neent’. CRJC, I:111. See generally 
Sumption, II:279-280. 
41 ‘…sanz le consentement, sceu et volenté du dir roy de France, son seigneur…’. CRJC, I:116. See 
generally Charon, 207. 
42 CJRC, I:117-118. See generally Sumption, II:295. 
43 CRJC, I:123-124. See generally Perroy, 133; Sumption, II:295-297. 
44 CRJC, I:92-93, 112-113. See generally Anne Curry, ‘France and the Hundred Years War, 1337-
1453’, in France in the Later Middle Ages, ed. David Potter (Oxford: University Press, 2002), 105. 
45 ‘…dist que le Roy et le royaume avoient esté, ou temps passé, mal gouvernez…’. CRJC, I:102. Cf. 
CRJC, I:78. See generally Sumption, II:258-260, 278-279. 
46 CRJC, I:67, 90-91. See generally Charon, 206, 257-259; Sumption, II:267. 
47 ‘…au prevost des marchans et à autres, qui usurpoient la puissance, de gouverner le royaume’. CRJC, 
I:112. 
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beyond deceptive narrative tactics. When recounting how Charles was forced to submit to 
Carlos’s demands in December 1357, Orgemont appears to intrude into the thoughts of Mar-
cel, who ‘wanted to say to [the dauphin]: “It will be done, if you want it or not”’.48 Thus, 
through creative use of his rubrics, narrative devices, and carefully-chosen details, Orgemont 
is able to frame these men as unjust, malevolent threats to Valois authority. 
 The chronicler also proves quickly that the triumvirate only had ephemeral authority in 
Paris. After Carlos left for Normandy to secure his hold over his lands there, Le Coq closed 
the gates and forbade any armed person from entering the city.49 Orgemont notes of this time 
that Charles became a virtual prisoner of Le Coq and Marcel, ‘because those of Paris had all 
the government’.50 Thus, the chronicler acknowledges Charles’s lack of regnal authority while 
simultaneously promoting the prince’s claim to said authority. The chronicler then explains 
how the dauphin escaped his captors and revealed himself to the people, and he includes a 
paraphrased speech by Charles, where the dauphin stated 
that he was there, that he had the intention of dying and living with them, and 
that they should not believe anyone who said and publicised that he sought to 
bring men-at-arms to pillage and destroy, because he had never considered it. 
But he sought to bring the said men-at-arms to help defend and guard the people 
of France, who had suffered greatly, because enemies were spreading all over 
the kingdom, and those who tried to govern it did nothing to fix it. So it was his 
intention, so he said, to govern from then on and push back the enemies of 
France…51 
This passage is the first instance where Charles is shown to have personal initiative, and the 
continuator uses it effectively to explain how the Parisians rallied to the dauphin, for which 
‘the greater party held to him’, allowing the dauphin to seize control of the government and 
finally assert Valois rule over Paris.52 According to Orgemont, this action shattered the trium-
virate. He recounts that Le Coq remained publicly loyal to Charles afterwards; Marcel went 
rogue, throwing Paris into chaos; and Carlos returned with a large armed force, ostensibly to 
discuss peace terms, but effectively to retake control of the city.53 The chronicler also demon-
strates that this disunity between his rivals allowed Charles to confirm his position as regent 
                                               
48 ‘…il vousist dire: “Il sera fait, vueilliez ou non”’. CRJC, I:124. See generally Charon, 207-208. 
49 CRJC, I:127-129. 
50 ‘…car ceulz de Paris avoient tout le gouvernement…’. CRJC, I:135. See generally Sumption, II:302. 
51 ‘Et dist à grant foison de peuple, qui là estoit, que il avoit entencion de morir et vivre avecques euls, 
et que ilz ne creussent pas aucuns qui avoient dit et publié que il foisoit venir genz d’armes pour les pillier et gas-
ter, car il ne l’avoit onques pensé. Mais il faisoit venir les dictes gens d’armes pour aidier à deffendre et garantir 
le peuple de France, qui moult espandus par le royaume, et ceuls qui avoient entrepris le gouvernement n’y met-
toient point de remede. Si estoit son entencion, si comme il disoit, de gouverner dès lors en avant et de rebouter 
les ennemis de France…’. CRJC, I:135. 
52 ‘…et se tenoit la plus grant partie par devers luy’. CRJC, I:136, 139. See generally Sumption, II:306. 
53 CRJC, I:137, 150-152, 156, 162. See generally, Sumption, II:307, 309, 311, 315. 
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of France, giving him full regnal authority in the kingdom during his father’s absence.54 
Therefore, the resulting rebellions, encouraged by Carlos and Marcel, can only be viewed 
within the narrative as acts of treason and a direct attack on regnal authority itself. 
Two concurrent rebellions arose in the spring of 1358.55 The chronicler states gener-
ally that ‘there was a great division in the kingdom, because several towns—and the greater 
part—held to the regent, their rightful lord, and others held to [those of] Paris’.56 Orgemont, 
therefore, holds Paris to blame for all the revolts and names the city, rather than Carlos or 
Marcel, as the propagator of revolt. Nonetheless, Carlos is almost immediately implicated 
with the Parisians, who wanted him to become their captain, for which Orgemont comments: 
‘false and evil that they were’.57 As violence escalated in the Île-de-France, the dauphin found 
himself trapped in the countryside without an army and with an increasingly-large company 
of Capetian women and children, displaced nobles, and others seeking safety.58 Orgemont 
splits his focus between Charles and Carlos and demonstrates how the latter eventually ended 
the provincial revolt—the so-called Jacquerie—by executing one of its leaders, Guillaume 
Caillet, in June.59 For his victory, the Parisians named Carlos their captain, but the Navarrese 
king’s repeated negotiations with the dauphin as well as continued civil unrest lost Carlos the 
confidence of the Parisian citizenry, who soon invited Charles back.60 Le Coq, meanwhile, 
was finally separated from the dauphin in May 1358, after which he disappears from the nar-
rative, with Orgemont later labelling him a traitor.61 The third triumvir, Marcel, met a grue-
some end outside the gate of Saint-Antoine when he attempted to allow Carlos and his troops 
back into Paris after they had been ejected by the populace.62 Although Carlos continued his 
campaign against the dauphin for another year, his reign over Paris was at an end and Valois 
                                               
54 CRJC, I:161-162. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 304-305; Élie Berger, ‘Le titre de régent dans les 
actes de la chancellerie royale’, Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes 61 (1900): 418-419. 
55 CRJC, I:170-171. For a detailed summary of the two revolts, see Pierre Rigault and Patrick Toussaint, 
eds., La Jacquerie entre mémoire et oubli 1358-1958-2008 (Amiens: Encrage, 2012); and Sumption, II:294-350. 
56 ‘Et fu une grant division ou royaume, car pluseurs villes, et la plus grant partie, se tenoient devers le 
regent, leur droit seigneur, et autres se tenoient devers Paris’. CRJC, I:171. 
57 ‘…comme faulx et mauvais qu’ilz estoient’. CRJC, I:174. 
58 CRJC, I:182-183. Orgemont states that Blanche, the wife of Philippe d’Orléans and daughter of 
Jeanne d’Évreux, was forced to flee Paris in May, while the dauphin’s wife and daughter, as well as his sister 
Isabel, were secured at Meaux under the guard of faithful adherents in June. CRJC, I:178, 182-183. See generally 
Sumption, II:317. 
59 CRJC, I:184. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 326. 
60 CRJC, I:185, 193-194, 210, 212. See generally Charon, 211, 239-248; Sumption, II:365. 
61 CRJC, I:175, 212. Autrand, Charles V, 255, notes of Le Coq that, ‘[a]vant de quitter la France, en 
1361, Charles de Navarre s’inquiétait de son fidèle conseiller que le roi Jean avait exclu de l’amnistie et dont le 
pape n’avait pas encore réglé le sort. Faisant son testament avant de prendre la mer, Charles offrait à Robert Le 
Coq, en cas de besoin, l’hospitalité en Navarre, avec une rente de 800 écus. Et c’est aux portes de la Navarre que 
l’ancien évêque de Laon, transféré au siège épiscopal de Calahorra, au royaume d’Aragon, vint finir ses jours’. 
62 CRJC, I:208-209, 212. See generally Sumption, II:345-346. 
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control over the kingdom quickly resumed, culminating in the May 1359 meeting of the Es-
tates where Charles felt confident enough in his authority to declare war on the English.63 
Orgemont constructs in this narrative a precise and fluid tale of the dauphin overcoming myr-
iad obstacles to assert Valois regnal authority over the kingdom despite the interference by 
Marcel, Le Coq, and Carlos. 
In the face of these challenges to regnal authority, Orgemont retasked Capetian dynas-
ticism as a weapon to be used to bolster that authority. He unusually positions Jeanne 
d’Évreux, aunt of Carlos and third wife of Charles IV of France, as the primary mediator in 
the conflict, with her home in Paris sometimes serving as neutral ground for negotiations be-
tween the parties.64 The dowager queen first appears in Orgemont’s text in 1354, assisting in 
the reconciliation between Jean II and Carlos following the assassination of Charles de la 
Cerda by Carlos’s agents.65 When Carlos escaped captivity in 1357, he appealed to his aunt 
for help to reconcile with the dauphin.66 From this point until 1359, Jeanne is portrayed as the 
only moderating voice in France.67 In 1357-1358, she ‘treated for an agreement between the 
said duke [Charles], who was [at Paris], and the king of Navarre, who was at Mantes’.68 When 
Carlos became captain of Paris and locked the dauphin out of the city, Jeanne diligently 
worked to negotiate a truce between the Parisians and Charles, even leaving the city to seek 
out the French heir.69 Shortly afterwards, ‘those of Paris still held proudly and haughtily 
against’ the dauphin, but Orgemont prefaces this passage with a sentence about Jeanne desir-
ing peace and follows with an entire chapter in which Carlos and the dauphin parlayed under 
Jeanne’s mediating eyes.70 Jeanne ceased negotiating with Carlos directly from March 1358, 
instead discussing peace with ‘those of Paris’, over whom Carlos was captain.71 Thus, narra-
tively, Carlos’s status as a Capetian cadet is erased and he is reduced to that of a spokesperson 
beholden to the Parisians, who were against any compromise with the dauphin.72 But even this 
untenable position did not stop Jeanne from obtaining her goal; within the same passage that 
                                               
63 CRJC, I:236. See generally Sumption, II:403. 
64 See generally Anne-Hélène Allirot, Filles de roy de France: Princesses royales, mémoire de saint 
Louis et conscience dynastique (de 1270 à la fin du XIVe siècle) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 389. 
65 CRJC, I:43. See generally Allirot, 387; Sumption, II:131. 
66 CRJC, I:117. See generally Allirot, 389. 
67 Allirot, 392, comments that ‘Jeanne d’Évreux [apparaît pour les chroniqueurs comme] une modèle de 
vertu et de piété, messagère de paix et de concorde’. 
68 ‘…qui traictoient d’accort entre le dit duc, qui là estoit, et le roy de Navarre, qui estoit à Mante…’. 
CRJC, I:122, 141, 145, 156. See generally Perroy, 151; Sumption, II:302. 
69 CRJC, I:186-187. See generally Allirot, 389; Sumption, II:308-309. 
70 ‘…car ceulz de Paris se tenoient tousjours fiers et haulz contre le dit regent…’. CRJC, I:189, 190-
191. 
71 CRJC, I:187, 189. 
72 CRJC, I:193. 
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Carlos renounces the 
reconciliation treaty, Jeanne is shown ‘often going to one and to the other in order to revive 
the said treaty’.73 In the end, her tenacity paid off and Orgemont credits her for their reconcili-
ation in July 1358 and lists her first among the Capetians present at the treaty confirmation.74 
Jeanne, her task done, disappears from the narrative leaving the final victory over Carlos to 
the dauphin.75 In this way, Orgemont shrewdly uses Jeanne to demonstrate how the primary 
role of any Capetian cadet, regardless of gender or familial relationship, is to promote regnal 
authority and dynastic unity. 
 When setting out to write his continuation, Orgemont did not have to document the war 
between the Dauphin Charles and Carlos of Navarre in such detail. Certainly, the conflict 
helped Charles establish himself as regnal material and saved the kingdom from a piecemeal 
annexation by the English and Navarrese, but the chronicler includes moments of weakness as 
well, where the dauphin was literally on the run, with few allies and no army to support him. 
Orgemont includes these instances to make an important point that Capetians must be self-re-
liant and never surrender, even when the odds are stacked against them. It is a message that 
Charles V especially wished to impress upon his heir, the future Charles VI, whose ambitious 
uncles were already jockeying for power even before the king died on 16 September 1380.76 
The depiction of the civil war between the two Capetian agnates represented a turning point in 
the Dionysian vernacular tradition. Previously, the continuators had supported cadet ambi-
tions, but Orgemont used the crisis of 1356 to 1360 to show exactly how such support could 
rebound disastrously. Carlos’s pretensions directly challenged the rights of Charles and the 
Valois. Had Orgemont promoted Carlos’s cause, it would have been to Charles’s detriment. 
Instead, the chronicler took a different approach, turning Carlos into an antagonist and making 
his goals antithetical to regnal authority. Within this context, it is Jeanne d’Évreux who trans-
fers the narrative away from dynasticism by moderating the two conflicting forces and ulti-
mately siding with the dauphin, who embodied regnal authority. By using her in such a way, 
Orgemont sacrifices the basic tenets of dynasticism established by earlier Dionysian continua-
tors to transition the focus of the remaining vernacular narrative to one of regnal supremacy. 
  
                                               
73 ‘[Elle] aloit souvent par devers les uns et par devers les autres pour renouer le dit traictié’. CRJC, 
I:195. See generally Sumption, II:340-342. 
74 CRJC, I:198-199. See generally Sumption, II:339. 
75 CRJC, I:207-210. See generally John Watts, The Making of Polities: Europe, 1300-1500 (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2009), 181. 
76 CRJC, II:382. See generally Sumption, III:390ff. 
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5.3 Quarrelous Uncles 
The situation in France following Charles V’s death was not dissimilar to that experi-
enced by Charles when his father was captured. The eleven-year-old Charles VI was in no posi-
tion to rule the kingdom and his four uncles all fought for some role in the governance of the 
realm.77 Juvénal, however, adapts and manipulates his source material—Pintoin’s chronicle—to 
streamline the narrative and erase most instances of intrafamilial rivalry or cadet dynastic ambi-
tions, thereby establishing from the beginning that his narrative does not support dynasticism 
except in instances where dynasticism enhances and promotes regnal authority. By adopting this 
technique, Juvénal disguises the fact that Charles VI did not assume personal power until 1388. 
Thus, numerous moments of dynastic strength are downplayed or ignored. For example, the ca-
reer of Louis I d’Anjou as regent for his nephew is barely examined in the chronicle and the 
duke’s adventures in Italy, while mentioned, are neither glorified nor used to establish an arche-
type as Primat had done for Charles I d’Anjou a century earlier. Similarly, Philippe II of Bur-
gundy, who dominated the regency council throughout Charles’s minority, is largely removed 
from Juvénal’s text in order to make the king appear capable of governing himself. Another cas-
ualty of this strategy is Louis II de Bourbon, Charles VI’s maternal uncle and co-guardian and a 
Capetian cadet of a line long neglected in the Dionysian vernacular chronicles. Whether Juvénal 
modified the dynastic narrative in this period out of hindsight, anticipating the domestic disturb-
ances that would develop after Charles VI became mentally unstable in 1392, or he simply felt 
the story should focus more on the king cannot be known, but the result is the same: the Cape-
tian cadets are removed from Juvénal’s chronicle during the time of the king’s minority. This 
section will examine the ways in which Juvénal intentionally crafted a narrative that down-
played Capetian dynasticism in order to emphasise the young king’s regnal authority. 
Juvénal was not the first Dionysian chronicler to neglect Louis d’Anjou. Orgemont 
barely mentions the man throughout his continuation but does emphasise Louis’s incompe-
tence as a royal lieutenant in 1356 and that he was to serve as regent for Charles VI.78 Indeed, 
Orgemont himself appears in Juvénal’s chronicle supporting Louis’s claim to the regency, but 
also advocates a role for Philippe of Burgundy and Louis de Bourbon.79 The fact that Louis 
d’Anjou had little long-term impact on Charles’s government likely motivated Juvénal to 
downplay his story. When Louis first appears in Juvénal’s narrative, he is attempting to assert  
  
                                               
77 See Figure 5.1. 
78 CRJC, II:384. 
79 HCRF, 339. Pintoin includes full speeches for both Louis and Orgemont that explain how the regency 
was to work according to the wishes of Charles V. CKS, I:8-12 (evens). 
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his status as regent over his relatives, but, because of the growing instability within France, 
they would not allow the Angevin duke to rule alone and argued that ‘when the King is 
crowned, all such divisions [in the kingdom] would cease, and they would take the govern-
ment in his name, and he would be well-advised’.80 Juvénal proves, however, that this is a 
misplaced hope. Indeed, he places the blame for many of the problems in the following years 
directly on the feuds between the royal uncles. Louis himself fought for his title of regent, his 
precedence in the coronation ceremony, and monies he took from the royal treasury.81 More 
generally, Juvénal blames the renewal of English attacks, general instability in France, and 
even the continuation of the Papal Schism on the Capetian agnates.82 Pintoin introduces all of 
these examples, but usually gives credit where credit is due, often by including speeches and 
documents that explain the various positions on the topics.83 In comparison, Juvénal, by 
abridging the narrative, removes much of the nuance given by Pintoin, resulting in an unbal-
anced narrative that places excess blame on the government and the royal dukes for issues that 
are considerably more complex and often outside their control. By the point in the narrative 
where Louis leaves France, Juvénal has largely dismissed him as a proponent of regnal au-
thority within the kingdom. This negative portrayal also follows Louis and his son whenever 
the chronicler documents their attempts to assert themselves in Italy over subsequent decades. 
Juvénal relates how, just like the senior Angevins, Louis would eventually become 
king of Naples, at least in name, something that his brother seemingly predicted when he ap-
pointed the duke lieutenant of Languedoc in 1364.84 The duke’s tenure over the southern part 
of France gave him an interest in the affairs of the adjacent county of Provence, an Imperial 
territory held by the senior Angevins.85 In June 1380, Queen Giovanna I of Naples, seeking to 
deprive her Durazzo cousins of their inheritance, adopted Louis as heir to all her titles, which 
served as a dynastic transference from the old Angevins to the new.86 Both Orgemont and  
                                               
80 ‘…et que quand le Roy seroit sacré, toutes telles divisions cesseroient, et prendroit le gouvernement 
en son nom, et auroit bon conseil’. HCRF, 340. Ultimately, Louis only held the title of regent for the few months 
between Charles V’s death and Charles VI’s coronation, after which he became simply the president of the re-
gency council. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 9-10, 12-14, 20; Berger, 420. 
81 HCRF, 340-342. See CKS, I:26-32, 40-42 (evens). See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 12-13, 89. 
82 HCRF, 343-346, 348. See CKS, I:16-22, 44-52, 56-62, 66-68, 72-90 (evens). See generally Autrand, 
Charles VI, 75-119; Casteen, 211; Jean Favier, Le temps des principautés de l’an mil à 1515, Histoire de France 
2 (Paris: Fayard, 1984), 328-329; Sumption, III:346, 393-394. 
83 Pintoin gives speeches for both sides of the debates surrounding increasing taxes in Paris, explains in 
detail the English attacks and how Brittany was not involved, and includes long discussions concerning the reso-
lution of the schism. CKS, I:44-52, 56-66, 72-90 (evens). 
84 CRJC, II:368; David Green, ‘The Hundred Years War, Colonial Policy and the English Lordships’, in 
The Hundred Years War (Part III): Further Considerations, History of Warfare 85, eds. L. J. Andrew Villalon 
and Donald J. Kagay, 233-257 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 252; Van Kerrebrouck, III:272. 
85 Van Kerrebrouck, III:272. For more on the senior Angevins in Provence, see Chapter 2.1. 
86 CRJC, III:8; HCRF, 347. See CKS, I:118-122 (evens). For the history of the senior Angevins in Italy, 
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Juvénal include details of what transpired next, although they are inconsistent. Orgemont em-
phasises that it was a family decision to support Louis’s bid on the Neapolitan crown, and he 
frames the entire affair as a part of the Papal Schism—a pro-Avignon attack against the fol-
lowers of the Roman pope.87 Juvénal only implies the schism is a cause, arguing primarily 
that Louis’s motive was revenge against the usurper Carlos III, who killed Giovanna in 1382 
in order to secure the kingdom for himself.88 He explains how Louis first moved on Provence 
in order to secure much-needed funds and ships for his campaign.89 This met with stiff oppo-
sition from the local populace, but after Pope Clement crowned Louis king of Sicily at Avi-
gnon, the Provençaux rendered obedience to him.90 Juvénal depicts the actual war in Naples 
as a much more personal affair between Louis and Carlos, with no other individuals named.91 
Notably, this deviates from Pintoin’s chronicle, which focusses almost exclusively on the 
duke and rarely references Carlos, even indirectly.92 Therefore, Juvénal intentionally crafts a 
story that frames Louis as a righteous warrior fighting against a heretic and a usurper, just as 
Charles I d’Anjou had done before. But Louis’s sudden death after victory brings with it an-
other message from Juvénal, that ‘this was a good example to princes: do not embark upon 
such enterprises if one does not know how’.93 This is a condemnation of not just Louis but 
any Capetian prince who neglects his homeland for foreign adventures, and it is a strong state-
ment by the chronicler that Capetian dynasticism begins and ends with France. 
For Juvénal, the Valois-Angevin narrative concludes with Louis I. Thus, the late 
duke’s son, Louis II, barely appears in Juvénal’s chronicle and, when he does, his story is 
substantially reduced. For example, Juvénal shows him being crowned king of Sicily by the 
pope at Avignon in 1389, but the chronicler leaves out details of Louis’s conquest of Naples 
                                               
see Chapter 2.3. See generally Casteen, 203-204; Léonard, 462.  
87 CRJC, III:9-10. Casteen, 196, adds that ‘Johanna had become respected for her piety, wisdom, and 
loyalty to the papacy; suddenly, she was again notorious. Her transfer of obedience to Clement VII shattered her 
previous reputation, which, at least among Urbanists, was lost forever. She became, virtually overnight, a symbol 
of the division of the Church’. 
88 HCRF, 347. Louis’s best opportunity to capture Naples was in mid-1380, soon after he became Gio-
vanna’s heir, but the death of Charles V in September forced him to delay his plans, leaving Giovanna vulnera-
ble. His later decision to go to Naples in 1382, however, was not because Giovanna had died—he had already 
left before this news reached him—but was in response to the limited power he was permitted as regent in 
France. Léonard, 459, 463, 467. 
89 HCRF, 350. See CKS, I:158-168 (evens). See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:273. 
90 Louis won over the Provençal urban aristocracy early, but was only accepted by the rural elite after 
his coronation as king of Sicily (Naples). Boyer, 57. Casteen, 220, adds that ‘Johanna was an important symbol 
[in Provence]. Her murder validated not only the new Angevins’ campaign against their adversaries but also the 
Clementist struggle. Her adoptive family took up the story of her murder and wielded it as a rhetorical weapon in 
their efforts to assert their legitimacy in Provence and their right to the Regno’. See generally Léonard, 467. 
91 HCRF, 351, 362-363. 
92 Cf. CKS, I:326-338 (evens). 
93 ‘Et ce fut bel exemple à prince, de ne faire telles entreprises, si on ne sçait bien comment’. HCRF, 
363. This lesson appears to originate with Juvénal. See generally Léonard, 473. 
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over the following years, diverging from Pintoin’s narrative.94 Likewise, the chronicler barely 
mentions the reconquest of Naples by Carlo III’s son, Ladislao, in 1399, implying that the 
story did not advance Juvénal’s overarching narrative in any meaningful way.95 Even when 
Louis fought to support the Pisan pope Alexander V in 1409-10, Juvénal overlooks the victo-
ries of the Angevin prince, emphasising instead the heroic deeds of others.96 Louis appears pe-
riodically in Juvénal’s text afterwards, usually in the company of the king, but after he 
returned to Anjou in December 1415, the duke is never referenced again.97 Juvénal’s style 
makes it clear that he never considered Louis important to the overall story and the author 
omits the duke’s death in April 1417, once more deviating from Pintoin.98 In the end, Orge-
mont and Juvénal portray the Angevins as having abandoned Charles VI, which makes them 
poor representatives of Capetian dynasticism and an example of how cadet ambitions can dis-
tract from the authority of the French king.99 
Juvénal and Pintoin take a somewhat different approach to the other cadets who ruled 
France between 1382 and 1388. Jean de Berry, the next eldest brother of Charles V after 
Louis, never has a substantial role in Orgemont’s chronicle. Orgemont reports that he was a 
hostage in England for much of the 1360s, briefly served in the war against the English in 
1377, and attended Emperor Karl IV in 1378, but these are the only instances the chronicler 
highlights.100 After Charles died, he was given no role in the government of the kingdom, so 
he asked his siblings in 1381 if he could serve as governor of Languedoc and Guyenne, which 
they allowed.101 As a consequence, Juvénal writes him out of the ensuing narrative. Jean’s 
only significant role in the chronicle during this period is as ambassador to the English from 
1384 to 1385.102 Philippe of Burgundy, the youngest brother, is likewise minimised prior to 
                                               
94 HCRF, 379, 381, 391. Cf. CKS, I:584, 586, 590, 622. See generally Léonard, 478; Rohr, 19-20; Van 
Kerrebrouck, III:284. 
95 HCRF, 418. Cf. CKS, II:748. See generally Léonard, 478; Rohr, 20. 
96 HCRF, 452, 455. Pintoin emphasises Louis in these battles, while Jean Juvénal des Ursins focusses 
instead on Paolo Orsini, whom he calls Paul des Ursins, likely to imply kinship between himself and the pro-An-
gevin Italian soldier. Cf. CKS, IV:310, 390-396 (evens). See generally Léonard, Angevins, 480-481; Rohr, 71-72. 
97 HCRF, 474, 475, 477, 491, 494, 496, 497, 520, 522. Sumption, IV:474, comments that the ‘Duke of 
Anjou, affable, ineffectual and vacillating, was too ill and too frightened of John the Fearless to take an active 
role and anyway spent long periods away from Paris’. 
98 Pintoin includes a brief chapter regarding Louis’s death. CKS, VI:76, 78. See generally Léonard, 484; 
Rohr, 82-83; Sumption, IV:523. 
99 For Jean Chartier’s portrayal of the Valois-Anjou family, see Chapter 8.1. 
100 CRJC, I:325, II:183, 203ff. In contrast, Françoise Lehoux, Jean de France, duc de Berri: Sa Vie, Son 
Action Politique (1340-1416) (Paris: Éditions A. et J. Picard, 1966-1967), I:213-300, demonstrates that Jean had 
a substantial role in the conquest of Poitou and the submission of most of Guyenne. See generally Lehoux, I:163, 
165-177, 405-406, 410. 
101 HCRF, 345. See CKS, I:90-98 (evens). See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 16-17; Lehoux, II:16. 
102 HCRF, 361-363. See CKS, I:306-314 (evens). See generally Lehoux, II:110, 168; Sumption, III:527-
531. 
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1388, perhaps because Juvénal and Pintoin could recall the later Armagnac-Burgundian war, 
but also because, in reality, the duke regularly subverted the power and authority of the king 
and, therefore, undermined the chroniclers’ message of regnal authority.103 The only instances 
where they afford Philippe any space are when things happened to members of his family, 
such as the deaths of Marguerite II and Louis II of Flanders, and the marriage of his son to a 
Hainauter princess.104 Thus, after Louis departed for Italy, the narrative is remarkably 
cleansed of powerful royal uncles. This allows Charles to appear as the one primarily respon-
sible for subduing the Flemish and rebellious Parisians in 1382, halting Despenser’s Crusade 
in 1383, stopping the Flemish and English again in 1385, and confronting the duke of Guel-
ders in 1388.105 It is not that the dukes are not present in the narrative, it is simply that Juvénal 
frames them as faithful agents of the king, often grouping them collectively under the style 
‘the King and those of his blood’ or some similar variant.106 More strategically, though, both 
chroniclers downplay the activities of specific individuals during this period. This technique 
deflects attention away from the fact that members of the Capetian family other than the king 
ruled the kingdom. Indeed, the only direct reference to the minority regency in Juvénal’s text 
is in 1388, when the council is dissolved.107 Juvénal reports that it ‘was of the opinion that the 
King alone had the government of his kingdom and that he was not under the governance of 
anyone else, such as his uncles, and especially [not subject to] the duke of Burgundy, who 
was not expressly named, but was clearly implied’.108 Juvénal shortly afterwards adds that 
Philippe left Paris ‘very malcontented, and his men displeased, since they did not have the  
                                               
103 John J.N. Palmer, England, France and Christendom 1377-99 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1972), 3, explains that ‘Philip was perhaps an even more gifted ruler [than Charles V]; certainly he was a more 
supple politician. He not only rectified Charles’s mistakes in Flanders and Brittany but turned the situations there 
to his own advantage and to that of France. He was the equal of his brother, too, in political courage, and in the 
first two years of his nephew’s reign he guided the monarchy through the gravest crisis it had undergone since 
the days of Etienne Marcel and the Jacquerie. After his brother’s death, Philip’s effective control over the French 
government lasted almost exactly as long as the remainder of the war: he was dismissed by Charles VI on his 
return from the final campaign of the century’. Richard Vaughan, Philip the Bold: The Formation of the Burgun-
dian State (London: Longmans, Green, 1962), 40, states more simply that ‘[a]fter Louis of Anjou’s departure in 
February 1382 Philip the Bold’s authority in France was unquestioned’. 
104 HCRF, 350, 361, 363-364. See CKS, I:156-158, 298-302, 352-354 (evens). See generally Vaughan, 
Philip, 16, 86-87. 
105 HCRF, 351-361, 366-367, 368, 375-376. Philippe was largely responsible for these things due to his 
position in the Low Countries. Vaughan, Philip, 20-29, 36-38, 97-99. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 91-98, 
162-163; Favier, La Guerre, 396-397; Sumption, III:442-449, 537-557, 649-652, 662-665.  
106 ‘…le roy et ceux de son sang…’. HCRF, 344, 356, 369, 373. Pintoin does not use this terminology 
but rather states precisely who is doing what in most instances. 
107 See generally Tracy Adams, The Life and Afterlife of Isabeau of Bavaria, Rethinking Theory (Balti-
more, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2010), 12. 
108 ‘Il fut d’opinion que le Roy seul eust le gouvernement de son royaume, et qu’il ne fust plus sous le 
gouvernement d’autruy, c’est à scavoir de ses oncles, et specialement du duc de Bourgogne, combine qu’expres-
sément il ne les nomma pas, mais on les pouvoit assez entendre’. HCRF, 376-377. 
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administration and authority that they had before, when they governed’.109 However, because 
Juvénal so thoroughly erased all implication that the royal uncles had previously had any sub-
stantial input in Charles’s regency government, these statements do not make logical sense. 
Why would Philippe be angry about losing power that he never had? Thus, Juvénal’s account 
of the minority of Charles VI is a strong narrative of regnal empowerment which conveniently 
ignores the dynastic drama that ran as an undercurrent throughout the period. 
Another character in this drama who is conveniently excised from the narrative is the 
Capetian cadet Louis II de Bourbon, who appears to be simply forgotten by Juvénal, much as 
his ancestors were by earlier Dionysian chroniclers.110 The patriarch of the family, Robert de 
Clermont, youngest son of Louis IX, is never mentioned in the vernacular tradition, although 
Guillaume de Nangis did mention him in his Latin chronicle.111 His son Louis I, however, 
does appear in Lescot’s chronicle. After being introduced in 1310 at the time of his marriage, 
Louis becomes another example of someone with crusading and chivalric vigour within the 
vernacular narrative.112 According to Lescot, he attempted to go on crusade twice, in 1325 and 
1328, and he also commanded the French rearguard at the battle of Cassel in 1328 and served 
in the royal army against the English in 1340.113 These are roles that Louis’s descendants later 
adopted and which characterised the cadet house throughout the Dionysian tradition, albeit 
never in any strong way.114 Lescot makes certain to highlight the elevation of Bourbon to a 
duchy in 1330, as well as the prestigious marriage of the duke’s daughter to the heir of the 
king of Cyprus the year before.115 Yet the chronicler says little more about the duke. He re-
serves only a single sentence for Louis’s death in 1342, noting his descent from Saint Louis 
but not commenting upon the duke’s character or achievements.116 Lescot only makes a pass-
ing reference to Louis’s successor, Pierre I, and his status as the only Capetian casualty of the  
  
                                               
109 ‘…le duc de Bourgongne en ses terres et seigneuries, tres-mal content, et ses gens desplaisans, de ce 
que ils n’avoient l’administration et l’auctorité qu’ils avoient eu auparavant, quand ils gouvernoient’. HCRF, 
377. Pintoin, though noting that the uncles were upset, does not elaborate or condemn anyone specifically. CKS, 
I:560, 562. Favier, La guerre, 402, explains that ‘Berry et Bourgogne tentèrent en vain d’obtenir un délai de ré-
flexion. Ils marchandèrent finalement un dédommagement qui eût démembré le royaume: la Guyenne à l’un, la 
Normandie à l’autre. Le jeune roi eut le cran de refuser. Les ducs ne pouvaient que céder’. See generally Adams, 
Life and Afterlife, 93; Vaughan, Philip, 42. 
110 See Figure 5.2. 
111 GPT, 512. Cf. GCF, VII:79-80. Robert was rendered an invalid at a tournament in 1278, which may 
explain why he does not appear in the vernacular chronicles. Hélary, 68; Wood, French Apanages, 44. 
112 GCF, VIII:277. See Continuatio, 601. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, IV:53.  
113 GCF, IX:49, 64, 85, 204. See Chronique Latine, II:81; Continuatio, 639. See generally Abbott, 190; 
Burne, Crécy, 48; Van Kerrebrouck, IV:53, 56n8. 
114 For the activities of the later Bourbons, see Chapters 7.2 and 8.2.  
115 GCF, IX:105, 107, 114. Another Bourbon princess, the daughter of Jean I de la Marche, married the 
king of Cyprus in 1411. HCRF, 455. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, IV:54, 55n1, 91.  
116 GCF, IX:223. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, IV:53. 
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battle of Poitiers in 1356 brings a swift end to his role in Orgemont’s continuation.117 Louis’s 
brother and the constable of France, Jacques I de la Marche, has a similar arc in Orgemont’s 
text: after briefly fighting the English in Languedoc, he was captured at Poitiers and then 
killed fighting routiers a year after his release.118 Even Charles V’s marriage to Jeanne, a 
daughter of Pierre, is only referenced in the context of the birth of a daughter sixteen years af-
ter their nuptials.119 However, the chronicler’s account of the queen’s death in 1378 is the 
most substantial space devoted to any queen or Bourbon cadet in the entire Dionysian vernac-
ular tradition, suggesting that Jeanne and her family were more important in reality than they 
appear to be within the chronicles.120 To Orgemont and the earlier Dionysian authors, the 
small appanage and limited political involvement of the Bourbons meant that the cadets were 
generally unimportant to the overarching narrative and contributed little to advancing Cape-
tian dynasticism. 
Because of this lack of coverage by the chroniclers, it comes as a narrative shock to 
find Louis II co-guardian of Charles VI alongside Philippe of Burgundy in 1380. According to 
Orgemont, it was a position that granted him ‘all the profits, revenues, and fees, both ordinary 
and extraordinary, of the duchy of Normandy, the bailliages of Senlis and of Melun, and of 
the town and viscounty of Paris’—a powerful position for a man from a family rarely refer-
enced in the vernacular texts.121 The chronicler does occasionally hint that the duke was more 
important than he seemed. He notes that, during the visit of Karl IV in 1378, Louis hosted the 
emperor alongside other cadets, and he was also responsible for the protection of the future 
Charles VI at this time.122 However, the revelation that Louis was a co-guardian comes so late 
in his narrative that Orgemont was unable to extrapolate additional information on the family 
and include it throughout the rest of his text. Juvénal, in contrast, did have such an oppor-
tunity, but clearly felt the Bourbons were unimportant in hindsight.123 In the narrative, Louis 
is hardly mentioned during the eight-year period in which he was supposedly the king’s pro-
tector.124 In fact, his sole moment of personal glory is on the Barbary Crusade of 1390, which 
                                               
117 GCF, IX:231; CRJC, I:72. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 219.  
118 CRJC, I:55, 73, 336. See generally Burne, Crécy, 255. 
119 CRJC, II:22. Jeanne herself is referenced indirectly as duchess of Normandy in 1358 and as a mem-
ber of the Bourbon family in 1364, but her parentage is not noted on either occasion. CRJC, I:182, II:1-2. See 
generally Allirot, 82-84.  
120 CRJC, II:278-282. 
121 ‘…le diz ducz de Bourgoigne et de Bourbon aroient le gouvernement, touz les prouffiz, revenues et 
emolumens, tant ordinaires comme extraordinaires, de la duchié de Normendie, des bailliages de Senlis et de 
Meleun et de la ville et viconté de Paris…’. CRJC, II:384. See generally Sumption, III:391. 
122 CRJC, II:201-202, 212, 221, 237. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 786, 788.  
123 Pintoin, too, rarely discusses Louis’s role. 
124 Notably, the duke is not even mentioned among the councillors that Charles VI dismissed in 1388. 
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he led and lost, although Juvénal comments that ‘for this voyage, the duke of Bourbon had 
great honour’.125 By including the crusade at all, the chronicler exemplifies what made the 
Bourbons important to the greater Capetian family: they were Saint Louis’s crusading heirs, 
constantly seeking martial feats for the glorification of the dynasty. It is no coincidence that 
most portrayals of the Bourbons in Juvénal’s text are of them fighting: Louis battled the Eng-
lish in Spain in 1387; Jacques II de La Marche, grandson of Jacques I, participated in the 
Nicopolis Crusade in 1396 and campaigned in England in 1403 and central France in 1411; 
Jean de Clermont, Louis’s son, used hit-and-run tactics against the English in Guyenne in 
1404; and Louis de Vendôme, Jacques’s brother, fought at Naples in 1412.126 But in the entire 
vernacular tradition, there is only one instance where a duke of Bourbon is directly associated 
with his duchy. In 1409, a vassal, Amédée de Viry, revolted against Louis II and led a short 
uprising against him.127 Juvénal uses this incident to highlight not Louis’s authority over his 
lands, but rather the potential for familial compromise in troubled times, since Jean of Bur-
gundy sided with the Bourbons even though Amédée wanted to pledge fealty to Jean. Both 
Jean de Clermont—who became duke in 1410—and Louis de Vendôme were captured at Ag-
incourt, marking the end of the Bourbons in Juvénal’s narrative.128 Much like with Louis 
d’Anjou, their failings and generally minor contributions to Capetian dynasticism explain why 
the Bourbons are underemphasised by the vernacular writers. Juvénal, seeking ever to pro-
mote regnal authority despite the circumstances, sees no purpose emphasising cadets who 
contributed so little to domestic stability or restoring the king’s power over the kingdom. Alt-
hough they appear everywhere in his narrative, Juvénal concludes that the Bourbons do not 
adequately represent the type of Capetian dynasticism that he advocates. 
It seems certain that Juvénal was uninspired by all the Capetian cadets who lived 
during the minority of Charles VI. This reflected Pintoin’s negative opinions as much as his 
own and was undoubtedly intensified by the fact that Juvénal wrote years after the conclusion 
of the Armagnac-Burgundian war. But his final message is clear: Capetian princes could 
wield a tremendous amount of power, and that power threatened the stability of the kingdom 
                                               
125 ‘Et en ce voyage eut le duc de Bourbon grand honneur’. HCRF, 383-384. See CKS, I:648-670 
(evens). See generally Sumption, III:790-791; Barbara Wertheim Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 
14th Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 470-477. 
126 HCRF, 369, 418, 429-431, 437, 473, 479. See CKS, I:444, II:748, III:206, IV:726. See generally 
Richard C. Famiglietti, Royal Intrigue: Crisis at the Court of Charles VI, 1392-1420 (New York: AMS Press, 
1986), 103; Setton, 354-355; Sumption, III:621-622, 834, IV:148-149; Van Kerrebrouck, IV:65.  
127 HCRF, 450, 452. See CKS, IV:240-248. See generally Sumption, IV:302.  
128 HCRF, 519. See CKS, V:574. See generally Abbott, 190; Barker, 334; Alfred H. Burne, The Agin-
court War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the Hundred Years War from 1369 to 1453 (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1956; reprint, Ware, UK: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1998), 87. For the roles of Bourbon bastards 
in this period and afterwards, see Chapter 7.2. 
THE TIMES OF TROUBLES Whaley 148 
and the authority of the king. To avoid showcasing this tendency, Juvénal minimises the roles 
of all the Capetians who sat on the regency council between 1380 and 1388. This task was 
made simpler by the fact that Louis d’Anjou went to Italy and Jean de Berry to Languedoc, so 
both voluntarily abandoned the royal administration and, therefore, the primary storyline. But 
with Philippe of Burgundy and Louis de Bourbon, Juvénal erases their influence, carefully 
structuring the narrative in such a way as to increase the authority of the teenaged Charles 
while simultaneously decreasing the power of the king’s co-guardians. In so doing, the chron-
icler constructs a story that showcases above all French regnal supremacy over the privileges 
and ambitions of Capetian cadets. 
 
                     
 
One thing the chroniclers all agree upon is that ruling during a time of regency is a difficult 
task and maintaining the appearance of regnal authority is key. During the long captivity of 
Jean II from 1356 to 1360, the Dauphin Charles struggled constantly to balance his duties as a 
Capetian cadet with his obligation to reassert regnal authority over the government. People 
such as Carlos of Navarre, Robert Le Coq, and Étienne Marcel saw weakness in his approach 
and exploited it, further destabilising France. Yet Orgemont strategically demonstrated that 
good Capetian cadets, such as Jeanne d’Évreux, could challenge the pretensions of bad cadets 
and help resolve dynastic conflicts and restore regnal authority. These are key lessons that Or-
gémont wanted to include within his chronicle so that it could function as a competent manual 
and miroir for the young Charles VI. But it came at an irreversible cost. Orgemont in effect 
redirected the focus of the Dionysian vernacular tradition from exemplifying Capetian dynas-
ticism to promoting regnal authority. Juvénal followed this trend when he described the re-
gency of Charles VI from 1380 to 1388. Viewing the various Capetian cadets as a threat to 
domestic tranquillity, he focussed on the king almost exclusively to create a narrative that em-
phasised regnal supremacy over cadet ambitions. Thus, the activities of the king’s four uncles 
are largely ignored in his text. Within the context of the Dionysian tradition, these two mo-
ments of dynastic crisis mark a fundamental shift in the type of didactic messages conveyed 
within the vernacular continuations. Previously, the sustained peace in France allowed the 
chroniclers to select good and bad examples from the totality of the greater Capetian dynasty. 
But without peace, narrative attention shifted to focus singly on the king and those cadets 
willing to sacrifice their own dynastic ambitions to uphold and promote regnal authority.  
 
 
CHAPTER SIX  
The Apanage Kings 
 
On 5 August 1392, Charles VI flew into a sudden, unprovoked rage, killing four men before 
he could be restrained.1 It was the first instance of a recurring illness that would define the re-
maining three decades of his reign.2 His uncle Philippe II of Burgundy immediately seized 
control of the government that had been taken from him four years earlier when Charles came 
of age.3 In many ways, this sequence of events was a repeat of that which came before: France 
found itself without a capable ruler, forcing the Capetian cadets to decide among themselves 
who was best-suited to rule during the king’s mental absences. By 1402, the regency was at-
times violently contested between two factions controlled by influential Capetian apanagists: 
the Burgundians, led by Philippe, his son Jean, and grandson Philippe III; and the Armagnacs, 
founded by Charles VI’s brother, Louis d’Orléans, and named after his close relative and 
powerful supporter, Bernard VII d’Armagnac. But no Capetian cadet sat out the conflict. The 
king’s uncle Jean de Berry, his wife, Queen Isabeau de Bavaria, and his sons, the dauphins, 
were all forced to take sides, though their loyalties often shifted. Also pulled into this bloody 
feud was a young Jean Juvénal des Ursins, who decades later navigated the political eddies of 
this conflict in an attempt to craft a didactic narrative worthy of the Dionysian tradition. His 
guides through this quagmire, from whom he borrowed heavily, were the Dionysian monk 
Michel Pintoin and his own father, Jean Juvénal, lawyer for the king in Parlement.4 Incapable 
of removing the cadets from the story as he did during Charles VI’s minority, Juvénal adopted 
various techniques to delegitimise the Armagnac and Burgundian causes, demonstrating to his 
readers the advantages of regnal, rather than dynastic, authority. By drawing out these tactics, 
this chapter will reveal the ways in which Juvénal problematised dynasticism through his 
characterisations of the major Capetian apanagists of the Valois line, thereby advancing a 
                                               
1 Autrand, Charles VI, 287, 291; CKS, II:16-22 (evens); HCRF, 389. 
2 For a thorough discussion of Charles VI’s disease, see Famiglietti, 1-21. 
3 CKS, II:24-28 (evens); HCRF, 389-390. 
4 Alain Demurger, ‘La Famille Jouvenal, quelques questions sur un tableau’, Annaire—Bulletin de la 
Société de l’histoire de France (1997): 35. The political leanings of both authors have been discussed by multi-
ple historians. Adams, Life and Afterlife, 128, 147-148, states that Pintoin had Burgundian leanings, but Nicole 
Pons, ‘Michel Pintoin et l’historiographie orléanaise’, in Saint-Denis et la royaututé: Études offertes à Bernard 
Guenée, eds. Françoise Autrand, Claude Gauvard, and Jean-Marie Moeglin (Paris: Publication de la Sorbonne, 
1999), 237-259, argues these have been exaggerated, especially in relation to Jean of Burgundy. Demurger, ‘La 
Famille Jouvenal’, 36, and HCRF make it clear that Jean Juvénal was an Armagnac, at least after the murder of 
Louis d’Orléans in 1407. However, Juvénal appears to borrow the pro-Burgundian perspective of Pintoin for his 
chronicle, at least until the Cabochien Revolt in 1413 when his own recollections and those of his father become 
more prominent within the text. Planchenault, ‘La “Chronique”’, 95. For more on the Juvénal family, see Pierre-
Louis Péchenard, Jean Juvénal des Ursins, historien de Charles VI, évêque de Beauvais et de Laon, archevêque-
duc de Reims (Paris: Ernest Thorin, 1876). 
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message of regnal supremacy. 
 
6.1 The Burgundians 
The seizure of the government by Philippe II, duke of Burgundy, in August 1392 fun-
damentally altered the relationship between Capetian cadets and French kingship. Reflecting 
on the matter decades later, Juvénal came to see agnates not as the bedrock of the kingdom, as 
his vernacular predecessors had, but as direct threats to the stability and sustainability of 
France. Philippe, as demonstrated by Juvénal through his depictions of the years the duke 
served as co-guardian of the child-king Charles VI, desired power and authority within 
France. This passed into his hands after the king fell ill. His feud with Louis d’Orléans was 
continued with vigour by his son Jean, whose confrontational personality led to the assassina-
tion of his rival and opened France up to civil war and foreign invasion. As a result, Philippe 
III becomes simply a product of his predecessors’ actions within the Dionysian vernacular 
continuations, and his generally negative portrayal by Juvénal and Jean Chartier represents the 
repercussions of betraying the king and the Capetian dynasty. Nonetheless, the chroniclers 
characterise each duke in a unique way that warrants individual attention, and this section will 
examine how these representations contributed to an overarching message of regnal suprem-
acy within the Dionysian narrative.5 
Juvénal was stubborn in his belief that regnal authority trumped dynasticism. After 
Charles VI fell ill, Juvénal resumes his rhetorical practice of attributing regnal decisions to the 
incapable king whenever possible or, more generally, to not attribute actions to any specific 
person at all.6 This technique effectively deflects attention from Philippe of Burgundy and im-
plies the inherent capability of the king to rule. But the chronicler is not always able to main-
tain this fiction. In 1398, Juvénal directly acknowledges the growing domestic crisis, writing 
that ‘there was already great hatred, envy, and divisions between the dukes’.7 But the issue at 
stake was resolving the Papal Schism, since Louis d’Orléans supported the Avignon pope and 
Philippe sought to compromise.8 Otherwise, there is no evidence of dynastic rivalries during  
                                               
5 See Figure 6.1. 
6 Throughout this period, Juvénal attributes decisions to ‘le Roy’, ‘le Roy, les oncles du Roy, et ceux du 
sang’, ‘le Roy et son conseil’, etc. See, for example, HCRF, 392, 395, 405. He also frequently informs the reader 
of the state of the king’s illness. See, for example, HCRF, 394, 404, 412. Pintoin more commonly attributes mat-
ters to the specific dukes, but he also interrupts his narrative to note the king’s health. See, for example, CKS, 
II:86-88, 402-408, 684-686 (evens). 
7 ‘…il y avoit ja grandes haines, envies et divisions entre les ducs…’. HCRF, 414. Pintoin does not 
mention these early disagreements. See generally Bertrand Schnerb, Les Armagnacs et les Bourguignons: La 
maudite guerre (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1988), 44. 
8 HCRF, 415. See CKS, III:20, 22. See generally Famiglietti, 24, 26; Vaughan, Philip, 47. 
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the time of the king’s illness until 1402. Philippe comes into his own within the chronicle at 
this time. Juvénal admits that ‘the principal cause [for the divisions] was to have the govern-
ment of the Kingdom and also finances. And the said [dukes] of Orléans and Burgundy each 
ordered men-at-arms to gather, which came toward Paris and did many bad things’.9 Shortly 
afterwards, Philippe ‘held the government of the kingdom [and] he wanted to find certain 
means of reformation, to reform all men who participated in the government, both the King 
and others, both men of the Church and the laity’.10 However, the archbishop of Reims dis-
suaded him. Juvénal notes in 1403 that each duke was told to go to separate sides of the king-
dom to subdue the English, but he laments that this plan ‘came to nothing, which was a great 
pity, having levied so much money, as one said was done, and without doing anything to ben-
efit the public’.11 Shortly afterwards in the narrative, Philippe attempted to halt a new tax 
from being levied, but failed again.12 Through these examples, Juvénal characterises the duke 
in a simple manner that is maintained throughout the continuation. On the topic of Philippe’s 
death in 1404, Juvénal describes the duke as a ‘valiant, wise, and prudent’ man, although one 
who left several debts.13 Since Juvénal deprives the duke of examples of his governing ability, 
these complimentary terms accurately summarise how Philippe is represented in the chronicle. 
The reference to debts, though, hints at a selfish nature not elaborated upon but demonstrated 
through his feud with Louis. By largely downplaying Philippe’s influence and portraying the 
duke as complementing regnal authority, Juvénal successfully attributes excessive authority to 
Charles VI and undermines much of the dynastic basis for the ensuing Armagnac-Burgundian 
civil war. 
 In contrast to his father, Jean of Burgundy simply could not be overlooked by Juvénal 
due to the role he played in the dynastic conflict. The chronicler recounts that in 1405, Jean 
                                               
9 ‘Et toute la principale cause estoit pour avoir le gouvernement du Royaume, et mesmement des fi-
nances. Et manderent chacun desdits d’Orleans et Bourgogne gens d’armes à foison, lesquels vinrent autour de 
Paris, et firent des maux beaucoup’. HCRF, 420. See CKS, III:14. Vaughan, Philip, 56, states that ‘France was 
saved from the horrors of civil war by the successful mediation of the dukes of Berry and Burgundy and the 
queen…. After this, there was no further resort to arms’. See generally Bertrand Schnerb, Jean sans peur: Le 
prince meurtrier, Biographie Payot (Paris: Payot and Rivages, 2005), 165. 
10 ‘…comme d’avoir le gouvernement du royaume, il voulut trouver certaines manieres de reformations, 
pour reformer toutes gens, qui avoient administrations, tant du Roy que d’autres, tant sur gens d’eglise que lais’. 
HCRF, 421. See CKS, III:34, 38. See generally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 53. 
11 ‘Mais tout vint au neant, qui estoit grande pitié, d’avoir levé tant d’argent, comme on disoit d’avoir 
fait, et sans rien faire au profit de la chose publique’. HCRF, 426. Pintoin does not mention this separation. In 
reality, both dukes had business elsewhere: Philippe went to Brussels to take possession of the duchy of Brabant, 
while Louis was in Luxembourg, consolidating his rule there. See generally Famiglietti, 34-35; Schnerb, Arma-
gnacs, 56. 
12 HCRF, 427. See CKS, III:38, 40. See generally Sumption, IV:125. 
13 ‘…on tenoit vaillant, sage, et prudent’. HCRF, 427. Pintoin gives an expanded assessment of the 
duke, but one that largely conforms to Juvénal’s conclusions. CKS, III:144-148 (evens). See generally Vaughan, 
Philip, 240. 
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proposed a four-step plan to reform the government. He declared his intention to take back the 
government, restore justice, streamline taxation, and recall the estates.14 The first pledge he 
accomplished when he had the Dauphin Louis de Guyenne appointed regent, but Juvénal 
makes clear that Jean retained control over the government, because ‘his daughter had married 
monseigneur the dauphin, who had all of the government for the said Duke, and without him 
nothing was done’.15 To restore justice, Jean militarised Paris, bringing in Burgundian troops 
and arming the populace against the followers of Louis d’Orléans, but the chronicler notes 
how these troops were soon withdrawn to allow the two factions to negotiate a truce and how 
the Parisians declined Burgundian armaments.16 On the issue of taxation, Juvénal attributes 
nothing to Jean and claims that ‘the dukes took everything and distributed it to their servants, 
as it seemed good to them’, indirectly blaming all the Valois apanagists for the kingdom’s 
economic woes.17 Jean’s final proposal, to recall the Estates, is stillborn and never mentioned 
again by Juvénal.18 Despite this detailed and provocative introduction, however, Jean is still 
largely absent from the narrative of the early Armagnac-Burgundian war, only appearing in 
isolated episodes. Juvénal organises the duke’s narrative in a way that is intentionally incon-
sistent and vague, which underemphasises the duke’s influence within the government. 
 The murder of Louis d’Orléans by Jean’s agents on 20 November 1407 complicates Ju-
vénal’s depiction of the Burgundian duke.19 Within the narrative, Jean transforms into a re-
morseless, power-hungry agnate determined to exert his control over Paris and the king.20 
From his public insistence that Louis’s death was necessary to his refusal to apologise for his 
crime over the subsequent twelve years, the duke is never again favourably portrayed by Juvé-
nal.21 For example, when Jean marches on Paris in 1408 and Charles d’Orléans, Louis’s or-
phaned successor, reconciles with him, Juvénal outlines how completely the duke controlled 
                                               
14 HCRF, 432. Juvénal is summarising a much more detailed passage from Pintoin, but he changes the 
final demand from the original, which was to subdue the routiers pillaging the French countryside. CKS, III:296-
304 (evens). See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 171. 
15 ‘…car sa fille estoit mariée avec monseigneur le Dauphin, lequel estoit tout au gouvernement dudit 
Duc, et sans luy ne faisoit rien’. HCRF, 437. See generally Tracy Adams, ‘Christine de Pizan, Isabeau of Ba-
varia, and Female Regency’, French Historical Studies 32:1 (2009): 23; Schnerb, Jean, 173-174. 
16 HCRF, 432-433, 437. See CKS, III:308, 340-344 (evens). See generally Schnerb, Jean, 175, 177. 
17 ‘En ce temps c’estoit grande pitié de voir le gouvernement du royaume: les ducs prenoient tout, et le 
distribuoient à leurs serviteurs, ainsi que bon leur sembloit’. HCRF, 443. See generally Adams, Life and After-
life, 133. 
18 See generally Schnerb, Jean, 174. 
19 HCRF, 444-445. See CKS, III:730, 732. See generally Famiglietti, 63. 
20 See generally Schnerb, Jean, 513ff. 
21 HCRF, 445, 479. 
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Paris and explains that Charles only forgave Jean ‘by the commandment of the king’.22 Alt-
hough Juvénal does not ignore the duke’s successes, he takes every opportunity to undermine 
them. One such instance that the chronicler includes takes place in 1410, soon after Jean left 
Paris to return to his territories.23 The duke was worried that the Armagnacs would take ad-
vantage of his absence and wrote to the Parisians asking if they needed assistance, to which 
they replied that ‘there was no doubt that they would guard themselves well, so that no incon-
venience would arise’, thereby brushing aside his offer.24 The next year, Waléran III de Saint-
Pol, the duke’s agent in Paris, incited the butchers of the city to rise up, prompting a crisis that 
required Jean to return.25 Juvénal explains how the duke entered the city accompanied by 
English soldiers—always a sign of treason—and promptly purged the city of Armagnacs and 
their supporters, after which he began cleansing the Île-de-France of Armagnac holdouts.26 
But the crisis Jean had manufactured with the butchers in Paris soon became unmanageable, 
causing the dauphin Louis to recall the Armagnacs and initiate a short-lived truce between the 
two factions.27 This allowed the Capetians to present a united front against the English at Ag-
incourt in 1415. Nevertheless, popular opinion for the Burgundians remained strong in Paris 
for the remainder of Charles VI’s reign. Juvénal states this outright when recounting the Bur-
gundian takeover of 1418, reporting that ‘[i]t is believed that God still wanted to chastise the 
kingdom because…the Burgundians entered Paris, and it is known…that the duke of Bur-
gundy had many supporters in Paris’.28 Indeed, according to the chronicler, Jean’s murder on 
the bridge outside Montereau on 10 September 1419 by agents of the Dauphin Charles (the 
                                               
22 ‘...aussi fit Orleans par le commandement du Roy...’. HCRF, 449-450. 
23 See generally Sumption, IV:269-270. 
24 ‘…et qu’il ne fist doute qu’ils se garderoient bien, tellement que aucun inconvenient n’en ad-
viendroit’. HCRF, 455. 
25 HCRF, 466-467. See CKS, IV:444, 446. See generally Schnerb, Jean, 534; Sumption, IV:276. 
26 HCRF, 468, 471ff. 
27 HCRF, 489, 490. The Parisians initially requested the Armagnacs to come because Jean had been un-
able to stabilise the city after the butchers revolted in the summer of 1413 and the Parisians wanted peace. Jean’s 
two brothers, Antoine de Brabant and Philippe de Nevers, had supported Jean steadfastly prior to 1413, but advo-
cated peace from 1414. Indeed, Philippe cried for mercy from the king, ‘en lui requerant qu’il luy voulust par-
donner de ce qu’il avoit esté devant Paris avec son frere: et luy fit plusieurs grandes promesses, tant de le servir, 
que autrement. De plus, il mit toutes ses terres en sa main et subjetion, ce qui fit que le Roy et monseigneur de 
Guyenne, bien et doucement luy pardonnerent’. HCRF, 499. Both brothers died at Agincourt fighting for the 
French. HCRF, 521, 524. See generally Burne, Agincourt, 86-87; Alfred Coville, Les Cabochiens et l’ ordon-
nance de 1413 (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1888); Schnerb, Armagnacs, 141-168; Sumption, IV:332-365. 
28 ‘Or est à croire, que Dieu vouloit encores chastier ce royaume: car le dimanche vingt-huictiesme jour 
dudit mois, les Bourguignons entrerent à Paris: et pour sçavoir la maniere, il est vray, comme dessus a esté tou-
ché, que le duc de Bourgogne avoit de grands fauteurs à Paris’. HCRF, 540. Blockmans and Prevenier, 43, argue 
that the Parisians only returned to Burgundian loyalty in 1418 after a joint publicity and military campaign con-
vinced them of the merits of the Burgundian cause. See generally Barker, 19-20; Schnerb, Jean, 666-669. 
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future Charles VII) only encouraged those in Paris to support the Burgundians more vehe-
mently, even to the point of ceding the kingdom to the English.29 Juvénal, therefore, uses the 
riotous and anti-Armagnac sentiment in Paris to undermine the legitimacy of Jean’s cause, 
leading to the duke’s characterisation as an instigator whose motivations remain uncertain and 
whose actions abused the inherent privileges of a Capetian agnate and undermined regnal au-
thority within France. 
In retaliation for his role in the treaty of Troyes in 1420, Jean’s son, Philippe III, is 
given very little narrative space by Juvénal. The treaty, in which the new duke facilitated the 
transfer of the kingdom of France to Henry V of England after the death of Charles VI, serves 
as the fulcrum upon which the portrayal of Philippe turns.30 While recounting the funeral of 
Charles VI, Juvénal condemns Philippe, repeating what ‘several men said between their 
teeth’: 
And you, duke of Burgundy, who in his life put [the kingdom] into the hands of 
his enemies, you have sealed his illness such that he never could escape and you 
knew well of his death, even delaying the funeral procession so that you would be 
there, and even longer would have been expected if you had ordered it; and yet 
you did not come anyway to it, so that in his life and in his death, you abandoned 
him.31 
This is a damning statement by Juvénal on Philippe’s character that blames the duke more for 
the crimes of his father than his own. In Chartier’s chronicle, the duke only features once di-
rectly early in the narrative.32 At the treaty of Arras in 1435, which ended the Armagnac-Bur-
gundian war, the duke was not present to sign the agreement and his personal acceptance of 
the treaty is only made clear later in the chronicle.33 Philippe was also absent when Charles 
VII named his newborn son after the duke of Burgundy in 1436, and the son’s death soon af-
terwards undermines the impact of this sign of reconciliation.34 The chronicler includes two 
instances where the duke participated in the French reconquest of English-held lands in 
France, but these are framed as isolated episodes occurring concurrent with but separate from 
                                               
29 HCRF, 553-555. See CKS, VI:374-378 (evens). See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 578; Schnerb, 
Jean, 680-684. 
30 HRCF, 555-557. Like Juvénal, Pintoin (and Chartier for the portion 1421-1422) focusses very little 
on Philippe III, and the duke’s role in crafting the treaty of Troyes is severely downplayed. The treaty, which 
Pintoin includes in full, is framed as an agreement between Henry V and Charles VI. CKS, VI:408-440. See gen-
erally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 216. 
31 ‘Et vous, duc de Bourgongne, qui en sa vie l’avez mis és mains de ses ennemis, vous avez sceu sa 
maladie telle qu’il n’en pouvoit eschapper, et sceustes bien sa mort, mesme delaya-on le convoy funebre en in-
tention que y fussiez; et encores eust-on plus attendu si l’eussiez mandé; et toutesfois vous n’y vinstes aucune-
ment: par ainsi en sa vie et en sa mort vous l’abandonnastes…’. HCRF, 568. See general, Conquest, 49. 
32 Chartier, I:31. 
33 Chartier, I:185, 189-204, 212. See generally Schnerb, Jean, 709. 
34 Chartier, I:220, 229. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:131. 
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Charles VII’s campaigns.35 Similarly, Chartier includes three episodes where Philippe dealt 
with affairs in his own lands, but again these are divorced from the rest of the storyline.36 The 
only time when the narratives collide is in 1456, when the future Louis XI fled into Burgun-
dian lands to seek asylum from Philippe, which caused a new diplomatic rift to form between 
Charles and the duke.37 In the end, Chartier simply felt that Philippe distracted from the larger 
narrative of the reconquest of northern France. The author wrote his chronicle after the treaty 
of Arras and, although he lived for many years in occupied Saint-Denis, he clearly felt that the 
Burgundians were better left out of the story. For both chroniclers, Philippe is somewhat of an 
enigma after 1420. Juvénal disliked the duke on a fundamental level for his crimes against the 
kingdom and Chartier felt the man was inconsequential to his narrative. These attitudes 
caused the continuators to keep the narrative tightly focussed on other figures who worked to-
ward restoring regnal authority to the king. 
 The Dionysian writers approached each duke of Burgundy differently in order to make 
specific points about Capetian dynasticism and regnal authority. With Philippe II, Juvénal 
framed the duke in generally positive terms by minimising his overall influence over Charles 
VI’s government and downplaying the severity of his feud with Louis d’Orléans. Thus, he 
serves as a positive promoter of regnal authority in the narrative. In contrast, Jean of Bur-
gundy directly threatened the king’s powers and, therefore, Juvénal rebuked him, strategically 
using the repeated partisan uprisings in Paris as a narrative device to further highlight the 
duke’s transgressions. The chronicler leaves little doubt that his death in 1419 was warranted 
and that his actions subverted the authority of the king. Regarding Philippe III, Juvénal re-
fused to see him as anything other than a traitor to the king and kingdom, while Chartier 
merely saw him as irrelevant to the overarching narrative. Considered together, the story of 
the Burgundians is of an ambitious family that usurped the powers of the king to promote 
their own dynastic interests. Their story serves as a moral message to readers that when cadets 
advance their own goals over dynastic unity and domestic stability, the result is division, civil 
war, and a diminished monarchy. 
 
 
                                               
35 Chartier, I:242-243, 245. In contrast, Philippe de Never’s son Charles served as a French commander 
during Charles VII’s campaigns against the English in Normandy and Guyenne, and fought alongside other Ca-
petian cadets throughout this period, although no important feats are attributed to him. Chartier, II:142-236, 306-
323, III:2. See generally Favier, La guerre, 608; Van Kerrebrouck, III:402. 
36 Chartier, I:248-249, II:324, III:80-89. 
37 Chartier, III:55-65. See Chapter 8.2. See generally Jean Favier, Louis XI (Paris: Fayard, 2001), 178. 
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6.2 The House of Orléans and the Armagnacs 
The princes of the house of Orléans are approached in a similar manner to their Bur-
gundian relatives, but Juvénal erects entirely new characterisations for each prince. Louis 
d’Orléans is eased into the narrative, appearing first as simply the brother of Charles VI in 
1380, becoming the count of Valois in 1382 and duke of Touraine in 1386, and only gaining 
the apanage of Orléans in 1392.38 Regarding this latter event, Juvénal, summarising Pintoin, 
explains that ‘those of Orléans were very discontented, saying that the King had promised 
them that he would never partition [the duchy] from the crown, for which they made a strong 
case, but ultimately the point was abandoned’.39 Thus, from his entry as duke, Louis is 
maligned by the chronicler. Over the subsequent sixteen years, Juvénal morphs the duke into 
an antagonist who used his position to steal from the government and usurp the king’s author-
ity. By the time of Louis’s murder in 1407, France was a divided kingdom, split between the 
Burgundians and Louis’s followers.40 A cognate of the Capetians, Bernard VII d’Armagnac, 
father-in-law to the orphaned son of Louis, Charles d’Orléans, quickly established himself as 
leader over Louis’s party and for a decade worked to defeat the Burgundians and unite France 
against the English. With his death in the streets of Paris in 1418, the Armagnac party came to 
be led by the future Charles VII. Meanwhile, the second generation of Orléans princes quickly 
disappear from the story since Charles and his brother Jean d’Angoulême became English 
hostages and Philippe de Vertus, another brother, died prematurely. Juvénal and Chartier, 
therefore, were left with a quandary: how did these Capetian cadets fit within their overarch-
ing narrative of enhancing regnal authority in France? In the end, they decided to respond to 
this issue through three entirely different methods, all of which will be examined within this 
section. 
It is clear early in his chronicle that Juvénal held a low opinion of Louis d’Orléans. In-
deed, he repeatedly infers that Louis was responsible for Charles VI’s illness. Juvénal reports 
that, in 1392, Louis was dabbling in witchcraft.41 This angered one of his companions, Pierre 
de Craon, whom Louis expelled from his court in response.42 Pierre, rather than blaming  
                                               
38 HCRF, 342, 355, 368, 385-386. See CKS, I:212, 418, 704. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:229-
232. 
39 ‘Dont ceux d’Orléans furent tres-mal content, disans que le Roy leur avoit promis que jamais ne par-
tiroient de la couronne, et en firent forte poursuite, mais finalement la chose demeura en ce point…’. HCRF, 
385-386. See CKS, I:704, 706. See generally Eugène Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France, duc d’Orléans 
1372-1407 (Paris: Picard, 1889), 89-90. 
40 See Figure 6.2. 
41 HCRF, 388. See CKS, II:2. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 272-273, 301; Sumption, III:800. 
42 Pintoin clarifies that Pierre was exiled from the royal court, not just the duke’s entourage, and that his 
goods were confiscated by the king. CKS, II:6. See generally Famiglietti, 2. 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































THE APANAGE KINGS Whaley 159 
Louis, attributed his exile to the constable of France, Olivier de Clisson, who was an advisor 
to Louis. Pierre fled to Brittany and Clisson convinced the king to pursue him, on which jour-
ney Charles fell ill for the first time.43 Although Juvénal never directly links the duke’s ac-
tions to the king’s illness, the correlation is obvious from the context. The chronicler also 
accuses Louis’s wife, Valentina Visconti, of sorcery. When the king in his delirium became 
infatuated with the duchess in 1393, Juvénal notes ‘one said and publicised that she had be-
witched him, by means of her father, the duke of Milan, who was a Lombard, and that in his 
lands one did such things’.44 Nothing actually came of this implication. During an inquiry in 
1397, several courtiers of the duke were interrogated, including the king’s barber, but the in-
vestigation proved fruitless and the courtiers were released.45 Nonetheless, the inclusion of 
these instances creates a negative image of the duke and his court within the chronicle. In a 
more general statement, Juvénal explains that Louis ‘governed himself as he pleased, taking 
young foreign women to himself’.46 The chronicler implies that this immaturity also led him 
to support the Avignon pope in the late 1390s, despite the fact that the government was mov-
ing toward reconciliation.47 His execution of a suspected necromancer and summoner in 1398 
was viewed not as a pious act, but as a direct attack on Philippe II of Burgundy, whom the de-
ceased had served.48 Juvénal reserves virtually no space in his chronicle for any positive or 
beneficial deeds of the duke, but rather paints a portrait of a reckless and manipulative agnate 
who desired to sow division rather than enhance regnal authority. 
Throughout the Armagnac-Burgundian war, Louis is framed as the aggressor, moving 
against the government of Philippe II of Burgundy in 1402. Juvénal explains how, during a 
moment of lucidity, Charles VI appointed Louis his lieutenant, but one of the duke’s first ac-
tions was to levy a hefty tax, which prompted Philippe and Jean de Berry to petition the king 
for a reversal of the duke’s appointment, which the king granted, returning the government to 
                                               
43 HCRF, 389. See CKS, II:16-22 (evens). 
44 ‘…on disoit et publioient aucuns qu’elle l’avoit ensorcelé, par le moyen de son pere le duc de Milan, 
qui estoit Lombard, et qu’en son pays on usoit de telles choses’. HCRF, 494. Pintoin includes this rumour but 
discounts it outright, saying ‘non tamen dicam probabilem’. CKS, II:88. Valentina left the royal court in 1396, 
partially due to accusations such as these, and she did not return until 1408, after her husband’s death. Emily J. 
Hutchison, ‘The Politics of Grief in the Outbreak of Civil War in France, 1407-1413’, Speculum 91:2 (2016), 
438. See generally Émile Collas, Valentine de Milan: Duchesse d’Orléans, second edition (Paris: Librairie Plon, 
1911), 187-227; Famiglietti, 4, 209n26; Sumption, III:809. 
45 HCRF, 412. Pintoin does not imply the barber is a partisan of Louis and only notes one member of 
the duke’s retinue who was arrested. CKS, II:544, 546. 
46 ‘[Il] se gouvernoit aucunement trop à son plaisir, en faisant jeunesses estranges…’. HCRF, 392. Pin-
toin only alludes to these activities. CKS, II:72. See generally Sumption, III:800. 
47 HCRF, 414, 420. See CKS, III:20, 22. See generally Famiglietti, 24, 26. 
48 HCRF, 415. Pintoin does not mention this incident. 
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Philippe.49 Louis immediately retaliated by purchasing the duchy of Luxembourg, which was 
strategically located between the Burgundian Low Countries and Burgundy, thereby escalat-
ing the feud.50 Although courtiers were able to separate Louis and Philippe in 1403, sending 
each to separate sides of the realm, Louis returned in 1404, where ‘one said that [he] had bro-
ken the outside door where the treasure of the King was and that he took all that he could find 
there’.51 Thus, Juvénal characterises the duke as an enemy to public welfare. The next year, 
Louis attempted to seize Normandy but the people of Rouen resisted and Charles refused to 
grant his brother the duchy.52 Another attempt was made in 1406 to separate the quarrelling 
dukes—now Louis and Jean of Burgundy—but Louis returned to Paris at the beginning of the 
next year, having accomplished little.53 His reputation tarnished and his loyalty to the crown 
questionable within the context of the chronicle, Louis was ingloriously murdered at night by 
Burgundian assassins on the street outside the queen’s home, the Hôtel Barbette.54 In re-
sponse, Jean successfully argued before the king ‘several cases of various types which one 
said were committed by the said duke d’Orléans, for which he sustained that one ought to 
hold him and repute him a tyrant’.55 This damning indictment of Louis is the most direct at-
tack on the duke’s character in Juvénal’s text, but it comes only after his murder, suggesting 
that Juvénal wanted an active player—Jean of Burgundy in this case—to act as his mouth-
piece against Louis.56 In a similar manner, Juvénal lists a number of advocates who came for-
ward to defend Louis, which ultimately led to a formal condemnation of Jean of Burgundy by 
                                               
49 HCRF, 421. See CKS, III:24-28, 34-36 (evens). Adams, ‘Christine de Pizan’, 10, states rather that Isa-
beau had been lieutenant for the king prior to 1402 and resumed that post after Louis was assassinated. See gen-
erally Famiglietti, 26. 
50 HCRF, 421. See CKS, III:42, 44. Adams, Life and Afterlife, 13-14, writes that ‘the Duke d’Orléans 
constructed a checkered empire to counter Philip’s Burgundian territories. His strategy…was less to create a he-
gemony in the kingdom than to spread his power throughout, as moves like the 1402 acquisition of rights over 
Luxembourg, smack in the middle of Philip’s holdings suggest’. 
51 ‘Et si disoit-on que le duc d’Orleans avoit esté rompre les huis où le tresor du Roy estoit, et qu’il prit 
tout ce qu’il y trouva’. HCRF, 426, 427. See CKS, III:140. Jarry, 306, argues that the villainisation of Louis in 
this episode is ‘probablement affaire aux calomnies intéressées, répandues par Jean-sans-Peur…; ce duc de 
Bourgogne était capable d’aussi vils moyens, puisqu’il l’était de méditer un assassinat’. 
52 HCRF, 435-436. See CKS, III:284-288 (evens). See generally Sumption, IV:171. 
53 HCRF, 439. Juvénal attributes this separation to ‘tousjours aucuns grommelis et plaintes entre les 
ducs d’Orleans et de Bourgongne’, but Pintoin frames it as a necessary response to recent English incursions in 
Picardy and Guyenne. CKS, III:432-436, 450-458 (evens). See generally Willem Pieter Blockmans and Walter 
Prevenier, The Promised Lands: The Low Countries Under Burgundian Rule, 1369-1530, trans. Elizabeth Fac-
kelman and Edward Peters (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 39; Famiglietti, 58, 60. 
54 HCRF, 444-445. See CKS, III:730-736 (evens). See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 349-352; Sump-
tion, IV:234-235. 
55 ‘…alleguant plusieurs cas de diverses especes, qu’on disoit avoir esté commis par ledit duc d’Orle-
ans, pour lesquels il soustenoit qu’on le devoit tenir et reputer tyran’. HCRF, 445. Juvénal heavily condenses 
Pintoin’s narrative here. Pintoin also recounts that Jean accused Louis of attempting to usurp the throne and 
called Louis a scoundrel and a profligate sinner. CKS, III:754. See generally Famiglietti, 67-68; Hutchison, 435-
436. 
56 Hutchison argues that Jean took this stance ‘[i]n order to retain his position of influence over the 
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the royal council.57 Despite this, though, Louis’s role in initiating the Armagnac-Burgundian 
war is undeniable within the narrative framework that Juvénal establishes. His portrayal is one 
of a greedy Capetian cadet willing to plunge the kingdom into civil war to pursue personal 
goals. He, therefore, represents the fundamental threat that an overly-powerful apanagist 
could pose to domestic stability and regnal authority. 
The death of Louis d’Orléans in 1407 shifted the nature of the late duke’s movement. 
No longer would a Capetian agnate oversee the party; rather, it would be led by a close rela-
tive, Bernard VII, count d’Armagnac, after whom the entire group would be named. Bernard 
is first introduced in Juvénal’s chronicle in 1405 as the husband of Bonne, daughter of Jean de 
Berry.58 Thus, his Capetian credentials are immediately established. In that year, Bernard 
‘made strong war against the English [and] conquered about sixty places [in Guyenne]…and 
did great damage to the English’, eventually pushing into the Bordelais, the heartland of Plan-
tagenet Guyenne.59 The count does not, therefore, enter the story as a follower of Louis, but as 
a Capetian warrior willing to attack the English in their undefended flank. Juvénal delays as-
sociating Bernard with either movement until the alliance of Gien in 1410, when the count 
formally joined the dukes of Orléans, Berry, Bourbon, and Brittany, and the counts of 
Alençon and Clermont—all Capetian agnates—in an alliance against Jean of Burgundy.60 
Both Juvénal and Pintoin neglect to include the marriage alliance that was established here be-
tween Bernard’s daughter Bonne and Charles d’Orléans, but Juvénal does note the next year 
that ‘because the count d’Armagnac was with the duke d’Orléans, one named those who held 
to his party Armagnacs’.61 Until his death, Bernard and the movement named after him merge 
                                               
king’, and that ‘he vilified the Orleanist party for their extended grief and had the king formally declare their 
party disobedient rebels’. She adds, ‘[f]rom 1408 to 1413 Burgundy defended against the persistence of his ene-
mies and the threats that their sustained mourning posed to his power’. 
57 HCRF, 447-448. In Pintoin’s chronicle, Jean Juvénal des Ursin’s father was responsible for delivering 
the rebuttal to Jean of Burgundy’s statements and much more space is given to this rebuttal than to Jean’s accu-
sation. CKS, IV:90-128 (evens). Jean [I] Juvénal served as Louis d’Orléans lawyer in parlement from 1398 and 
continued in that capacity for Louis’s family. Louis Batiffol, Jean Jouvenel, prévôt des marchands de la ville de 
Paris (1360-1431) (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1884), 129, 151, 180. 
58 HCRF, 434. See CKS, III:354. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 539. 
59 ‘…fit forte guerre aux Anglois [et] gagna bien soixante places…et fit un bien grand dommage aux 
Anglois’. HCRF, 434, 438. See CKS, III:354-358 (evens). See generally Sumption, IV:185-188. 
60 HCRF, 452. The members of this alliance were condemned by the king as traitors on 3 October 1411. 
This condemnation also listed Charles d’Orléans’ brothers, Philippe de Vertus and Jean d’Angoulême. Jean de 
Berry and Charles d’Eu were originally members of the alliance, but were not condemned alongside their con-
federates. For the original condemnation, see ‘Letters par lesquelles Charles VI. declare les Ducs d’Orléans [etc.] 
coupables de rebellion…’, in Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, recueillies par ordre 
chronologique, vol. IX, ed. Louis-Guillaume de Vilevault (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1775), 635. See CKS, 
IV:316. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 506; Famiglietti, 88. 
61 ‘Et pource que le comte d’Armagnac estoit avec le duc d’Orléans, on mit nom à ceux qui tenoient son 
party, Armagnacs’. HCRF, 467. Pintoin uses the name ‘Armagnacs’ but does not explain its origin. See CKS, 
IV:442. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 26; Famiglietti, 88. 
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together in the narrative, thereby supporting the idea that Bernard was considered a full mem-
ber of the Capetian dynasty by Juvénal. Within the chronicle, the count is rarely separated 
from the other party leaders—Charles d’Orléans, Jean I de Bourbon, Jean I d’Alençon, and 
Charles d’Albret—but after Agincourt, where all four of his associates were either captured or 
killed, Bernard became sole leader of the party.62 Promoted to the constableship in late 1415, 
Bernard was powerless to halt the advance of the English and Burgundians into the Île-de-
France.63 He eventually died as a martyr to his cause when a Burgundian mob in the streets of 
Paris murdered him in May 1418.64 From his introduction in the chronicle until his death, Ber-
nard is shown championing the cause of the house of Orléans so much that the chronicler ac-
cepts him as a member of the family, but none of the stain of Louis d’Orléans’s reputation 
appears in his depiction, suggesting that Bernard represented something different to Juvénal: a 
bulwark against the Anglo-Burgundian tide and a champion of the king’s authority.  
Although the Armagnac movement ultimately triumphed due to the treaty of Arras 
with the Burgundians in 1435 and the victory of Charles VII over the English in 1453, the ca-
det line that founded the party disappears into obscurity in Chartier’s narrative. According to 
Juvénal, Charles d’Orléans only briefly took over his father’s movement, and his capture at 
Agincourt severely reduces his importance to the vernacular narrative. Juvénal continues to 
mention the duke until his capture, but he is usually portrayed as just another cadet in the 
company of more important Armagnacs.65 In the few instances where he does act inde-
pendently, he is seeking justice for the murder of his father, such as in 1408, when he and his 
mother petitioned the king to condemn Jean of Burgundy, which led to a formal declaration 
against the duke.66 Juvénal also includes verbatim a letter that the duke and his brothers wrote 
to the towns of France in 1411, in which he insists that they rise up against Jean in retaliation 
for the murder of his father.67 But when depicting the creation of the Gien confederacy in 
                                               
62 HCRF, 468. Bernard escaped the carnage since he was in the south at the time, negotiating a truce 
with the count of Foix. Burne, Agincourt, 100; HCRF, 507. Pintoin does not mention Bernard’s absence. See 
generally Autrand, Charles VI, 535; Burne, Agincourt, 87. 
63 HCRF, 527, 541. See CKS, V:584, 590. See generally Christopher T. Allmand, Lancastrian Nor-
mandy 1415-1450: The History of a Medieval Occupation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 6; Autrand, Charles 
VI, 538; Georges Poull, La Maison ducale de Lorraine devenue La Maison impériale et royale d’Autriche, de 
Hongrie et de Bohême (Nancy: Presses universitaires, 1991), 121.  
64 HCRF, 541. See CKS, VI:234. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 203-204. 
65 HCRF, 448-449, 455, 467-468. Pintoin downplays Charles d’Orléans role even more substantially 
than does Juvénal. Cf. CKS, IV:90-140 (evens). See CKS, IV:184, 190-202 (evens).  
66 HCRF, 447-448. See generally Sumption, IV:247. 
67 HCRF, 456-465. See CKS, IV:418-438 (evens). Jean countered this letter with one of his own, in 
which he called the Armagnacs traitors. See generally Famiglietti, 95-96. 
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1410, Juvénal credits Jean de Berry for uniting the Capetian cadets, not Charles or even Ber-
nard.68 With his capture in 1415, Charles almost entirely disappears from the Dionysian ver-
nacular tradition.69 Chartier mentions him only three times: in 1440 when he was released and 
married to a niece of Philippe III of Burgundy, in 1457 at a royal function, and in 1461 in the 
funeral procession of Charles VII.70 Equally useless to the overarching narrative are Charles’s 
brothers, Jean d’Angoulême and Philippe de Vertus. Juvénal explains that, while still a child, 
Jean was handed over to the English in 1412 as a hostage to ensure the payment of a bribe to 
the Lancastrian duke of Clarence.71 The count was not released until 1445.72 Chartier later 
notes that he participated in the campaigns of 1449 to 1453, and attended the function in 1457 
and Charles VII’s funeral.73 Philippe was even less fortunate. The chronicler describes how he 
became a royal lieutenant after Agincourt and led a successful siege against Parthenay in 
1419, for which ‘all the counties of Poitou, Berry, and Aunis were put into the obedience of 
[the Dauphin Charles]’.74 This cleared the area south of the Loire from Anglo-Burgundian 
strongholds and allowed Charles to establish his court-in-exile, but Philippe never saw this.75 
The count of Vertus died suddenly in 1420 from an unknown illness, a fact Juvénal neglects 
to include in his chronicle.76 Thus, the Dionysian chroniclers mostly abandoned the second 
generation of Orléans cadets to focus on other, more useful members of the Capetian dynasty. 
The long captivities of Charles and Jean made them largely irrelevant to the primary story, 
and their return in the 1440s did not herald any change in fortune for the dynasty. In the opin-
ions of the chroniclers, the Orléans princes simply did not impact regnal authority in any sig-
nificant way, positive or negative, making them didactically useless to the overall story. 
When reading the later Dionysian chronicles, one must constantly remember that both 
Juvénal and Chartier wrote their texts decades after the events described. Their chronological 
vantage point proved very important to how they chose to portray the Orléans princes. Thus, 
Juvénal felt comfortable placing the blame for the Armagnac-Burgundian war squarely at the 
                                               
68 HCRF, 452. See CKS, IV:318. See generally Lehoux, III:167-170. See generally Famiglietti, 88. 
69 HCRF, 521. See CKS, V:574. For information on Charles during his captivity, see Mary-Jo Arn (ed.), 
Charles d’Orléans in England, 1415-1440 (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell and Brewer, 2000). See generally Burne, 
Agincourt, 87. 
70 Chartier, I:260, III:75, 115. See generally Favier, La guerre, 559; Vale, Charles VII, 173, 212. 
71 HCRF, 478. See CKS, IV:720. See generally Famiglietti, 110. 
72 Van Kerrebrouck, III:249. 
73 Chartier, II:250, 262, 269, 307-308, 313, III:12, 75, 115. See generally Favier, La guerre, 608. 
74 ‘…toute la comté de Poictou, de Berry, et d’Aunis furent en l’obeyssance de monseigneur le Re-
gent…’. HCRF, 547. The siege of Parthenay is absent from Pintoin’s text. 
75 See generally Sumption, IV:616. 
76 Sumption, IV:685. 
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duke’s feet. In contrast, Bernard VII d’Armagnac loyally served the king before and through-
out his tenure as leader of his namesake party. The fact that his movement ultimately merged 
with that of the king’s afforded his reputation some protection, but Juvénal may have person-
ally remembered Bernard from his youth and felt that the Armagnac count deserved the posi-
tive portrayal he received in his chronicle. In contrast, neither Juvénal nor Chartier likely 
knew the second generation of Orléans princes at all. Charles d’Orléans was largely distrusted 
by Charles VII, so Chartier ostracised him from his chronicle.77 Jean d’Angoulême served in 
the army during the period of conquest from the English, and the chronicler says as much, but 
such was the duty of all Capetian cadets and nothing the count did made him especially note-
worthy when compared to his companions. Therefore, within the Dionysian chronicles, each 
Orléans prince is villainised, praised, or ignored in direct relation to their contributions in ad-
vancing regnal authority within France. 
 
6.3 Those Left Behind 
Stuck between the two extremes of Burgundians and Armagnacs were dozens of Cape-
tian cadets and other prominent nobles who were forced to take sides in the conflict. Among 
all of them, Juvénal emphasises the roles of several immediate members of the royal family. 
First among this group is Jean de Berry, a paternal uncle of Charles VI, who began as a 
staunch Burgundian but switched sides once it became clear that Jean of Burgundy had lost 
the moral high ground. Similarly shifting in her allegiance was Isabeau of Bavaria, Charles’s 
wife, who began as an Armagnac but ultimately defected to the Burgundians. However, it is 
the sons of Charles who truly represent the problems with governing France at this time, with 
three of the sons serving as rallying points for various factions in the ongoing civil war. This 
section will analyse how Juvénal portrays these Capetian family members as they attempted 
to restore regnal authority and explore why he believed the king’s youngest surviving son, the 
future Charles VII, succeeded where the other members of the family failed. 
The characterisation of Jean de Berry is ever-changing in the Dionysian vernacular 
continuations. Orgemont says little of the duke throughout his chronicle and Juvénal spares 
few words for the man during the minority of Charles VI.78 Thus, it is only with the onset of 
Charles VI’s illness in 1392 that Jean’s role within the story begins to emerge.79 Throughout 
the first decade of the king’s infirmity, Jean appears regularly as a proponent for peace with 
                                               
77 See generally Barker, 295-296; Demurger, Temps, 184-185. 
78 See Chapter 5.3. 
79 HCRF, 389. 
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England and for the union of the Church, often alongside his brother Philippe.80 However, Ju-
vénal frames all these activities as directed by the king, which deprives Jean of any actual in-
fluence over them. Jean is also nearly always accompanied by other Capetian cadets, making 
his specific contribution to anything less certain. Only on four occasions between 1392 and 
1402 does Jean appear as an independent agent within the chronicle. When John of Gaunt 
died in 1399 and his ambitious son Henry resided at the French court, Jean ‘strongly com-
forted him and appeased him as much as he could’.81 But Juvénal uses this episode to contrast 
him with Louis d’Orléans, whom the chronicler implies influenced Henry to depose Richard 
II.82 The scene does establish Jean’s compassionate side, but Juvénal counters this with an-
other episode in 1400, when the duke discovered his cousin Louis d’Étampes dead at his din-
ner table. In this situation, Jean laughed, thinking Louis was simply asleep, suggesting the 
duke was somewhat absentminded.83 In the other two instances, Juvénal showcases Jean’s re-
ligiosity. In 1393, the duke purchased the head of Saint Hilarius, which he gave to the saint’s 
church in Poitiers, and in 1400, he gifted to Saint-Denis bones of Saint Benedict, founder of 
the abbey’s order.84 All considered, these examples from Juvénal suggest that Jean before 
1402 was a generally average duke whose actions were unremarkable and largely unimportant 
to the Dionysian vernacular narrative. 
Once the rivalry between Philippe of Burgundy and Louis d’Orléans began in earnest, 
Jean de Berry becomes an important medium in Juvénal’s chronicle through whom the audi-
ence can relate. Juvénal demonstrates that the duke operated as a Burgundian for the first five 
years of the feud. He supported Philippe against Louis in 1402 and aided Jean of Burgundy in 
his attempt to reform the government in 1405.85 But the narrative makes it clear that the duke 
shifted his perceptions after Louis’s assassination in 1407. According to Juvénal, the crime 
was committed the evening after a truce was agreed between Louis and Jean of Burgundy that 
Jean de Berry had facilitated.86 Thus, it is framed as a personal betrayal of Jean de Berry by 
                                               
80 HCRF, 392, 396-397, 399-400, 405-407, 410, 413. See CKS, II:74-78, 128-130, 132, 248, 262, 458-
472, 578 (evens). See generally Lehoux, II:313-387. 
81 ‘Dont monseigneur de Berry fort le confortoit, et l’appaisoit le plus qu’il pouvoit’. HCRF, 415. See 
CKS, II:676. See generally Sumption, III:854. 
82 HCRF, 417-418. See CKS, II:700, 702. See generally Lehoux, II:417; Sumption, III:857. 
83 HCRF, 418. Pintoin does not include these details in his account. CKS, II:750. See generally Van 
Kerrebrouck, I:179. 
84 HCRF, 396, 420. See CKS, II:116-118, 780-782 (evens). 
85 HCRF, 420-421, 432-433. See CKS, III:36, 306, 308. See generally Famiglietti, 26, 48; Sumption, 
IV:41. 
86 HCRF, 444-445. Pintoin states, rather, that no reconciliation could be found between the two dukes. 
CKS, III:732. For more on the murder and its immediate repercussions, see Bernard Guenée, Un meurtre, une 
société: L’assassinat du duc d’Orléans, 23 novembre 1407, Bibliothèque des histoires (Paris: Gallimard, 1992). 
The reconciliation was on 20 November, three days before the murder. Schnerb, Armagnacs, 70. 
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Jean of Burgundy. From this point until his death in 1416, Jean de Berry remains an Arma-
gnac within Juvénal’s narrative.87 Indeed, Juvénal directly associates Jean with the founding 
of the Armagnac party in 1410, an alliance that cost the duke virtually everything.88 Increas-
ing pressure by the Burgundians on his territorial holdings forced Jean to capitulate in 1412.89 
Embracing Jean of Burgundy after years of feuding, Jean de Berry said to his nephew: ‘I did 
wrong and you still worse. Let us make an effort to return the kingdom to peace and tranquil-
lity’.90 But Juvénal does not focus on the benefits of the Burgundians; rather, he explains in 
vivid detail through a long narrative—supplemented by his and his father’s experiences at the 
time—how the butchers of Paris rose up and took over the city.91 Eventually, the trapped Ca-
petians in the city called for help from the Armagnacs, who captured the city and violently 
suppressed the revolt.92 After the takeover, Jean was left in charge of the government of 
France, alongside his nephew Louis II d’Anjou.93 Because of his advanced age and his posi-
tion, the duke of Berry avoided the disastrous battle at Agincourt, but he soon found himself 
trapped in Paris and surrounded by Burgundians.94 In 1416, shortly before but unrelated to his 
death, a member of a hit squad was captured in Paris and claimed that ‘they had the intention 
of killing the king of Sicily [Louis II d’Anjou], the duke of Berry, and those who one sus-
pected to be or have been of the party of the duke d’Orléans’.95 Thus, Jean’s affiliation with 
the Armagnacs undermined his authority and this episode demonstrates how the balance be-
tween the two factions in Paris shifted again following Agincourt. In the end, Juvénal laments 
Jean’s death, stating it ‘was a great shame for the kingdom, because he had been in his time a 
determined (valiant) and honourable prince. And…he feasted very willingly with foreigners 
                                               
87 HCRF, 446-447, 449, 451. See CKS, IV:54, 56, 180. 
88 HCRF, 452-455. According to Juvénal, the Burgundians had Jean excommunicated, confiscated his 
goods, and revoked his lieutenancy over Languedoc. HCRF, 467, 470, 472. Juvénal implies Jean had held 
Languedoc since at least 1380, although he notes that the duke encountered resistance from the populace who 
disliked his ‘merveilleuses exactions’. HCRF, 378, 380. Pintoin, however, explains that Jean lost his lieutenancy 
in 1389. CKS, I:646. Pintoin does not list Jean among those excommunicated in 1410. Cf. CKS, IV:550. See also 
CKS, IV:316-320, 324-326, 532-552 (evens). See generally Lehoux, III:166-170, 247. 
89 Famiglietti, 104-108, explains that Jean de Berry was negotiating an Armagnac alliance with the Eng-
lish, which caused the Burgundian government to turn all their military might on his lands in Berry. 
90 ‘Beau neveu, j’ai mal fait, et vous encores pis. Faisons et mettons peine que le royaume demeure en 
paix et tranquillité’. HCRF, 478. Juvénal borrows this quote from Pintoin. CKS, IV:692. See generally Adams, 
Life and Afterlife, 29-31; Lehoux, III:276-281. 
91 HCRF, 485ff. Cf. CKS, V:24ff. See generally Lehoux, III:308-309. 
92 HCRF, 492, 494, 496. See CKS, V:80ff. See generally Lehoux, III:324-326. 
93 HCRF, 497. See CKS, V:284. See generally Lehoux, III:351; Rohr, 82. 
94 HCRF, 520, 522, 524. See CKS, V:556, 584. See generally Lehoux, III:389-392. 
95 ‘…ils avoient intention de tuer le roy de Sicile, le duc de Berry, et ceux qu’on soupçonnoit estre ou 
avoir esté du party du duc d’Orléans’. HCRF, 531-532. Pintoin states rather that the conspirators intended to kill 
the king. CKS, VI:6. Coincidentally, the leader of this subterfuge was Nicholas d’Orgemont, second son of the 
chronicler Pierre d’Orgemont. See generally Lehoux, III:402-403. 
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and gave of himself generously’.96 This statement summarises Jean’s role in the narrative 
well. Through many examples, Juvénal demonstrates how Jean was never arbitrary and al-
ways did what to him was right. Furthermore, the duke was charitable to the Church and me-
diated between the factions. In the end, his selfless devotion to peace and dynastic unity 
helped advance domestic stability, which was a prerequisite toward strengthening regnal au-
thority within France. 
When compared to the kings and agnates of the Capetian dynasty, the queens of 
France are rarely emphasised by the Dionysian writers. Thus, the mere presence of Isabeau of 
Bavaria in large portions of the narrative suggests that she serves an important role in the nar-
rative. However, her characterisation in Juvénal’s chronicle is almost entirely negative. The 
chronicler sets the foundations for this early, linking the queen’s lavishly-described corona-
tion in 1389 to increased taxation and claiming that the accompanying jousts ‘had come from 
dishonest things in the matter of love, from which many evils have come’.97 Criticising Isa-
beau seems to come as second nature to Juvénal and from 1405 he repeatedly associates her 
with Louis d’Orléans, a man whom he regularly villainises.98 The chronicler recounts that the 
queen attended a sermon and the preacher ‘began to accuse the Queen in her presence, dis-
cussing the exactions that she demanded of the people and the excessive state that she and her 
women held themselves’.99 Twice Juvénal attributes uncanny weather phenomena to Isa-
beau—once in 1401 and again in 1405—and in the second event, he adds that ‘several notable 
men and Catholics’ thought ‘it was a divine example, and divine punishment’, for not with-
drawing the extraordinary taxes Louis and Isabeau were levying.100 When the anti-Burgundian 
leadership chose her as council chair in 1408, ‘it was advised that it was the least bad option 
for the Queen to preside over the council and have the government’.101 From 1413, the 
                                               
96 ‘…qui fut grand dommage pour le royaume: car il avoit esté en son temps vaillant prince, et honora-
ble. Et…[f]estoyoit tres-volontiers les estrangers, et leur donnoit du sien largement’. HCRF, 532. Pintoin largely 
agrees with Juvénal’s assessment but devotes considerably more words to the duke’s memory. Cf. CKS, VI:28-
34. See generally Lehoux, III:404-406. 
97 ‘…desdites joustes estoient provenuës des choses deshonestes en matiere d’amourettes, et dont depuis 
beaucoup de maux sont venus’. HCRF, 378-379. Juvénal conflates in this episode two separate events mentioned 
by Pintoin, who did not question the morality of the participants in the tournament. Cf. CKS, I:594-598, 608-616 
(evens). See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 106-110. 
98 HCRF, 432-437. See CKS, III:266. 
99 ‘Lequel commença à blasmer la Reyne en sa presence, en parlant des exactions qu’on faisoit sur la 
peuple, et des excessifs estats qu’elle et ses femmes avoient et tenoient…’. HCRF, 434. See CKS, III:268, 270. 
See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 135-137; Famiglietti, 41-42. 
100 ‘Et y eut aucunes gens notables, et catholiques, qui advertirent la Reyne et le duc d’Orléans, que 
c’estoit exemple divin, et punition divine…’. HCRF, 420, 435. See CKS, III:6, 282, 284. See generally Fami-
glietti, 39. 
101 ‘Et fut advisé que c’estoit le moins mal que la Reyne presidast en council, et eust le gouvernment…’. 
HCRF, 447. Pintoin notes that Isabeau and Louis de Guyenne controlled the government jointly at this time, but 
he makes no comment upon her qualifications. CKS, IV:90. Pintoin notes that Jean Juvénal was reponsible for 
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queen’s servants became the target of the chronicler’s vitriol. Juvénal recounts a conversation 
between a Carmelite and the royal family where the monk called the queen’s brother, courti-
ers, and ladies-in-waiting ‘weeds’ that needed to be removed from the proverbial garden of 
the French court.102 Similarly, in 1417, Juvénal writes that ‘in the hotel of the Queen, several 
dishonest things were done…. And whatever war, storms, and tribulations there were, the la-
dies and damsels led great and excessive estates, and wore marvellous horned hats, tall and 
broad’.103 For her largesse, Isabeau was exiled from Paris and her household income and per-
sonnel were reduced by the Armagnacs.104 This pushed her into the Burgundian camp, and Ju-
vénal depicts her almost continuously alongside Jean of Burgundy from 1417.105 Throughout 
1419, the queen is portrayed as the chief agitator for peace with the English, even agreeing to 
the marriage of her youngest daughter, Catherine, to Henry V, but after Jean’s assassination 
that year, she completely disappears from the narrative.106 Her only mention by Chartier, the 
final Dionysian chronicler, is at the time of her death in 1435. Chartier does not blame Isabeau 
for the part she played in the Anglo-Burgundian takeover of northern France and even sug-
gests that the queen was tricked by the English and her reputation blackened by Henry’s rhet-
oric after the treaty of Troyes.107 Nevertheless, the overwhelming perception within Juvénal’s 
narrative is that Isabeau of Bavaria was a malevolent force in France—a person who repeat-
edly aligned herself with the wrong faction and sacrificed her husband, and therefore regnal 
authority, to ensure her own safety and security. Within this context, Chartier’s final words 
regarding the queen suggest that all her plotting failed to deliver to her the tranquillity she so 
long desired. Her life serves as an important lesson within the Dionysian vernacular tradition 
that true peace can only be ensured when regnal authority is embodied by the rightful king of 
                                               
her nomination, citing Blanca of Castile’s regency during the reign of Louis IX as a precedent. CKS, IV:90. 
 See generally Rachel C. Gibbons, ‘Isabeau of Bavaria, Queen of France: Queenship and Political Au-
thority as “Lieutenante-Général” of the Realm’, in Queenship, Gender, and Reputation in the Medieval and 
Early Modern West, 1060-1600, Queenship and Power, eds. Zita Eva Rohr and Lisa Benz (Houndmills, UK: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2016), 154. 
102 HCRF, 483. In Pintoin’s recounting of this story, the queen is not mentioned. CKS, V:40, 42. See 
generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 244-245. 
103 ‘Et quelque guerre qu’il y eust, tempestes et tribulations, les dames et damoiselles menoient grands 
et excessifs estats, et cornes merveilleuses, hautes et large’. HCRF, 533. Pintoin does not mention this episode. 
104 HCRF, 533, 537. See CKS, VI:72, 76, 140. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 32, 201; Gib-
bons, ‘Isabeau—Queenship’, 154. 
105 HCRF, 537, 541-542, 544, 546, 548, 549-550. See CKS, VI:254. See generally Adams, Life and Af-
terlife, 33-34; Rachel C. Gibbons, ‘Isabeau of Bavaria, Queen of France (1385-1422): The Creation of an Histor-
ical Villainess (The Alexander Prize Essay), Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 6 (1996): 62-63; 
Schnerb, Jean, 660-662. 
106 HCRF, 549. Pintoin states in a rubric that Isabeau is involved, but the queen does not appear in the 
negotiations and her role in general is substantially reduced in the text. CKS, VI:208ff. 
107 Chartier, I:208-212. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 36; Famiglietti, 44; Gibbons, ‘Isa-
beau—Creation’, 68. 
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France. 
It is within this same mindset that Juvénal approaches the narratives of the many sons 
of Charles VI and Isabeau. Between 1223 and 1380, only twice did a French heir predecease 
his father, yet nowhere else in the entire history of France did a king outlive four sons.108 Of 
the first two sons, both named Charles, nothing needs to be said except that they died 
young.109 The third son, Louis de Guyenne, survived until almost the age of nineteen and be-
came a nexus point for both factions during the Armagnac-Burgundian war, epitomised by the 
fact that he was named after his uncle, Louis d’Orléans, and married to a daughter of Jean of 
Burgundy.110 However, in most of Juvénal’s narrative, Louis is little more than a puppet for 
whichever party controlled Paris, a fact referenced explicitly in 1405 when ‘it was decided 
and concluded…that the Dauphin would have the government. But some said that the provi-
sion was not sufficient because, in effect, the duke of Burgundy would have it’.111 When 
Louis was appointed regent in 1408, he was too young to rule, prompting the nomination of 
his mother as head of government.112 Even once he began ruling in 1413, Juvénal largely de-
prives him of any independence. The two actions the chronicler directly attributes to him both 
occurred when the prince was trapped in Paris during the violent revolt that year. At that time, 
the dauphin led an expedition to free his imprisoned uncle and a cousin from the Louvre.113 
Louis also called for help from the Armagnacs, undermining Jean of Burgundy’s authority in 
the city and forcing the duke to flee.114 Yet the success of the Armagnacs pushes Louis to the 
background of Juvénal’s narrative. Throughout 1414 and 1415, he is found with close mem-
bers of his family and Juvénal attributes no part of the ongoing negotiations with England or 
the Burgundians to Louis’s influence.115 The dauphin also avoids participating in the tragedy 
at Agincourt.116 Even Louis’s death comes not through his own actions, but through his 
                                               
108 Louis IX’s eldest son died at the age of fifteen in 1260. See GCF, VII:216. Meanwhile, Philippe IV’s 
elder brother died in 1276, which Guillaume de Nangis attributes to poisoning. See GCF, VIII:61-62; GPT, 502. 
A sixth son of Charles VI, unmentioned by Juvénal, was born in 1407, but he died soon afterwards. CKS, III:230. 
See generally Sivéry, Philippe III, 156; Van Kerrebrouck, II:134, 145, III:118. 
109 HCRF, 370, 387, 419. See CKS, I:454, 456, 732, 734, 770, 772. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 
385; Van Kerrebrouck, III:115. 
110 HCRF, 410, 424, 428, 450. See CKS, II: 76, 78, 522, 524. See generally Famiglietti, 31-32, 37; Jarry, 
189. 
111 ‘…il fut ordonné et conclu le septiesme jour de novembre que monseigneur le Dauphin auroit le gou-
vernement. Mais aucuns disoient que la provisio n’estoit pas suffisante, pource qu’en effect le duc de Bour-
gongne l’auroit…’. HCRF, 437. See generally Sumption, IV:173-175. 
112 HCRF, 445, 447. See generally Sumption, IV:246-247. 
113 HCRF, 488. See generally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 141. 
114 HCRF, 486, 490-496. See CKS, V:70, 80, 82. See generally Sumption, IV:355. 
115 HCRF, 496, 497, 502, 504. Juvénal attributes the negotiations to Charles VI himself, while Pintoin 
gives more credit to the Capetian agnates, including Louis. Cf. CKS, V:296ff. 
116 HCRF, 520. See generally Sumption, IV:448, 461, 468-470. 
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mother’s: in December 1415, Louis visited Isabeau, who was sick, and he caught her illness, 
which led to his death two weeks later.117 Juvénal does not lament Louis’s passing and imme-
diately moves on with the narrative.118 Similarly, the fourth dauphin, Jean de Touraine, only 
appears twice in Juvénal’s text. In the first instance, he is depicted as a Burgundian, and in the 
second, he dies while en route to Paris to assume the government in 1417.119 Implicitly refer-
encing this dauphin’s inability to rule on his own initiative, Juvénal laments not his death, but 
the fact that ‘the count of Hainaut [Jean’s father-in-law] was a wise lord who intended to find 
means to a good peace with the duke of Burgundy’.120 Thus, Jean’s passing imperilled domes-
tic stability since it deprived the kingdom of Guillaume II of Hainaut’s wisdom. Within the 
context of the Dionysian continuations, all that can be said about Louis and Jean is that they 
represented the potential of regnal authority. However, their relative ineffectiveness, empha-
sised by Juvénal’s lack of interest in either prince, suggests that both failed to actually ad-
vance regnal authority and contributed little to supporting the overarching themes of the 
chronicles. 
In contrast, Juvénal describes the future Charles VII immediately after becoming heir 
as a boy of ‘good sense and understanding’, with a chancellor who is ‘a very prudent and wise 
cleric’.121 His portrayal of Charles here and afterwards is significantly more nuanced than Pin-
toin’s, reflecting the fact that Pintoin died in 1421, before the dauphin became king. After the 
Burgundian capture of Paris in 1418, Charles emerges in Juvénal’s text as a warrior prince, a 
man determined to reassert regnal authority in the Capetian heartland.122 To announce this os-
tentatious goal, Charles declared himself regent, and Juvénal uses this tituary for the remain-
der of his chronicle.123 Charles’s victory at the battle of Parthenay in 1419 secured the area 
                                               
117 HCRF, 525-526. Pintoin does not imply any connection between Louis’s death and his mother’s ill-
ness. CKS, V:586. Sumption, IV:471, rather, suggests Louis contracted dysentery while returning from Rouen 
with his troops. 
118 See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 196-197. 
119 HCRF, 525, 532. See CKS, VI:58, 60. See generally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 172-173; Sumption, 
IV:508-512. 
120 ‘…car le comte de Hainaut estoit bien sage seigneur, lequel avoit intention que par son bon moyen 
paix se trouveroit avec le duc de Bourgongne’. HCRF, 532. Pintoin only notes the medical reasons for his death. 
Cf. CKS, VI:58, 60. Jean had married Jacqueline, daughter of Guillaume II d’Hainaut, in 1406. Famiglietti, 55. 
Adams, Life and Afterlife, 31, notes that Jean’s ‘family status as son-in-law of William Count of Hainaut-Hol-
land would seem to incline him to favor the Burgundians, but the Count of Hainaut-Holland initially refused to 
send his son-in-law to Paris, cautiously biding his time to see what would happen’. 
121 HCRF, 532. See generally Vale, Charles VII, 21. 
122 HCRF, 544-545. Adams, Life and Afterlife, 34, writes that ‘the dauphin Charles had assumed the 
leadership of the Armagnacs with the slaying of Bernard [d’Armagnac] in May. As a faction leader, he partici-
pated directly in the feud, and, like the Armagnacs, he refused to negotiate with Jean [of Burgundy]. In this way, 
he was different from his brother Louis of Guyenne, who had distinguished himself from the factions, regarding 
his own role as mediatory, his goal as the restoration of peace’. 
123 HCRF, 547ff. Pintoin only names Charles regent later as a contrast to Philippe III of Burgundy, who 
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south of the Loire for the Armagnacs, setting a territorial status quo that would barely shift 
until 1429.124 Juvénal directly calls Charles an Armagnac during the Anglo-Burgundian nego-
tiations that began in 1419; however, the dauphin is nonetheless portrayed as conciliatory, 
whereas Jean of Burgundy and Isabeau ‘had no intention to hear any treaty with monseigneur 
the Regent’.125 In this context, the murder of Jean by Charles shortly afterwards seems counter 
to the dauphin’s intentions. Throughout the ensuing narrative, Juvénal deflects the blame from 
Charles and shows that the dauphin did not personally kill anybody but that his actions were 
rightly done.126 The chronicler even references a letter Charles wrote to the Parisians that ex-
plains why Jean was killed, although neither the Parisians nor Burgundians were swayed by 
his arguments.127 Over the subsequent three years in the narrative, Charles is shown to have 
expanded his authority over Languedoc and secured his position against the Anglo-Burgundi-
ans, but he lost control of the north.128 For this reason, Juvénal directly attacks the provisions 
of the treaty of Troyes and boldly proclaims that, ‘as it well belonged to him, [Charles] named 
himself and became king of France, so he was without doubt’.129 Juvénal clearly supports 
Charles’s cause, and the chronicler’s optimistic conclusion reflects his foreknowledge that 
Charles would, indeed, overcome the obstacles before him to become the unifying king 
France so desperately needed. Of the five dauphins in Juvénal’s text, only Charles effectively 
advanced regnal authority. 
 By ending with Charles VII, Juvénal provided his long, tragic narrative of dynastic civil 
war and foreign invasion with a glimmer of hope, albeit one that would be realised outside his 
authorial control. However, the other members of the immediate royal family did not contrib-
                                               
also claimed the title. CKS, VI:382, 384. He inconsistently acknowledges Henry V’s regency from 1420 on-
wards. CKS, VI:442, 446, 458, 462, 464, 484. See generally Adams, Life and Afterlife, 204; Barker, 28. 
124 HCRF, 547-548. Lacking hindsight, Pintoin does not mention this battle. See generally Sumption, 
IV:616. 
125 ‘…ne faisoient aucun semblant d’entendre à aucun traité avec monseigneur le Regent…’. HCRF, 
549. Pintoin also names Charles’s followers Armagnacs, but blames the dauphin’s bad councillors for the trou-
bled negotiations and mournfully states that ‘circumspecti viri sumpserunt evidens argumentum quod promissa 
que tam diu adimplere ex cordiali affectu minime processerant, nec sperabant quod pax inde sollida posset se-
qui’. CKS, VI:316, 328-348 (evens). See generally Famiglietti, 189-190. 
126 HCRF, 554-555. Pintoin does nothing to downplay the role the dauphin played in the murder of 
Jean. CKS, VI:372, 374. See generally Famiglietti, 191; Vale, Charles VII, 28-31. 
127 HCRF, 554-555. Pintoin does not include or reference the letter Charles sent to the Parisians. See 
generally Famiglietti, 192; Vale, Charles VII, 31. 
128 HCRF, 556ff. Juvénal calls the lands of the Anglo-Burgundian kingdom ‘tout noir et obscur’, while 
the lands south of the River Loire are ‘pur et net en l’obeïssance’ of the dauphin. HCRF, 557. See CKS, VI:372, 
374, 458ff. See generally Schnerb, Armagnacs, 225-226; Sumption, IV:710, 721-728; Vale, Charles VII, 33-35. 
129 ‘…comme il lui appartenoit bien, se nomma et porta roy de France: aussi l’estoit-il sans nul doute’. 
HCRF, 569. Chartier, who wrote the conclusion to Pintoin’s text, alludes to the long war Charles would fight 
throughout his life against the Burgundians and English, but the chronicler does not name Charles king in 1422, 
perhaps saving that title for his coronation in 1429. CKS, VI:496. See generally Barker, 61. 
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ute anything substantial to create this positive message. The earlier dauphins collectively rep-
resent lost opportunities in the narrative, with their actions rarely strengthening the French 
kingship or stabilising the realm. Likewise, Jean de Berry, long a mediating voice in the king-
dom, was unable to repair the divisions between the two sides in the conflict, and his death es-
sentially ended any chance of the Armagnacs reconciling with the Burgundians after 
Agincourt. Isabeau of Bavaria, meanwhile, represented an inverse reflection of Jean in the 
chronicles. Her dalliance with Louis d’Orléans and defection to the Burgundians established 
her as an untrustworthy Capetian, someone who embodied all the problems that perpetuated 
the Armagnac-Burgundian feud. Thus, among these many royals, only Charles would ulti-
mately unite the kingdom, albeit decades afterwards. A reader of Juvénal’s text is only left 
with the knowledge that France was divided at the time of Charles VI’s death, and that regnal 
authority was dispersed among the English, Burgundians, and the disinherited Dauphin 
Charles.130 Those most capable of healing the wounds of division became victims of that divi-
sion, shifting allegiances when necessary but rarely doing anything that benefited the king-
dom. The final message in the chronicle, therefore, is that the person most capable of 
embodying regnal authority other than the king himself is the future king, a conclusion that 
could only be made in hindsight. The duty of all other relatives, be they dauphin, uncle, or 
queen, is to support the king so that regnal authority can be restored. 
 
                     
 
At its core, Juvénal’s narrative of the reign of Charles VI is a lesson in greed and hubris. 
Greed for political power consumed Philippe II of Burgundy, causing him to seize the govern-
ment following the onset of the king’s illness in 1392. Hubris overwhelmed his son, Jean, who 
took every opportunity to seize authority in the kingdom, depriving those who undeniably had 
a better claim. Greed also attracted Louis d’Orléans, who fought long and hard for land and 
power, but failed and, for his ambitions, was assassinated in 1407. Hubris subsequently en-
couraged his followers, the Armagnacs, to inflate the family feud into a full-fledged civil war. 
Juvénal makes it clear that everyone in the family, including Jean de Berry, Isabeau, and the 
later three dauphins, played a part in the ongoing political nightmare, and none was com-
pletely innocent in perpetuating the chaos. The only true victim was the weary king Charles, 
whose inherent regnal authority was seen by all as the golden goose, who, if possessed, would 
                                               
130 HCRF, 557. See generally Barker, xviii, 29. 
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give them all that they desired and allow them to impose their visions of peace on the realm. 
Yet the chronicler proves that the king’s peace, established by the treaty of Troyes, did not 
pacify the realm, but rather elevated the domestic conflict into a resumption of the Anglo-
French war. Only the future Charles VII contributed to the end of this conflict, and this in it-
self is an important didactic message for the reader. In many ways, it is difficult to view 
Juvénal’s chronicle as a miroir des princes. The moral messages are less clear, the characteri-
sations of individuals are more nebulous, and the general mood less hopeful than in earlier 
continuations. But one of the primary themes that comes out of this chronicle is the potential 
pitfalls inherent in the unrestricted promotion of dynasticism. Orgémont hinted at this 
throughout his chronicle, but Juvénal’s narrative provides the convincing argument that tradi-
tional dynasticism in France died as a result of the Armagnac-Burgundian war. It becomes 
clear by the end of Juvénal’s text that traditional forms of dynasticism cannot resolve dynastic 
crises—only the king or a future king can be trusted to end these types of conflicts. This 
largely agrees with Orgemont’s portrayal of the future Charles V, who is shown embodying 
his father’s regnal powers while dauphin. But unlike Orgemont, Juvénal attacks the problem 
of dynasticism directly and demonstrates through his narrative and his portrayals of the royal 
family what happens when cadets are left in charge of France. The result of their meddling is 
a splintered kingdom that is forced to await a new generation of cadets who are willing to sac-




CHAPTER SEVEN  
Reimagining the Capetian Dynasty 
 
By the middle of the fifteenth century, Capetian ancestry was ubiquitous among the French 
nobility. The plethora of descendants left by Louis VIII, Louis IX, and Jean II contributed the 
most to this dispersion, although most Capetian kings were responsible for at least some sec-
ondary progeny. Increasingly, the Dionysian vernacular continuators, especially Jean Juvénal 
des Ursins and Jean Chartier, expanded their lists of royal kin to include major French lords 
and their families, who had never before been considered a part of the Capetian dynasty and 
lacked the prerequisite agnatic or legitimate descent. Foremost among these individuals were 
the Montforts, true-born agnates of the dynasty whom the Dionysian continuators felt com-
pelled to marginalise until the 1430s, when members of the family finally began to support the 
regnal authority of the Valois kings. Similarly, numerous bastards of royal ancestry, long ig-
nored by previous chroniclers, suddenly appear within Capetian ranks as key agents of Valois 
regnal empowerment. The most marked change, however, related to the French nobility after 
the battle of Agincourt in 1415. Juvénal and Chartier highlight numerous Capetian cognatic 
families who stepped into the void left by those killed and captured at the battle, including 
members of the houses of Armagnac, Albret, Harcourt, Foix, and Ligny. Although the status 
of Capetians of agnatic descent was rarely discounted by the continuators, those of cognatic or 
illegitimate origins had rarely before been considered royalty and their sudden inclusion sug-
gests a change in attitude prompted by the Armagnac-Burgundian and the Anglo-French wars. 
This chapter will examine the didactic examples these individuals contribute to the Dionysian 
vernacular narratives and the ways in which their unprecedented inclusion reinforced an over-
arching message of regnal empowerment. 
 
7.1 Redeeming the Capetians of Brittany 
 Within the vernacular tradition, members of the house of Dreux always struggled for 
recognition as Capetian cadets. Primat and Guillaume de Nangis barely hinted at a relation-
ship between the Breton rulers and the other Capetians in their continuations, and Richard 
Lescot followed in that vein, maligning the Montfort dukes as they attempted to seize the du-
cal throne from the Penthièvre family beginning in 1341.1 The primary stumbling blocks 
toward reconciliation were the close familial relationship of the Penthièvres to the Valois and 
                                               
1 GCF, IX:217-220. See Lescot, 54-56. For a discussion of the history of the Capetian house of Dreux 
before 1399, see Chapter 4.1. 
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the French government’s acceptance of Charles de Blois as duke.2 Even after the death of 
Charles and the treaty of Guérande in the mid-1360s, Montfort-Penthièvre tensions remained 
an obstacle to a Valois-Montfort reconciliation.3 Thus, it was only through the evolving situa-
tion caused by the Armagnac-Burgundian crisis and the resulting Anglo-French war that the 
Montforts were able to restructure their relationship with the French monarchy and be ac-
cepted back into the Capetian fold. According to Chartier, the primary agent of this change 
was Arthur de Richemont, who fought for Charles VII continuously from 1424. But most of 
the family contributed to the French victory in the war against the English. Chartier uses the 
Montforts as examples for how wayward cadets can restore their status within the Capetian 
dynasty. This section will analyse the ways in which these examples are expressed and how 
they strengthen the chroniclers’ message of regnal supremacy.  
 The rehabilitation of the Montforts in the Dionysian vernacular narrative begins with 
Jean V, who, two years prior to his accession in 1399, married Jeanne, daughter of Charles 
VI, in the first of many marriages that would embed the Montforts in the royal family.4 Even-
tually, his brothers, Arthur and Richard, and his son François would marry other Capetian 
princesses, further infusing their blood with that of the Valois.5 But a blood relationship did 
not ensure Montfort loyalty.6 Soon after their father died, Jean and his brothers were taken un-
der the guardianship of Philippe II of Burgundy and raised with Charles VI’s children at court, 
a move that undoubtedly left an impression on their upbringing.7 Juvénal shows that Jean hes-
itantly joined the Armagnacs in 1407, although he does not list the duke among the signatories 
of the declaration of alliance made in 1410.8 At Agincourt, Jean arrived late or not at all, and 
during the fighting, Arthur was taken captive by the English.9 This proves to be a turning 
point for Jean in the narrative. With the death of another brother, Gilles de Chantocé, in 1412 
and the capture of Arthur, Jean is presented as a failure to his family and the Capetian  
                                               
2 GCF, IX:218-220. See Lescot, 55. See generally Galliou and Jones, 220. 
3 CRJC, II:5-8. See Figure 7.1. See generally Galliou and Jones, 227, 234. 
4 HCRF, 410, 412. See CKS, II:443. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 393; Henri Poisson and Jean-
Pierre le Mat, Histoire de Bretagne (Nantes: Coop Breizh, 2000), 180. 
5 Arthur married Marguerite of Burgundy in 1423 as a part of the treaty of Amiens. Burne, Agincourt, 
183-184. Richard married Marguerite d’Orléans in 1423. Jean-Pierre Leguay and Hervé Martin, Fastes et mal-
heurs de la Bretagne ducale 1213-1532 (Rennes: Ouest France, 1982), 390. Lastly, François married Yolande 
d’Anjou in 1431. Graeme Small, Late Medieval France, European History in Perspective (Houndmills, UK: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2009), 163. 
6 Galliou and Jones, 238 argue that the marital alliances made by Jean V allowed the Montfort family to 
remain aloof from much of the fighting. 
7 HCRF, 422-423. See generally Sumption, IV:101. 
8 HCRF, 445, 452-454. Jean was an original member of the League of Gien in 1410, but he rarely 
fought for either side in the conflict. Famiglietti, 88, 91, 169. 
9 HCRF, 519. See CKS, V:556, 574. See generally Galliou and Jones, 237; Sumption, IV:458. 
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dynasty.10 As such, his actions in the chronicle appear very conservative and protectionist. For 
example, he signed a separate peace with the English in 1417 to protect Brittany from further 
attack and mediated in the treaty of Troyes in 1420 to ensure a defensible position between 
England and France.11 Ultimately, Jean’s wild vacillations between the Armagnacs and Bur-
gundians after the murder of Louis d’Orléans in 1407 prompted Juvénal to generally write 
him out of his narrative as a bad agent of regnal authority.12 
 A constant counterpoint to Jean that Juvénal calls upon is the Penthièvre family, de-
scendants of Charles de Blois and his wife, Jeanne, who were dispossessed of Brittany in 
1365. Over the ensuing generations, the family married into the Capetian houses of Anjou and 
Burgundy, pulling them back into the orbit of the French royal court.13 Notably, Juvénal links 
the Penthièvres both to Olivier de Clisson, a man despised by the Montforts and partially 
blamed for the king’s illness, and Jean of Burgundy, whom the chronicler personally dis-
liked.14 These connections to the Burgundians and Clisson serve to discredit the family since 
their only other mention in the narrative is in 1420. In that year, Juvénal recounts, Olivier de 
Penthièvre and his brother Charles d’Avaugour kidnapped the duke of Brittany because ‘he 
held to the party of the king of England [and] had sworn homage and oaths to him’.15 The 
chronicler then describes how the Bretons rallied to the duke and ‘tore down the places 
that…belonged to the said count of Penthièvre: they even took and imprisoned the young 
brother [Guillaume] of the said count, whom they put in a very secure prison, even though he 
knew nothing and was pure and innocent’.16 When the Bretons began sacking Penthièvre 
holdings outside of Brittany, Jean de l’Aigle, another brother, agreed to release the duke, who 
promptly repudiated everything he promised while imprisoned.17 Juvénal takes a somewhat 
neutral stance on this entire episode, but his language suggests he leans toward the 
                                               
10 HCRF, 478. See CKS, IV:690, V:574. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:388. 
11 HCRF, 534, 538, 544, 548-549. Pintoin does not mention the Anglo-Breton alliance. Cf. CKS, 
VI:100-108, 160-168 (evens). See CKS, VI:290. See generally Famiglietti, 169; Sumption, IV:676, 687-688. 
12 Jean was an Armagnac from 1407-1411, highly variable 1411-1419, Anglo-Burgundian 1419-1424, 
Armagnac 1424-1427, and functionally neutral from 1427 to his death in 1442. Burne, Agincourt, 221; Leguay 
and Martin, 197-198; Small, 152-153. 
13 See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:237, 367. 
14 HCRF, 442. See CKS, III:396. See generally Poisson and le Mat, 174, 178; Sumption, III:800-801, 
IV:99, 688, 706. 
15 ‘…ils le reputoient tenant le party du roy d’Angleterre: car il luy avoit fait hommage et serment’. 
HCRF, 556. This accusation is not unfounded; Poisson and le Mat, 179, note that ‘[a]près l’assassinat de Jean 
sans Peur, duc de Bourgogne, Jean V abandonna la cause du dauphin Charles qu’il jugeait perdue (1419)’. See 
CKS, VI:400, 402. 
16 ‘Les Bretons…abatirent les places qu’on disoit appartenir audit comte de Pointiève: mesme ils prirent 
et emprisonnerent le jeune frere dudit Comte, lequel ils mirent en bien dure prison, combien qu’il n’en sçavoit 
rien, et en estoit pur et innocent…’. HCRF, 556. Pintoin does not mention this pillaging. See generally Jones, 
Creation, 343; Sumption, IV:690. 
17 HCRF, 556. See CKS, VI:404, 406. See generally Sumption, IV:706-707. 
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Penthièvres, whom he implies the dauphin supported. Additionally, he neglects to mention the 
real repercussions of this incident, that the Penthièvres lost all their Breton possessions and 
titles and that Guillaume remained a prisoner for nearly thirty years.18 To emphasise their dra-
matic fall from power, the Penthièvres are hardly mentioned in Chartier’s continuation, with 
only Jean de l’Aigle named as a participant in the conquest of Guyenne in 1450-1453.19 While 
the Montforts proved to be poor agents of regnal authority, so too did the Penthièvres, so nei-
ther warranted significant space within Juvénal’s text. As with their predecessors, the Bretons 
were too independent-minded and recalcitrant to justify using them as positive didactic exam-
ples.   
  The Montforts benefited greatly from the political downfall of the Penthièvres, but 
such a victory is not immediately obvious in Chartier’s narrative.20 The chronicler is com-
pletely silent regarding Jean V’s involvement in the Anglo-French war, avoiding any mention 
of the flexible nature of the Breton allegiance to the Capetian cause or any pro-French mili-
tary actions Jean took during his reign.21 When the duke does enter the narrative in 1431, it is 
in relation to an unpaid dowry owed to his nephew Jean II d’Alençon, and a resolution is 
quickly found with the help of Arthur de Richemont, who refused to bear arms against his rel-
ative.22 Chartier includes Jean’s ambassadors at the Arras conference in 1435, but the duke is 
not mentioned in the treaty text nor listed among the princes standing as surety for the Franco-
Burgundian agreement.23 His continued loyalty to the English is cited in 1438, although 
Chartier adds ‘notwithstanding the Bretons serving the king of France against the said English 
of good will’.24 The duke is named a final time in the judicial matter of Gilles de Rais’s trial 
in 1440, but Chartier is clearly more interested in the details of the proceedings than the 
                                               
18 Galliou and Jones, 238; Jones, Creation, 343-344; Leguay and Martin, 173-174; Poisson and le Mat 
180, 188. 
19 Chartier, II:241, 267-268, 313, 334, III:2, 4, 14. In contrast, Gaussin, 108, states that Jean was in-
volved in ‘plusieurs campagnes’, and sat on the royal council in 1427, suggesting he retained some influence 
with the king after 1420. Furthermore, Poisson and le Matt, 188, add that François restored to the Penthièvres 
their Breton possessions, but not their right to the ducal throne, on 27 June 1448, implying a reconciliation be-
tween the two families. See generally Desmond Seward, The Hundred Years War: The English in France, 1337-
1453 (New York: Atheneum, 1978), 256. 
20 For more on the Montforts after 1420, see Jones, Creation, 343-344. 
21 The only direct reference to Jean between 1422 and 1431 is when the duke and Philippe of Burgundy 
negotiated the release of Arthur de Richemont in 1424. Chartier, I:47. See generally Régine Pernoud and Marie-
Véronique Clin, Joan of Arc: Her Story, trans. and rev. Jeremy duQuesnay Adams, ed. Bonnie Wheeler (New 
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1999), 199. 
22 Chartier, I:157-160. See generally Rohr, 176. For a full account of the feud, see Arthur Le Moyen de 
La Borderie and Barthélemy Pocquet, Histoire de Bretagne, vol. 4 (Rennes: Librairie Générale de J. Plihon et L. 
Hommay, 1906), 239-246. 
23 Chartier, I:187, 204. See generally Schnerb, Armagacs, 282; Van Kerrebrouck, II:397. 
24 ‘…néantmoins les Bretons servoient le roy de France contre lesdits Angloiz de bonne voulenté’. 
Chartier, I:242. See generally Galliou and Jones, 238. 
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duke.25 Jean’s death in 1442 and the succession to the ducal throne of François I are nowhere 
mentioned, and François himself does not enter the narrative until the English sack Fougères 
in 1449.26 In the end, Chartier only shows any real interest in the judicial affairs of the Mont-
forts and, in these instances, he focusses specifically on the non-ducal elements. The author 
neither acknowledges Jean as a Capetian prince nor calls him a traitor, suggesting that Chart-
ier no longer considers the duke worthy of use as a didactic example. He has become simply a 
waypoint, helping guide other characters along their narrative journeys. 
 Chartier’s attitude toward the Montforts as a whole only begins to change in 1449, when 
François I became directly involved in the final phase of the Anglo-French war on the side of 
Charles VII. Indeed, it was his call for help to the French king that prompted the resumption 
of hostilities.27 Twice in this passage Chartier calls François the king’s ‘good nephew of Brit-
tany’, a sign of familiarity never before used by a Dionysian chronicler to refer to a Montfort 
duke.28 In the latter passage, ‘the said duke promised to the king of France to serve him 
against the English in his person and power by sea and by land; never to treat for peace with 
those English nor abstain from war except by the consent, dismissal and good pleasure of the 
king’.29 From this point forward, the Montforts suddenly become major players in the chroni-
cle, with Chartier repeatedly mentioning the duke’s relationship to the king.30 Indeed, 
François even briefly vies with his more famous uncle, Arthur de Richemont, for narrative 
space in Chartier’s retrospective on the invasion of Lower Normandy in September 1449.31 
The duke appears among the Capetian martial ranks at Louviers and Château Gaillard, a sign 
of his acceptance into the Capetian familial network.32 Chartier notes at François’s death in 
1450 that ‘he loved the king of France naturally, as it is quite apparent; because he brought 
war to all those who had been and who he knew to be against his royal majesty’, including his 
own brother Gilles.33 Thus, within the Dionysian vernacular tradition, François is the first 
                                               
25 Chartier, II:5-6. For a full discussion of Gilles de Rais, see George Bataille, Le procès de Gilles de 
Rais (Paris: Pauvert, 1979); and Leonard Wolf, Bluebeard: The Life and Crimes of Gilles de Rais (New York: 
Clarkson N. Potter, 1980). 
26 Chartier, II:61. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:397; Wolffe, 205-207. 
27 Chartier, II:61. Although the Bretons always reserved this option, the Montfort dukes rarely appealed 
to the French king for help prior to 1449, instead relying upon their own vassals. Peter S. Lewis, Essays in Later 
Medieval French History (London: Hambledon Press, 1985), 84. See generally Anthony James Pollard, John 
Talbot and the War in France 1427-1453 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1983), 64.  
28 Chartier, II:64. 
29 ‘Que ledit duc promectoit au roy de le servir à l’encontre des Anglois de sa personne et puissance par 
mer et par terre; ne jamais à iceulx Anglois ne seroit tractié paix ne abstinence de guere que ce ne fust du consen-
tement, congié et bon plaisir du roy’. Chartier, II:73. 
30 Chartier, II:72, 75, 106, 228. 
31 Chartier, II:122-126. François and Arthur fought together throughout the campaign. Small, 163. 
32 Chartier, II:111, 134. See generally Barker, 389. 
33 ‘Ce dit prince, en son vivant, aîmoit le roy de France naturellement, comme il y est assez apparu; car 
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Montfort duke worthy of being portrayed as a Capetian prince, which Chartier makes clear by 
explicitly stating how François successfully advanced regnal authority. 
 Chartier realised that the case of François’s brother Gilles de Chantocé represented an 
important shift in Montfort allegiance, which explains why his story is included after the 
duke’s eulogy. The anglophile was the English constable of France, and Chartier notes that 
Gilles acted ‘against reason, justice, and all order of right’ in his adherence to Henry VI, and 
that, despite forceful encouragement by the duke, ‘he wanted never to retire and deviate from 
his ill-placed courage and damnable purpose’.34 François eventually imprisoned his brother in 
1446, much to the consternation of Henry, and the man was quietly strangled to death in 1450, 
thereby confirming for Chartier the duke’s complete loyalty to the king.35 The chronicler also 
exonerates François for the crime by adding that the murderers were later executed for per-
jury.36 Following François’s death, the Montforts largely disappear from the narrative again, 
but that is historically accurate as they were not heavily involved in the subsequent invasion 
of Guyenne.37 However, Chartier does include Pierre II’s pledge of homage for Brittany in 
1450, as well as that of Arthur de Richemont (as Arthur III) in 1457 and François II in 1458.38 
François enters the narrative earlier as the count of Étampes in 1453, leading the Breton bat-
talion alongside other Capetian lords at the battle of Châtillon.39 His loyalty to the royalist 
cause is never doubted by the chronicler. Thus, within Chartier’s chronicle, the Montforts are 
recognised as full Capetian princes from 1449, fighting as commanders in the royal army 
against the English and acting in every way as proper champions of regnal authority. 
 Although the sack of Fougères acted as the catalyst for the dukes to enter the war on the 
side of the French, the Montfort rehabilitation would not have been possible without the sup-
port of Arthur, second son of Jean IV of Brittany, titular earl of Richmond in England and 
constable of France, who from 1425 became the most highly-regarded Montfort cadet in 
                                               
il a proté guerre à touls ceulx qui avoient esté et qu’il savoit estre contre sa majesté royale…’. Chartier, II:229. 
See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:405. 
34 ‘…il soustenoit contre raison, justice, et tout ordre de droit…. [Il] ne se voult jamais retraire et depar-
tir de son mauvais courage et dampnable propos’. Chartier, II:229. 
35 Chartier, II:230. Barker, 371-372, adds that the arrest of Gilles was provoked by Charles VII on be-
half of Prégent de Coëtivy, admiral of France, a highly influential Breton in the French court. The continued im-
prisonment of Gilles by François was the justification for the English seizure of Fougères—the English 
government hoped to trade Fougères for Gilles, a gamble that backfired on the English spectacularly. Poisson 
and le Mat, 189. Gilles was never tried in court prior to his murder due to procedural difficulties and diplomatic 
pressures. Jones, Creation, 347. See generally Galliou and Jones, 239. 
36 Chartier, II:230-231. 
37 Poisson and le Mat, 191. 
38 Chartier, II:248-249, III:73-74, 112. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:410, 414, 417. 
39 Chartier, III: 2, 6. See generally Poisson and le Mat, 191. 
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French history.40 Juvénal documents that Arthur was briefly raised by the Burgundians after 
his mother married Henry IV of England.41 However, as an adult he chose the Armagnac 
party, being named in a letter from Charles VI to Jean of Burgundy alongside many other Ca-
petian lords in 1411.42 He remained in the company of these lords between 1413 and 1415, 
culminating with his capture at the battle of Agincourt, where he had served as a com-
mander.43 Simply by including Arthur within the ranks of the Capetian princes, Juvénal 
clearly considers him one of them, giving the earl precedent over at least one other Capetian 
prince, Louis de Vendôme.44 When Arthur is released from captivity in 1424, Chartier is 
quick to note that, although Arthur had pledged to serve Henry V as a condition of his release,  
the said king of England being dead…it seemed to the said earl of Richmond that 
he was no longer bound by faith or promises to the successor of the said king of 
England, and that also they had been made under duress and in order to get himself 
out of prison, [he] always having the wish to serve the king of France, and it 
seemed to him that [since] the said king of England was dead, that all promises 
were void.45  
Thus, Chartier justifies why Arthur is not a perjurer and confirms that he never truly wavered 
in his loyalty to Charles.46 Arthur is then made constable of France and purges the govern-
ment, executing two principal councillors of the king before installing Georges de La  
Trémoïlle in 1427.47 No space in the story is provided for Arthur’s long feud with La Tré-
moïlle or the constable’s exclusion from government between 1427 and 1433.48 But Arthur is 
                                               
40 Gaussin, 110; Pernoud and Clin, 198. 
41 HCRF, 422-423. CKS, III:40. See generally Poisson and le Mat, 177. 
42 HCRF, 461. See CKS, IV:428. See generally Pernoud and Clin, 199. 
43 HCRF, 494, 496, 519-520. See CKS, V:286, 302, 322, 370-374, 432, 546, 574 (evens). See generally 
Jean Kerhervé, ‘Arthur de Richemont, connétable et duc. Entre guerre et politique, dans la France du XVe siè-
cle’, in 2000 ans d’histoire de Vannes, 95-120 (Vannes: Archives municipales—Animation du patrimoine, 
1993), 100-101. 
44 Arthur retains a place immediately before Louis throughout Chartier’s chronicle. Chartier, I:85-86, 
186, 204, 215. 
45 ‘Et le dit roy d’Angleterre mort…il sembla au dit conte de Richemont que plus n’avoit de foy ne de 
promesse au successeur du dit roy d’Angleterre, et que aussy ce qui en avoit esté fait par contrainte et pour soy 
mettre hors de prison en ayant tousjours voulenté de servir le roy de France, et luy sembloit que le dit roy d’An-
gleterre mort, que de toutes promesses estoit quicte’. Chartier, I:47. 
46 Arthur was probably an English loyalist from 1420 to 1424. Pernoud and Clin, 198-199, imply that 
Arthur renounced his allegiance because John of Bedford refused to give the earl a prestigious position in the 
English army. See generally Kerhervé, 99-100. 
47 Chartier, I:48, 54. Arthur was recruited by Yolande of Aragon, Charles VII’s mother-in-law, as a po-
tential step toward a Franco-Burgundian reconciliation. Rohr, 120-121. He was only the third Capetian constable 
in the history of France, the first two being Jacques I de La Marche (see Chapter 5.3) and Philippe d’Eu (see 
Chapter 2.3), although numerous cognates had served as constables, including Charles de la Cerda, Olivier de 
Clisson, Charles d’Albret, Waléran III de Saint-Pol, and Bernard VII d’Armagnac. Anselme, Histoire de grands 
officiers, 32, 38, 47. See generally Gaussin, 126; Kerhervé, 101. 
48 Arthur planned to remove La Trémoïlle from power soon after installing him, but his plans were 
thwarted and he was banished from court. La Trémoïllle, fearing for his life, quit the government permanently in 
1433. Robert Jean Knecht, The Valois: Kings of France 1328–1589 (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2007), 65-
66, 71. 
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mentioned repeatedly alongside other Capetians and Jeanne d’Arc in 1429, with Chartier  
noting, at the siege of Beaugency, that Arthur was ‘well recommended, because here and in 
several other places he did great services for the king’.49 At the treaty of Arras in 1435, Arthur 
stood among the ‘cousins and other relatives of his blood’ as surety for the king.50 Soon after 
in the narrative, Arthur seized two pillagers and had them executed, for which Chartier ob-
serves, ‘[he] showed himself a good judge, and also he had the favour and renown of all the 
country’.51 Proof of this is found during the Praguerie revolt in 1440, when Arthur remained 
loyal to the king, placing him resolutely against the other Capetians who rallied to the dau-
phin.52 Arthur’s importance to the narrative is so great that when his wife died in 1441, Chart-
ier mentions this event, something he and his predecessors did only rarely for any Capetian 
agnate and never for a prince of such low rank.53 His ascension to the Breton ducal throne in 
1457 is referenced twice, once at his coronation and once at his death, again showing Chart-
ier’s appreciation for the man.54 However, the bulk of Chartier’s text focusses on the war it-
self, in which Arthur was the head military commander. He fought prominently at the siege of 
Paris in 1436 and in the invasion of Normandy in 1449-50, always advancing the royal 
cause.55 Within Chartier’s chronicle, Arthur de Richemont is the quintessential Capetian ca-
det, a man recognised for his successful campaign to reclaim the land the English had seized 
and advance the regnal authority of Charles VII throughout France. 
 The Montfort family as a whole never had been nor would be a primary agent of regnal 
authority, but by the death of Charles VII in 1461, Chartier recognised a distinct shift in Bre-
ton ducal policy toward the French king. This change began with Jean V, but he was not its 
chief motivator and both Juvénal and Chartier saw him as an unreliable ally and potential en-
emy, a man who could not be trusted. With each successive duke, through, the Montfort fam-
ily became closer to their Valois cousins, largely due to the influence and efforts of Arthur de 
Richemont, the family’s most visible representative. It is clear within the Dionysian vernacu-
lar tradition that, by the middle of the fifteenth century, the Montforts had redeemed them-
selves by sacrificing their dynastic pretensions and directing their focus to restoring the king’s 
                                               
49 ‘…en est ledit connestable bien à reconmander, car icy et en plussieurs autres leiux a fait de grans 
services au roy’. Chartier, I:84. See generally Burne, Agincourt, 255-256, 259. 
50 ‘…par ses cousins et autres parens de son sang…’. Chartier, I:187, 203-204. 
51 ‘Et se monstra en ce ledit connestable bon justicier, et aussi il en avoit la grâce et renommée par tous 
pays’. Chartier, I:216-217. 
52 Chartier, I:258. Indeed, the king’s fondness for Arthur was a primary reason for the revolt. Knecht, 
79. See generally Pernoud and Clin, 199. For further discussion of the Praguerie, see Chapter 8.2. 
53 Chartier, II:34-35. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:365. 
54 Chartier, III:73-74, 112. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, II:414. 
55 Chartier, I:226, II:122-238. See generally Burne, Agincourt, 320; Ralph A. Griffiths, The Reign of 
King Henry VI, 2nd ed. (Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing, 1998), 516; Small, 163. 
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authority in Normandy and Anjou. In this way, the Montforts provide an example within the 
narrative for how to return to the Capetian fold, an important message for the many nobles 
who had pledged fealty to the English or Burgundians and, by the 1450s, desired to re-estab-
lish their traditional relationship with the Valois monarchy. 
 
7.2 Reframing Illegitimate Kin 
 The Montforts certainly did not act alone in reconquering the English kingdom of 
France. One repercussion of the defeat at Agincourt was the sudden desperate need for noble-
men capable of commanding Armagnac forces. Unable to rely on the usual stock of Capetian 
cadets, the Armagnacs fell back on their unorthodox progeny: sons long maligned or ignored 
because of their illegitimate parentage. The earlier Dionysian continuators completely ignore 
such progeny and most French kings throughout the later Middle Ages refused to 
acknowledge their disreputable offspring. But increasingly, bastards of Capetian extraction 
were not only recognised by the chroniclers but included alongside other Armagnac princes. 
The importance of one in particular, Jean d’Orléans, natural son of Louis d’Orléans, was so 
remarkable that he ranks as one of the most frequently-mentioned cadets in all the continua-
tions. The sudden introduction of such kin was a development Juvénal and Chartier could not 
ignore. This section will survey the illegitimate offspring of the Capetian dynasty to determine 
how they operated as vessels of regnal authority within the vernacular narratives. 
 Illegitimacy had always been present in the royal family; however, the early vernacular 
continuators chose to overlook the less-than-ideal progeny of their subjects. Guillaume, Les-
cot, and Orgemont all shunned any bastard of agnatic Capetian ancestry, a tactic that worked 
prior to the Armagnac-Burgundian war largely because most royal bastards were not active in 
political circles.56 But Juvénal and Chartier both wrote after Jean d’Orléans and other illegiti-
mate kin had proven their value to the dynasty. Indeed, Jean is the first acknowledged Cape-
tian bastard found in the continuations.57 He appears in Juvénal’s text in 1408 after a eulogy 
for his father’s wife, Valentina Visconti, where the author notes that ‘she willingly recog-
nised’ him, implying her acceptance of him as her trueborn son.58 Overall, though, Juvénal fo-
cusses primarily on Bourbon and Alençon bastards. He notes that Hector, natural son of Louis 
                                               
56 An exception to this was Louis d’Orléans, bishop of Poitiers and Beauvais, illegitimate son of 
Philippe d’Orléans, who was a peer of France from 1394-1395. Van Kerrebrouck, II:85. 
57 Philippe Hurepel, son of Philippe II and his controversial second wife, Agnès de Méranie, appears in 
1226, but by that date he had been legitimated by the pope. GCF, VII:37. See GSL, 312. See generally Van Ker-
rebrouck, II:110. 
58 HCRF, 449. Lacking hindsight, Pintoin does not mention any children of Louis at Valentina’s death. 
Cf. CKS, IV:178, 180. See generally Jean Thibault, ‘Familles royales, familles princières: l’exemple atypique de 
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II de Bourbon, fought at Soissons in 1414 alongside other Armagnacs, giving his life to the 
cause when he was killed scouting a way into the city.59 Similarly, Guy de Bourbon, illegiti-
mate son of Jean I, enters the narrative immediately prior to Agincourt alongside Charles 
d’Albret.60 After the battle, he was one of the captains of a French fleet that was resoundingly 
defeated by the English in 1417.61 He too sacrificed his future for the Armagnac cause, being 
captured by the English in that battle. Later, in Chartier’s chronicle, Guy returns alongside his 
brother Alexandre in 1435 as a leader of the écorcheurs, a riotous free company with a reputa-
tion for flaying enemies.62 Guy disappears from the narrative but Alexandre’s role continues, 
leading the relief of Harfleur in 1440 before being drowned by the townsfolk of Bar-sur-Aube 
for pillaging the countryside.63 Meanwhile, yet another bastard, Pierre, natural son of Pierre II 
d’Alençon, enters Juvénal’s chronicle in 1417 as a significant threat to the English in Nor-
mandy and Maine.64 Unlike Guy, Pierre led a successful sea battle against the English in 
1419, butchering many English sailors and drawing the ire of Henry V, who said of him that 
‘it was very shocking that he took pleasure in killing his men when he took them’, to which 
Pierre replied that he acted ‘to avenge the death of his brother, who had been killed by them’ 
at Agincourt.65 Thus, Pierre’s motives were similar to those of the Bourbon and Orléans bas-
tards who sought vengeance for their relatives who were killed in battle or held captive in 
England. Pierre continued campaigning against the English, appearing in Chartier’s chronicle 
at the battle of Broussinière in 1423 before being captured at Verneuil the next year.66 Indeed, 
many illegitimate Capetian relatives, including Bernard de Foix, Jean de Vendôme, and Arch-
bishop Louis d’Harcourt of Narbonne, enter Chartier’s narrative as servants and soldiers of 
the French king.67 The Dionysian opinion of bastards had clearly changed in the aftermath of 
Agincourt and both Juvénal and Chartier recognised the important role illegitimate cadets 
                                               
la famille d’Orléans au XVe siècle ou Légitimité assumée par la Bâtardise’, in Familles royales vie publique, vie 
privée aux XIVe et XVe siècles, ed. Christiane Raynaud (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l’Universitié de Pro-
vence, 2010), 135. 
59 ‘…il fut fort plaint de toutes gens…et ses ennemis mesmes le plaignoient’. HCRF, 498. See CKS, 
V:314, 316. See generally Famiglietti, 146. 
60 HCRF, 509. See CKS, V:534, 550. 
61 HCRF, 532, 534. See CKS, VI:96. See generally Sumption, IV:526. 
62 Chartier, I:216. See generally Small, 159. 
63 Chartier, I:259, II:12. Philippe Contamine, Olivier Bouzy, and Xavier Hélary, Jeanne d’Arc: Histoire 
et dictionnaire (Paris: Robert Laffont, 2012), 572, clarify that Alexandre was drowned by order of the king. Both 
bastards participated in the Praguerie of 1440, but Chartier does not list them in the Bourbon ranks. Vale, 
Charles VII, 76-78. See generally Barker, 285. See also Chapter 8.2. 
64 HCRF, 539-540, 545. See generally Sumption, IV:686. 
65 ‘…“il estoit bien esbahy pourquoy il prenoit plaisir à ainsi tuer ses gens, quand il les prenoit”. Et il 
luy fit response, “que c’estoit pour venger la mort de son frere: lequel avoit esté par eux occis”’. HCRF, 556. See 
generally Sumption, IV:677. 
66 Chartier, I:35, 43. See generally Barker, 80. 
67 Chartier, II:186, 265, 276, 317, III:77. 
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could play in advancing regnal authority. 
 This fact cannot be more strongly exemplified than by Jean, bastard d’Orléans. Raised 
alongside his legitimate brothers who were all captured or killed before 1420, Jean rose 
quickly to prominence as the de facto head of the house of Orléans.68 Indeed, when introduc-
ing him, Juvénal records that he ‘was best suited to avenge the death of his father’, Louis 
d’Orléans.69 Although Jean’s first military victory was at the siege of Montargis in 1427, 
Chartier chooses to introduce the bastard at the siege of Orléans instead.70 By doing this, 
Chartier achieves two things: he decisively connects Jean to the Armagnac agenda of defeat-
ing the Anglo-Burgundians and he links the bastard to Jeanne d’Arc, who enters Chartier’s 
narrative in the same episode.71 Indeed, from her entry in the narrative until the start of the 
coronation tour to Reims, Jeanne always appears immediately ahead of Jean in lists whenever 
they appear together.72 By associating Jean with Jeanne, Chartier establishes the bastard’s cre-
dentials as a loyal and reliable follower of Charles VII as well as a companion of Jeanne. It is 
therefore unsurprising within the context of the chronicles to find Jean leading the royalist ar-
mies as the successor to Jeanne from 1432 until the fall of Bayonne in 1451.73 However, 
Chartier holds Jean in special regard also because he recaptured Saint-Denis in 1435, which 
placed the abbey and its monks in debt to him for protecting their relics and royal tombs.74 
This may explain why Chartier leaves Jean’s involvement in the Praguerie out of the chroni-
cle, only ever showing the bastard alongside the other loyalists.75 Indeed, the chronicler places 
Jean at Harfleur during the revolt, removing any suspicion that he may have been involved.76 
It is also at this moment, when Jean resolutely stood beside the king, that the bastard is first 
called in Chartier’s chronicle count of Dunois, a title he received in 1439 from his half-
brother-in-exile.77 By naming him such here, Chartier associates his elevation to the nobility 
                                               
68 Contamine, Bouzy and Hélary, 674; Thibault, 132. 
69 ‘..[il] fust si bien taillé de venger la mort de son pere...’. HCRF, 449. 
70 Chartier, IV:61. See generally Rohr, 126; Seward, 208. 
71 See generally Barker, 99; Pernoud and Clin, 165. 
72 Chartier, I: 69, 73-74, 77, 81-83, 103-104. 
73 Chartier, I:142-143, II:320. See generally Griffiths, 530. 
74 Chartier, I:179-183, 220-226. The town had been captured by Jeanne d’Arc in August 1429 but was 
lost to the Anglo-Burgundians shortly afterwards. After Jean d’Orléan’s takeover in June 1435, it was recaptured 
again by the Anglo-Burgundians in September. It did not permanently fall into French hands until April 1436. 
See generally Barker, 135, 219-220, 242-243; Viriville, introduction to Chartier, I:viii. 
75 Chartier, I:258. Barker, 278, explains that Jean joined the side of the rebels initially ‘because he was 
rightly suspicious of Charles’s willingness to assist in securing the release of his brother [Charles, duke d’Orlé-
ans]’. See generally Mikhaël Harsgor, ‘L’essor des bâtards nobles au XVe siècle’, Revue Historique 253:2 
(1975): 342. 
76 Chartier, I:259. The Praguerie was in April 1440 while the Harfleur siege was in October. Barker, 
285. 
77 See generally Pernoud and Clin, 195. 
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and the removal of his bastard identity with adherence to the king.78 Jean shows his ultimate 
dedication to the royalist cause in the aftermath of the English sack of Fougères in 1449 with 
Charles naming him ‘lieutenant general of the king in his wars’.79 This functionally situates 
Jean above all other Capetian relatives except the kings of France and Sicily, and Charles of 
Maine, the king’s chief councillor.80 Chartier implies at this time that Jean should be counted 
among the seigneurs du sang royal—lords of royal blood—when the count calls himself such 
in a treaty with the town of Bayeux made in 1450.81 Later in the narrative, the chronicler 
states that Jean was first among those who ‘greatly led, most valiantly and very honourably,’ 
in the conquest of Normandy, and he is the only individual named in a similar context after 
the conquest of Guyenne.82 And in his final mention in Chartier’s chronicle, the king calls 
Jean ‘our very dear and beloved cousin’, implying a level of intimacy and kinship between the 
king and a bastard that is unprecedented elsewhere in the Dionysian vernacular continua-
tions.83 It cannot be doubted that Chartier greatly admired the man, but he also saw Jean as a 
symbol of regnal authority in the same vein as Jeanne d’Arc. Within the chronicle, the count 
is a selfless defender of the king and kingdom and the single best representative of Capetian 
dynasticism in recent history.  
 The Capetian bastards taught the chroniclers of the fifteenth century something that 
their predecessors had not before considered: that a Capetian did not necessarily have to be 
legitimate to be able to promote regnal authority. The earlier continuators rarely had to con-
sider this since there were so few acknowledged illegitimate Capetians in France, but the 
                                               
78 In 1442, Chartier calls him ‘Monseigneur le bastard d’Orléans, conte de Dunois’. This marks the last 
time he is called bâtard, thus marking his formal transition from one identity to the other. Chartier, II:37. Jean 
acquired the prestigious county of Longueville from the king in 1443, which Chartier includes among Jean’s ti-
tles the next year. Philippe Contamine, ‘Jean, comte de Dunois et de Longueville (1403 ?-1468), ou l’honneur 
d’être bâtard’, in La bâtardise et l’exercice du pouvoir en Europe du XIIe au début du XVIe siècle, eds. Éric 
Bousmar, Alain Marchandisse, Christophe Masson, and Bertrand Schnerb (Lille: Revue du Nord, 2015), 295-
296; Pernoud and Clin, 195. Jean became a peer for Dunois and Blois in 1446 and the titles became hereditary in 
his bloodline. Harsagor, ‘L’essor des bâtards’, 332n5. 
79 Chartier, II:73, 82. See generally Favier, La guerre, 698; Griffiths, 530. 
80 Chartier, I:86. The princes did not, however, lose their order of precedence, as evidenced by the treaty 
of Mantes, in which Jean is listed after the counts of Eu and Saint-Pol. See also Chartier, II:101, 141, 151, 153, 
156. 
81 Chartier, II:153, 207. Thibault, 135, adds that Jean ‘prit conscience que…il avait naturellement qual-
ité de prince du sang’. A seigneur du sang royal is not the same as the later prince du sang, which did not enter 
popular usage until after Juvénal’s chronicle was written. Richard A. Jackson, ‘Peers of France and Princes of 
the Blood’, French Historical Studies 7:1 (1971): 33, states that it was the ‘addition of the word “prince” [that] 
was a crucial step in the development of the concept because it implied a separation of the Princes of the Blood 
from the other nobles of France’. The two terms should not be equated, even though the latter did evolve from 
the former. 
82 ‘Ladite guerre durant s’y gouverna grandement, moult vaillement et très-honorablement le susdit 
conte de Dunois, lieutenant général du roy…’. Chartier, II:236, 312. See generally Barker, 380; Seward, 256. 
83 ‘…nostre très-chier et amé cousin…’. Chartier, III:92. 
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progeny of the family had increased greatly since 1274 and the fallout from Agincourt forced 
the chroniclers to recognise the current structure of the royal family. Many bastards, such as 
those of the Bourbon and Alençon houses, contributed to the defeat of the Anglo-Burgundians 
with several sacrificing their lives to the cause. Jean d’Orléans, meanwhile, spent his entire 
life serving Charles VII, an arrangement that earned him titles of nobility, military renown, 
and an unprecedented inclusion among the seigneurs du sang royal. Together, these natural 
sons of France formed a serendipitous phalanx against Anglo-Burgundian aggression, proving 
to readers that every member of the Capetian dynasty, be they legitimate or illegitimate, has a 
duty to uphold the authority of the French king. 
 
7.3 Embracing Capetians of Another Father 
 An equally unique phenomenon occurred during this period that gained significant mo-
mentum following Agincourt: whereas with the Montforts and royal bastards, a person’s qual-
ity as a Capetian was hereditary, other men who had only distant genealogical connections to 
the dynasty also began to be treated by the Dionysian vernacular chroniclers as implicit or ex-
plicit cadets. Indeed, the very conflict in question was partially named after Bernard VII d’Ar-
magnac, whose dominance over a faction in the war was such that he and his descendants 
were essentially adopted by the Capetian dynasty.84 But theirs was not a unique case. The 
cognatic descendants of Pierre I of Bourbon, the Albrets and Harcourts specifically, gained a 
remarkable prominence in the continuations after 1380 with their members supporting the Va-
lois cause throughout the war. By the end of Charles VII’s reign, Chartier also suggests that 
the Graillys of Foix should be considered Capetian cognates, despite having little royal blood. 
More extreme still is Chartier’s acceptance of the count of Saint-Pol as a Capetian prince even 
though his family refused to accept the 1435 peace of Arras due to their loyalty to Henry VI 
of England.85 The substantial shift by the chroniclers toward accepting those of questionable 
Capetian kinship as members of the royal dynasty reflects the desperate measures taken by the 
supporters of Charles VII in the Armagnac-Burgundian and Anglo-French wars. This section 
will assess the vernacular portrayals of these princely families to determine why they are de-
picted as members of the dynasty and how their inclusion set a new standard regarding the 
qualities required of a Capetian prince. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, Bernard VII d’Armagnac was fully enveloped into 
the Capetian fold, with Juvénal considering him both the leader of the Armagnac faction and a 
                                               
84 For more on Bernard, see Chapter 6.2. 
85 See generally Allmand, Lancastrian, 227; Pernaud and Clin, 191-192. 
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champion of regnal authority. Following his death, Bernard’s sons and grandsons by his wife, 
Bonne de Berry, initially remained loyal to the Armagnacs and Charles VII.86 Chartier first 
introduces Jean IV d’Armagnac and Bernard de Pardiac in 1435, when both cadets acted as 
surety for the king in the treaty of Arras alongside other Capetian princes.87 By introducing 
them in this way, the chronicler jumps over the complex dynastic marriages the family had 
made since 1418 to reach his main point: the Armagnacs continued to be fundamental mem-
bers of the dynasty two decades after their father’s death.88 However, their two stories diverge 
at this point. Bernard stayed by the king’s side during the Praguerie revolt in 1440 and his son 
Jacques de Castres served in the conquest of Normandy and Guyenne from 1449 to 1453.89 As 
late as 1457, Bernard is still found among his Capetian relatives.90 Thus, the loyalty of the 
junior line of the Armagnacs is never questioned and they are ever-present agents of regnal 
authority within France. In contrast, Jean IV and his son Jean V represent how tenuous an 
adoptive relationship with the royal family can be. The senior Jean disappears from Chartier’s 
chronicle after 1435, but Chartier notes that his son served with Jacques in Normandy in 1449 
and 1450.91 The younger Jean is later included among the victors during the capture of Bor-
deaux in 1451, but is conspicuously absent from any account of the campaign itself.92 That is 
likely because Jean serves a different purpose in Chartier’s narrative. The chronicler relates 
that, in 1455, the count attempted to install his cousin as archbishop of Auch against the 
wishes of the king.93 Chartier uses this opportunity to warn that ‘it is a very hard and reckless 
thing to resist his lord, and push, as it is said, against a stinger’, a metaphor that implies the 
dangers of recalcitrance.94 Indeed, he demonstrates that the action cost Jean everything: 
Charles VII confiscated all his lands and, in the process, the count lost his adoptive identity.95 
                                               
86 See Figure 6.2. 
87 Chartier, I:204. 
88 Chartier, I:236. Most prominent among the marriages was Bernard de Pardiac’s to Eléonore de Bour-
bon, heiress of La Marche, in 1429. Gaussin, 105. 
89 Chartier, I:258, II:110, 133, 141, 156, 166, 323, III:2. Both counts sat on the royal council numerous 
times between 1424 and 1460. Gaussin, 105. See generally Favier, La guerre, 554. See also Chapter 8.2. 
90 Chartier, III:75-76. 
91 Chartier, II:110, 133, 141, 156, 166. Small, 158, reports that a breach between Foix and Armagnac 
led to Jean IV’s bellicose attitude against the French monarchy. Favier, La guerre, 562-563, adds that Jean led a 
brief rebellion against the king in 1442, although he eventually bowed to the king’s arbitration. Another dispute 
over Jean’s use of the term ‘comte par la grâce de Dieu’ prompted a second invasion by the king leading to the 
count’s imprisonment from 1443 to 1446. See generally Gaussin, 80; Small, 162-163. 
92 Chartier, II:305-306, 308. See generally Favier, La guerre, 608. 
93 Chartier, III:50. See generally Cuttler, 209. 
94 ‘…c’est chose bien dure et téméraire que de résister à son seigneur, et regimber, comme il se dit, con-
tre l’aiguillon’. Chartier, III:51. 
95 Chartier, III:51. Bove, 459, states that the reason for the confiscation was because Jean conquered the 
county of Comminges in 1454 without the king’s permission. Cuttler, 209, in contrast, argues that ‘it was appar-
ently the count’s refusal to end his scandalous incestuous liaison with his sister that provoked Charles VII to take 
action against him’. 
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When he appears for a final time in 1457, Jean is just another name in a crowd of lesser no-
bles.96 Taken as a whole, the story of the Armagnac family from 1405 to 1457 is one of a pro-
vincial family rising above its origins to become akin, both figuratively and literally, to 
royalty. But the moral of the story is more nuanced: regardless of how a person may become a 
Capetian, their continued acceptance by that body is entirely dependent on their unwavering 
acceptance of regnal authority over personal ambition, a lesson the junior Armagnacs realised 
but the senior cadets only learned through failure. 
 A desire to restore regnal authority also drove the Harcourts and Albrets to Charles 
VII’s camp, a development Juvénal and Chartier highlight frequently, although they never im-
ply that the families were accepted into the Capetian dynasty to the same degree as their Ar-
magnac kin.97 Jean VI d’Harcourt, who was a brother-in-law to Charles V’s wife, Jeanne de 
Bourbon, first enters Orgemont’s chronicle in 1378 during the visit of Emperor Karl IV to the 
French court, although his relationship to the royal family is not mentioned.98 Juvénal in-
cludes the count early in his continuation at the coronation of Charles VI, ranked in a list 
above the Capetian count d’Eu and among other dynastic agnates and cognates.99 Jean is last 
mentioned in 1382, fighting for the king in Flanders.100 His son, Jean VII, first enters the nar-
rative in 1390 during the Barbary Crusade alongside Louis II de Bourbon.101 Juvénal notes 
later, during the meeting between Charles and Richard II of England in 1396, that ‘before the 
King was the count of Harcourt, his close relative, who carried the sword of the King’.102 This 
is the nearest Juvénal comes to acknowledging the Harcourts’ relationship to the Capetian 
dynasty. At Agincourt, Jean was captured, and his son Jean VIII enters the narrative shortly 
afterwards as the Armagnac guardian of Rouen in 1417.103 Chartier notes that Jean was ap-
pointed in 1423 ‘governor for the king of France in the said lands of Anjou and Maine’, a title 
that acknowledged his guerrilla war against the English in northern France.104 At Brous-
sinière, Jean distinguished himself as a capable champion of Capetian authority north of the  
                                               
96 Chartier, III:77. 
97 See Figure 7.2. 
98 CRJC, II:215, 237, 250. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 379, 788, 793. 
99 HCRF, 341. See CKS, I:26. 
100 HCRF, 355. See CKS, I:210. See generally Tuchman, 387. 
101 HCRF, 361, 383. Juvénal mistakenly places the crusade in 1383, although he also includes it in 
1390. Jean is mentioned on both occasions. Pintoin calls Charles d’Albret, who is unmentioned by Juvénal on the 
crusade, and Jean d’Harcourt ‘cognati regis germani’. CKS, I:652. See generally Tuchman, 470. 
102 ‘Et devant le Roy estoit le comte de Harcourt son prochain parent, lequel portoit l’espée du Roy’. 
HCRF, 405. See CKS, II:456. 
103 HCRF, 539. See generally Georges Martin, Histoire et généalogie de la maison d’Harcourt (La 
Ricamarie, France: Imprimerie Mathias, 1994), 52, 54. 
104 ‘…icelluy conte d’Aumarle gouverneur pour le roy de France ou dit pays d’Anjou et du Maine’. 
Chartier, I:33. See also HCRF, 567. See generally Martin, Histoire, 52, 54. 
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Loire; indeed, he is one of the only capable fighters Chartier highlights in the first three years 
of his chronicle. But the count is killed at Vermeuil in 1424, cutting his career short.105 The 
Harcourts are removed from the narrative from this point, but Jean VIII’s illegitimate son, 
Louis, returns in Chartier’s text, leading the funerary procession of Charles VII in his role as 
patriarch of Jerusalem, thus providing a poetic conclusion to his father’s activities at the be-
ginning of the king’s thirty-nine-year reign.106 The Harcourts’ role in advancing regnal au-
thority was brief and limited in impact, but their story is included in the chronicles to 
demonstrate how even the most minor members of the extended family were obliged to sacri-
fice for the greater good of the kingdom and dynasty. 
 Similar in many ways, the story of the Albrets is one of individuals sacrificing their 
lives to advance regnal authority. Juvénal shows that Charles I d’Albret, constable of France, 
struggled with the Burgundians and the English for a decade before his death at Agincourt.107 
He appears among the Armagnac princes in 1411, but his membership is never as forcefully 
stated as that of Bernard d’Armagnac.108 Before Agincourt, Charles sought to attack Harfleur 
rather than engage the English directly, but he was overruled and his death cost the Arma-
gnacs their chief strategist.109 Chartier suggests that Charles’s second son, Guillaume d’Orval, 
served as the short-lived martial successor to his father. In 1428, Guillaume attempted to re-
capture Maine from the English, but he died early the next year in the disastrous battle of the 
Herrings, never able to reach his full potential.110 Chartier does not welcome the family of 
Charles II, Charles I’s elder son, into the narrative until the reconquests of Normandy and 
Guyenne, although two earlier appearances serve as proof of Charles’s devotion to the Cape-
tian cause.111 From 1449, one son, Arnaud d’Orval, served the king and his lieutenants as they 
reconquered Normandy, with the seigneur appearing over a dozen times in the narrative, often 
                                               
105 Chartier, I:43. See generally Martin, Histoire, 54. 
106 Louis was also archbishop of Narbonne, president of the king’s exchequer, and a frequent member of 
the royal council in the 1450s. Chartier, III:115; Gaussin, 117; Martin, Histoire, 55; Michel Nassiet, ‘Les bâtards 
dans l’ouest au XVe et au début du XVIe siècle’, in La bâtardise et l’exercice du pouvoir en Europe du XIIe au 
début du XVIe siècle, eds. Éric Bousmar, Alain Marchandisse, Chrostophe Masson and Bertrand Schnerb (Lille: 
Revue du Nord, 2015), 232. 
107 HCRF, 430, 439, 446, 521. See CKS, V:570. He was appointed constable in 1403 through the efforts 
of Louis d’Orléans, despite heavy opposition. Sumption, IV:103. Juvénal does not overtly include Charles 
among the Armagnacs until 1411. HCRF, 467. See generally Allmand, Lancastrian, 6.  
108 HCRF, 470, 497. See CKS, V:158, 186, 228, 534. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 502, 506. 
109 HCRF, 518-519. See generally Autrand, Charles VI, 535; Sumption, IV:451-452. 
110 Chartier, I:58, 63. See generally Gaussin, 104; Pernoud and Clin, 10. 
111 In 1429, Charles is shown in the company of Jeanne d’Arc, a possibly intentional prestige boost 
given to him by Chartier, while he is also shown in 1440 defeating the English at Tartas, which he subsequently 
granted to his eldest son. Chartier, I:104, II:10. Charles served on the royal council at least fifteen times from 
1425, fought in the royal army continuously from 1429, and carried the king’s sword at his coronation at Reims. 
Gaussin, 104; Pernoud and Clin, 67. 
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in the company of other Capetian lords.112 Furthermore, Chartier records that, in 1450,  
Arnaud led a raiding party across the Bordelais in preparation for the conquest of Guyenne.113 
The next year, Charles II himself joined the war alongside his two sons, Arnaud and Jean de 
Tartas, and the trio participated in the first siege of Bordeaux as well as the final conquest of 
Guyenne that followed the victory at Châtillon in 1453.114 In contrast to the Harcourts, the re-
lationship between the Albrets and the Capetian dynasty is never stated by the chroniclers but 
only implied by Albrets frequently appearing alongside other Capetian princes. Nonetheless, 
they provide yet another example of the obligations required of cognatic relatives to sacrifice 
themselves to ensure the triumph of regnal supremacy in France. 
 The Grailly counts of Foix did not have such a close genealogical relationship with the 
Capetian dynasty. Indeed, Juvénal and Chartier generally treat the Graillys as simply rivals to 
the Armagnac family. Juvénal records that Jean de Foix governed Languedoc for the Arma-
gnacs until 1420, placing him on equal footing with Bernard d’Armagnac, the constable of 
France.115 But whereas Bernard ultimately gave his life for the Armagnacs, Jean’s actions put 
him at odds with the Dauphin Charles, who invaded the south and stripped the count of his 
lieutenancy.116 Juvénal concludes his narrative with the Graillys in disrepute and Languedoc 
under the direct control of Charles VII. But Chartier ignores this transgression and when Jean 
re-enters the narrative in 1435, it is in the exact same context as the Armagnacs: among the 
surety lords for the treaty of Arras.117 By 1449, Jean’s son Gaston IV reclaimed the traditional 
role of the Graillys in Languedoc as the ‘lieutenant general of the king of France in the parts 
between the Gironde and the Pyrenees, his relative and subject’.118 Although Gaston shared a 
Bourbon heritage with the Albrets and Harcourts, Chartier implies that his relationship to the 
Capetian king was via his wife, Leonor, who was the granddaughter of Carlos III of Na-
varre.119 Like Jean V d’Armagnac, Gaston joined with his brothers Pierre de Lautrec and  
                                               
112 Chartier, II:110, 115, 122, 133, 141, 151, 154, 166, 177, 195, 204, 215, 225, 236. See generally 
Favier, La guerre, 607. 
113 Chartier, II:246-247. See generally Favier, La guerre, 607. 
114 Chartier, II:265, 315-317, 322-323, 332, III:10-13. See generally Contamine, Bouzy and Hélary, 
498. 
115 HCRF, 556-557. Jean had been a passive Burgundian until Bernard d’Armagnac’s death in 1418, at 
which point he switched allegiance to the dauphin, although he accepted a lieutenancy from the Burgundians as 
well. Sumption, IV:624. 
116 HCRF, 555. See generally Rohr, 112; Sumption, IV:680. 
117 Chartier, I:204. 
118 ‘…il estoit lieutenant général du roy de France ès parties d’entre Gironde et les Monts-Pyrénées, son 
parent et son subject’. Chartier, II:129. See generally Griffiths, 529. 
119 Chartier, II:128-129. Leonor briefly became queen regnant of Navarre in 1479. See Woodacre, 109-
130. 
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Bernard de Béarn in a general rout of the English in Guyenne that continued into 1453.120 
Chartier includes Gaston at the triumphal entries into Bordeaux and Bayonne alongside the 
other victorious Capetian cognates.121 Gaston’s reputation was enhanced further by the  
downfall of his uncle, the captal du Buch, in 1451.122 The captal was a supporter of Henry VI 
in Guyenne and, after his defeat by the French, he was forced to abandon guardianship of his 
children to Gaston, under whom they would become ‘good and loyal Frenchmen, subject and 
obedient to the king of France, Charles’.123 Thus, Gaston was literally charged with ensuring 
his cousins were raised as faithful promoters of regnal authority. This implies a strong trust in 
Gaston by the king, but also a more general expectation that cognatic relatives of the dynasty 
should advance the king’s authority as an inherent duty. Gaston’s last mention in Chartier’s 
chronicle is precisely where Bernard de La Marche’s story ends, at a gathering of the Capetian 
princes in 1457.124 Thus, the senior Graillys largely parallel the junior Armagnacs in that both 
families rose to prominence after the treaty of Arras and became instruments of regnal author-
ity in Charles VII’s wars. By including them among the princes, Chartier emphasises that 
even those of the most remote dynastic kinship must still promote the restoration of the king’s 
authority in France. 
 This is especially exemplified by the house of Luxemburg-Ligny, princes of no French 
royal descent whose loyalty to the Capetian dynasty came only after a protracted alliance with 
the Anglo-Burgundians.125 Throughout the course of his narrative, Juvénal significantly 
changes his opinion of the family’s first notable member, Waléran III de Saint-Pol. When the 
count is introduced in 1385, he is framed as a loyal Capetian retainer in the unique position of 
representing both the English and the French due to his marriage to Richard II’s half-sister, 
Maud Holland.126 Because of these ties, he took the Lancastrian usurpation personally and 
harried the English from 1403 through 1405.127 It is only in his account of the events of 1411  
                                               
120 Chartier, II:127, 186-187, 265-266, 313-318, III:11-13. See generally Pollard, 136-137; Small, 163. 
121 Chartier, II:306, 320-321. See generally Griffiths, 529. 
122 Chartier, II:291-298. Gaston purchased the county and later sold it back to the captal’s son. Abbott, 
311. See generally Seward, 256-257.  
123 ‘…estre bons et loyaulx François, subgectz et obéissans au roy de France Charles…’. Chartier, 
II:296. See generally Perroy, 320. 
124 Chartier, III:75-76. 
125 Despite shared paternal kinship with the Luxembourger kings and emperors, the counts of Saint-Pol 
were not directly descended from any of them. Fabien Roucole, ‘De royale et impériale maison: Les liens de 
parenté de Jean de Luxembourg, comte de Ligny’, in Familles royales vie publique, vie privée aux XIVe et XVe 
siècles, ed. Christiane Raynaud (Aix-en-Provence: Publications de l’Universitié de Provence, 2010), 114. See 
Figure 7.3. 
126 HCRF, 368, 406, 420, 455. Pintoin does not include Waléran in this episode. Cf. CKS, I:392-396 
(evens). See generally Sumption, III:366, 783. 
127 HCRF, 427, 431. See CKS, III:116-120, 258-260 (evens). See generally Sumption, IV:120-123,160-
161. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































REIMAGINING THE CAPETIAN DYNASTY 
 
Whaley 196 
that Juvénal informs readers that Waléran became a Burgundian, but the context is telling: he 
makes Waléran personally responsible for agitating the civilians to revolt in Paris that year.128 
From this point onward, the chronicler reduces Waléran to Jean of Burgundy’s henchman. As 
such, he is depicted as the callous governor of Paris, responsible for the deaths of many Arma-
gnacs, and the usurping constable of France, who advocated civil war.129 His death in April 
1415, while still supporting the Burgundians, was deemed unworthy of Juvénal’s pen.130  
 Chartier’s portrayal of the Lignys remains decidedly negative when they first appear in 
his chronicle. Jean, bastard son of Waléran, appears as an Anglo-Burgundian soldier in 
1429.131 Meanwhile, a nephew of Waléran, Louis, bishop of Thérouanne, served as English 
chancellor of France and was in charge of Paris.132 And lastly, Jean II de Ligny, an older 
brother of Louis, is introduced the next year as the person responsible for the capture of 
Jeanne d’Arc.133 In contrast to how Arthur de Richemont, Jean d’Orléans, and Charles II 
d’Albret are enhanced by their association with Jeanne, Jean de Ligny’s role in Jeanne’s cap-
ture earns him and his family condemnation by Chartier.134 At Arras in 1435, the Lignys rep-
resented the Burgundian establishment and, although Chartier suggests otherwise, Jean and 
Louis refused to support the treaty for the remainder of their lives.135 But Jean’s death in 1441 
and Louis’s in 1443 allowed Ligny loyalties to shift.136 Within Chartier’s chronicle, this 
change occurs quickly. Louis de Saint-Pol, Jean and Louis’s nephew, is found in Charles 
VII’s army in 1443, receiving a knighthood for his valour.137 The count served in the van-
guard of the French invasion of Upper Normandy alongside the count d’Eu and the bastard 
                                               
128 HCRF, 466. See CKS, IV:442-446 (evens). Autrand, Charles VI, 439, first names Waléran a Burgun-
dian in 1409. 
129 HCRF, 469, 473-475, 477. See CKS, IV:458, 512, 568, 582, 584, 634, 672. See generally Autrand, 
Charles VI, 444. 
130 For more on the life of Waléran, see Céline Berry, ‘Waleran de Luxembourg, un grand seigneur en-
tre loyauté et opportunism (fin XIVe-début XVe siècle)’, Revue du Nord 380 (2009): 295-326. 
131 Chartier, I:104. See generally Céline Berry, ‘La bâtardise au sein du lignage de Luxembourg’, in La 
bâtardise et l’exercise du pouvoir en Europe du XIIe au début du XVIe siècle, edited by Éric Bousmar, Alain 
Marchandisse, Christophe Masson, and Bertrand Schnerb, 169-188 (Lille: Revue du Nord, 2015). 
132 Chartier, I:107, 223. See generally, Pernoud and Clin, 96. 
133 Chartier, I:121-122. See generally Contamine, Bouzy and Hélary, 834. 
134 Roucole, 123, adds that ‘[a]ucun des chroniqueurs étudiés ne qualifie Jean de Luxembourg de cousin 
du roi, ce qui est probablement dû à leur orientation bourguignonne autant qu’aux prises de position du comte de 
Ligny’. 
135 Chartier, I:189, 208. Chartier states that Jean de Ligny did sign the treaty after some hesitation, but, 
in reality, he remained opposed to the French until his death. See generally Allmand, Lancastrian, 227. 
136 Barker, 380. This change is most visible in the marriages made between the Lignys and other dynas-
ties. In 1433, Jean de Ligny’s niece Jacquetta married John, Duke of Bedford, paternal uncle of Henry VI. But 
after Jean’s death, two other nieces married the Capetian princes Charles de Maine, brother-in-law and chief 
councillor of Charles VII, and Arthur de Richemont, constable of France. Barker, 189-190; Van Kerrebrouck, 
II:414, III:316. 
137 Chartier, II:39-41. Gaussin, 120, makes clear that Jean was immediately accepted on the royal coun-
cil after Louis de Ligny’s death. 
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d’Orléans, and was rewarded for his service with the lordship of Gournay.138 Meanwhile, his 
brother, Jacques, was made lieutenant constable under Arthur de Richemont in the invasion of 
Lower Normandy.139 Chartier lists Louis among the assembled Capetian lords at Rouen, and 
at Harfleur, the count is named by Chartier in such a way to suggest he should be considered a 
seigneur de son sang—a lord of the king’s blood—which is the only outright suggestion made 
in any of the Dionysian continuations that a cognate could be considered a full Capetian 
prince.140 Thus, Chartier’s narrative is another story of redemption, demonstrating how the 
Ligny family overcame their Burgundian origins to advance regnal authority alongside the 
other Capetian princes. At the end of the chronicle, Louis is characterised as one of the heroes 
of the Capetian dynasty, a wealthy count who was rewarded not only with money and titles 
but with a status earned by actively promoting the authority of the king. 
 Each of the princes hitherto discussed sacrificed much for regnal authority and each ulti-
mately aided in the final royalist victory over the English. The narratives of the Armagnacs 
and Graillys largely paralleled each other, but where the Graillys and junior Armagnacs re-
mained steadfastly loyal to the Capetians, the senior Armagnacs drifted away, ostracised from 
the dynasty. The Harcourts and Albrets, in contrast, are portrayed by the chroniclers as never 
wavering in their campaign to restore regnal authority to the king, with both families sacrific-
ing greatly for the royal cause. But Juvénal and Chartier never incorporate either family into 
the dynasty in quite the same way, leaving their genealogical relationship to the Capetians un-
stated, though implied. However, the chroniclers reserved a special place in the dynasty for 
the Lignys, counts who had to abandon their past in order to embrace their future as lords of 
the royal house. In the end, the fifteenth-century Dionysian vernacular continuators deter-
mined that blood alone did not make one a Capetian, but that it was a potent mixture of com-
plete loyalty and active participation in advancing regnal authority that truly proved one’s 
worthiness to be numbered among the lords of the blood. 
 
                     
 
                                               
138 Chartier, II:84ff. See generally Barker, 380. 
139 Chartier, II:122-123, 195, 212-214. See generally Anselme de Sainte-Marie and Honoré du Fourny, 
Histoire genealogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France, 3rd ed., vol 3 (Paris: Compagnie des 
Libraires, 1728), 726. 
140 The full passage reads: ‘Tantost après se partit le roy de Rouen, armé d’une brigandine, et dessus une 
jacquète de drap d’or, accompagné du roy de Cécille et de plusieurs aultres seigneurs de son sang, en grands et 
riches habillemens, par espécial le conte de Sainct-Pol, lequel avoit ung chanfrain à son cheval d’armes prisé 
trente mille escuz’. Chartier, II:156, 176. 
REIMAGINING THE CAPETIAN DYNASTY 
 
Whaley 198 
Chartier approached dynasticism and regnal authority in a very different manner than had his 
predecessors. To him, the disaster at Agincourt forced the Capetian dynasty to go on the de-
fensive, compelling those whose origins did not correspond to common conceptions of Cape-
tian dynasticism to nonetheless embrace their dynastic heritage. For some, like the Montforts, 
that meant setting aside century-old grudges in order to support fully their ancestral dynasty. 
For others, like the many illegitimate offspring of Capetian ancestry, the chronicler had to 
overlook Church stigmas against bastardy, which may have influenced earlier Dionysian 
chroniclers, to prove that devotion to the king was more important. And for the wider diaspora 
of Capetian cognates—families such as the Armagnacs, Harcourts, Albrets, Graillys, and 
Lignys—ancestry itself was never the issue. For them, admission into the dynasty came only 
through absolute loyalty and allegiance to the king and none other. Together, these unlikely 
cadets led the armies of Charles VII, served in his retinue, and became his councillors and al-
lies. By the end of the war and Charles’s death, Chartier acknowledges far more Capetians in 
France than there were agnates. Although this was not a unique message in the Dionysian ver-
nacular tradition—all earlier chroniclers had included some cognates as members of the dyn-
asty to some degree—the shear scale that Chartier includes them is unprecedented and 
important. It served as a powerful didactic message to future kings and princes that the house 
of Capet was not simply a hereditary entity—it was open to all cognates who proved them-
selves capable of selflessly advancing regnal authority within France.
 
 
CHAPTER EIGHT  
The Triumph of Regnal Supremacy 
 
There is an ever-present sense of déjà vu when examining Dionysian vernacular depictions of 
the Capetian dynasty in the later Middle Ages. The persistent themes of domestic divisions 
within and foreign threats without never abate, even in Jean Chartier’s continuation, which 
was written after the Capetian victory over the English in France. Yet it must be remembered 
that Chartier could only see his present circumstances: Charles VII had achieved major suc-
cesses between 1449 and 1453, but nobody knew in the early 1460s that the century-long in-
termittent war with England had finally come to a decisive end.1 Indeed, no treaty between the 
kingdoms would be agreed until 1475 and the English monarchs continued to style themselves 
king (or queen) of France until 1801.2 Lacking this foreknowledge, Chartier nonetheless sug-
gests that by the end of his reign, Charles was victorious and his authority undisputed in 
France. In order to achieve this, the chronicler intentionally restructured events to emphasise 
regnal authority. For example, he carefully constructed his portrayal of the Valois agnates of 
the house of Anjou to showcase how their activities enhanced regnal authority in France. 
Chartier also turns a failed noble uprising against the royal government in 1440 into an event 
that shifts the focus away from the independent activities of the Capetian princes and toward a 
unified story of regnal empowerment. The victims of this narrative reframing are the Dauphin 
Louis and Jean II d’Alençon, whose activities incurred the wrath of the king and condemna-
tion from the chronicler. This final series of case studies will explore the ways in which 
Chartier manipulated the portrayals of specific Capetian cadets and events in order to de-em-
phasise dynasticism and showcase the ultimate triumph of regnal supremacy in France. 
 
8.1 The Rise of the Angevins 
 The battle of Agincourt in 1415 and other engagements in the 1420s exhausted the roy-
alist cause, depleting it of soldiers, military leaders, and government officials. As discussed in 
previous chapters, many unlikely candidates stepped in to fill the void left by the absent Cape-
tian agnates, but the problem remained that most of the legitimate princes were either in cap-
tivity or too inexperienced to adequately fight. Although the contributions made by Louis III, 
                                               
1 Burne, Agincourt, 347; Perroy, 333, 343. 
2 Jeremy Black, George III: America’s Last King, The English Monarchs Series (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 379; Small, 213. 
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duke d’Anjou and titular king of Sicily, are completely ignored by Chartier, he does empha-
sise that the duke’s brothers, René and Charles, were fortunate to have been too young to par-
ticipate in the battle of Agincourt.3 From 1429, the two cadets rarely leave the king’s side in 
the narrative, demonstrating for the first time a higher devotion by Angevins to the royal 
cause than to their traditional aspirations outside of France. Nevertheless, Chartier does occa-
sionally divert the narrative to Angevin wars in Lorraine, but does so in order to demonstrate 
how Charles VII was able to manifest his regnal authority along the French periphery even 
while promoting his authority domestically. The end result is that the Angevins become some 
of the most inspiring figures in the continuation. They personally link the saga of Jeanne 
d’Arc in 1429 to the story of the French triumph over the English, serving as heroic figures 
that readers can aspire to follow. This section analyses how Chartier depicted the Angevin 
family and used them as purveyors of regnal authority within his narrative. 
 Chartier manipulates the story of the Angevins from the very beginning, carefully se-
lecting events that emphasise regnal authority and downplay the family’s other activities. The 
Angevins first join the narrative with René, who enters after the coronation of Charles VII at 
Reims in July 1429 at the head of a company of soldiers who pledge themselves to the king.4 
By skipping directly to this point, Chartier ignores the fact that René had previously been a 
recalcitrant Burgundian who was, at least nominally, an English vassal.5 Thus, Chartier con-
verts René in a single sentence from the prodigal son he actually was into the vanguard of a 
dynastic resurgence. René is further glorified through his association with Jeanne d’Arc, 
whom he joined on her campaign in the Île-de-France in late 1429.6 Although René was cap-
tured by the Burgundians in 1431, he proved his value to the king’s cause, so Chartier consid-
ers the preceding battle as well as the later ransom negotiations important details to include in 
the narrative.7 Likewise, representatives of the duke are at the congress of Arras, pledging 
their duke as surety for the king, implying continuous contact between René and the Valois  
  
                                               
3 Jean Juvénal des Ursins only mentions Louis III once, in 1419. Chartier, meanwhile, only refers to 
Louis in the past tense to inform the reader of his passing. Another mention of the ‘duke d’Anjou’ at the treaty of 
Arras in 1435 must refer to René even though Chartier does not otherwise call him by that title until 1436. Chart-
ier, I:204, 233; HCRF, 547. René was only six-years-old and Charles was not yet one at the time of the battle. 
See Figure 8.1. See generally Rohr, 107-108; Small, 149-150. 
4 Chartier, I:97. See Jean Favier, Le roi René (Paris: Fayard, 2008), 38; Rohr, 159. 
5 As a dependent of both Cardinal-Duke Louis de Bar and Charles II de Lorraine, both Burgundians, 
René was hesitant to renounce the oath of homage he had made to John, duke of Bedford, for his lands in Eng-
lish-held territories, such as the county of Guise. Favier, Le roi René, 32-33; Rohr, 151. 
6 Chartier, I:100, 103. See generally Jacques Levron, Le bon roi René, new ed., Présence de l’histoire: 
Collection historique (Paris: Perrin, 2004), 65-66. 
7 Chartier, I:133-134, 215, 232-233. 
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court during his captivity.8 Ultimately, René figures very little in the first half of Chartier’s 
chronicle, but his contributions to restoring regnal authority earn him a place of respect within 
the narrative. 
In his brother’s absence, Charles d’Anjou catapulted himself to the forefront of French 
politics. First mentioned by Chartier in 1432, Charles is characterised as a warrior-prince 
fighting at the siege of Saint-Cénéry alongside Jean II d’Alençon and Arthur de Richemont.9 
When he next appears in the narrative in 1433, he is at the head of a coup which saw him re-
place Georges de La Trémoïlle as the king’s chief councillor.10 In recounting this event, 
Chartier notes that Charles d’Anjou was ‘brother of the queen of France’, which establishes 
the prince’s genealogical credentials, and he adds that Charles and his allies ‘remained in 
great government and authority with the said king’.11 This episode is the only substantial hint 
Chartier gives of a much larger division that had existed at the French court since Arthur was 
removed from power by La Trémoïlle in 1427.12 However, because Arthur never falls out of 
favour with the king in Chartier’s narrative, it does not make logical sense for him to seize 
power again, thus Charles d’Anjou’s role in the affair is expanded to compensate for this in-
consistency. An intimate relationship between Charles and the king is implied after this in two 
unusual passages included by Chartier: in 1436, Charles is named a godfather of the king’s 
son Philippe, a strange insertion into the chronicle since the boy died soon afterwards;13 then, 
in 1441, Charles is made count of Maine by his brother, a procedural transfer-of-title between 
brothers that rarely warrants attention in the continuations.14 Meanwhile, the brief falling-out 
between Charles and the king in the mid-1440s is entirely overlooked by Chartier, although 
the count is absent from the narrative during this time.15 This suggests the chronicler wished 
to gloss over moments of domestic instability, especially after 1435, to imply a stronger 
united front against the English.  
Both Charles and René return to the narrative in 1449, which coincides with the 
French invasion of the English kingdom of France. At that time, Chartier credits the brothers 
                                               
8 Chartier, I:186-187, 203-204. René remained in contact with his mother, Violante de Aragón, but both 
she and Charles VII were more interested in a Franco-Burgundian peace. Resolving René’s ransom would have 
added an unnecessary stumbling block. See generally Levon, Le bon roi René, 80-81; Rohr, 189, 191. 
9 Chartier, I:135, 166-167. Chartier misidentifies this fortress as Saint-Célerin. Barker, 185n17, 201. 
10 Chartier, I:171. Charles’s mother and Arthur were responsible for orchestrating this coup. Rohr, 180-
181. Charles sat on the royal council fifty-nine times from 1433 until the king’s death in 1461. Gaussin, 105. 
11 ‘[Ils] demourèrent en grant gouvernement et auctorité avecques ledit roy’. Chartier, I:171. 
12 Chartier, I:54. See generally Rohr, 125-131. 
13 Chartier, I:220, 229. See also Chapter 6.1. 
14 Chartier, II:33. Charles did not personally come into possession of Maine until April 1448 when the 
English reluctantly relinquished control over the county. Poull, 138. 
15 Favier, Louis XI, 114; Perroy, 310; Vale, Charles VII, 113. 
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with raising the king’s morale so much that ‘the king, seeing such noble chivalry, concluded 
and decided to proceed again with the conquest and recovery of his land of Normandy’.16 
Thus, the Angevins are not only depicted as supporters of the king at this time, they are made 
responsible for ensuring the campaign continues. Throughout the invasion, both René and 
Charles remained the king’s constant companions-in-arms.17 During the triumphal entry at 
Rouen in 1450, René and Charles flanked the king on either side, ‘armed all in white, their 
horses richly adorned and covered in coverings of similar velvet, with white crosses, and their 
devices among them, sown with tufts of gold thread’.18 It is an image Chartier includes to in-
spire awe and respect for the regal trinity of the king of France, the titular king of Sicily 
(René), and the king’s chief counsellor (Charles d’Anjou). In Guyenne, Charles remains in the 
field while René disappears, but for both, their purposes in the chronicle are essentially ful-
filled.19 To Chartier, the Angevins represented loyal Capetians who remained by the side of 
the king throughout the long war. Their wise advice and meritorious deeds made them fore-
most among the Capetians praised by Chartier as champions of regnal authority. 
Much like Pierre d’Orgemont and Jean Juvénal des Ursins, Chartier devotes very little 
space to Angevin ambitions abroad. But what is unique is that he ignores entirely their cam-
paigns in Italy and instead focusses on their duchies of Bar and Lorraine on the Franco-Impe-
rial march.20 Even here, though, the continuator toys with chronology and facts in order to 
advance a narrative that promotes Angevin and—more legally dubious—French claims to the 
region. When René is first introduced in the chronicle, it is as the ‘duke of Bar and Lorraine’, 
even though he only had some authority over the former and none over the latter in 1429.21 
After this, Chartier never again calls René duke of Lorraine. The simplest explanation for this 
                                               
16 ‘…le roy, voyans si noble chevalerie, conclud et délibéra de procéder oultre à la conqueste et re-
couvrement de son pais de Normendie’. Chartier, II:134. 
17 Chartier, II:137, 143, 153, 155, 161, 176. At the siege of Caen in 1450, Chartier mentions that the 
king briefly lodged with René despite having his own residence nearby. Chartier, II:217. See generally Favier, Le 
roi René, 182-183. 
18 ‘…armez tout à blanc, leurs chevaux richement parez et couverts de vouertures de veloux pareilles, 
avec des croix blanches, et leurs devises parmy, semées de houppètes de fil d’or…’. Chartier, II:164. See gener-
ally Levron, 111. 
19 Chartier, II:323, III:2, 12-13. Favier, Le roi René, 184, notes that ‘René manifesta le peu d’intérêt que 
suscitait chez lui la conquête de la Guyenne. C’est l’Anglais de Normandie qui avait exercé une lourde pression 
sur le Maine et l’Anjou, non l’Anglais de Bourdeaux’. 
20 Chartier calls René ‘king of Sicily’ following his release from captivity in 1437 and his son Jean is 
called ‘duke of Calabria’ from his introduction in the text in 1450, but neither the titles nor René and Jean’s at-
tempts to claim the crown of Naples is ever discussed. Chartier, I:233, II:215, 224. René led an expedition into 
Naples in 1438 and his son led another in his father’s name in 1458. Jacques Bénet, Jean d’Anjou, duc de Cala-
bre et de Lorraine (1426-1470) (Nancy: Société Thierry Alix, 1997), 80-81; Noël Coulet, Alice Planche, and 
Françoise Robin, Le roi René: le prince, le mécène, l’écrivain, le mythe (Aix-en-Provence: Édisud, 1982), 22. 
21 René did not become sole duke of Bar until 1430, although he used the title from 1419 when his un-
cle, Cardinal-Duke Louis, named him heir and resigned the administration to him. He did not receive Lorraine 
until the death of his father-in-law, Charles II, in 1431. Chartier, I:97; Poull, 142, 144; Rohr, 106. 
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is that a portion of Bar was a French fief and held more status for René within France, while 
the remainder of Lorraine was within the Empire.22 Additionally, Chartier may have been  
acknowledging the recent Capetian ancestry of the dukes of Bar, something the Lotharingian 
dukes lacked.23 Alternatively, the chronicler could have been avoiding discussion of the dis-
puted succession between René and the counts of Vaudémont, the latter of whom claimed 
Lorraine as agnates of the old ducal line.24 This final option seems the least likely, however, 
since Chartier carefully removes any trace of the Angevin-Vaudémont succession dispute 
from his chronicle and he did not know how the feud would conclude.25 When discussing 
René’s capture by Antoine de Vaudémont at the battle of Bulgnéville in 1431, Chartier frames 
the event as if it were a Burgundian counter-offensive against the overly-ambitious duke, no-
where hinting at a personal conflict between Antoine and René.26 The realities of the situation 
are further deflected when Chartier recounts René’s release five years later: in 1436, a group 
of Capetian princes began negotiations with Philippe of Burgundy, but Chartier apparently 
loses interest in the topic and recounts instead how Arthur de Richemont left the delegation in 
order to subdue rebel strongholds in Champagne.27 Later, the princes finally secured René’s 
freedom by negotiating a marriage between René’s son and Philippe’s niece, but René is 
framed as the victim here in the chronicles, a man forced to call upon his relatives for help, 
rather than a victor against Vaudémont claims to Lorraine.28 While this makes it easier to in-
clude the Vaudémonts in the royalist army in 1449, the reader is left with no notion that some-
thing important actually occurred beforehand.29 Only once does Chartier include an instance 
when the king was personally involved in the conflict—when the people of Metz refused to 
                                               
22 Abbott, 546, explains that ‘[i]n 1297 the count [of Bar], who had fought with his father-in-law, the 
English king, against king Philippe IV was made prisoner by the latter. In 1301, in order to obtain his freedom he 
had to render homage to the king of France for that part of the Barrois west of the Meuse. Henceforth this was 
the Barrois mouvant’. A later count, the son-in-law of Jean II of France, assumed the title duke of Bar to place 
him on par with his Capetian relatives, although the Imperial portion of Bar remained a fief of the duchy of Lor-
raine. See generally Favier, Le roi René, 29, 31. 
23 Juvénal alludes to this connection in 1410 when discussing Louis of Bar and his elevation to the car-
dinalate. Louis, the uncle of René, was the maternal grandson of Jean II of France. HCRF, 452. See CKS, 
IV:254. See generally Favier, Le roi René, 29. 
24 For specifics regarding this feud, see Favier, Le roi René, 29-75; and Levron, 71-85. 
25 The Vaudémonts eventually succeeded to Lorraine in 1473 as the result of a marriage made between 
René’s daughter, Yolande, and Friedrich II von Vaudémont. Abbott, 541. 
26 Chartier, I:133-134. See generally Favier, Le roi René, 42-43. 
27 Chartier, I:215. See generally Favier, Le roi René, 63. 
28 Chartier, I:232-233. Jean, duke of Calabria, married Marie de Bourbon, daughter of Philippe’s sister, 
Agnès, although the original plan was for Marguerite d’Anjou, René’s daughter, to marry the Burgundian heir, 
Charles de Charolais. Levron, 82. In another part of this agreement, Philippe recognised René’s claims to Lor-
raine over those of the Vaudémonts. However, René was forced to cede his holdings in Flanders to the duke of 
Burgundy and lands in Picardy to Louis, count of Saint-Pol. Favier, Le roi René, 64.  
29 Chartier, II:110, 166, 216, 224-225, 233, 236. Friedrich von Vaudémont, René’s son-in-law, accom-
panied the Angevins in Normandy throughout 1449-1450. Favier, Le roi René, 182. 
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recognise the authority of René in 1444-1445—but in this instance, the author makes clear 
that Metz was just one city among many that Charles wished to subdue in the region.30 Alt-
hough Chartier lingers at times on Angevin ambitions along the eastern fringe of France, he 
does so not to promote dynasticism but rather to highlight specific examples of Burgundian 
aggression that the king was forced to address in the years following the treaty of Arras. It 
therefore becomes just another method through which Chartier showcases the regnal authority 
and influence of the king, in this instance along the peripheries of the kingdom in lands not 
directly subject to French royal control. 
Much like the Bourbons in the previous century, the Angevins become in Chartier’s 
chronicle exemplary Capetian princes due to their unceasing devotion to the king both person-
ally and as head of the kingdom and dynasty. Within the chronicle, René is one of the first legit-
imate agnates to enter the narrative, after which he becomes a companion of Jeanne d’Arc and 
the king throughout their campaigns against the English. Likewise, Charles d’Anjou is quickly 
established as a reliable and faithful councillor to the king, although to accomplish this, Chartier 
removes any trace of the decade-long court struggle that secured for him his position and power. 
Similarly, the chronicler ignores Angevin claims abroad and reframes the succession dispute in 
Lorraine as an assertion of royal authority against Burgundian territories in the eastern marches, 
thereby erasing the Angevin-Vaudémont conflict. Thus, through this creative manipulation of 
facts, Chartier converts the struggles of the Angevins for dominance inside and outside of 
France—issues that do not directly impact the overarching narrative—into examples of regnal 
empowerment that glorify the king at the expense of those who would challenge his authority. 
 
8.2 Echoes of the Hussites in France 
 Coincidentally, just when the historically distracted Angevins became undisputed  
champions of regnal authority within France, the notoriously loyal Bourbons turned their 
coats against the king. But Chartier does not condemn the entire family for the crimes of its 
head and maintains throughout his chronicle their traditional role as agents of regnal empow-
erment. Their one substantial deviance—the Praguerie revolt of 144031—is manipulated by 
the chronicler into a powerful statement about royal supremacy over princely ambitions. 
                                               
30 Chartier, II:43-47. Levron, 103-104, largely agrees with Chartier’s assessment but adds that Metz was 
the only recalcitrant city in the region and that their rebellion was specifically against the French king since they 
‘prétendirent qu’ils étaient d’allégeance allemande et n’avaient pas à obéir au roi de France’. See generally 
Favier, Le roi Réne, 121-123. 
31 The Praguerie was named after the recent Hussite revolt in Prague (1419-1436), which many in 
France viewed as analogous. Chartier, I:258; Vale, Charles VII, 74.  
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Chartier accomplishes this by strategically avoiding discussion of the actual issues that 
prompted the result or the lingering difficulties the king had in keeping Capetian dynasticism 
in check. Simultaneously, the chronicler uses the rebellion to foreshadow the divisions  
between the Dauphin Louis, who was its figurehead, and Charles VII, a dispute that resulted 
in Louis’s exile to the Burgundian court and the functional annexation of the Viennois into the 
kingdom of France. This section will explore the ways in which Chartier portrays the chang-
ing nature of dynasticism in respect to the Praguerie, its prelude, and its aftermath. 
 The Praguerie was the brainchild of Charles I de Bourbon, a man whose family was 
historically synonymous with Capetian dynastic loyalty.32 Perhaps because of this, Chartier 
decides that the family itself should not suffer for one duke’s failings, and, therefore, he con-
structs a narrative that specifically discredits Charles while simultaneously praising the other 
Bourbon princes.33 He begins by introducing Charles in February 1429 as the leader of the 
disastrous Orléans relief expedition that is remembered as the battle of the Herrings.34 He then 
contrasts this by presenting as a companion of Jeanne d’Arc at the victorious battle of Patay 
the duke’s cousin Louis, count of Vendôme, who remained one of Jeanne’s staunchest sup-
porters even after she was captured by the Burgundians in 1430.35 Although Chartier eventu-
ally associates Charles with Jeanne as well, their relationship is only highlighted in situations 
where Louis, too, is present in the narrative.36 Concluding this arc, the chronicler recounts 
how the duke, appointed lieutenant over recently-reconquered territories in the Île-de-France 
in autumn 1429, abandoned his post upon learning that the Bourbonnais was being ravaged by 
the Anglo-Burgundians.37 In contrast, Louis is praised by Chartier for stepping in and claim-
ing the vacated lieutenancy.38 In this way, the chronicler erects a dualism between the con-
demned Charles, who prioritised his duchy over the kingdom, and the praised Louis, who 
bolstered regnal authority.39 
                                               
32 Cuttler, 196; Vale, Charles VII, 76. For earlier portrayals of the Bourbons, see Chapter 5.3.  
33 See Figure 5.2. 
34 Chartier, I:62-63. See generally André Leguai, Le Bourbonnais pendant la guerre de cent ans, De la 
seigneurie a l’état (Moulins: Les imprimeries réunies, 1969), 343. 
35 Chartier, I:85-86, 123-124. See generally Walter Sidney Scott, Jeanne d’Arc (London: George G. 
Harrap, 1974), 59-60. 
36 Chartier, I:87-88, 100, 103-104, 107-109. Jeanne only begrudgingly worked with Charles de Bourbon 
since their campaign together was primarily to serve the interests of the Bourbons, not the king. Leguai, 343-344. 
Chartier does not include either Bourbon prince at the coronation at Reims in 1429, although Scott, 62, states 
that both represented absent peers during the ceremony.  
37 Chartier, I:111, 116. See generally Leguai, 344-345; Pernoud and Clin, 177. 
38 Chartier, I:116. 
39 Charles’s duchy—which was significantly larger than Vendôme—sat on the French side of the An-
glo-Burgundian frontier and was prone to frequent incursions by the English, while Louis’s county was entirely 
under English control, making his position as lieutenant personally beneficial since he could use it to reclaim his 
land. See Abbott, 107; Perroy, 259, 273. 
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 Beginning with the congress of Arras in 1435, the chronicler takes a more neutral line 
regarding the Bourbon princes. During the treaty negotiations, both lords acted as  
representatives of the king and as surety for him, a clear recognition by Chartier of their  
loyalty.40 In 1436, Charles, alongside his Angevin and Burgundian cousins, was named a god-
father to the king’s short-lived son Philippe, an example that suggests intimacy between the 
king and his kin.41 That same year, Louis escorted the dauphin’s new wife from Scotland to 
France, a procedural task that rarely merits inclusion in the continuations but nevertheless im-
plies trust in the qualities of the escort.42 Furthermore, both princes led the party that eventu-
ally obtained the release of René d’Anjou from his Burgundian captors in 1437, an action that 
demonstrates dynastic loyalty to both the Angevins and the king.43 Although Louis did, in re-
ality, participate in the Praguerie, Chartier chooses not to record this fact, maintaining the fic-
tion that he was a devout Capetian prince.44 In his last narrative entry, Louis gives the king’s 
daughter Catherine in marriage to Charles de Charolais, son of Philippe III of Burgundy, a fi-
nal reminder to the reader that Louis was a faithful, trustworthy, and loyal servant of the king 
and the dynasty.45 But Charles de Bourbon is not similarly praised. He was pardoned for his 
leadership role in the Praguerie, but Chartier nonetheless blames him for the revolt and erases 
the final sixteen years of the duke’s life in his chronicle—an implicit condemnation for his 
disloyalty.46 Thus, the author maintains the dualism he established earlier in the chronicle  
between the two Bourbon princes. To Chartier, Charles is nothing more than a wayward and 
incompetent Capetian prince, incapable of adequately representing regnal authority, while 
Louis remains a man unwavering in his devotion to the king and kingdom. 
 Beyond these simple manipulations of facts, the Praguerie itself is recounted by Chart-
ier in a manner that deliberately alters events to more effectively empower Charles VII. The 
author leaves out all the background motives—Capetian dissatisfaction with the treaty of Ar-
                                               
40 Chartier, I:86-187, 203-204. See generally Rohr, 189, 192. 
41 Chartier, I:215. 
42 Chartier, I:230-231. Louis was, in fact, the grand master of the hôtel and served as a councillor of the 
king thirty-five times between 1425 and 1446. Gaussin, 74, 102. 
43 Chartier, I:215, 232-233. René subsequently joined a proposed revolt that Charles de Bourbon and 
Jean d’Alençon were organising, although the plan collapsed soon afterwards. Favier, La guerre, 552; Vale, 
Charles VII, 74. See generally Rohr, 191-192. 
44 See Cuttler, 196; Favier, Louis XI, 87; Vale, Charles VII, 76. 
45 Chartier, II:8-9. 
46 Chartier, I:258-259. Leguai, 358, emphasises that ‘[l]e fin de la Praguerie valut au duché de Bourbon 
vingt-cinq ans de tranquillité’. Gaussin, 109, only lists Charles as a councillor of the king once after 1439, sug-
gesting that Charles absented himself—or was forcibly removed—from the government after the Praguerie. 
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ras, a failed noble uprising in 1437, and the attempts by the king to end écorcheur compa-
nies47—enabling him to place the blame for the revolt squarely on the shoulders of the six-
teen-year-old Dauphin Louis, who desired autonomy from his guardian, Bernard de la 
Marche.48 Chartier records that Louis commanded Jean II d’Alençon to serve him, and 
Charles de Bourbon soon joined as well, although the latter’s role as ‘principal author’ is only 
stated at the end of the episode.49 Yet it is the language that Chartier employs to describe the 
event that is telling. When recounting how Louis, Jean, and Charles captured Niort, Chartier 
calls them ‘rebels and disobedient men to the sovereign majesty’, a reference to the crime of 
lèse-majesté or treason.50 Indeed, one of Jean’s agents, Jacquet, is directly called ‘false and 
traitorous’ and later the ‘conductor of the treason’ for allowing the Praguists into Saint-
Maixent, a crime which earned him immediate quartering upon his capture by the royal 
army.51 The legitimacy of the Praguists is undermined by the presence among their ranks of 
the discredited Georges de La Trémoïlle, who Chartier notes ‘had once been in great authority 
with the king’ but had since been displaced by Charles d’Anjou, who is listed among the 
king’s allies.52 Meanwhile, Jean, bâtard d’Orléans, is also listed exclusively on the side of the 
                                               
47 The end of the Armagnac-Burgundian war prompted popular outrage among some nobles who felt 
that the Burgundians benefited too much from the treaty of Arras. Loïc Cazaux, ‘Les lendemains de la Praguerie: 
Révolte et comportement politique à la fin de la guerre de Cent Ans’, in Lendemains de guerre… De l’Antiquité 
au monde contemporain: les hommes, l’espace et le récit, l’économie et le politique, eds. François Pernot and 
Valérie Toureille (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2010), 365; Favier, La guerre, 551. A planned uprising in 1437, 
led by Charles de Bourbon, was a reaction to this and sought to remove certain influential councillors from the 
king, but the plot was discovered before it began. Favier, La guerre, 552. Charles called upon his écorcheur 
companies to lead the rebellion and they became the target of the king’s ire in 1439, when Charles sought to dis-
solve all such groups in favour of a more centralised military hierarchy, an action that bred further discontent and 
led directly to the Praguerie. Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1984), 169; Cuttler, 196; Demurger, Temps, 185; Favier, Louis XI, 87; Knecht, 78. For the original 2 
November 1439 ordonnances, see ‘Lettres de Charles VII, pour obvier aux pilleries & vexations des Gens de 
guerre’, in Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race, recueillies par ordre chronologique, vol. XIII, 
ed. Louis-Guillaume de Vilevault and Louis George Oudard Feudrix de Bréquigny (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 
1782), 306-313. 
48 Chartier, I:253. Chartier goes so far as to entitle the chapter: ‘Comment Monseigneur le Daulphin 
s’en alla d’avecques le roy son père sans son congié et contre sa voullenté’. Even here, though, Chartier misrep-
resents facts. Vale, Charles VII, 81, argues that Louis’s ‘major grievance…was that he had not yet been given 
the Dauphiné…. He also requested the lieutenancy of Languedoc and Guyenne, or of France…’.  
49 Chartier, I:253, 254, 259. In contrast, Favier, Louis XI, 84, emphasises that ‘c’est le dauphin Louis 
que les ducs de Bretagne, d’Alençon, d’Anjou et de Bourbon…vont séduire pour légitimer leur mouvement’, 
implying that the prince was only a pawn in this entire plot. See generally Cazaux, 366-367; Henry de Surirey de 
Saint Remy, Jean II de Bourbon, duc de Bourbonnais et d’Auvergne 1426-1488, Nouvelle Collection d’Études 
Médiévales (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1944), 29. 
50 ‘…comme rebelles et désobéissans à la souveraine majesté…’. Chartier, I:254. See generally Cazaux, 
372; Favier, Louis XI, 87. 
51 ‘…icellui Jacquet, comme faulx et traistre…’; ‘…qui avoit esté conducteur de la traïson.’ Chartier, 
I:255, 256, 257. See generally Demurger, Temps, 184; Knecht, 79. 
52 ‘…le sire de la Trimoulle, lequel avoit esté autrefoiz en grant auctoritee devers le roy’. Chartier, 
I:258. See generally Favier, La guerre, 551; Knecht, 78. 
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king despite initially joining the Praguists in an attempt to free his brother from captivity.53 
Chartier strategically resolves this factual contradiction by including the ransoming of Charles 
d’Orléans two chapters later, thereby removing any reason for Jean to join the revolt.54 Other 
Capetian members of the government such as Bernard de la Marche—whom Chartier portrays 
as a victim of the dauphin’s ambitions—and Arthur de Richemont—the rival of La Tré-
moïlle—are also listed beside the king, thereby balancing the rebellious princes with loyal 
ones.55 The revolt ultimately ends ‘by the good means of the count of Eu [Charles d’Artois] 
and other lords and valiant men’, a judgment statement that suggests Chartier associates good-
ness with loyalty to the king.56 The author makes this clearer when he adds that ‘it was neces-
sary that [all the Praguists] received the grace of the king and remission sealed with his great 
seal’, recognition that forgiveness only came through the king.57 But more importantly, this 
specific retelling emphasises the hopelessness of those rebelling against regnal authority, 
since ‘from the beginning until the end, [the king] did not cease to hold the field, and con-
quered the towns and castles and fortresses which held themselves for the party of the said 
dauphin and his allies, following them from one place to another until they submitted to full 
obedience’.58 Historically, this revolt marked the end of many of the court intrigues and rival-
ries that had come before, but for Chartier, who never focusses on these conflicts, the only 
purpose for recounting the Praguerie is to highlight the ways in which it demonstrates regnal 
supremacy over princely ambitions. Stated simply, the king will come for those who reject his 
authority and they will submit to him in the end, one way or another. Nowhere else does a 
vernacular continuator illustrate the realities of regnal authority so clearly. 
Initially, the king’s heir, the future Louis XI, serves a similar purpose in the narrative 
as other dauphins discussed within this study. Born in 1423, he is not referenced in Chartier’s 
chronicle until 1436 on the occasion of his marriage to Margaret of Scotland.59 The author 
uses the Praguerie as the prince’s coming-of-age announcement, stating that ‘the said dauphin 
                                               
53 Chartier, I:258. See generally Demurger, Temps, 185; Favier, La guerre, 555; Vale, Charles VII, 77. 
54 Chartier, I:260. His release was secured not by the efforts of the king, however, but by the interven-
tion of Philippe of Burgundy as an act of reconciliation with his long-time enemy, something Chartier only hints 
at by mentioning the marriage between Philippe’s daughter and the released Charles. Demurger, Temps, 185. 
55 Chartier, I:258. See generally Favier, La guerre, 554. 
56 ‘…par le bon moien du conte d’Eu et autres seigneurs et vaillans gens…’. Chartier, I:258. See gener-
ally Favier, La guerre, 88. 
57 ‘Et faillit qu’ilz eussent tous grace du roy et rémission seellée de son grand seel…’. Chartier, I:258. 
See generally Cuttler, 197; Demurger, Temps, 185-186. 
58 ‘…depuis le commencement jucques à la fin, ne cessa de tenir les champs, et conquist villes et chas-
teaulx et forteresses qui se tenoient du parti dudit Daulphin et de ses aliez, en suyvant iceulx de lieu en autre et 
jucques à ce qu’ilz vindrent à plaine obéissance…’. Chartier, I:258. 
59 Chartier, I:230-232. See generally Favier, Louis XI, 23, 78. 
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began to take control of every aspect of his household and upbringing that the count of la 
Marche, to whom he was given by the king to teach good manners, had not shown him’.60 
Furthermore, Louis declared that ‘he wanted to rule by his own will, saying that he would no 
longer be held subject as he had been in times past, and that it seemed to him that it would be 
very profitable to the kingdom’.61 As the tightly curated narrative of the Praguerie progresses, 
however, Louis is lost in the crowd, listed beside the dukes of Bourbon and Alençon, the  
actual architects of the revolt, but never again a focal point. Narratively, nothing is resolved 
for the dauphin and this seems to reflect Chartier’s dedication to the king’s story over that of 
the princes. But Louis does not disappear from the chronicle. In fact, Chartier shows him loy-
ally fighting beside his father at Creil and Pontoise in 1441, at Dieppe in 1442, and at Metz in 
1444.62 At Dieppe, the dauphin, according to Chartier, led his company, ‘desiring with all his 
heart to chase and destroy [the English], and through them acquire renown for his prowess 
and bravery’.63 Thus, he still adhered to the king’s goal of ejecting the English from France. 
However, like Jean II and Charles V before their successions, Louis was a territorial lord in 
his own right and his land was the Imperial county of Viennois, which meant he owed feudal 
service to Emperor Friedrich III. Chartier records that, at Metz, ‘a great lord named Monsei-
gneur Bourga Le Moyne, whom the emperor had sent to Monseigneur the Dauphin, came to 
lead him into the lands of Basel…in order to subjugate the Swiss and the Germans who said 
they were not beholden to the said emperor’.64 In response, the dauphin led a short military 
campaign through the region, pillaging much but accomplishing little.65  Chartier alters the 
context of this affair by avoiding any question of feudal service or the dauphin’s split alle-
giances, instead framing the episode as simply the emperor requesting help from an ally.66 
                                               
60 ‘…commença ledit daulphin prendre tout aultre régime et gouvernement que le conte de La Marche, 
auquel il estoit baillé de par le roy pour l’instruire en bonnes mœurs, ne lui avoit montré’. Chartier, I:253. 
61 ‘…maiz voulloit user de sa voullenté, en disant que plus ne seroit tenu subjet comme il avoit esté le 
temps passé, et qu’il lui sembloit qu’il feroit très bien le proffilt du royaulme’. Chartier, I:254. 
62 Chartier, II:16, 20-21, 27, 38-42, 43-47. See generally Favier, Louis XI, 90, 96; Favier, Le roi René, 
122. 
63 ‘[Il] désirant de tout son cueur les enchasser et destruire, et sur eux acquérir renom de prouesse et 
vaillance…’. Chartier, II:38. 
64 ‘…vint ung grant seigneur nommé Monseigneur Bourga Le Moyne, lequel empereur l’avoit envoyé 
devers Monseigneur le Dauphin pour le conduire ès pays de Basle…, affin de subjuguer les Suisses et les Alle-
mans qui disoient riens tenir dudit empereur’. Chartier, II:44. See generally Favier, Louis XI, 100. 
65 Chartier, II:45. For more on this campaign, see Favier, Louis XI, 102ff. 
66 Favier, Louis XI, 100, 103, implies that the emperor may not have even been involved in this cam-
paign, although it is unclear why Chartier would include the Imperial ambassador were that the case. He states 
that Charles VII sent Louis because the king wanted ‘envoyer contre les Suisses les companies don’t il n’en-
tendait pas s’encombrer alors qu’il entreprenait sa réforme de l’armée’. Nevertheless, ‘Louis n’oubliait pas les 
intérêts de son Dauphiné, et l’une des routes du commerce dauphinois passait par Bâle. Dès lors qu’il intervenait 
contre les confédérés, Bâle pouvait, si elle tombait en leurs mains, constituer un verrou redoutable pour l’accès 
au Rhin’. 
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Thus, the chronicler uses the dauphin’s campaign in Switzerland as an example of dynasti-
cism in the French periphery. 
 Louis’s absence from the events of 1449-1453 does not go unnoticed by Chartier and, 
indeed, it becomes one of many points of contention when the dauphin re-enters the narrative 
twelve years after his last appearance. The catalyst for this reintroduction was his flight to the 
Burgundian court without the king’s permission, an action for which Charles ‘dreaded 
strongly that [the dauphin] would follow bad council, and that he would govern himself  
contrary to reason’ due to Philippe of Burgundy’s influence over him.67 This again distracts 
from the real issue—Louis’s increasing autonomy in the Viennois—which allows Chartier to 
adopt an explanation that better serves his narrative of regnal authority.68 The chronicler rea-
sons that, since the dauphin was discredited and under the influence of an untrustworthy party, 
the king was justified in annexing the Viennois since it would force the dauphin to submit to 
the king.69 Naturally, the dauphin protested this seizure, but he further asserted that the king 
had never treated him with respect regarding his lands or his ambitions.70 These are accusa-
tions that neither the king nor Chartier take lightly, and the latter categorically denounces 
each. He establishes first and most forcefully that the dauphin went  
directly against the desire and goodwill of those of the kingdom, even the council and 
advice of Monseigneur the duke of Burgundy and the other lords of the blood, and of 
noblemen and notable lords of this kingdom, who all gave [the king] advice and de-
manded that he force my said lord the Dauphin to his duty and to serve him….71 
Thus, Chartier proves to his audience that the king acted with the support of his nobility and 
that Charles’s son was undeserving of any special treatment. Furthermore, the king was per-
sonally upset with his son’s departure because the prince missed the entire recovery of France 
from the English, and Chartier adds an explicit moral message here that ‘the glory of the fa-
ther is when the son makes valiant and laudable works’.72 It is in this context that Chartier ad-
dresses the issue of returning the Viennois to the dauphin. Although Chartier records that the 
                                               
67 ‘…il appréhendoit fort qu’il ne creust mauvaiz conseil, et qu’il ne se gouvernast autrement que de 
raison’. Chartier, III:55. See generally Philippe Hamon, Les Renaissances, 1453-1559, 2nd ed. (Paris: Belin, 
2014), 16. 
68 Louis abandoned France for the Viennois in 1446 and, while there, married Charlotte of Savoy with-
out his father’s permission. Charles ended his son’s pension in 1452 in response. Demurger, Temps, 189; Favier, 
Louis XI, 153; Hamon, 15-16; Knecht, 85-86; Vale, Charles VII, 164. 
69 Chartier, III:56. Once there, Charles called the Estates, who approved his conquest. Favier, Louis XI, 
159. 
70 Chartier, III:58-59. 
71 ‘…car ce seroit directement aller contre le désir et le bonne voulenté de ceulx du royaume, mes-
mement contre le conseil et advis de Monseigneur le duc de Bourgogne et des autres seigneurs du sang, et des 
nobles hommes et notables seigneurs de ce royaume, qui tous luy ont donné conseil et l’ont requis de réduire 
mondit seigneur le Dauphin à son devoir, et se servir de luy…’. Chartier, III:61. 
72 ‘…car le gloire du père est quand le fils fait œuvres vaillables et louables’. Chartier, III:62. 
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king ‘was always ready, and still is, to receive the said lord benignly’, there is little to suggest 
that Charles intended to grant the county full independence under Louis.73 Indeed, after the 
king subdued the Viennois, Chartier notes that ‘all those of the land, when they perceived the 
good will of the king in this matter, were very joyous and relieved’.74 According to Chartier, 
the king acted as an agent of stability, a contrast to the poor governance of the dauphin.75 The 
issue is never resolved since Louis’s most faithful followers were still at the Burgundian court 
two years later.76 Chartier does record that, following the death of Charles VII, the people 
cried ‘Vive Louis, roy de France’, but he ends the chronicle before Louis is crowned.77 
Throughout this narrative, Charles is portrayed by the chronicler as a man mourning the loss 
of his son and who only sought the reunification of his family. In contrast, Louis is framed as 
a selfish, cowardly prince who was a poor representative of Capetian dynasticism and a threat 
to regnal supremacy. 
 By the end of the Dionysian vernacular tradition, some semblance of Capetian dynastic 
unity had already been established. Despite Charles de Bourbon’s inglorious erasure from  
history after the failed revolt that he led, his son, Jean de Clermont, returns to prominence in 
Chartier’s chronicle as a royal lieutenant in the counteroffensive against the English.78 The 
legacy of his father does not tarnish his portrayal nor impact the depiction of their cousin 
Louis de Vendôme. Indeed, within the Dionysian vernacular tradition, the Praguerie is a mile-
stone in the establishment of regnal supremacy since forgiveness became tied to the submis-
sion of the Capetian agnates who led the rebellion. Within the compressed narrative structure 
of Chartier’s text, their defeat gives Charles VII the authority and confidence he needs to fi-
nally take the war on the offensive and defeat the English. Behind him in this endeavour was 
every significant Capetian prince with one glaring omission: the king’s heir. Louis’s struggle 
with his father is depicted as both a personal slight to the king and a larger threat to the king-
dom since the dauphin allied himself to Philippe of Burgundy. However, Chartier uses this 
conflict to highlight why Charles annexed the Viennois, making clear that it was the dauphin 
                                               
73 ‘…le roy a tousjours esté prest, et encores est, de recevoir bénignement ledit seigneur’. Chartier, 
III:64. Louis wrote to his father on at least three occasions, but the king always insisted that the dauphin return to 
court, something that Louis was unwilling and afraid to do. Knecht, 86; Vale, Charles VII, 167. 
74 ‘…tous ceux du pays, quand ils ont aperceu le bon vouloir du roy en cette matière, ils en ont esté 
moult joyeux et consolez…’. Chartier, III:65. Vale, Charles VII, 167, adds that the Estates ‘had already agreed to 
obey [the king] and to “accomplish whatever it pleases the king to command them”. Loyalty to the dauphin was 
thus non-existent in April 1457, even within the land which…he had governed so well’. 
75 Chartier, III:64-65. 
76 Chartier, III:87-88. 
77 Chartier, III:120. See generally Demurger, Temps, 189; Hamon, 208. 
78 Chartier, II:110ff, 312-313. See generally Barker, 395-396; Burne, Agincourt, 320; De Saint Remy, 
35ff. 
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who was at fault due to his reckless behaviour and flight from the kingdom. The events sur-
rounding the Praguerie reverberate long after it, but Chartier carefully manipulates the details, 
downplaying and discounting the ambitions of the nobility so that regnal authority appears as 
the paramount source of power within the kingdom of France. 
 
8.3 The Valois’s Sacrificial Lamb 
 The ostracised dauphin was not the only victim of regnal supremacy. Another Capetian 
agnate, Jean II, duke of English-occupied Alençon in Normandy, descended from the junior-
most branch of the Valois line, whose loyalty to the Capetian dynasty over the previous cen-
tury was indisputable. Rarely mentioned within the Dionysian vernacular continuations, the 
rulers of Alençon grew in prominence as the Anglo-French war progressed, but it was not un-
til Jean that a chronicler finally granted one of their number substantial narrative space. Alt-
hough Jean is long portrayed as a faithful follower of the king, hints of malice run as an 
undercurrent throughout Chartier’s text. When Jean’s secret negotiations with the English 
were confirmed by royal agents in 1456, the duke went on trial before a court of his peers. 
The proceedings are an extremely important moment within the Dionysian vernacular tradi-
tion and it is appropriate that they conclude this study. Not only does the trial stand as a 
resounding declaration against Capetian dynastic ambitions, but it also confirms for readers 
that regnal supremacy has become a permanent fixture in France. This final case will survey 
the Dionysian vernacular depictions of the Alençon lords since their beginning and examine 
the ways in which their family’s decline in fortunes was emblematic of this changing narrative 
focus within the continuations. 
 The Alençon lords were derived from the same stock as the Valois kings since both de-
scended agnatically from Charles de Valois.79 The first member of the line, Charles II, brother 
of Philippe VI of France, is mentioned frequently by Richard Lescot until the count’s demise 
at the battle of Crécy in 1346.80 Pierre d’Orgemont, in contrast, holds virtually no interest in 
the Alençons except as members of the higher nobility and clergy, leading them to almost 
 
 
                                               
79 See Figure 8.2. 
80 Lescot first mentions Charles during the war of Saint-Sardos in 1324. He then mentions him leading a 
battalion at the battle of Cassel in 1328 and being one of the peers at the trial of Robert d’Artois in 1329. Through-
out the first decade of warfare with the English, the count was constantly on the battlefield, where he ultimately 
died. The inclusions of Charles in the narrative are additions made by Lescot specifically and do not appear to de-
rive from other sources. GCF, IX:33, 83, 110, 283. See generally Burne, Crecy, 183; Raymond Cazelles, La Société 
Politique et la Crise de la Royauté sous Philippe de Valois (Paris: Librairie d’Argences, 1958), 43. 
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disappear from dynastic history during the thirty years spanned by his continuation.81 A later 
Alençon agnate, Jean I, enters Juvénal’s chronicle in 1405 and is quickly characterised as a 
martial prince in the war against the English.82 From 1410, he is frequently listed among the 
Armagnacs, and it was while fighting alongside them at the battle of Agincourt in 1415 that 
he died.83 His son, Jean II, is found early in Chartier’s chronicle supporting the government-
in-exile of Charles VII as a brave royalist fighter who was captured by the English at the bat-
tle of Verneuil.84 Up until this point, neither Juvénal nor Chartier have any cause to question 
Jean’s loyalty to the Capetian cause and, indeed, he seems to embody the Capetian dynasty’s 
best qualities. His status was elevated further when he became the favoured companion of 
Jeanne d’Arc, a point that Chartier emphasises on numerous occasions during his recounting 
of their campaigns in the Île-de-France from 1429 to 1430.85 Jean’s amiable relationship with 
Charles was cemented when he was dubbed a knight by the king at the latter’s coronation.86 
By the end of Jeanne’s saga, Jean had become the quintessential Capetian prince, the martial 
driving force behind the king’s campaign to restore his authority in France. 
 A different narrative quickly emerges after Jeanne is removed from the picture. Chartier 
demonstrates that Jean could be a vengeful prince when he lashed out against Jean V of Brit-
tany over the unpaid dowry of his mother in 1431.87 The chronicler notes that, over the fol-
lowing two years, the duke continued fighting the English, but that most of his activities were 
localised to Normandy, Anjou, and Maine, which suggests a greater interest in reclaiming his 
own patrimony than in helping the king recover the entire kingdom.88 It is in these moments 
                                               
81 Charles III, the eldest son of Charles II, is present at Jean II’s coronation in 1350 and, with his third 
brother Pierre, at the signing of the treaty of Brétigny in 1360, after which the latter became an English hostage. 
Charles, as archbishop of Lyons, and his brother Philippe, as archbishop of Rouen, appear numerous times in 
their ecclesiastical roles. CRJC, I:26, 282, 325, II:65, 280, 298. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:412-413, 
415-416. 
82 HCRF, 432, 439-440. See CKS, III:368. Juvénal never references Pierre II, who was count until 1404. 
See generally Sumption, IV:209-210. 
83 HCRF, 452, 461, 467-486, 490, 497, 519. See CKS, IV:324, 482, V:34-44, 96, 148ff, 570 (evens). See 
generally Burne, Agincourt, 87; Sumption, IV:307-308, 355. 
84 HCRF, 565; Chartier, I:41, 43. Jean served as a royal councillor nine times, twice before Verneuil. 
Gaussin, 104. He was also the godfather of Louis XI and fought at the battle of Broussinière in 1423. At 
Verneuil, he was thought dead by his comrades ‘but he had been found alive by the British [sic] among the 
heaped-up corpses on the field of battle…’. Pernoud and Clin, 26, 172. 
85 Chartier, I:81-83. See generally Burne, Agincourt, 255-259; Favier, La guerre, 554.  
86 Chartier, I:81ff, 97. During this ceremony, Jean stood as a titular peer. Philippe Contamine, ‘Le prem-
ier procès de Jean II, duc d’Alençon (1456-1458): quels enjeux, quels enseignements politiques?’ in Power and 
Persuasian: Essays on the Art of State Building in Honour of W.P. Blockmans, eds. Peter Hoppenbrouwers, An-
theun Janse, and Robert Stein (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 107-108; Scott, 61. See generally Pernoud and Clin, 
172.  
87 Chartier, I:157-160. See generally Jones, Creation, 252; Small, 158. 
88 Chartier, I:166-167, 173. His activities were not appreciated by the king, who had ordered a retreat. 
Pernoud and Clin, 172. 
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that Jean’s dynastic resolve seems to waver in the narrative. When Jean supported an uprising 
in Normandy in 1435, Chartier reports that ‘the greater part of those in the commune re-
turned…in order to make their peace with the English, and [the duke] abandoned the business, 
having achieved nothing’.89 Chartier, thus, implies that Jean’s charisma alone was not enough 
to inspire the inhabitants to change their allegiance. At Arras in 1435, Jean was present at the 
conference but notably absent when the Capetian lords pledged themselves as surety for the 
king.90 During the siege of Avranches in 1439, Jean left to capture Sainte-Suzanne in Maine, 
which Chartier informs the reader twice ‘belonged to the duke d’Alençon’.91 After the seizure 
of the town, the duke’s anger peaked because the town’s guardianship was awarded by the 
king to the lord of Bueil, ‘who held [it] against the will and volition of the said duke 
d’Alençon’.92 Although Chartier does not state it, this decision was the result of a new ordon-
nance that transferred supreme military authority over apanages to the king.93 Jean, angered 
by this new law, was the first to support the dauphin in the Praguerie according to Chartier, 
and, as such, he was responsible for the removal of Bernard de la Marche from power and for 
the capture of Saint-Maixent, where much of the subsequent narrative focusses.94 After the re-
volt, he, like the Bourbons, disappears from the chronicle until 1449, an implicit disapproval 
by Chartier of the duke’s rebellious actions that undermined regnal authority.95  
 Jean returns to the narrative during the invasion of Normandy, but Chartier makes clear 
that the duke’s participation was not about reclaiming land for the king—he intended to take 
back what was rightfully his. The duke is first mentioned outside Essay, a town in his duchy, 
and Jean is shown ruthlessly blackmailing the citizens into submission, ‘threatening them that 
otherwise, he would behead all his prisoners’.96 When the duke captured his namesake town 
shortly afterwards, Chartier redirects some responsibility for the victory to ‘Louis de Beau-
mont, [the king’s] governor of Le Mans, [who] went to the aid of this duke with sixty lances 
                                               
89 ‘Et depuis s’en retournèrent la plus grant part d’icellui commun en pays de Normendie pour faire leur 
traicté avec les Angloiz, et ne sortist leur entreprinse nul autre effect’. Chartier, I:173. See generally Allmand, 
Lancastrian, 40-41; Barker, 216. 
90 Chartier, I:187, 204. See generally Rohr, 191. 
91 ‘…les chasteau et ville de Saincte-Susanne, en pais du Maine, appartenant au duc d’Alençon…’. 
Chartier, I:252, 253. See generally Barker, 276; Burne, Agincourt, 289-290. 
92 ‘…lequel les tint contre le gré et voullenté dudit duc d’Alençon…’. Chartier, I:253. 
93 Barker, 277-278; Cazaux, 368; Small, 160. 
94 Chartier, I:253-255. See generally Vale, Charles VII, 79. 
95 Chartier, I:258, II:111. Vale, Charles VII, 87-88, expands on this, stating that Jean ‘was virtually ex-
iled from the king’s presence, his pension was reduced, and his lordship of Niort seized…. The other magnates 
might plead for him, as they did in March 1442, but the king remained adamant. Alençon would not be received 
back into favour, let alone be summoned to the council, “until he conducts himself as he ought to do”’. 
96 ‘…les menaçant qu’aultrement, il feroit trancher les testes à tous ses prisonniers’. Chartier, II:121. 
See generally Barker, 389. 
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and some archers’, thereby depriving the prince of a portion of the glory.97 Chartier continues 
to show Jean subduing his ducal lands throughout 1449—conquering Fresnay, Bellême, and 
Argentan—but in this time, the duke only ventured outside his duchy twice, to assist the king 
in taking Caen and Falaise, after which he permanently retired from combat and the narra-
tive.98 At one point during these conquests, the chronicler uncharacteristically praises the 
duke, stating that ‘the duke d’Alençon showed himself to be a very valiant man, and he  
maintained himself there honourably’, but this is linked to a specific situation: the duke was 
surrounded by the English with few of his own soldiers, yet he still held the field.99 Since first 
becoming duke d’Alençon, Jean was a landless Capetian prince whose home was occupied, 
leaving him with nothing except vengeance. Chartier builds off this idea, curating his story in 
such a way that the duke becomes little more than a vessel of revenge, striking at the English 
in whichever way possible in his desperate attempt to reclaim what was denied to him. By the 
end of the conquest of Normandy in 1450, the prince regained nearly everything owed to him, 
ostensibly in the name of the king, but the chronicler overlooks Jean’s positive achievements 
and converts his lifetime of anger into fuel for his final textual journey. 
 The sudden arrest of the duke d’Alençon in 1456 for the crime of lèse majesté is a 
shocking turn of events narratively, especially since it follows the equally-startling seizure of 
the Viennois by the king.100 Lèse majesté is, according to the fourteenth-century jurist Jean 
Boutillier, ‘to plot, scheme or conspire in any way soever against the noble majesty of the 
king our lord’.101 More simply stated, it is treason against the king—the exact opposite of pro-
moting regnal authority. Chartier streamlines the crime, arrest, trial, and punishment, and ex-
plains the entire situation primarily by publishing the king’s judicial decision, which spans 
nearly 5,000 words of text.102 Although similar trials had occurred throughout the previous 
two centuries, the vernacular chroniclers of Saint-Denis were silent on the subject with one 
significant exception: Robert III d’Artois. His trial for fraud in 1331 proved to be a landmark 
case in regard to trying peers and princes, and the similarities between it and Jean II 
                                               
97 ‘…à l’aide duquel duc vint Louis de Beaumont, gouverneur du Mans, à tout biens soixante lances et 
des archers’. Chartier, II:127. See generally Barker, 389. 
98 Chartier, II:135, 174-176, 215, 224. See generally Barker, 389, 393-394, 398; Contamine, ‘Le prem-
ier procès’, 109. 
99 ‘Le duc d’Alençon se monstra en cette besongne très-vaillant homme, et s’y gouverna fort honorable-
ment…’. Chartier, II:175-176. 
100 Chartier, III:55-57. See generally Franck Mercier, ‘Un prince du sang devant le tribunal de “l’opin-
ion publique”? Le procès pour crime de lèse-majesté de Jean d’Alençon (1456-1458)’, in S’exprimer en temps de 
troubles: Conflits, opinion(s) et politisation de la fin du Moyen Âge au début du XXe siècle, eds. Laurent Bour-
quin, Philippe Hamon, Pierre Karila-Cohen, and Cédric Michon (Rennes: Presses universitaires, 2011), 149. 
101 Cuttler, 21. 
102 See generally, Mercier, 154. 
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d’Alençon’s trial in 1458 are undeniable.103 Both princes were Capetian agnates closely re-
lated through marriage to the king, both were peers of the realm whose conflict with the king 
was primarily driven by disputed land claims, and both were tried in a court of their peers dur-
ing an extraordinary lit de justice—a trial over which the king presides.104 A striking  
difference between the two trials, though, is the status of the offending prince during the pro-
ceedings. Lescot notes that ‘when Robert d’Artois saw how things were going, he fled in  
disguise’, and he never returned to court, meaning that his trial was conducted entirely in ab-
sentia and the king’s decision meant very little practically.105 Jean, in contrast, was arrested 
without warning at Paris, imprisoned in Melun, and interrogated by his uncle, Arthur de 
Richemont.106 Although he was not present when the verdict was read, the duke was entirely 
at the mercy of the king and, because of this, the king was more flexible in his judgment.107 In 
addition, by giving his readers a full transcription of the king’s ruling, Chartier allows his au-
dience a more intimate look at the complexities of the trial than does Lescot, who only men-
tions portions of Robert’s trial. More importantly for this study, it provides a unique look into 
how a Dionysian chronicler understood the lit de justice and how its development enhanced 
regnal authority. 
 Chartier begins by recounting the crime that Jean II d’Alençon was accused of commit-
ting, in the process making clear that the king was the primary victim. He states that Jean 
had conducted and aspired—and intended to conduct and aspire—to several treaties 
and agreements with our ancient enemies and adversaries, the English, and for this 
he sent into England and other lands of the said English several messages without 
our leave or license, and without informing us of anything, to the great prejudice of 
ourselves and to the common welfare of our kingdom.108 
                                               
103 Cuttler, 96, 114, emphasises that the real precedent was set through the treason trials of Jean IV of 
Brittany and Carlos II of Navarre, neither of which is discussed in the Dionysian vernacular continuations. Dur-
ing these trials, the king pronounced his judgment and the peers only advised or served a decorative role. At the 
time, the peers objected, but during the trial of Jean d’Alençon, ‘they seem meekly to have accepted the situa-
tion…: in all but form they had abandoned their right to render judgment’. For the trial of Robert III d’Artois, see 
Chapter 2.3. 
104 GCF, IX:126, 129; Chartier, III:90. See Chronique latine, II:126-127; Lescot, 26-27. See generally 
Christelle Balouzat-Loubet, Mahaut d’Artois: Une femme de pouvoir (Paris: Perrin, 2015), 178; Brown and 
Famiglietti, 39. 
105 ‘Quant Robert d’Artois vit comment les choses aloient, si se departi moult confusement’. GCF, 
IX:124, 126, 129-130. See Chronique latine, II:124, 129-130. See generally Kervyn de Lettenhove, 118, 123; 
Ledwidge, 31-32; Sumption, I:170-171. 
106 Chartier, III:56-57. See generally Cuttler, 211. 
107 Chartier, III:107, 110. Among those who pled for mercy for the duke were Jean Juvénal des Ursins, 
archbishop of Reims; Philippe of Burgundy; Charles d’Orléans; and Arthur de Richemont. Allmand, Lancas-
trian, 46; Cuttler, 104-105. 
108 ‘…avoit conduit et démené, et fait conduire et démener plussieurs traictez et appoinctement avec noz 
anciens ennemys et adversaires les Angloiz, et pour ce faire avoit envoyé en Angleterre et ailleurs ès pays desdits 
Angloiz plussieurs messages sans noz congié et licence, et sans aucune chose nous en faire savoir, au grant pré-
judice de nous et de la chose publicque de nostre royaulme’. Chartier, III:91-92. 
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Through this simple condemnation, Chartier establishes why Jean was a traitor (he negotiated 
with the English), what crime he committed (he operated outside the purview of the king), and 
why his trial is important (he risked the security and stability of the kingdom).109 To these 
crimes, Jean ‘confessed liberally and of free will’ under oath, which is perhaps the most notable 
contrast to Robert, who repeatedly denied the charges against him.110 However, Chartier also 
allows hearsay to influence the reader’s judgment, inserting early in the account that ‘one said 
that he was culpable’.111 Because Jean was a peer of France and seigneur de sang, the assembly 
of judges had to be equally magnificent, so the king summoned to his court ‘several of the lords 
of our blood and lineage, peers of France and holders of lands, and the archbishops and bishops 
above named, also peers of France, and several other prelates, counts, barons, and knights, in 
great number, of our said court of parlement and others of our council’.112 Not a single one of 
these individuals, though, is actually named by the chronicler, which re-emphasises that this lit 
de justice was above all between the omnipotent king and his wayward vassal.113  
 The bulk of Chartier’s report focusses on the nuances of Jean’s activities with the Eng-
lish from the latter’s recapture of Bordeaux in 1452 to the time of the duke’s imprisonment in 
1456. From this evidence, it is clear that the duke was encouraging another English invasion 
of recently reconquered Normandy.114 Although Chartier explains that there was much dis-
content at this time in Normandy and Guyenne and that the king’s army was dispersed—ideal 
conditions for an English invasion—he never elaborates on Jean’s motives for defecting to the 
enemy. In reality, Jean had been forced to sell Fougères to Jean V of Brittany in 1428 in order 
to pay for his ransom and the king had refused to help him repay that debt or reclaim the 
town.115 When the English sacked Fougères in 1449 prompting the French king to reconquer 
Normandy, the duke of Brittany was confirmed in his possession of the town, prompting Jean 
to begin his intrigues with the English. Without this explanation, the duke’s actions appear 
                                               
109 Cuttler, 104, 210. 
110 ‘[Il] a dit et confessé de libéralle et franche vollenté…’. Chartier, III:95. Cf. GCF, IX:123-124. See 
generally Cuttler, 104. 
111 ‘…on disoit qu’il estoit couppable’. Chartier, III:90. 
112 ‘…plussieurs des seigneurs de nostre sangc et lignage, pers de France et tenans en parrye, et les 
arcevesques et évesques dessus nommez aussi pers de France, et plussieurs autres prélatz, contes, barons et che-
valliers, en grant nombre, de nostre dite cour de parlement et autres de nostre conseil…’. Chartier, III:94. 
113 Those present included all of the ecclesiastical peers, who were required to attend, the king’s 
younger son, Charles, Charles d’Orléans, Jean II de Bourbon, and the counts of Angoulême, Maine, Eu, La 
Marche, Vendôme, Foix, Dunois, and Laval, all associated closely with the royal family through blood. Conta-
mine, ‘Le premier procès’, 114-115. 
114 Chartier, III:95-97. See generally Vale, Charles VII, 155-156. 
115 Contamine, ‘Le premier procès’, 104, 107; Jones, Creation, 45; Knecht, 83; Vale, Charles VII, 156. 
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petty and insidious, but also purposeless. Most damning is the repeated inference in Jean’s in-
terrogation report that the dauphin was in some way involved in the plot. Chartier immedi-
ately invalidates the evidence against Louis since his letters ‘were not in the form according to 
which our said son is accustomed to writing to [his father]’, but the implication is that it was 
not an impossibility.116 Additionally, the possible involvement by the heir to the French 
throne suggests that a larger coup to replace Charles VII could have been the duke’s ultimate 
goal. Chartier uses the king’s decision in the case, therefore, not only to malign Jean but also 
to suggest that the dauphin was potentially subverting the king’s authority in favour of his 
own. Furthermore, Chartier uses this trial to emphasise the continuing threat posed by the re-
cently-ejected English. 
 It is in this context that Chartier records Charles’s final judgment on the affair. Jean 
himself was condemned to death and all of his goods, lands, and titles were declared forfeit to 
the crown, although his execution was commuted at the king’s pleasure.117 But the king 
showed himself merciful in regard to the next generation, allowing the children to be raised at 
the court of François II of Brittany, ‘hoping also that the said children governed and con-
ducted themselves toward us as good, true, and loyal subjects ought to do toward their sover-
eign lords’.118 Additionally, the king granted to the children and their mother some land and 
their moveable goods—minus weaponry—and allowed Jean’s son, René, to become count of 
Perche, albeit without the status of peer.119 Nonetheless, the king emphasises initially that, 
‘according to right and uses maintained in such a case, they must be deprived of all goods, 
honours, and prerogatives, and live in such poverty and mendicancy that it is an example to all 
others’, a warning Chartier includes for his readers to remind them that their primary duty is 
to the king.120 Imprisoned, Jean was entirely subject to the king’s mercy; meanwhile, the new 
count of Perche owed his life and livelihood, as well as that of his mother and siblings, to the 
benevolence of the king of France.121 This firmly underlines Chartier’s final message that reg-
nal supremacy must always supersede dynastic ambitions. The era of dynastic jockeying for 
                                               
116 ‘…elles n’estoient pas en la forme selon laquelle nostredit filz lui avoit acoustumé escripre’. Chart-
ier, III:105. 
117 Chartier, III:107-108. See generally Contamine, ‘Le premier procès’, 118; Cuttler, 105. 
118 ‘…espérant aussi que lesdits enffans se gouverneront et conduiront envers nous comme bons, vrays 
et loyaulx subgetz doivent faire envers leur souverains seigneurs…’. Chartier, III:108. 
119 Chartier, III:108, 110-111. See generally Cuttler, 105. 
120 ‘…selon droit et usages gardez en tel cas, deussent estre privez et débouttez de tous biens, honneurs 
et prérogatives, et vivre en telle povreté et mendicité que ce fust exemple à tous autres…’. Chartier, III:108. Vale 
adds that ‘it was not Alençon who was on trial. The lit-de-justice effectively put the notions which had been de-
veloping among the king’s servants…to the test. It was a trial of strength between the monarchy and oligarchy’. 
Vale, Charles VII, 162. 
121 Cuttler, 242. 
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power and influence was at an end—the king would no longer suffer those who opposed his 
absolute authority within France. 
 Within the Dionysian vernacular narrative, the Alençon family undoubtedly exemplifies 
the evolution of Capetian dynasticism and the growth of regnal supremacy between 1328 and 
1461. The cadets selflessly supported and sacrificed for their Valois kin from the War of 
Saint-Sardos to the battle of Verneuil. They were visible symbols of dynastic loyalty, and they 
were rewarded for their service repeatedly with titles, land, and status. Yet, like most of the 
other cadets in the dynasty, the Alençons wavered in their devotion during the Armagnac-Bur-
gundian war and the final stages of the Anglo-French war. The conquest of all their hereditary 
lands in northern France by the English caused Jean II to reassess his priorities even while 
publicly supporting Charles VII. His loyalties became clear once he regained possession of his 
estates and abandoned the king’s cause. The punishment for his short-sightedness was impris-
onment, confiscation, and the ever-present risk of execution—an important lesson for  
ambitious Capetian princes. Whereas two centuries earlier, Louis IX simply forgave recalci-
trant lords for their rebellions, and a century before, war was the natural result of the king as-
serting his judicial prerogatives on his vassals, by the mid-fifteenth century, the king’s will 
had become the ultimate authority and those who fought against it suffered the consequences. 
In Chartier’s view, regnal supremacy had not only trumped dynasticism, but dynasticism itself 
became simply another vehicle of regnal authority. 
 
           
 
For two centuries, feuding lords in France challenged the authority of the kings, denying them 
their self-perceived rights and threatening the very integrity of the Capetian monarchy. Under 
Charles VII, it became clear that, to promote regnal authority, the various lords had to be reined 
in and taught their place within the feudal hierarchy of the kingdom. Cadets such as René d’An-
jou and his brother Charles exemplified this new type of obedient and submissive prince, and 
Chartier praises them for their desire to restore regnal authority to the king. But those who bene-
fitted most from the old order, great dynastic lords such as Charles I de Bourbon, the Dauphin 
Louis, and Jean II d’Alençon, resisted such change and fought back. Chartier, as a sponsored 
advocate of the king, carefully constructed his narrative to turn every instance of noble discon-
tent and rebellion into expressions of regnal authority. He corrupted his portrayals of Charles de 
Bourbon and Jean d’Alençon, building up cases that emphasised how untrustworthy these lords 
had always been and how their past activities undermined their legitimacy within the kingdom. 
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Even the king’s heir was not immune from Chartier’s moralising. Although often considered the 
most formulaic of Dionysian vernacular chronicles, Chartier’s continuation is also the most di-
rect in its didactic agenda. From beginning to end, the chronicle serves as a miroir des princes 
with a singular, unifying message: dynastic disunity cannot longer be tolerated within France. In 
order to achieve regnal supremacy within the kingdom, apanagists must be put in their place. It 
is a message repeated ad nauseam within the continuations, but only Chartier states it with such 
impassionate bluntness. If there is a sense of déjà vu when reading these continuations, it is be-
cause every chronicler ultimately concludes that the Capetian king is and should be the only le-
gitimate source of authority in France.
 
 
CHAPTER NINE  
Conclusion: Les Chroniques de France 
 
This study has proven that the agnates and cognates of the Capetian dynasty are a constant 
presence within the narratives, often serving as people to whom readers can better relate. Fur-
thermore, these myriad cadets tie the various continuations together into one relatively fluid 
narrative. Guillaume de Nangis built off Primat when composing his Latin continuations, 
Richard Lescot adapted and expanded Primat and Guillaume’s texts, Pierre d’Orgemont cop-
ied and altered Lescot’s narrative, and Jean Chartier completed and continued Michel Pin-
toin’s Latin chronicle, which was abridged and translated by Jean Juvénal des Ursins. In the 
end, it is clear that there is a conscious continuity between these works and that certain themes 
are revealed only when the various continuations are analysed together. Pasquier Bonhomme 
recognised this when he first published the Dionysian vernacular chronicles in 1476, but mod-
ern historians have still been reluctant to view the continuations holistically. All of the texts 
Bonhomme chose for his collection share a Dionysian influence and focus primarily on the 
Capetian monarchy and its activities. But these texts are not only occupied with the activities 
of the kings; they depict the activities of many of the Capetian cadets as well. Primat hinted in 
his prologue that his intention was to emphasise individuals in direct proportion to their im-
portance to his moral narrative, yet he never explained how he planned to accomplish this.1 
More problematically for readers and historians, it remains unclear whether his continuators 
followed his premise. This study, therefore, has analysed and compared the portrayals of doz-
ens of cadets who lived between 1223 and 1461 to determine whether they reflect an overt de-
sire on the part of the continuators to advance specific didactic messages. 
 While this study has explored the depictions of the most visible cadets of the Capetian 
dynasty, it did not look at those who went unmentioned in the continuations. Naturally, it is 
difficult to derive didactic meaning from something that is not there, but the absence of key 
members of the French royal family within the Dionysian texts is not something that can be 
ignored. Among the branches of the Capetian dynasty, there are a surprising number of ag-
natic lines that are neglected by the continuators. Perhaps most conspicuous by their absence 
are the Burgundian dukes of the thirteenth century.2 Derived from the junior-most recognised 
                                               
1 GCF, I:3. 
2 For a brief discussion of them, see Chapter 6.1. 
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Capetian line, the Burgundians are almost entirely ignored by Primat and Guillaume in their 
lives of Louis IX and Philippe III. Hugues IV is mentioned only once in 1249, while Robert II 
is referenced in 1278 and 1283.3 It is only from the marriage of the future Louis X to Margue-
rite of Burgundy in 1305 that the family begins to appear more frequently, although their pres-
ence remains remarkably understated considering their high status in the French peerage.4 For 
example, the counts of Viennois from 1228 and 1282, Burgundian cadets, never appear in the 
continuations, and the Burgundian kings of Portugal, who reigned in legitimate descent until 
1383, are only ever framed as foreign monarchs, never agnates.5 Equally missing from the 
thirteenth-century continuations are the Courtenay rulers of the Latin Empire and their junior 
line in the Île-de-France. Emperor Baudouin II is only referenced when he sold the crown of 
thorns and other Passion relics to Louis IX in 1239, and the marriage of his granddaughter, 
Catherine I, to Charles de Valois is noted in 1301, after which her narrative becomes entwined 
with her husband’s.6 Even less is said of the junior Courtenays, whose sole representative in 
the continuations is the wife of Robert II d’Artois, Amicie, who died in Rome in 1275.7 Last 
among the more distantly-related Capetians are the counts of Dreux, who appear sporadically 
when one of their cadets, Pierre, became count of Brittany in 1214.8 But the senior line largely 
vanishes from the continuations afterwards. Jean I de Dreux appears only once in 1248 among 
the company of Louis IX’s crusaders and, a century later, Pierre de Dreux is included in the 
army of Philippe VI.9 Ultimately, the chroniclers left these cadets out of their narratives ex-
cept in rare moments when their actions reflected well on the Capetian dynasty. 
The Capetian agnates of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries are significantly more 
prominent in the later continuations, but some are nonetheless neglected. The only branch that 
suffers a near-complete narrative absence is the senior house of Anjou. While the rulers of 
Naples maintain a token presence throughout the continuations, the Angevin rulers of Hun-
gary, Poland, and the Latin Empire are not afforded such narrative space.10 Lajos I of Hungary 
                                               
3 GCF, VII:141, VIII:76, 91; GSL, 370; GPT, 510. Lescot mixes up Duke Robert II of Burgundy with 
Count Otto IV of Burgundy in the second instance. Cf. GPT, 522. 
4 GCF, VIII:245-246. See Chronique latine, I:349. See generally Jackson, 30-31. 
5 See, for example, GCF, IX:211; and CRJC, III:18-19. 
6 GCF, VII:72-74; VIII:190-191. See Ex Gestis Ludovici, 631; GSL, 326, 328; Continuatio, 582. 
7 GCF, VIII:58. See GPT, 500. 
8 All of the dukes of Brittany from 1213 to the end of this study, with the exception of Charles de Blois, 
are members of the house of Dreux. See Chapters 4.1 and 7.1. 
9 GCF, VII:120, IX:205. See GSL, 356. 
10 Charles Martel, eldest son of Charles II of Naples, was given the kingdom of Hungary in 1290 as a 
papal grant, while his son, Károly I, married the heiress of Poland, Elżbieta, in 1320. Their agnatic descendants 
ruled Hungary until 1395 and Poland until 1399. John Van Antwerp Fine, Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans: A 
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is only referenced by Orgemont once, in 1378, within the context of the Papal Schism, while 
Juvénal does not hint at a Capetian presence in Eastern Europe at the end of the fourteenth 
century.11 Meanwhile, Lescot mentions the marriage of Catherine II de Valois, titular Latin 
Empress, to Filippo di Taranto, another Angevin cadet, but he and Orgemont do not discuss 
their descendants’ seventy-year struggle for authority in the Latin East.12 Other Capetian ca-
dets appear but are severely downplayed. For instance, Juvénal includes in his narrative Jean 
of Burgundy’s two brothers, Antoine of Brabant and Philippe II de Nevers, who both died 
fighting in the French army at Agincourt in 1415.13 However, their children are almost en-
tirely neglected by Chartier. Antoine’s two sons inherited the duchy of Brabant in turn, with 
the younger first succeeding to Saint-Pol after Waléran III’s death, but neither is mentioned 
by the chronicler.14 Chartier frequently includes Charles I de Nevers, the elder son of Philippe 
de Nevers, in the French army during the reconquest of Guyenne, albeit always in the com-
pany of others, but otherwise Philippe’s sons are also absent from the continuation.15 Lastly, it 
must be reiterated that Louis III d’Anjou and the entire second generation of Orléans princes 
are virtually erased from Chartier’s narrative. 16 This intentional reduction in the number of 
cadets creates an illusion that the Capetian dynasty in the fifteenth century was considerably 
smaller and more focussed on re-establishing regnal authority than it was in reality. 
In addition to male agnates of the Capetian dynasty, there are two other groups of peo-
ple who are notable by their absence from the texts. The first are the powerful cognatic rela-
tives of the Capetians, people such as the German emperors and kings, the Spanish monarchs, 
and the myriad regional dukes and counts of Arles, Italy, and the Low Countries, all of whom 
married into the Capetian family over the ensuing generations. The relationships between the 
imperial family and the Capetian kings are probably the most important to the Dionysian 
                                               
Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan 
Press, 1994), 207-209, 458; Jean W. Sedlar, East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000-1500, A History of 
East Central Europe, vol. 3 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994), 34, 473. For depictions of the rulers 
of Sicily and Naples, see Chapter 2.2. 
11 CRJC, II:345. 
12 GCF, VIII:290. See Continuatio, 607. The rights to the Latin Empire were ultimately bequeathed to 
Louis I, duke d’Anjou, by the last titular emperor, Jacques des Baux. Peter Topping, ‘The Morea, 1364-1460’, in 
A History of the Crusades, Vol. 3: The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, ed. Harry W. Hazard (Madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, 1975), 150-151. See generally Fine, 240ff, 401-402. 
13 HCRF, 521. See CKS, V:570. 
14 See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:396-398. 
15 Chartier, II:204, 215, 225, 236, 276, 306, 313, 323, III:2, 13. See generally Van Kerrebrouck, III:402-
404. 
16 For the rest of the Valois-Angevins, see Chapter 8.1, and for the house of Orléans, see Chapter 6.2.  
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narrative, with Jan of Bohemia, Jean II’s father-in-law, dying at the battle of Crécy while 
fighting alongside Philippe VI in 1346, and Jan’s son, Emperor Karl IV, making an extended 
appearance in Orgemont’s chronicle in 1378.17 Nonetheless, most of the German kings and 
emperors after the death of Friedrich II in 1250 only receive brief mentions within the vernac-
ular continuations, usually at the time of their succession, and none is mentioned after Karl IV 
died in 1378.18 More unusually for the continuations, none of the interdynastic marriages be-
tween the Capetians and Imperial ruling families is noted, suggesting a conscious attempt by 
the continuators to remove the Germans from the narrative.19 Regarding the Spanish mon-
archs, only the rulers of Navarre are emphasised at all, even though each of the French kings 
from Louis VIII through Philippe IV married princesses of Iberian ancestry.20 Indeed, despite 
numerous offspring from Capetian-Iberian unions who lived in France from 1223 to 1461, 
narrative space is only granted to the de la Cerda family due to the fact that their activities in-
tersected with those of Philippe III.21 In the Low Countries, the ruling families of Flanders 
and Hainaut make frequent appearances but those of the other principalities in the region are 
thoroughly neglected by the continuators.22 Further south, the ruling families of Lorraine and 
the county of Burgundy are equally forgotten except when they directly involved themselves 
in French affairs, such as with the Vaudémonts in the 1430s or the daughters of Otto IV of 
Burgundy, whose scandal presaged the succession crises of 1314-1328.23 Similarly, virtually 
nothing is said of Capetian relatives living in Italy except for those in Sicily and Naples. In-
deed, the entire Orléans claim to Milan is ignored by Juvénal, although the chronicler does 
                                               
17 GCF, IX:283; CRJC, II:193-277. See generally Autrand, Charles V, 779-805; Sumption, I:526, 529. 
18 The election of Rudolf von Habsburg is noted in 1273. GCF, VIII:46. The parentage of Heinrich VII 
von Luxemburg is mentioned in 1287. GCF, VIII:132. The election of Adolf von Nassau and a dispute that re-
sulted from it is discussed in 1292. GCF, VIII:158-160. The death of Adolf in battle followed by the election of 
his successor, Albrecht I von Habsburg, is stated in 1298. GCF, VIII:180. Albrecht’s assassination and the suc-
cession of Heinrich VII is mentioned in 1308. GCF, VIII:265. Heinrich’s coronation is noted in 1310 and 1312, 
and his death is described in 1313. GCF, VIII:278, 286, 291-292. Ludwig IV of Bavaria’s election is referenced 
in 1317, while the succession dispute resulting from that election is discussed in 1319. GCF, VIII:339, 344-345, 
349. Ludwig’s deposition by the pope is explained in 1324, after which his wars in the Empire are mentioned 
periodically by Lescot. GCF, IX:37-40, 57-60, 64-65, 75-78, 106, 112-113, 120, 158. For a discussion of Diony-
sian portrayals of German rulers in general, see Jones, Eclipse, chapter 3. 
19 Blanche, daughter of Philippe III, married Rudolf, son of Albrecht I von Habsburg, in 1300. Another 
Blanche, daughter of Charles de Valois, married the future Karl IV in 1329, while Karl’s sister, Guta [Bonne], 
married Charles’s grandson, the future Jean II. Lastly, Charles VI married an agnatic descendant of Ludwig IV 
of Bavaria. 
20 Louis VIII married Blanca of Castile, Louis IX wed Margarida of Provence (a branch of the Barcelo-
nan royal house), Philippe III first married Isabel de Aragón, and Philippe IV wed Jeanne I of Navarre. For dis-
cussion of the rulers of Navarre, see Chapter 3. 
21 For more on the de la Cerda family, see Chapter 1. 
22 See Chapter 4.1. 
23 See Chapters 3.2 and 8.1. 
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briefly mention the French occupation of Genoa between 1396 and 1409.24 In contrast, per-
haps the most frequently mentioned cognatic cadets outside of France are the counts of Savoy, 
who appear throughout the entire span of the Dionysian continuations. For example, Amédée 
III, whom Primat-Guillaume names ‘uncle of the queen of France’, is depicted escorting Beat-
ritz of Provence to her marriage in 1246.25 Lescot, meanwhile, notes how Amédée V helped 
negotiate a treaty with Flanders and France in 1303, and he later recounts a war fought be-
tween Guigues VIII de Viennois and Édouard of Savoy in 1325.26 Counts are mentioned as 
participants in Philippe VI’s wars in 1328 and 1340, while Amédée VIII is shown actively 
working to end the Armagnac-Burgundian war in 1412.27 But like the other cognates men-
tioned above, the rulers of Savoy make only infrequent appearances, their stories rarely im-
portant to the overarching narrative. This suggests that only those who actively advanced 
Capetian dynasticism or regnal authority were considered worthwhile inclusions in the ver-
nacular continuations. 
The exclusion of cognates of the family in the continuations extends to Capetian 
women as well, even though it was they—the daughters, sisters, and wives of the dynasty—
who actually formed the genealogical foundation for Capetian dynasticism.28 Whether as a re-
sult of the process of translation and consolidation or simply because of editorial choices, few 
women appear in the Dionysian vernacular continuations and those who do are often por-
trayed negatively. Of the seventeen French queens who reigned during the timeframe covered 
by these continuations, most only enter sporadically in the context of marrying, giving birth, 
or dying. Some exceptional Capetian women are scattered haphazardly throughout the contin-
uations, often in isolated moments that emphasise their contribution to the dynasty or high-
light the damage their actions caused. Some, such as Mahaut d’Artois, the Marguerites of 
Flanders, Jeanne I and Joana II of Navarre, and Jeanne d’Évreux, are praised by the chroni-
clers for contributing to Capetian dynasticism in some tangible way.29 But other princesses, 
                                               
24 HCRF, 404, 424, 444. See generally Knecht, 120-121, 126. 
25 ‘…il estoit oncle à la royne de France’. GCF, VII:115. Cf. GSL, 354. 
26 GCF, VIII:223-224, IX:57, 64. 
27 GCF, IX:90-91, 205-207; HCRF, 433, 473. 
28 Indeed, Bumke, Courtly Culture, 509-510, argues that ‘women were active in court society not only 
as patrons, but also as readers and listeners, as lectors and copyists, as singers and dancers. Because they were 
better educated, women were more qualified than men to discuss literary matters.... If women made up a signifi-
cant portion of the audience at court, they undoubtedly also had a considerable influence in shaping literary 
tastes’. 
29 See Chapter 2.3 (Mahaut d’Artois), Chapter 3.1 (Jeanne I of Navarre), Chapter 3.3 (Joana II of Na-
varre), Chapter 4.2 (Flanders), and Chapter 5.2 (Jeanne d’Évreux). 
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including most of the royal daughters, are rarely mentioned within the chronicles. Indeed, 
with the exception of the saga of Jeanne d’Arc, the funeral of Isabeau of Bavaria, the marriage 
of Marguerite of Scotland to the Dauphin Louis, and a chapter on Charles VII’s mistress, 
Agnès Sorel, Chartier almost completely erases women from his continuation, as if they con-
tributed nothing to the reestablishment of regnal authority in fifteenth-century France.30 Thus, 
there is a mismatch here between reality and the Dionysian narrative. The continuators, in 
their desire to streamline the narrative and emphasise the easily-observed activities of the Ca-
petian princes, overlook women, even though it was through their cognatic lines that much of 
the aristocracy of France claimed royal descent. It is in this capacity that most Capetian 
women appear, as wives and mothers to important French lords. Their role as such is omni-
present in the continuations and the authors frequently acknowledge this fact, suggesting that 
this is where most women fit within contemporary conceptions of dynasticism: as progenitors 
of the dynasty itself. 
 Returning to those Capetian cadets who are developed and characterised by the Diony-
sian continuators, these individuals provide the narratives with the primary moral guides. In 
many ways, the kings are beyond reproach—the continuators cannot in good conscience criti-
cise and critique them. Indeed, many of the continuators wrote during the reigns of their sub-
ject kings or in the reign of those kings’ sons. Therefore, the most they could do is erect 
positive moral portrayals of the kings and erase or downplay any negative traits. The cadets 
are different, though. The Dionysian continuators, especially when writing under royal com-
mission, felt more comfortable commenting upon them and using them to create didactic mes-
sages. And Primat intended his chronicle to be a miroir for them. In describing his aims, he 
said that ‘[h]ere each can find good and bad, beauty and ugliness, sensibility and folly’.31 For 
the continuators, the cadets provided an abundance of material they could use to exemplify 
contrasts such as these. For example, Robert II d’Artois was a chivalrous, brave warrior, who 
is contrasted so easily with his conniving, deceitful grandson Robert III.32 The future Charles 
                                               
30 Chartier, I:66-125, 208-212, 229-232, II:181-186. Notably, Chartier does not include the 1456 retrial 
of Jeanne d’Arc in his narrative. See Pierre Duparc, Procès en nullitè de la condamnation de Jeanne d’Arc: Édité 
par la Société de l’histoire de France, 5 vols. (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1977-1988). 
31 ‘Ci pourra chascuns trover bien et mal, bel et lait, sens et folie…’. GCF, I:3. 
32 See Chapter 2.3. 
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V serves as the very essence of goodness and is contrasted with Carlos II of Navarre, a hope-
less schemer who callously disregarded regnal authority.33 Even the two Angevin lines, sepa-
rated by a century, are comparable in this way. Whereas Charles I was glorified as a martial 
hero and adventurer of the Capetian dynasty, a century later, Louis I is written out of the 
chronicles as an agnate distracted by vain ambitions in foreign lands.34 This study has proven 
beyond a doubt that the portrayals of Capetian cadets often served didactic purposes. And this 
is to be expected. The intended audience of these chronicles was not just kings but ‘princes 
who have lands to govern’ such as apanagists, dukes, counts, and other landed Capetian ca-
dets.35 Nowhere does it state that kings provide the only—or even the best—examples in the 
texts. Rather, it says clearly that one ‘derives his profit above all by the examples of history’ 
and that all of the examples ‘can provide guidance’.36 If ‘this history is a mirror of life’ for 
both kings and princes, then it must provide specific examples that princes can relate to, in-
stances where great lords perform valorous feats that enhance their dynasty and strengthen the 
kingdom.37 And, indeed, this study has proven that there is a plethora of examples to choose 
from, found in each continuation from the succession of Louis VIII to the death of Charles 
VII. 
 The dozens of cases that have been analysed showcase the myriad ways in which Ca-
petians provided didactic examples to the readers of the Dionysian continuations. Multiple 
positive archetypal figures were assessed, including Louis IX’s brothers, Robert II d’Artois, 
Charles V, Arthur de Richemont, René d’Anjou, and Charles du Maine. In contrast, a number 
of people were found to be villains and traitors, such as Robert III d’Artois, Pierre of Brittany, 
the Dampierres of Flanders, the Plantagenets of England, Carlos II, Louis d’Orléans, Isabeau 
of Bavaria, and Jean II d’Alençon. Some members of the family advanced dynasticism into 
the periphery, including Charles I and Charles II d’Anjou, Alphonse de Poitiers, and Jeanne I 
and Filipe III of Navarre. Others threatened the security of France, cadets like the early Mont-
forts of Brittany, Jean and Philippe III of Burgundy, Louis I d’Anjou, the later Penthièvres, 
the senior Armagnacs, and the future Louis XI. And some simply served as good examples of 
                                               
33 See Chapter 5.2. Wagner, 93, notes that because Carlos’s ‘quest for power seriously weakened the 
authority of the Crown, Navarre became known in the sixteenth century as “El Malo”, “the Bad”, a sobriquet 
later adopted by French historians’. 
34 See Chapters 2.2 and 5.3. 
35 ‘…aus princes qui ont terres à governer…’. GCF, I:3. 
36 ‘…fere son preu de tout par les examples de l’estoire…’; ‘…de toutes ces choses que on lira en cest 
livre, se eles ne profitent toutes…’. GCF, I:3. 
37 ‘…car I vaillans mestres dit que ceste estoire est miroers de vie’. GCF, I:3. 
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loyal cadets, people like Mahaut d’Artois, Thibaut II of Navarre, Charles de Valois, Jeanne 
d’Évreux, Bernard VII d’Armagnac, Jean de Berry, Jean de Dunois, and the many cognatic 
relatives who served in the recovery of France in the mid-fifteenth century. This list is not ex-
haustive and, even if it were, there are still many other individuals within these continuations 
that serve didactic purposes, including other relatives, royal bureaucrats, military command-
ers, members of foreign courts, and religious leaders. While each person is portrayed in their 
own unique way, they all contribute to the moral narrative that underlies the Dionysian ver-
nacular continuations. By this point, there should be no doubt that these chronicles are miroirs 
due both to their narrative content and to the intentions of their authors. 
 This study has shown that the overarching narrative of the continuations reflects au-
thorial reactions to and conscious restructuring of historical events in order to present a mor-
ally-enhanced narrative. All of the Dionysian vernacular continuators wrote with a veneer of 
impartiality and objectivity, and both Primat and Chartier state this intention outright in their 
prologues.38 Yet one cannot both moralise and remain objective. The Dionysian chroniclers’ 
solution to this paradox was to omit anything that did not advance their didactic messages 
while generally avoiding making anything up wholesale. However, this technique reveals the 
inherent dualism found within the vernacular continuations between the promotion of dynasti-
cism and regnal authority. Contributors such as Primat, Guillaume, and Lescot wrote of the 
golden age of Capetian dynasticism, when the activities of cadets glorified the dynasty, ex-
panded its influence throughout Western Europe, and brought renown upon the house of 
France. Under Orgemont, the narrative turned against the activities of the greater Capetian 
dynasty. The chronicler deemphasised other cadets and focussed specifically on the Dauphin 
Charles, a unique breed of cadet, and his struggles with Carlos II of Navarre. But when the 
dauphin becomes king within the narrative, the Dionysian chronicles shed the mantle of dy-
nasticism and become a tale of regnal authority. Never again do cadets receive the same focus 
and respect within the continuations. Under Juvénal and Chartier, the Armagnac-Burgundian 
war and the Anglo-Burgundian occupation of northern France clouds their opinions of Cape-
tian cadets. Both continuators witnessed the destruction caused by the rampant abuses of ca-
dets, and their narratives reflect this fact. Thus, Orgemont’s 1377 continuation represents a 
fundamental shift within the Dionysian tradition. Whereas earlier continuators focussed on 
dynasticism and the benefits of a Western Europe ruled by a diaspora of interrelated princes, 
                                               
38 Chartier, I:27; GCF, I:2. 
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later continuators saw autonomous cadets as an existential threat to the inherent power of the 
French king. The focus within the vernacular continuations on Capetian cadets as didactic ex-
amples did not change, but the nature of their portrayals shifted. They went from being used 
as examples of dynastic ambition, chivalric valour, and pious sacrifice, to becoming examples 
of absolute loyalty, selfless devotion, and obligatory submission to the king. The history in the 
chronicles continued to be altered but the reason behind those alterations shifted to reflect 
changing perspectives and evolving narrative goals. 
 The Dionysian vernacular continuations also enhanced and advanced Capetian dynas-
ticism in their own right. As a collective unit, the continuations tell an extended tale of the end 
of dispersed dynasticism and the rise of unitary dynasticism over the course of the later Mid-
dle Ages. When the first continuation begins its narrative in 1223, France was still a divided 
land, with major portions of the kingdom ruled by virtually autonomous rulers such as the 
counts of Brittany and Flanders, and the dukes of Guyenne. As the continuations progress, in-
ternal and external wars haemorrhage the kingdom and dynasty, prompting the chroniclers to 
narrow their focus progressively toward the top of the feudal pyramid. It is unsurprising, then, 
that each continuation was composed in moments when regnal authority was especially high 
and the realm was in a state of relative peace. Primat completed his initial work in 1274, dur-
ing an especially peaceful time in the kingdom. His finished product celebrates a triumphant 
king at the pinnacle of his power. But the continuators proved it was the wrong king and the 
wrong century! Primat, lacking foresight, intended his chronicle to reflect the apogee of Cape-
tian power as achieved by Philippe II Auguste in 1223. Guillaume lived in both peaceful and 
troubled times, but there was never a fundamental threat to the monarchy during his life and 
he likewise wrote from a place of security. Lescot wrote in the aftermath of the Black Death, 
during a long truce before fighting resumed in 1355. Orgemont worked in the late 1370s, after 
the English had largely been pushed out of Guyenne. And Juvénal and Chartier both wrote in 
the mid-fifteenth century, after the tide had turned against the English in France. In other 
words, the Dionysian continuations, when viewed together, deprive Primat of his perfect end-
ing by demonstrating how ephemeral the peace established in the thirteenth century was. Yet 
even Chartier’s ending was premature since conflict continued to fracture the kingdom for an-
other fifteen years. It is not unintentional that Bonhomme published the Dionysian vernacular 
chronicles when he did. His printed text released a decade after the War of the Public Weal, a 
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year after the Anglo-French peace at Picquigny, and concurrent with the collapse of the Bur-
gundian hegemony. Much like Primat and Chartier before him, Bonhomme likely viewed the 
state of the realm as finally stabilising after centuries of recurring warfare and domestic dis-
turbances. But unlike his predecessors, he was largely correct in his assessment, which is sup-
ported by the fact that his compilation was reprinted three times over the subsequent four 
decades without significant alteration. By the end of the fifteenth century, the collected works 
from the abbey of Saint-Denis could truly be called the Chroniques de France. They had 
become a part of the mythology of France, their recension, continuation, and publication his-
tory all direct reflections of and reactions to the historical events they record. They represent 
moments when members of the Capetian dynasty felt confident in their relative power in 
Western Europe and wished to record what they had learned for posterity. 
 Yet the chronicles produced at Saint-Denis cannot be the only medieval literary tradi-
tion that approached history as a vehicle for teaching contemporary morality. Hundreds of 
Latin and vernacular chronicles exist from throughout the Middle Ages and, while many were 
intended for a strictly monastic audience, others were commissioned by royal and noble fami-
lies, merchant houses, religious and chivalric orders, and other organisations. Indeed, each 
chronicle was designed with a purpose. Sometimes this was stated explicitly, as in the case of 
Primat and Chartier’s chronicles, other times it was only implied or has been lost. However, 
simply viewing medieval chronicles from a structuralist perspective—as poor attempts at re-
cording history—or from a post-structuralist perspective—as unreliable narratives revealing 
mental contexts—ignores the intentions of the chroniclers and binds the importance of these 
texts to modern conceptions of historical worth. Modern readers have their own biases and fil-
ters through which they interpret information and it is impossible to ever fully understand why 
chroniclers wrote what they wrote. Their texts are filled with omissions and additions, myths 
and legends, fabrications and simplifications, and many other literary techniques that blur the 
boundary between history and fiction. What is clear, though, is that morality is commented 
upon regularly and that the activities of individual people provide the narratives with sub-
stance.  
 This study has analysed how historical individuals in a medieval chronicle could be 
used to advance didactic messages. It has revealed that, rather than simply observing the titu-
lar and chronological subjects of these Latin and vernacular chronicles, a historian may do 
well to examine the storylines of those individuals whose lives ran parallel to the French 
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kings. To do so, one must extract their stories from the text and examine them on their own 
merits. In so doing, one will discover what certain tangential people added to the primary nar-
rative, what moral roles they played, and how they advanced the goals set out by the author. 
Furthermore, it may reveal the author’s perception of contemporary society and hint at the 
mental context from which they wrote. Lastly, this technique may help underline the im-
portance of family relationships to the medieval world. Genealogical studies have become in-
creasingly popular among amateur researchers, but remain in their infancy in the academy.39 
Nonetheless, family relationships were one of the most fundamental aspects of late medieval 
life and one cannot even begin to fathom the complexities of the Middle Ages without first 
recognising and understanding this fact. Just with regard to royalty, family relationships deter-
mined who sat at tables, baptised children, led armies, negotiated peace, met with dignitaries, 
and appeared in chronicles such as those produced at Saint-Denis. By focussing on the dyn-
asty as a whole and keeping the king on the sideline, this study inverts the standard method of 
historical analysis. The result is a new approach that can be used to further assess how late 
medieval chronicles functioned as moral treatises and miroirs for princes. 
 When viewed in retrospect, the Dionysian vernacular continuations were many things 
to many people. To the monks of Saint-Denis, the texts were a physical example of the ab-
bey’s elevated status within the kingdom, due partially to its chroniclers who were frequently 
patronised by the French monarchy. To the Capetian kings and cadets, the volumes repre-
sented a didactic miroir—a reflection of history that revelled in the deeds of those who came 
before and attempted to derive moral meaning from their actions. And to the Capetian dynasty 
itself, the chronicles repeatedly showcased victory following defeat, unity over division, and 
family triumphing above all else. Primat and his successors perceived in their writings a conti-
nuity that spanned centuries—a grand narrative that unified the Frankish past with the French 
future—and it was through the members of the Capetian dynasty that they most clearly ex-
pressed this continuity. No, the story of France in the later Middle Ages is not one of singular 
national determination as some would like to believe. The reality is that medieval France was 
                                               
39 For recent information on the growth of amateur genealogical research, see Alan Farnham, ‘Who’s 
Your Daddy? Genealogy Becomes $1.6B Hobby’, ABC News, 24 October 2012, http://abcnews.go.com/Busi-
ness/genealogy-hot-hobby-worth-16b-mormons/story?id=17544242, accessed 26 September 2017; and Gregory 
Rodriguez, ‘How Genealogy Became Almost as Popular as Porn’, TIME, 29 May 2014, 
http://time.com/133811/how-genealogy-became-almost-as-popular-as-porn, accessed 26 September 2017. 
Within academia, there is The Genealogist, a biannual journal founded in 1980 and published by the American 
Society of Genealogy, and Foundations, established in 2001 by the Foundation for Medieval Genealogy as the 
first journal specifically devoted to medieval genealogy. 
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full of intradynastic civil wars, recurring conflicts, court intrigues, and mutually-assured de-
struction. It was a garden of golden lilies wilting from decay and decadence. But this is not 
the story one finds in the Dionysian vernacular continuations. Rather, one discovers a tale of 
Capetian cadets coming together, first out of a sense of dynastic unity and later out of an obli-
gation to the French king. Each member of the royal family serves a purpose in this story as 
an example upon which later kin can learn and reflect. For some, it is how to act like a brave 
soldier, a loyal companion, or a faithful follower. For others, it is how to avoid becoming an 
enemy of the French king and the Capetian dynasty. These chronicles were intended to be re-
flections of late medieval French aristocratic life and culture, miroirs for princes to gaze into 
and see something toward which to aspire. Historians today will never know precisely what 
readers saw when they read the Dionysian vernacular continuations, but by analysing the de-
pictions of the Capetian cadets and pinpointing the didactic messages contained within their 
stories, one better understands the world in which they lived and the expectations and obliga-
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